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ABSTRACT 
The ecological crisis was a complex social phenomenon which 
caused some concern and public debate in the Western industrialised 
nations in the late sixties and early seventies. The crisis 
situation has been discussed in the World Council of Churches, which 
formulated its goal in social ethics in terms of the Just,Partici-
patory, and Sustainable Society. Most of the ecumenical discussions 
about the sustainable society have taken place in the programme of 
the Church and Society subunit, which has been concerned with the 
place of technology in such a society. It held a major conference 
at the Massachuse-tts Jhstitute of Technology in 1979, on 'The 
Contribution of Faith, Science and Technology to the struggle for 
the Just and .Ittrticipatory and Sustainable Society' , and it had already 
conducted an intense investigation from 1969 to 1974, on 'The Future 
of Man and Society in a World of Science-Based Technology'. The 
basic problem seems to lie in ethics rather than systematic theology; 
but I argue in Chapter One that the ecological crisis involves questions 
at the level of systematic theology. My Chapter Two is concerned with making 
precise the concept of an 'ecological theology' within theological 
discourse and adducing as examples ecological theologies from a Barthian 
theologian, a process theologian, and a biblical theologian. Chapter 
Three analyses the ecumenical materials, and places the MIT conference 
in the ethical and theological history of the Church and Society programme. 
Four main theological approaches are found in the sources: an approach 
which sees nature as an entangling force from which huma~ity is to 
emancipate itself by scientific and technological skill; a theology of 
hope; a process theology; and an Orthodox approach. These are 
described , . analysed, and evaluated in Chapter Four, and the orient-
ation they give for Christian life in the technological culture is 
described. The conclusions of this thesis include some constructive 
criticisms aimed at assisting the Church and Society programme and 
enhancing its theological adequacy. 
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CHAPTER OOE: The Problem 
This thesis is concerned with the Christian theological response 
to the so-called 'environmental crisis' of the late sixties and early 
seventies. Inevitably there is great difficulty in setting so recent 
a portion of human history in its proper context, and still greater 
difficulty in assessing the adequacy or otherwise of the Christian 
churches' activity. The full significance of the 'crisis', if crisis 
it is, will only became apparent with the passage of time. It will 
also take time for the theological issues and implications to become 
clear and to be seen in proper perspective. 
This thesis represents an attempt to work towards such a perspec-
tive, by subjecting an important and still continuing programme of 
enquiry to theological analysis, and by offering certain provisional 
conclusions. It focusses on the theological adequacy of .the enter-
pris.e on which the WOrld Council of Churches has set out in its Church 
and Society programme, and its conclusion is that there are some fail-
ings to be identified and corrected. 
The failings a:re theological, and are discerned by cauparison with 
the attitudes and beliefs which appear to be demanded by fidelity to 
the Christian gospel. But that gospel has,notoriously,given rise to 
a variety of responses and thus also to vigorous debate among Christians 
about the stances and actions appropriate to the different challenges 
which the Church has faced in its history. It may be argued that the 
churches have been better served by such vigorous internal debate than 
by the imposition of uniformity of opinion, belief and ethics. The 
cla~ of this thesis is, accordingly, not so much that certain failings 
can be or have been correctly identified; rather, that the structure 
of the contemporary debate falls into a discernible pattern, in which 
certain alternatives appear with particular combinations of advantages 
and disadvantages. The discernment of such a pattern, and the 
evaluation of the alternatives, is one of the achievements of this 
thesis which will help achieve, eventually, a true perspective on 
the theological response to the environmental crisis. 
This thesis lays claim to a combination of 'cheap' and 'expensive' 
forms of originality. 'Cheap' is the not surprising fact that no one 
has so far attempted (to the author's knowledge) to analyse the material 
under discussion here; but I set no store by cheap originality. 
Much more expensive, however, is the hard-won construction of a frame-
work within which to handle the material. The framework yields 
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certain conclusions, but the value of the conclusions rests largely on 
the adequacy of the framework. The thesis attempts to show that some 
such analytic tools are required by the complex subject matter, and 
that when they are employed the results are genuinely illuminating. 
There remains, needless to say, plenty of room for disagreement with 
the specific theological criticisms passed here, and room for further 
debate on the idea and content of theological response to the ecological 
crisis. 
In order to launch the study, however, it is necessary to grasp 
the character of the situation facing the churches in the sixties. The 
so-called environmental crisis was a complex social phenomenon of the 
industrialised countries, into which theology was drawn. My first two 
chapters set out to explain why this social phenomenon involved 
systematic theology, and to justify writing a thesis in systematic 
theology which focusses on the environmental crisis. After justifying 
the limits chosen for this thesis, this first chapter seeks to provide 
a brief account of the crisis (section 1), to survey some of the 
theological issues which emerged from it (section 2), and to survey the 
theological climate and resources of the late sixties (section 3), in 
order to place the concept of an ecological theology in a social, 
historical, and theological context. Section 4 concludes the chapter 
with a brief outline of the future develq:meil.t of the thesis, and so 
prepares the way for the extensive theological discussion of the 
'ecological theology' concept undertaken in Chapter Two. 
But: why choose the ecumenical forum? Arrl why the period 1966 -
1979? The decision to concentrate on the World Council of Churches 
and more particularly on the programme of its Church and Society subunit 
may be justified very simply. 
The WCC is an inter-denominational and international body which 
has traditionally included specific consideration of questions of 
social ethics and the churches' life in and impact tpOn the world. The 
global environment crisis and the Christian response to it, whether 
ethical or theological, is exactly the sort of issue that falls within 
the bailiwick of the Church and Society subunit. As I shall show in 
Chapter Three, they have investigated this issue at great length. Their 
investigations showed the need for theological as well as ethical 
reflection, and there is therefore a significant body of pertinent 
material for theological analysis. 
There is no comparable volume of material available for analysis. 
(1) So it remains to justify the choice of period, 1966-1979. 
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The Church and Society subunit is heir to the Life and Work 
Movanent. which originated at the Edinburgh Missionary Conference of 
1910. (2) Before its merger with the Faith and Order Movement in 1938, 
and its eventual incorporation into the World Council at its fonnal 
inception ten years later, it held ·two major conferences. · The first was 
'The Universal Conference on Life artdWork', held at Stockholm in 1925. 
The. second was held in Oxford in 1937, on the theme 'Church, Commmity 
and State'. Since those conferences, the Church and Society subunit 
has held only two other comparable conferences: the first of these was 
held at Geneva in 1966, on the theme 'Christians in 'the Technical and 
Social Revolutions of our Time'; the second at the Massachusetts 
Insidtut.e of Technology (Cambridge, Mass.), on 'The Contribution of 
Faith, Science and Technology in the Struggle for a Just, Participatory 
and Sustainable Society', in 1979. These two Church and Society 
conferences are the natural terminus ad guo and terminus a!\:i_gyem for my 
study. 
They are the natural termini, but they are also significant 
tennini. The Geneva conference of 1966 was part of a major breakthrough 
in ecumenical social ethics, it 
'was a landmark which is likely to stand out in 
the church history of this century'. (3) 
This makes the Geneva Conference a good starting-point. ·It has the 
added advantage of indicating the climate of ecumenical social ethics 
and theology before the ecological crisis became a theological issue, 
since. the crisis did not impinge upon the ecUmenical discussions to any 
significant degree until the early seventies. ( 4) During the course of 
the Church and Society programue, as I shall show in Chapter Three, it 
is possible to chart the development of the theological response to the 
crisis right up to the 1979 conference. The latter conference was 
preceded by years of reflection on the theological and ethical issues, 
and so marks a natural climax to the discussions. Since that conference 
however, and partly because of it, the Church and Society programue 
has concentrated more on the questions of energy resources and distri-
bution, the ethics of nuclear technology, and the ethics of biomedical 
engineering. The 1979 conference thus makes an appropriate stopping 
point for my study. Hence the title of my thesis: Ecological Theology 
in the Church and Seciety Programme of the World Council of Churches, 
1966.-1979. 
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1. The environmental crisis. 
This section describes the environmental crisis by listing some 
o:f its salient. features and some of the responses it evoked. I am not 
attempting a thorough historical analysis, or to analyse the crisis from 
the viewpoint of sociology or social psychology; though such analyses 
would. be interesting in themselves, they are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Instead, ~wish only to show that there was a complex social 
movement which culrninated in a concern about issues broadly related to 
the environment, why the expression 'environmental crisis' was used, 
and that this crisis and movement can be dated to a specific period of 
recent history. It is this movement which provides the socio-cultural 
background to my thesis. The section concludes by showing that the 
ecological crisis· has led to the development of an 'environmental 
philosophy'. This makes it plausible to ask\whether the environ-
mental crisis may also affect theological discourse and give rise to an 
'ecological theo.logy'. Thus the way is prepared for section 2 •. · 
Human concern about the environment is not a new phenomenon. The 
bible shows a perception that environmental malaise is incongruous with 
the right ordering of human existence: 
'like a muddied spring or a polluted well 
is the righteous man who gives way to .the wicked' 
:(Proverbs 25: 26) , and the general assumption is that the state of the 
land reflects the moral state of its inhabitants. (5) Plato, for his 
part, lamented the soil erosion and deforestation of ancient qreece: 
' • • • what now remains of the once rich land is like the 
skeleton of a sick man, all the fat and soft earth 
having wasted away, only the bare framework is left. 
Formerly, many of the present mountains were arable hills, 
the present marshes were plains full of rich soil; hills 
were once covered with forests, and produced boundless 
pasturage that now produces only food for bees. Moreover 
the land was enriched by yearly rains, which were not 
lost, as now, by flowing from the bare land into the sea, 
the soil was deep, it received the water, storing it up 
in the retentive loamy soil; the water that soaked into 
the hills provided abundant springs and flowing streams 
in all districts. Some of the now abandoned shrines, at 
spots where former fountains existed, testify that our 
description of the land is true.' (6) 
In Britain, air pollution has been a persistent problem. The first 
law to stop the smoke and smuts of medieval London was passed in 1273, 
and in 1661, it was charged that. her citizens 
'breathe nothing but an impure and thick Mist, accompanied 
with a fuliginous and filthy vapour, which renders them 
obnoxious to a thousand inconveniences, corrupting the 
. J:~ and disordering the entire habit of their Bodies; 
so that Catharrs, Phthisicks, ~hs, and Cons!JID.12tions 
rage more in this one City, than in the whole earth besides' • 
(7) • 
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Atmospheric pollution by industry, particularly from factories produc-
ing soda, led to the passing of the first Alkali Act in ,1863. There 
have also been a number of Clean Air Acts, dating from 1956, giving 
local authorities legislative power against smoke emissions from 
domestic fires as well as industrial furnaces. (8) Evidently 
pollution is no new ·problem, nor is man's concern· about the state of 
his environment a new phenomenon. What, then, is the new factor in 
the: modern concern that would justify the ·:use of the tenn 'crisis'? 
The new factor is the extent and scope of the· human impact upon 
the: environment, and its consequent repercussions upon human existence. 
I note t.wo aspects in particular: population, and pollution. 
The increase of the human population puts pressure on land. It 
is land which supplies the human diet, through agriculture or by 
providing habitats for the animals on which man preys (sheep, cattle, 
etc). On the other hand, land is also needed for human habitation. 
Population increase requires greater efficiency in the use of land for 
food production; the decreasing area of land must sustain the 
increasing population. There is a point of no return. Thus argu-
ments for lirni ting population growth must consider the earth's capacity 
to feed the human species. (9) 
The question of population and land is part of the broader question 
of resource availability and the viability of species. This was 
considered by T.R. Malthus in the late eighteenth century, and his 
arguments may be supported· by ·the contemporary ecological studies of 
the population dynamics of many species. In brief, his argument was 
that population increase must eventually be checked by natural limit-
ations which in their turn restore the equilibrium between population 
and resources. These 'natural limitations' are effected by starvation, 
predation, and disease, so that excess individuals are culled out 
(usually before they reproduce) • So population is checked and, in the 
case of the: human species, 
'all these checks may be fairly resolved into misery 
and vice.' (10) 
Man is therefore in a dilercma. Food production has advanced and kept 
ahead of the population increase, and this has served to postpone the 
Malthusian limitations rather than eliminate the possibility of their 
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occurrence. But if humanity relies on continual technological 
advance to fOrestall the lliuitations (by .improved agricultural tech-
nology, for example), this jeopardises ecological homeostasis and 
puts human survival at risk through ecological breakdown. The other 
alternative is to substitute some other limitation to population 
growth (such as rational family planning). rather than population 
control by starvation and selective predation. (ll) There are other 
very difficult. questions to be considerro as well: the social effects 
of population increase or, conversely, of family planning; the question 
of disttibutive ·justice· in the sharing··of the earth's resources; and 
the question of defining an appropriate 'human•· quality of life in order 
to set humane goals for population limits. These questions have 
theological aspects. But the 'crisis' aspect of the population 
question is that the time for decisive actionseems to be upon us, 
if not. already past. 
Malthus wrote in 1789. The world's population reached 1 billion 
(i.e. 1000 million) about 1600 A.D. The second billion was reached 
in only 300 years, partly as the result of the .improvement in health 
care which lowered the death rate·per thousarid and significantly 
liuproved the infant survival rate, and partly as a result of the 
increased food productivity and better distribution made possible by· 
new inventions. The third billion then took 50 years (1900-1950), 
and the fourth only 30. It is likely that the global population 
will be 7 billion by the turn of the century. (12) This rate of 
population increase means that the natural checks of the Malthusian 
argument may occur· within the lifespan of the contemporary generation, 
and overtake humanity more rapidly than technological innovation, 
develop:nent, and ingenuity may save him. There are a number of 
variables and unknowns in this· simple fear, but the Mal thus ian 
possibility must be faced and forestalled by planning in so far as 
this is possible. This is one aspect of the environmental concern 
which merits the word 'crisis'. 
Environmental pollution is another major area of concern. This 
includes air and water pollution as well as .thermal pollution with 
its attendant clliuatic changes. It also includes concern about the 
effects of pollution upon ecosystans, the transmission of pc)llutants 
along foooc chains, and the effects of pollution on human health. 
In the sixties, two concerns came to prominence. One, that this 
pollution was jeopardising the survival of certain species, 
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unnecessarily and perhaps wantonly. Second, · that· human health was 
also jeopardised unnecessarily and without proper·appreciation (or even 
study) of the effects. For example,· certain pesticides are progress-
ively concentrated along food chains, reaching dangerous concentrations 
in the species at the sumnits of these chains (of which humanity is 
one) • These pesticides are retained in fatty tissues, and the 
dosage is cumulative because the chemicals are inherently very stable. 
(13). The pesticide example underlines the connection between 
population increase and food production, mentioned above: as the ratio 
of population to production narrows, there is less and less :roan for 
any species which competes with humanity for the ecological raw 
materials, and the use of pesticides is therefore necessary, even at 
the risk of food contamination. This becomes a dilerrma of short-
term benefit versus long-term risk. 
This dils:nma may be illustrated by the agricultural use of DDT. 
(14) It is a persistent chemical, passed along food chains and 
accumulating in organisms. It is also highly dispersable, since it 
vapourises into the atmosphere, is blown by winds, dissolves in rain, 
and may accumulate in rivers and seas and lakes. It is used in 
temperate and tropical countries, but has been located in the fatty 
tissues of penguins. (15) Fish and birds are particularly 
vulnerable to its effects. No one knows what the long-term effects 
will be of generations of living organisms having DDT in their bodies 
all their lives. It:. is passed through human milk, and is found in 
cow milk, so 'all their lives' is a real prospect for the human species. 
One writer claims that there is some evidence that DDT could be 
carcinogenic in man. (16) This is an ecological backlash. On the 
other hand, it may also be claimed that. millions will die of mal-
nutrition or infectious disease if the use of pesticides in agriculture 
is limited too drastically. (17). 
This is part of the broader problem in agr.icul tural technology: 
new techniques are being used,· new and more virulent chemicals developed 
and applied, new biological varieties invented by genetic technology 
(with an eye to food productivity of grains, in particular) -- but 
with no systematic investigation, or appreciation of,the ecological 
consequences. ( 18) The concern is that man may inadvertently 
destroy the ecological substructure which supports his existence, or 
poison himself by the accumulation of man-made chemicals absorbed from 
the: air, and his food and water. Thus, one writer: 
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'Had DDT been more toxic than it. is to the micro-
organisms in soil and water that play essential roles 
in the cycle of nature, we might have trigger~d a 
global catastrophe by ever releasing . it. We were 
lucky that time. With many of the chemicals we 
release deliberately or as a by-product of industry 
we are. playing environmental roulette.' (19) 
And another' speaks of the 'haunting fear' that the environment may be 
so corrupted that human life is no longer viable, adding that 
'whatmakes these thoughts all the more disturbing 
is the knowledge that· our fate· could perhaps be 
sealed twenty or more years before the development 
of symptoms.' (20) 
It is therefore :fair to describe the concern about the extent of 
chemical intervention in and control of natural and ecological 
structures as 'critical'. The environmental situation can be 
described as an ecological crisis. But: is the picture given above 
unduly pessimistic, based upon exaggerated facts and figures? There 
was sufficient concern at an international level for the United Nations 
to hold a special conference on this theme at Stockholm in 1972; this 
in itself shows that the situation required serious consideration and 
internationally concer>lted action. The Secretary-General to the 
Conference conrrnissioned Dr. Ren~ Dulx:>s to serve as Chainnan of a 
disting ui.shed group of experts to serve as advisors in preparing a 
report for the Conference: more than seventy scientific and intellectual 
leaders from fifty-eight countries made detailed contributions. (21) 
The ·resulting report speaks of the 'element of extreme ·urgency' , and 
the present (1972) as 'a very critical time'. (22). The editors 
note that there is consensus amongst the experts, and that the environ-
mental problems are global in extent (thus requiring consideration and 
action under the auspices of an international body such as the U.N). (23) 
Where the. experts disagree, their disagreement arises from differences 
in attitudes towards social values,·and not from uncertainties about 
the scientific evidence.(24) In other words, the U.N. was right to 
call a conference on this theme. The conclusion of the report's first 
chapter shows the urgency and the measure of concern generated by the 
expert evidence: 
' In short, the two worlds . of man - the 'biosphere of 
his inheritance, the technosphere of his creation -
are out of balance, indeed, potentially, in deep 
conflict. And man is in the middle. This is the 
hinge of history at which we stand, the door of the 
fut-tn::'e opening onto a crisis more sudden, more global, 
more inescapable and more bewildering than any ever 
encountered by the human species and one which will 
take decisive shape within the life span of children 
who are already born. • (25) 
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What I have shown so far is that concern about the human relation-
ship to the environment is justified, and that the present and fore-
seeable human impact on the environment has posed questions requiring 
urgent consideration; therefore, that the expression 'ecological 
crisis' is an accurate assessment of the situation. To conclude 
this section, I will tum very briefly to some of the philosophical 
and ethical discussions this crisis has evoked. This will serve 
three purposes: it will show that theological response to the environ-
mental crisis is part of a wider and more complex response, which was 
evident at the intellectual levels of philosophical and theological 
reflection as well as at the more practically oriented levels of 
politics, economics, and the direction of research and development; 
it will help show that there is a nrima facie case for the development 
of an ecological theology which may be comparable in same ways to 
the development of an ecological philosophy; and it will help 
illuminate the subsequent discussion of the theological issues. 
An early philosophical response to the crisis, which was well 
received at the time and is now often cited, is John Passmore's book, 
Man's Responsibility for Nature. Ecological Problems and Western 
Traditions.(26) Passmore is Professor of Philosophy at the 
Australian National University in Canberra. He set out to discover 
whether there were any sound philosophical argt:nnents for the statements 
that pollution ought to be reduced, resources conserved, the rate of 
population growth reduced, and wilderness areas and animal species 
preserved. He concludes that there are, but that the conclusions 
also require concessive provisos.(27) Then he asked why the 
arguments have taken 'so long to win the slightest recognition'; he 
concludes that false views about man's place in nature played some 
part in the delay.(28) Effectively, his subsequent argument is 
that only a meta-ethic which recognises the primacy of human interest 
contains the potential for preserving both the environment and human 
creative freedom.(29) 
Passmore's book was the subject of an extensive critical notice 
in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy by Val Routley. (30) 
Passmore seeks, she says, 
'to demonstrate· that. present environmental problems 
can be solved. (and can only be solved) within the 
fundamental Western ethical and metaphysical tradition 
• • • (}Ie] accepts that there are serious ecological 
. problems, and that changes are required. But (he argues 
that] there is no need for the rejection of the basic 
ethical value system of Western civilisation, and its 
rejection is, indeed, dangerous. • (31) 
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She then takes Passmore apart, piece .by piece, ;arguing that his thesis 
rests on a false dichotomy and special pleading, and includes the 
occasional lacuna and circular argumEent~ (32) The false dichotomy 
relates to the • Dominion Assumption • which undergirds the environ-
mental ethic of the West. This assumption is 
'that it is permissible to manipulate the whole earth 
and what it contains exclusively in the human interest; 
that the value of a natural item is entirely a matter 
of its value for human interests; and that all constraints 
on behaviour with respect to nature derive from 
responsibilities to other humans.' (33) 
The false dichotomy is, that rejection of the domini on assumption 
necessitates comnitment to the view that nature is sacred and has 
rights of its own independently of man, and that therefore manipulation 
and even interference of any sort is not permissible. (34) Val 
Routley is arguing for a middle position for environmental ethics. 
Philosophically, this may be based on 
'the deontic distinction between recognising obligations 
concerning or with respect to an i tern, as opposed to 
recognising obligations toward an item ••• Thus one can 
recognise that an item is a proper object for moral 
concern, and that yons_traints may apply on actions with 
respect to it, without eifectively attributing to it 
rights, especially rights similar to those normally 
attributed to humans. • (35) · 
This thesis will not attempt to follow the course of the philo-
sophical debate. (36) For my purpose here, the important fact is 
that the • traditional Western environmental ethic' (however that is 
understood) has been questioned as a result of the environmental crisis, 
that alternative approaches are being developed, and the consequent 
change in philosophy and ethics makes it possible and legitimate to 
speak of an 'environmental philosophy' as a field of philosophical-
ethical endeavour. Another important fact is that the Routley-
Passmore debate has been repeated in the theological context, within 
the Church and Society programme, in the debate between Thomas Sieger 
Derr and the process theologians. (37) 
li 
This may lend some plausibility to the idea that 'ecological 
theology' may be a legitimate field of theological endeavour, the 
counterpart in theology to the change in philosophy evoked by the 
ecological crisis. The discussion of the concept of an ecological 
theology, and the legitimacy or othe:rwise of its claim to be 
'theology', is deferred until Chapter Two. The next section prepares 
the way for Chapter Two, by showing how the environmental crisis 
provoked discussion of theological issues. 
- .i 
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2. Theological overtones to the crisis. 
The preceding section. outlined some of the issues and concerns 
associated with the environmental crisis, and concluded with a brief 
account of the philosophical and ethical debate it provoked. This 
section takes the discussion into the theological realm, and indicates 
two aspects. of the theological response to the crisis. The first is 
at the level of exegesis and hermeneutics: Christian theology was 
charged with culpability in the ecological crisis, because of the 
.imago Dei and QQminil.Jm terrae traditions. So one sort of response 
has been to focus attention on the appropriate texts and see if the 
charges should be upheld. Another sort of response has been to look 
at the history of the interpretation of these texts, and this leads to 
the second level of theological response, at which the influence of 
Descartes and Kant is the subject of critical attention. As a result 
of the discussions at these two levels, it becomes clear that the 
environmental crisis also provoked something of a crisis for theology 
as well. In fact, this section concludes with the question, whether 
Christian theology may respond to the ecological crisis and retain its 
Christian character. This makes it necessary to survey the theological 
cl.irnate of the sixties, as the contemporary starting-point for theo-
logical response; this survey is undertaken in· section 3. 
The charges referred to above, thatChristianity was culpable, are 
really hypotheses of social history and should therefore be debated 
with appropriate social and historical arguments. I do not intend to 
cover the debate. But since these charges have been couched in 
theological guise and raise issues for theological discussion, I intend 
to describe and discuss them at the theological level. 
For several decades, a strong case has been made for the 
proposition that the Judaeo-Christian doctrine of creation was of major 
significance in providing a philosophy of nature which enabled and 
eventually catalysed the development of empirical science. (38) 
Because nature had been stripped of supernatural significance, it was 
made available to humanity for inwestigation by science and manipu-
lation by technology. (39) This argument was turned against 
Christian theology in a provocative essay which has been cited 
frequently and reprinted in anthologies which continue the debate: 
'The Historical Roots of. our Ecologic Crisis' by Lynn White, Jr. (40) 
White claims that it was the Western Judaeo-Christian tradition which 
was historically responsible for the development of science and tech-
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nology and therefore. for the environmental deterioration this develop-
ment has engendered. Western Christianity is a massively anthropo-
centric religion within which, from early on 
'no item in the physical creation had any purpose 
save to serve man's purposes'.(41) 
Animistic inhibitions to the exploitation of nature evaporated, leaving 
nothing to protect it from abuse by humanity. God transcends nature, 
and man was made in God's image to transcend nature. 
Christianity 
Thus Western 
thus 
'not only established a dualism of man and nature 
but also insisted that it is God's will that man 
exploit nature for his proper ends.' (42) 
'Christianity bears a huge burden of guilt' 
for the pollution and environmental deterioration of the contemporary 
crisis. (43) In a later paper, White concluded that 
'the religious problem is to find a viable equivalent 
to animiS!n'. (44) 
The historian Arnold Tbynbee came to a similar conclusion: 
'If I am right in my diagnosis of mankind's present-
day distress, the remedy lies in reverting from the 
Weltanschauung of monotheism to the Weltanschauung of 
pantheism, which is older and was once universal. The 
plight in which post-Industrial-Revolution man has now 
landed himself is one more demonstration that man is not 
the master of his environment -- not even when supposedly 
armed with a warrant, issued by a supposedly unique and 
omnipotent God with a human-like personality, delegating 
man to plenipotentiary powers. Nature is now demon-
strating to us that she does not recognise the validity 
of the alleged warrant, and she is warning us that, if 
man insists on trying to execute it, he will commit this 
outrage on nature at his peril.' (45) 
This thesis of White and Toynbee has been echoed, with variations. 
(46) In terms of the philosophical-ethical debate mentioned at the 
conclusion of section 1 above, it represents the rejection of the 
Dominion Assumption and argues for the other extreme, the Sacralisation 
of Nature. The American ecologist Frank Fraser Darling argues for a 
middle position, conrrnending an ethic of human aristocratic servanthood 
on ecological grounds. (47) Darling states that this is not the 
attitude espoused by traditional Christianity, which has instead 
(banished all living things other than the human species 
from the partnership of God and himself, and developed 
the convenient conviction that God created the rest of 
living things for the~ and delectation of man'. (48). 
His charge is that 
'Orthodox religions of the Judaic-Christian phylum 
have failed us badly, h..:i.storically in the Scriptures, 
philosophically in having split the corro:nuni ty life 
by the f.igment of soul as a human prerogative in 
association with God, and currently in their tardi-
ness to face the. consequences of uncontrolled human 
increase. r (49) 
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He, however, holds out some hope that the churches may come to their 
senses and give greater attention to the ethical issues emerging from 
the ecological crisis.(SO) 
The rejection of monotheism in favour of ·the sacralisation of 
nature, as recommended by White and Toynbee, ·is vulnerable to the same 
'false dichotomy' criticism that Val Routley levelled against Pass::-
more. F .F. Darling has seen the issue more clearly and attacked at 
the right point, on the imago Dei and dominium terrae flank. There 
are four questions involved: 
(1) How are the biblical texts about 'human dominion' and the 
'image of God' (Genesis 1:26- 28, Psalm 8:5 -8, etc.) to be inter-
preted? Are the two themes related? 
(2) How have these texts been interpreted in the history of theology? 
(3) What factors have influenced theology, if there is any dis-
crepancy between the traditional and the exegetically appropriate 
interpretations of the texts? 
(4) Are there any such influences which are now to be rejected? In 
other words, is there any need to reject the traditional interpretations 
and engage in the reconstruction of imago Dej and aamininm te:o:ae 
theologies? 
These are big questions, but the limitations of space preclude 
anything more than brief treatment here. I will only attempt to out-
line the contemporary discussion of the questions. Question 1 is a 
matter of specialist study in exegesis and biblical theology: questions 
3, 4, and to same extent 2, develop into questions of the influence 
of philosophy on theological discourse, and r will give a brief account 
at that level. 
The ~dominion' and 'image' texts have their own interest, and have 
been discussed extensively for their own sakes and not just in order 
to respond to the claims made by White and the others. The Old 
Testament references to the image of God in man are tantalising in their 
brevity and scarcity, occurring only in Genesis 1:26, 5:2 and 9:6. 
Thus their meaning has to be inferred from syntactical and contextual 
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considerations, with appropriate reference to cognate ideas in the 
Old. Testament. and in the religions of the surrounding peoples. Debate 
about their interpretation may therefore be wide-ranging, and always 
includes the possibility that new evidence will come to hand. (51) The 
consensus is that theology should not attempt to ' locate' the image 
by trying to specify which aspects o£ human existence may constitute 
the image and likeness of GOO. in man. White's argument, however, 
turns on the identification of the image of God in man with the 
dominion that humanity is to exercise; the exegetes' concensus 
precludes that identification and dismisses his argument by 
implication. (52) 
If the charges made by White, Toynbee and Darling may be dismissed 
on exegetical grounds, they may nevertheless be sustained at the 
philosophical level. Here, the argument is that Western theology has 
followed Francis Bacon and Ren~ Descartes in adopting a Pelagian 
interpretation of the dorojnium ter~ texts.(53) This raises the 
question of Descartes' influence upon Western theology, and I aim to 
show how the tradition built on Descartes and Kant has been 'caught 
out' by the ecological crisis. 
Francis Bacon had interpreted Genesis 1:26 - 28 in the light of 
the manifest potential of the new science: by his creative genius and 
sustained effort, humanity could win back the dominion over nature it 
had lost through Adam's sin.(54) Some thirty years later, Descartes 
published his Discourse on the Method and spoke of man's potential 
ability to become 'the masters and: possessors of nature' by virtue of 
human science and technology. This was one of the practical conse-
quences of the Cartesian epistemology, in which the self-conscious 
'self' was the arbiter of knowledge. God's existence was proved by 
the knowing subject, and God's existence in turn guarantees the 
veracity of the human knowledge of the world. The world is the 
res extensa, separated radically from the knowing subject (res cogitans). 
This establishes a duality of thinking subject and neutral object, 
linked by a 'dominion' of mastery and possession(55) 
Kant maintained and developed this duality, in three ways. First, 
he showed that. it is only when, the human intelligence imposes corder on 
sensory experience that the world is knowable by man at all. Second, 
he undercut.the proofs of God's existence which·start·from the human 
experience of the natural· world. This meant that the natural world 
could be the subject of rational reflection and investigation (as it is 
in the empirical sciences), but was of lesser theological importance. 
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Is there any way, then, for human thought to contemplate the divine? 
Kant's third development separated humanity from nature even further, 
by making the ethical aspect serve as a way to God: . he held that if man 
listens to the moral law within and reflects on the implications of the 
categorical imperative, he may be led to the place where God is to be 
found, or at least, where it becomes necessary to think the thought of 
God. (56) 
Theology was therefore encouraged to view the self as the locus 
of man's relationship to God, and to concentrate on subjectivity, self-
awareness, and selfhood as expressed in history or existential life. (57) 
At the same time, it was encouraged to hold natural theology under 
suspicion, and to omit reflections on the world of nature from theolog-
ical discourse. This was further exacerbated in the nineteenth 
century when religious dogmatism had to defer to the confident 
scientific interpretations of natural phenomena. Darwin's theory 
opposed dogmatic assertion with rational argument, and explanations 
which were both cogent and convincing. The study of the natural world 
for its own sake gave understanding and an ability to explain, predict, 
and control the course of natural phenomena which surpassed theology's 
knowledge of the natural world. Here, Kant provided a city of 
refuge for beleaguered theologians, and the result was a sort of tacit 
agreement about the realms of discourse appropriate to science and to 
theology. Natural scientists would keep to the natural world and 
attempt to shake off prejudices inherited from theology and philosophy; 
for their part, theologians would leave the natural world to the 
scientists, and concentrate on religion, human experience, and the 
relc3.tionship_ · between God and man. (58) 
This meant that the Bacon-Descartes interpretation of Genesis 
1:26 - 28 was accepted without question, since theology was concerned 
with the relationship between man and God and not with humanity's 
relationship to nature. The impressive achievements of science and 
technology, and the benefits they bring to human existence, on the one 
hand, and their increasing ability to bring constructive order to the 
destructive chaos .of nature's forces on the other, gave added· 
plausibility to this interpretation. (59) Thus one writer could 
state that the contemporary (1979) human attitude to the nonhuman 
creation 
'presupposes the separation, or rather the rupture, 
of. man from nature. Rene Descartes, with his 
separation of ms cogitans from res extensa, stands 
-:= 
as its symbol ••• [This rupture] has penetrated so 
deeply into the modern theology of_ the West that 
this theological tradition can only with difficulty 
correct it ••• ' (60) 
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That is, the interpretation of the dominium terrae texts has been taken 
- -
from Descartes and developed, erroneously, along Cartesian (and 
Kantian) rather than biblical and Christian lines. 
; 
Another (and related) result of this division of labour has been 
the developnent of a doctrine of creation which has little to do with 
the natural world. That world is theologically neutral, and only 
becomes relevant to theological discourse _when it may be related to 
human experience. (61) This may be seen in some Old Testament 
theologies, in which 'creation' has become a datum for the interpre-
tation of history (an approach which avoids possible contention with 
scientific interpretations of the natural world and its origins) • 
Nature has been removed from the doctrine of creation. (62) 
In fact, it is possible to argue from the philosophical viewpoint 
that a doctrine of creation which deals with nature can only be 
incoherent if it is built on the Western philosophical tradition of 
Descartes and Kant, Berkeley and Hume. One philosophical theologian 
argues that, insofar as it has accepted their conclusions, theology 
has adopted a 
'fundamentally non-Christian vision of the world'.(6~) 
His hypothesis is that Christian theology is impossible unless the world 
is seen as creation, and he is therefore constrained to ask whether 
Christian theology may no longer be possible. Using the expression 
'modern theology' to describe theology built on the philosophical 
foundations of Descartes, Berkeley, Hume and Kant, he states that the 
outcome of the contemporary theological situation is that 
'no truly modern theology is fully Christian, no 
matter how great a nostalgia for Chrstian faith 
it may betray' , 
for the vision of the world as creation is 
'lost to the modern consciousness'.(64) 
The only way to a tru:lY Christian vision of the world as God's 
creation, and the only way in which Christian theology is viable 
philosophically, is to adopt the foundation of a suitable 'post-modern' 
philosopher. In other words, the doctrine of creation may only deal 
with the natural world if it repudiates the Cartesian and Kantian 
philosophical tradition and chooses another. (65) 
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Viewed in isolation, this may represent nothing more than a call 
to theology to take a fresh look at its philosophical assumptions and 
their implications; that is, a call to a theoretical debate which might 
interest professional theologians but contain little practical interest 
for or effect on the behaviour of the ordinary Christian believer. 
The ecological crisis has taken this discussion out of the realm of 
theory, and shown that the choice of philosophical foundations may have 
far-reaching implications in environmental ethics. 
The situation can be summarised as follows. Theology had allowed 
nature to become theologically neutral, and had opened the way for 
scientific analysis and technological manipulation of nature by man for 
humanity's benefit. All to the good. But at the same time it 
allowed the possibility for exploitation and abuse, by failing to 
provide ethical criteria to guide the scientific and technological 
enterprises and a Christian attitude to nature by which these enter-
prises could be evaluated. Instead, it followed Bacon and Descartes 
and encouraged these enterprises uncritically, interpreting the 
dominium terrae texts from a Pelagian standpoint. If Descartes and 
Kant and their philosophical legacy provide the basic philo~ophical 
concepts, assumptions, and methods for theological discourse, however, 
there is no way for theology to deal coherently with nature and to 
redress this situation. This leaves Christian environmental ethics 
without theological foundation. If a distinctively Christian environ-
mental ethic is deemed necessary, and if a the6logical foundation for 
such an ethic is also necessary, this raises the problem of how nature 
may be a subject of theological discourse. Thus the environmental 
crisis, which appears at first sight to involve ethics but not syste-
matic theology, has taken on a fundamentally theological dimension. 
This section has shown that the ecological crisis has brought 
some theological questions to prominence, namely the interpretation 
of the 'dominion' texts, the place of nature in theological discourse, 
and the wider question of the appropriateness or otherwise of the 
philosophical foundations on which theological discourse is based. It 
therefore shows that there is a prima facie case for the existence of 
an 'ecological theology' as a type of theological discourse within 
the discipline of systematic theology, comparable tb the development 
of an' environmental philosophy'. within the discipline of philosophy 
(as described in section 1 above) • When·the ecological crisis came 
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to prominence, what were the theological resources available for the 
first attempts to fonmulate an ecological theology? The next section 
will survey the theological scene of the sixties, to see how some of 
the theological approaches evident then were able (or unable) to deal 
with the question of nature. 
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. 3. Theology in the sixties. 
Section 2 showed that the ecological crisis had theological as well 
as ethical dimensions, by raising the ·question of the place of nature 
in theological discourse. This section attempts a brief survey of 
theology in the sixties, in order to see how the contemporary theo-
logical approaches could conceivably respond to the question of nature 
and to the environmental crisis. In other words, it attempts to 
discover what resources were q.ya,tlc;ililein the sixties for the task of 
formulating an ecological theology. The survey will show, in fact, 
that there were resources available which appear to be potentially 
adequate to the task, and therefore that it is theoretically possible 
to formulate a distinctively christian and theological response to the 
environmental crisis. 
It is necessary to limit the survey very carefully, because the 
'theology of the sixties' was an extremely complex and diverse phenome-
non. In one survey, it is described as 
'the11 decade of the dilettantes .. , lduting whicJ::i] theo -
logical fashions changed as quickly as fashions in 
haute cout.ure.. Positions had scarcely been expounded 
when they were abandoned and there was a move to some-
thing new'. (66) 
Theological thought in the sixties 
'seemed to be falling into utter disarray and 
fragmentation' , 
the scene was one of 
'chaos and bewildenuent' ; 
but the writer continues that the storm later gave way to calm and more 
profound reflection.(67) My brief survey must be highly selective, 
in consequence, because I cannot hope to do justice to the whole of the 
theological scene. I will begin by stating ooin themes and trends of 
the sixties which I amexcludingfDDm consideration. 
I am not directly concerned with the frontier interaction between 
philosophy and theology, so I will not be attempting to trace the 
philosophical antecedents of and influences upon the various theologi-
cal figures.(68) Nor will I follow through the sophisticated discuss-
ion of religious language and the impact on theology of philosophical 
' Logical Positivism. (69). I am not going to attempt to ascertain how 
far the theology of the sixties was influenced-. by, or repudiated, the 
Cartesian- Kantian philosophical heritage; this is part of the wider 
problem of philosophical foundations for theology, and beyond the scope 
of my discussion which is immediately concerned with the place of 
nature in theological discourse, and not. with questions of philoso-
phical principle. (70) 
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Since the Roman Catholic Church is not a member church of the 
World Council of Churches, its theological history during the sixties 
is mostly remote from the World Council discussions and has little 
theological influence on them. (71) This excuses me from the task 
of assessing the theological impact of the Second Vatican Council: or 
the works of Bernard Lonergan and the 'transcendental Thomists' , 
Hans Kting, Karl Rahner, and Edward Schillebeeckx. (72) 
The survey is thus narrowed down to Western Protestant 
theologians, but the field is still dauntingly broad and complex. 
There are the giants - Barth, Brunner, Tillich, Gogarten, Donald and 
John Baillie, and Reinhold and H.Richard Niebuhr, most of whom died or 
became inactive during the sixties. There were the posthumous 
influences of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. 
There was a persistent dissatisfied core of conservative theologians 
which included eminent figures such as Langdon Gilkey, E.L. Mascall, 
and John Macquarrie. The sixties also saw the rise of process 
theology in the Chicago school under Charles Hartshorne, represented by 
John B. Cobb, Jr., Schubert Ogden, and Daniel Day Williams; the develop-
ment of the 'radical' ('God is dead') theologies of Paul van Buren, 
Thomas Altizer, and William Hamilton; the opening of new dialogue, or 
at least new rapprochement, between science and theology, involving 
specialists in both fields such as Ian Barbour (physics) and Gftnter 
Altner (biology); the development of liberation theology, particularly 
by Richard S})auJ,l·. and Rubem Alves; and the new theological approaches 
associated with the names of Moltrnann and Pannenberg. The list could 
be extended even further, by taking note of those biblical scholars.who 
double as theologians: Bul trnann, von Rad, Eichrodt, Westermann, 
KM.semann, Conzelmann, and John Austin Baker, to name but a few. (73) 
In the light of the discussion in section 2 above, and consider-
ation of space, I will select from the list above only those theologians 
who deal directly with the question of nature. This is an obvious 
place to start; it is also a convenient place, because some of the 
material has already been surveyed. (74) This enables me to cover most 
of the theological ground of the sixties which is relevant to my concern 
in this section, with particular reference to the work of Tillich, 
Bulbmann and Moltmann. I am obliged to deal with pYOcess theology 
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as well because it figures prominently in the Church and Society discuss-
ions. I defer the detailed discussion to Chapters Two and Four. (75) 
Teilhard de Chardin was also an influential figure, .and some claim that 
his thought provides a basis for environmental concern. (76) I will 
deal with his thought very briefly below, as a specially relevant inter-
est. Finally, I must survey the work of the biblical theologians, 
if only briefly. In Chapter Two below, I will deal with new approaches 
to biblical theology, associated with the work of Claus Westennann in 
the sixties (and subsequently), and the work of Odil Hannes Steck in 
the seventies; their approaches make specific attempts to restore nature 
to the considerations of biblical theology.(77) In this section, I 
will briefly describe the approaches of two Old Testament scholars, 
Gerhard von Rad and Walther Eichrodt; they have written substantial 
and standard theologies of the Old Testament, and exerted considerable 
influence on biblical and theological scholarship during the sixties. 
This leaves me with the three major positions (Tillich, Bultrnann 
and Mol bnann) and two areas of specialist interest to be described 
briefly. The other major theological approach of the sixties which deals 
directly with the place of nature in theological discourse, Karl Barth's, 
is the subject of lengthy debate in Chapter Two below. 
The survey is undertaken in four subsections: one for each of the 
three major positions, and one subsection which deals with the two 
special interests. The subsections are 
(i) The ontological approach - Paul Tillich 
(ii) The existentialist approach -Rudolf Bultmann; 
(iii) The eschatological approach - Jtlrgen Moltrnann; and 
(iv) Two other approaches - Teilhard de Chardin, and Old 
Testament Theology. 
(i) The ontological approach - Paul Tillich 
Tillich starts with the real world and the features and structures 
of human existence within it. A number of existential questions arise 
from the experience of life, and these may be seen as features of a 
larger human situation. They are then explored through the Christian 
tradition and •correlated' with the multidisciplinary human reflection 
on experience of life, to give theological answers to these existential 
questions. The only guarantee that same such correlation is. possible 
between the knowledge that the arts and sciences can give of the human 
situation, and the Christian theological tradition as a potential 
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resource for answers to these questions, is that there is some under-
lying reality linking the human situation and the divine Word, and 
some. correspondence- between thought and being so that the way we think 
about things matches· (in some sense) the way they really are. 
Tillich speaks of three basic 'dimensions' of life: the inorganic, 
the organic, and the spiritual, and all but the first of these incor-
porates several other dimensions.(78) These are the dimensions of 
life in which its ambiguity is seen and in which it strives for unam-
biguous life and self-transcendence. (79) 
Tillich discusses the self-integration of life and its ambiguities; 
the self~creativity of life and its ambiguities; and the self-
transcendence of life with its ambiguities. These three 'functions 
of life' are each dependent on the basic polarities of being: self-
integration on the polarity of individualisation and participation, 
self-creation on the polarity of dynamics and form, and self-
transcendence on the polarity of freedom and destiny. 
these polarities, they 
'unite elements of self-identity with elements of 
self-alteration. But this unity is threatened 
Because of 
by existential estrangement, which divides life in 
one or the other dir;ection, thus disrupting the 
unity. To the degree in which this disruption 
is real, self-integration is countered by disinte-
gration, self-creation is countered by destruction, 
self-transcendence is countered by profanisation'. (80) 
This means that Tillich's system can give a theological descript-
ion of what is going on in the ecological crisis. The tension which 
characterises the polarity of man's essential being has been released, 
so that without its appropriate counter-balance each aspect of human 
existence (inorganic, organic, and spiritual) becomes distorted and 
destroyed. In the instance of the ecological crisis, it is the 
polarity between freedom and destiny that has been unbalanced, since 
the exercise of human freedom has failed to take account of the 
limitations (the constraints imposed by the regularities of the 
cosmos) within which this freedom is to be exercised. 
Ability to give a theological description is one matter, but it 
is another matter to make a constructive theological response to the 
environmental crisis and the problem of nature in theology. Here 
Tillich provides a foundation which may be tested. In his discussion 
of the three basic dimensions of life, he states that 
' the inorganic has a preferred position among the 
dimensions in so far as it. is the first condition 
for the actualisation of every dimension. This 
is why all realms of being would. dissolve were the basic 
condition provided by the constellation of inorganic 
structures to disappear. Biblically speaking: 11You 
return to the ground, for out of it you were taken 11 
(Genesis 3: 19) ' (81) • · 
The inorganic is a precondition for the organic and the spiritual. 
Tillich therefore comments that 
'The religious significance of the inorganic is 
immense, but it is rarely considered by theology. 
In most theological discussions the general term 
11nature 11 covers all particular dimensions of the 
11natural 11 • This is one of the reasons why the 
quantitatively overwhelming realm of the inorganic 
has had such a strong anti-religious impact on many 
people in the ancient and the modern worlds. A 
11 theology of the inorganic11 is lacking. According 
to the principle of the multi-dimensional unity of 
life, it has to be included in the ••• discussion 
of life processes and their ambiguity.' (82) 
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This is a statement of good intention on Tillich' s part·•: How-
ever, the main focus of his 'correlation' was with the human sciences 
of psychology, philosophy, sociology, and history. So the problem 
of the inorganic was not given substantial treatment, even though he 
recognised the need for such treatment in principle. 
Does his system allow for an ecological theology? It has 
been argued that it does. (83) There are three elements in Tillich's 
theology which may give grounds for a theology of the environment. 
First is his reaffirmation of the goodness and worth of the 
entire creation, including the material. This is clear from his 
acknowledgement of the fundamental importance of the inorganic (noted 
above) • The inorganic is important because it is the precondition 
for life in general and human life in particular, and this is an 
instrumental importance. But in his discussion of 'originating 
creativity', Tillich states that 
'God as creator is equally near the material 
and the spiritual', 
thereby implying, that there can be no theological justification for 
human arrogance towards or exploitation of other ·creatures ; the 
ontological distinction of humanity does not imply, of itself, a 
distinction in value before God •. (84) 
Second, is the human capacity for self-actualisation in freedom. 
This has both positive and negative implications in the consideration 
of environmental ethics. Positively, it enables the transformation 
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of human attitudes and life-styles, and new hope· for the world through 
the exercise of genuine human creative genius. Negatively, it may 
be associated with the threat of further estrangement and distortion 
of human capabilities, and the attendant risk of the destruction of 
the natural oDder. Tillich balances in favour of the positive: he 
does not deny the depth of human sinfulness, but he does deny the 
necessity and inevitability of environmental catastrophe. (85) 
Third, and finally, matter too may participate in the unambig-
uous life symbolised in his system by • Eternal Life • , and this is 
based on an ecological perception of reality. Thus he sees 
•essentialisation or elevation of the positive into 
Eternal Life as a matter of universal participation: 
in the essence of the least actualised individual, 
the essences of other individuals and, indirectly, 
of all beings, are present ••• Eternal blessedness is 
also attributed to those who participate in the 
Divine life, not to man only, but to everything 
that is. The symbol of a "new heaven and a new earth" 
indicates the universality of the blessedness of the 
fulfilled Kingdom of God.' (86) 
In this way, matter has a place in theological discourse relating to 
the new creation as well as in that of creation and of Fall. 
Thus Tillich's ontological approach seems able to provide a 
sotmd theological basis for environmental concern.(87) As mentioned 
above, Tillich's correlation focussed more upon the human sciences 
than the natural, so his theology of the inorganic (and of that aspect 
of the organic which pertains to the ecological crisis) remained 
inchoate in his work. The final volume of his Systematic Theology 
was published in 1963, and he died in 1965, before the envirornnental 
crisis had really become a theological issue. So it was left to others 
to develop appropriate theological responses on the basis of an 
ontological approach to theology. 
One type of ontological response has figured prominently in the 
Church and Society discussions, namely the process theology based on 
the metaphysic of Alfred North Whitehead. (88) Another ontological 
response has been formulated by John Macquarrie, who speaks of an 
•organic model' of God in his relationship to the world. He argues 
that the traditional •monarchical model' of that relationship led to 
ecological irresponsibility and that the organic model is more 
appropriate theologically and environmentally.(89) In a later paper, 
he speaks of God as the (Aristotelian) • fonn • of the world, the 
•meaning• of the world, and the (Heideggerian) 'being• of the world's 
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beings. (90) Such an approach, together with, say, Heidegger' s 
philosophical discussion of technology, might fruitfully serve as a 
theological resource for an ontologically-ba:sed ecological theology. (91) 
The ontological approach to theology therefore seems to have good 
potential for respond:ing to the environmental crisis. I turn now to 
another approach, which does not enjoy the same measure of success. 
(ii.}. The existentialist approach - Rudolf Bul tnann 
Bultmann's theology concentrates on the historical dimension of 
hunan existence. · it may be described as 'existent.ial', if that 
tenu is reserved for theologies whi.ch share four ma:in fea'b::lres: they 
are, first, the view that the theological statements are only meanin-y-
ful, if they say sonething directly to human existence; second, such 
statements must address one's own personal existence in the present 
(at the level of self.;:understanding, decision-making, action and 
response, inter illill.._; third, the self thus addressed is seen prjmarily 
in historical (geschichtlich) rather than na'b::lral tenus, which means 
that present existence is constituted by historical events, responses 
and decisions; and f mally, an 'existentialist' approach makes the 
historicity of the self into the primary domain of history 1 because 
history (Historie) is existentially insignificant until it impinges 
upon an individual's present existence and helps infonu the context of 
decision-making for the present. Bultmann's approach, and the 
henueneutic he champions, are 'existentialist' in this sense •. (82) 
I have introduced the distinction between Historie and 
Geschichte into the surmuary definition of 'existent.ialist' above, 
because the . distinction is ,]roportant in Bultroann' s theology but is 
masked by the fact that the English language· has only one word 
'history' to convey both meanings. The noun Historie designates 
history in the ordinary sense, .including the histories of people and 
nations and of the evolutionary processes of nature. It is an 
academic discipline -- rational knowledge which seeks the assirrilation 
of' data, the jmposition of an interpretive pattern, and a cognitive 
understanding of the past. The noun Geschichte derives from 
the verb geschehen and designates the history of becorring and there-
fore of freedom, the capacity for self-ac'b::lalisation and self-
transcendence. Bul tmann often defines man as Sein-+K?:!Innen, aptitude 
for being: Man is not 'being', he is aptitude for being, ability to 
become what he is not, to be torn from himself in order to receive 
new being. In this sense, man is Gegc~ch~lichk~it. (93) 
This means that. nature, all things flowing and changing and 
developing (n~v1'41( pt1) has no history in the sense of ('.,eschichte. 
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As a seed grows into a plant, so nature already is what it will be in 
the future after its many metamorphoses -- nature. Physical and 
chemical transformations in a body, the continual flux of the cosmos, 
the growth of living things, the evolution of species and humanity (as 
detennined by biological factors) do not figure as Geschichte. They 
are bound to and take place within the regularities of natural 
existence, without self-transcendence. It is only human freedom which 
can surpass this determinism and become the subject of Geschichte. 
Thus Bultmann may define man as Entscheidung (decision), free response 
to the encounters of human existence. (94) Thus history becomes the 
realm of self-hood. And 
'rnan,if he rightly understands himself, differentiates 
himself from nature. When he observes nature, he 
perceives there something objective wfuich is not 
himself. When he turns his attention to history, 
however, he must admit himself to be a part of history; 
he is considering a living complex of events in which 
he is essentially involved.' (95) 
The implications for the understanding of the doctrine of creation are 
clear. It is in existential Geschichte and not in the realm of nature 
that God is known as the creator and the source of new creation. 
This may be seen.as one of the implications of the existentialist 
approach, as described by the four characteristics listed above. 
Bultmann went further; he claimed that it was a feature of biblical 
thought in contrast to that of Greek philosophy. For the Greeks, nature 
was the dominant category. The view of history was obscured because 
the meaning of human life and of the world was seen as inherent in 
nature and its relationships, and man became an object of natural know-
ledge. This is not the biblical view, which makes Geschichte the 
dominant category. God reveals himself in history rather than in 
nature, and man finds himself and his place over against nature and with 
a history given him by God.(96) Thus the distinction between nature 
and history may be firmly established and rigidly maintained theolog-
ically. (97) It is then only a short step to a negative assessment 
of the world of nature and a licence for man to act as he chooses 
without reference to the wellbeing and maintenance of the natural world, 
though Bultmann did not take this step himself. (98) 
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This sharp distinction between nature and history makes it 
difficult for Bul tmann' s approach to. provide a theological foundation 
for response to the ecological cr~sis: the logic of his position leads 
him away from areas of exploration which may help in the theological 
task. This may be seen in his discussion of human fallenness and 
the new creation: God meets man in the personal encounter of historical 
existence, and not in the realms of nature or Historie. (99) In his 
fallenness and because of it, man·is always tempted to turn toward 
the creation and away from the creator. One of the features of the 
new creation in Christ, as Bul bnann expounds it, is that it means an 
existential reversal of the decision for the creation rather than for 
the creator. God's eschatological act of new creation 
'does not consist in a transformation of nature, but 
in the fact that "this" world, which has gained its 
character through men who have succumbed to evil, is 
finished for the one who by faith in the word spoken 
by God in Jesus Christ has become a new creature and 
has f0und freedom • • In this sense Christ has sub-
dued both nature and history'. (100) 
Both now and eschatologically, the natural world is what man turns from 
in order to turn to God. Nature per se, and the quality and habit-
ability of the world bequeathed to future generations, do not matter 
theologically. 
In fact 
'to speak of responsibility before God "in the last 
judgement" means neither responsibility for the world 
nor for the future, but the responsibility of a 
single individual for hiffiself.' (101) 
This means that the only theological basis for envirornnental concern 
is the acceptance of the environmental situation as it presents itseLf 
to historical existence, _-working . within the constraints of that 
situation on the basis of the Christian's encounter with God. But it 
is the encounter which matters; any benefit to or destruction of the 
envirornnent is beyond theological consideration. 
The envirornnental crisis is posing questions that Bul trnann' s 
approach excludes from theological discussion. Nature is not a 
subject of theological discourse, because God cannot be known in nature 
but only in human history; nature has no 'ill timate importance, and all 
that matters for the present is the relationship between man and God 
which, by implication, turns away from the created world; the difference 
between envirornnental care and exploitation is beyond the scope of 
theological discourse; the envirornnental crisis addresses the future of 
the human species, but Bultmann's concern is with the immediate present 
1 
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of the existential self, ; and his concentration on the present inclines 
to the acceptance of the environmental gtatus guo and away from the 
need to discuss or provide any theological basis for a long-tenn 
environmental ethic. 
Bultmann's approach is certainly a subtle, careful, and very 
fl:ui tful approach to the articu~ation of theology and some of its 
fundamental problems. (102) It would be foolhardy for me to state 
that his position cannot possibly respond to the environmental crisis. 
But it is clear from my outline of his approach that its main concerns 
are far removed from the issues raised by the crisis, and that it 
would require a major overhaul of his system and the development of new 
categories before a Bultmannian ecological theology could be formulated. 
I now turn to one of Bultmann's critics. 
(iii) The eschatological approach - Jtirgen Molitmann. 
Moltmann started to come to prominence in the sixties, with the 
publication of Theology of Hope; this book contained some sharp 
criticisms of Bultmann's approach and also marked out a distinctively 
new theological position. (103) He has continued to develop this new 
perspective into the seventies and, unlike Tillich and Bultmann, has 
been able to develop this position in partial response to the ecolog-
ical crisis. Thus, I may describe his approach in the sixties, and 
show how he applied it to the crisis in his essay 'Creation as an 
Open System'.(l04) 
Moltmann takes the eschatological character of Christianity with 
'utter seriousness', and he is concerned to relate the eschatological 
vision to contemporary social and political problems. (105). This 
approach contrasts fundamentally with Bultma.nn' s, thus: 
'Bultmann's approach looks for meaning within the self 
despite the plight of the world. New creation has 
already arrived within the faithful self whatever the 
world looks like. Moltmann's approach searches for mean-
ing in the future action of God that makes living in the 
world the way it is tolerable. New creation is there-
fore to be made real by actions that cut across the 
negativities of the present.' (106) 
In Mol tmann' s early theology, 'the world the way it is' focussed upon 
the social and political real~ties and experience, and this .lent 
itself to the development of a 'theology of revolution'. (107) This 
focus did not preclude consideration of any doctrine of creation, 
however, because it is partly grounded in Moltmann's interpretation 
of the Qreatio ex nihilo. 
~ 
'A creation:out-of nothingness is nevertheless simul-
taneously a creation within a sea of nothingness. A 
creation out of chaos is an order of life within 
chaos~ Therefore creation is an open creation, open 
for its own destruction as well as its redemption and 
new creation • • • We cannot understand ·it therefore . as 
the golden state of affairs before ·history, instead 
we must conceive it as the laying of the foundation and 
the inauguration of history. The process is 
inaugurated. The field of destructive and construct-
ive possibilities is laid out.' (108) 
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This means that the future cannot function as a source of 
security in the social and political realms, or, as he later develops 
his thought, in the ecological realm. There is no point in looking 
to the future for a return to same hypothetical pre-creation 
perfection or pre-temporal bliss. Nevertheless, one may look to the 
future with hope: the hope which looks for God's act of new creation 
(prefigured in Jesus' resurrection) in which he will make all things 
new. (109) The early MOJ.tmann .translated this into social and 
political terms. Hope is to be interpreted constructively and 
sacramentally, forbidding humanity to wait passively for the dawn 
of a better day while patiently enduring the darkness of the present, 
but creating instead a tension between what is and what ought to be. 
This tension should. generate and impel social and political action. 
It may be charged against Moltmann, however, that he gave no 
definite criteria for the kinds of action which might be regarded 
as valid from this theological perspective. (110) 
Moltmann's attention to the doctrine of creation provides an 
obvious starting-point for new developuent and new interpretation of 
that doctrine in response to the ecological crisis. In his later 
essay 'Creation as an Open System' , there is the same gap between 
what is and what ought to be: 
'Belief in creation repeats the judgement of the 
Creator over his creation: "Behold, it was the very 
good" • Unfortunately man carmot, like his Creator, 
rest at this point. For experience tells him, 
"Behold, it is unfortunately not very good".' (111) 
He reaffirms his earlier interpretation of creation: 
'Creatio ex nihilo is therefore creatio in nihilo 
as well and is consequently creation that is 
threatened, and only protected to a limited degree 
against that threat.' (112) 
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The environmental crisis and the threat of nuclear holocaust may be 
acknowledged as real threats, posed. by 'the sea of nothingness' and 
arising from within the 'field of destructive and constructive possi-
bilities' laid out at the initial creation. As in the The:ology of 
~~ man's fallenness is epitomised by the sin of hopelessness, 
which believes that the constraints on social and natural life assoc-
iated with the field of possibilities describe the negative limits of 
human existence; then, in the face of the social tunnoil and environ-
mental problems which appear at the boundaries, hopelessness becomes 
the double despair that gives up on God and on humanity and abandons 
the promise of the new creation.(ll3). The theological. response 
appropriate to the crisis, from Moltmann's perspective, is therefore 
to give some content to the promise of the'new creation' as it applies 
to the present created world, and which will generate the appropriate 
tension and action for the realisation of that eschatological goal in 
the natural-human-historical world. 
He attempts to do this in 'Creation as an Open System', which 
focusses upon the theological unity of creation through history to 
new creation, and on the new metaphor of the 'open system'. He 
criticises the theological method which begins with the description 
of the creation, arrives at the idea of the world's redemption, and 
sees redemption as the restoration of the primal goodness (restitutio 
in integrum). History between creation and redemption then becomes the 
history of the Fall, and can bring nothing new except the ageing and 
increasing deterioration of the earth, since only redemption will 
restore creation. Instead, Moltmann seeks an eschatological under-
standing of creation, in which eschatology continues to be understood 
in the light of creation, and creation is understood afresh in the light 
of eschatology. (114) This means that 
'we must have in view the total process of divine 
creative activity. 11Creation11 as the quintessence 
of God's creative activity comprehends creation 
at the beginning, the creation of history, and the 
creation of the End-Time'.(ll5) 
This safeguards the continuity and unity of the divine creative 
activity. It also changes the position of man with regard to creation; 
'He no longer merely confronts God's non human 
creation as its lord, the creature who was made in 
the image of God; together with all other things, he also 
stands in the Becoming of the still open, uncompleted 
process of creation. Creation is not then a factum 
but a ~ieri. This leads to a new interpretation of 
man's destiny in creation; and "subdue the earth" 
cannot be this destiny's final word.' (ll6) 
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That is, an eschatological understanding of creation relativises the 
concept of human dominion. What this means for environmental ethics 
nay be described in tenns of 'open syste:ns ' • 
By the openness of a system, Mol tmann means: first, that it has 
different possibilities of alteration; second, that its future 
behaviour is not totally determined by its previous behaviour; third 
that it can communicate with other systems; and finally, that the 
terminal condition of the system differs from its initial condition. 
(117) Sin and slavery, at both individual and social levels, 
can be understood as the self-closing of open systems against their 
tnne and their potentialities, which leads ultnnately to self-
isolation and death. Thus the fallenness and hopelessness of man 
can alsobe expressed in tenns of the closing of his individual and 
social systems. On the other hand, salvation in history may be 
understood as the opening of a 'closed system' by divine grace; the 
closed or isolated person is freed for liberty and for his own future, 
and the closed society is able to look upon the future as one of self-
transformation.(ll8) 
Creation at the beginning is a system open for tnne and potent-
iality; God's creative acts in history are interpreted as the opening 
up within time of closed systems; but what of the eschatological 
consummation? It will mean the openness Par excellence of all life 
systems, because the unlimited fullness of the divine potentiality 
dwells in the new creation (Revelation 21:3). There will therefore 
be time and history, future and possibility, but they will not be 
ambiguous as they are now. Instead of timeless eternity, 
'we would do better to talk about eternal time, and 
instead of the end of history we would do better to 
speak of the end of pre-history and the beginning of 
the eternal history of God, man, and nature. We must 
then ••• : think of change without transience, tnne 
without the past, and life without death. But it is 
difficult to do this in the history of life and death, 
growth and decay, because all our concepts are stamped 
by these experiences.' (ll9) 
Nevertheless, Mol tman continues, 
'both the structure of the natural system and the 
human experience of history point in this direct-
ion. (120) 
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Moltmann's metaphor of the open system is therefore as versatile as 
it is appealing. It provides an interpretation of the new creation, 
and provides criteria and goals for the human contribution to that 
creation according to the divine creative and eschatological purpose. 
It is a metaphor of communication and cooperation, which gives a new 
look to the dominium terrae text: 
'Genesis 1:28 will have to be interpreted in an 
entirely new way: not "subdue the earth" but "free 
the earth through fellowship with it".' (122) 
Nature is a coherent ecological system which includes the human species 
and has its own subjectivity. Man's goal in nature is to preserve 
its openness, and nature shows man the way: 
'Investigations into the ecology of survival on the 
sub-human level have shown that ••• symbioses 
between competing organisms have a far greater 
chance of survival than conflicts of competing organ-
isms. The subject-object relationship of man to 
nature, and the pattern of domination and exploit-
ation, do not lead to any symbiosis between human and 
non-human systems that \oi.DUld be capable of survival; 
they lead to the silencing of nature and to the ecolog-
ical death of both nature and man.' (122) 
Thus the metaphor of the open system, in conjunction with Moltmann' s 
interpretation of the creatio ex nihilo and the eschatological under-
standing of creation, enable him to develop his theological position 
of the sixties and outline an ecological theology and an environmental 
ethic. 
My survey of the discussions in the Church and Society programme, 
in Chapter Three below, will show that these discussions began to 
incorporate an eschatological dimension -- in fact, it is necessary to 
describe one of the main theological approaches represented there as a 
' theology of hope' • This is not meant to imply that this approach 
finds its origin and inspiration in Moltmann's thought of the sixties 
or the seventies (after all, the environmental crisis raises the 
question of survival for the human species, a question which has 
eschatological overtones);. But it does indicate that some eschato-
logical understanding of the doctrine of creation may function as a 
starting-point for an ecological theology and be necessary for its 
development. 
With the exception of Barth's thought, which is discussed more 
fully in Chapter Two below, this completes my brief survey of the main 
theological approaches of the sixties. The next subsection will deal 
with two other influences on the religious thought of the sixties, and 
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so complete the present section. 
(iv) Two other approaches - Teilhard de Cha.rdin, ·and Old Testament 
Theology. 
The theology of Teilhard de Chardin, and the Tendenz of Old 
Testament theology in the sixties, will be discussed separately. 
(a) Teilhard de Chardin 
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin published over 150 scientific articles 
on the basis of his researches in geology and palaeontology, and his 
theology attempts to synthesise his scientific knowledge of the 
world's structure and processes with his Christian commitment as a 
Jesuit priest. (123). 
In the Phenomenon of Man this becomes a synthesis of the material 
and the physical with the world of mind and spirit; of the past with the 
future; and of variety with unity, the many with the one. He uses the 
category of evolution, and extends it beyond its usual application in 
biology to speak of cosmogenesis and noogenesis (the gradual evolution 
of mind and mental properties) and ultimately Christogenesis. The 
latter concept is related to the doctrine of the mystical body of 
Christ, which all mankind is called to fonn. With the noosphere in 
the full spate of human existence, itself evolved from and developed 
within the biosphere, humanity is now in the early stages of the Christo-
sphere; and Teilhard sees Christogenesis as the evolutionary process of 
development towards the hyperpersonal psychosocial organisation of hum-
anity in Christ, point Qnega. (124) Evolution, he says 
'has come to infuse new blood, so to speak, into the 
perspectives and aspirations of Christianity'; 
and he then asks 
'in return, is not the Christian faith destined, is 
it not preparing, to save and even to take the place 
of evolution?' ( 125) 
This bold extrapolation from scientific evidence and evolutionary 
theory to theology seems to make Teilhard' s work a valuable potential 
resource for ecological theology, with a built-in theology of nature.(l26) 
The central concepts of the crisis may be included in his thought, as 
he speaks of the two possible ways of approaching the critical point in 
the Christogenic process: one, which wil~ result in an 'ecstasy in 
concord'; the other, in the discordant_ 
'death of the materially exhausted planet; the split of 
the noosphere, divided on the fonn given to its unity; 
and simultaneously ••• the liberation of_ that per-
centage of_ the universe which, across time, space and 
evil, will have succeeded in laboriously synthesising 
itself to the very end.' (127) 
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However, Teilhard's theological evaluation of nature is negative. 
It is the stuff with which human progress feeds its further· scientific, 
teclmological, and evolutiona:ry advance. It is instrumental in 
furthering Christogenesis, but it has no other value at all. Humanity 
and its progress is the important theological consideration, and all 
scientific investigation and teclmological enterprise is to be directed 
towards this aim. (128) If all goes well, 
'nothing could stop man in his advance to social 
unification, towards the develo];ment of machine:ry 
and automation (liberators of the spirit) , towards 
"t:rying all" and "thinking all" right to the ve:ry 
end.' (129) 
In his discussion of' the ul tirna te earth' , he speaks of 
'the wholesale internal introversion upon itself 
of the noosphere, which has simultaneously reached 
the uttennost limit of its complexity and its 
centrality', 
and the detachment of the mind, 
'fulfilled at last, from its ma·terial matrix, so 
that it will henceforth rest with all its weight 
on God-omega' ; 
this is the critical point 
'of maturation and escape'.(l30) 
It is clear from this brief account of Teilhard's thought that 
he espouses the ve:ry attitude to nature that Lynn White, Arnold 
Toynbee, and F. Fraser Darling clainrf has helped precipitate the 
environmental crisis. Teilhard de Chardin is part of the problem 
and not part of the solution.(l31) 
(b) Old Testament scholarship 
The tradi tiona! locus for the discussion of nature in theology 
has been the doctrine of creation, and most of the biblical texts 
relating to the exposition of this doctrine are found in the Old 
Testament. The discussion there is subject to expansion and further 
developnent in the New Testament, in the light of Christ' s revelation, 
but the basic discussion takes place in the Old Testament. There it 
is established that nature is neither divine (as the pantheist 
maintains) nor evil (Gnostic belief) butowes its origin to God 
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(Genesis 1 and 2) • My present ~estion is, how has Old Testament 
scholarship and. theology interpre-ted the Genesis sagas and the 
theological problem of the creation? I answer this by examining 
the works of two major Old Testament scholars, Gerhard von Rad and 
Walther Eichrodt, both of whom wrote standard theologies of the Old 
Testament and who therefore exercised considerable theological 
influence on the thought of the sixties. (132) 
Gerhard von Rad's approach to all the Old Testament material 
relating to creation is dominated by his view that 
' the Yahwistic faith of the Old Testament is a faith 
based on the notion of election and therefore 
primarily concerned with salvation'. (133) 
His view is that the work of the Old Testament writers and editors 
is dominated and shaped by the twin themes of God's action in self-
revelation and in salvation-history. Theological reflection on 
creation belongs to the second theme. Israel's doctrine of creation 
is a late develo:pment, which extends their understanding of Yahweh 
as Saviour by the use of earlier beliefs and the 'creation' of myths 
of the surrounding nations, and which speaks of creation as one of 
God's saving acts in history. For example, 
and 
'Deutero-Isaiah obviously sees a saving act in 
creation itself', 
'this pushing back of the beginning of the saving 
history [to the creation] was only possible because 
the creation itself was regarded as a saving work 
of Yahweh's'. (134) 
God's history with his people (election) expanded from the story of 
the creation of the people in the exodus and their entry to the 
Promised Land, to include the stories of the patriarchs, and the 
doctrine of creation was added to supply the theological base 
necessary to this expansion.(l35) Thus the doctrine of creation 
belongs, theologically, to the theme of God's action in salvation-
history. It is interpreted in historical categories, and has lost 
contact with the natural world. 
The 'cultic credo' of Deuteronomy 26:5 ~ 9 and the theme of the 
Israelite confession of faith which it epitomises provide the focus 
for von Rad' s Old Testament Theology. Walther Eichrodt focusses 
instead on the centrality of the covenant. This is an oversimplifi-
cation which is not fair to either writer: but it indicates neverthe-
less that both their treatments of creation refer primarily to God's 
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history with his people - with the natural world a poor second. This 
may be seen in Eichrodt•s chapter on 'Cosmology and Creation'. (136) 
There, he states that. 
' [the] understanding of the creation as the work of 
the covenant God endued the will of· the Creator 
from the start with the characteristics of personal 
and spiritual activity, and of moral purpose'.(l37) 
This activity and purpose are manifested in God's covenant history with 
his people; from the very first, the creation is 
'integrated into a spiritual process in which each 
individual event acquires its value from the overall 
meaning of the whole;that is to say[ into history'. (138) 
Quoting Isaiah 45:18f, he states that. 
'Yahweh's opposition to all the haphazard tyranny 
of the powers of Chaos is here made utterly plain; 
his idea in creation is the salvation of mankind, 
which he brings about by his purposeful govern-
ment.' (139) 
He compares the Israelite idea of creation with the Babylonian creation 
epic (emma eli~) and its theology of the God-world relationship. 
The Babylonian concept of God's relationship to the world is bogged 
down in naturalism; but Israel's experience of the covenant God showed 
that he was quite different from the deities of any of the other nations, 
and enabled Israel to reject the naturalistic (and other mythical, 
pantheistic and deistic) conceptions of God's relationship to the 
world. This is the unique element in Israel's theology of creation. 
The world is indissolubly connected to God, but God is free and sovereign 
with regard to the world, makes himself known in personal and moral 
action, and can therefore be experienced as a spiritual personality 
independent of nature.(l40). 
It is evident from this account that these two major Old 
Testament scholars, whose works helped shape biblical and theological 
scholarship in the sixties, were concerned primarily with man and his 
salvation, and saw the doctrine of creation in terms of the human 
history with God rather than in terms of the natural world. This 
means that the main thrust of Old Testament scholarship in the sixties 
was not prepared to deal adequately with the issues·raised by the 
ecological crisis, unless they could be formulated in terms of 
salvation-history. 
This section has ~urveyed some of the main trends in religious 
thought during the sixties, with an eye to assessing their capacity to 
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respond theologically to the environmental crisis. The results are 
mixed. Some theological approaches seemed to be unable to .address 
the situation or: to speak of nature thec>logically; others, such as the 
ontological approach (Tillich, Macquarrie, andpr0oess theology) 
and Mol tmann' s eschatological approach, seemed to have the resources 
necessary for the task. This positive note is important. Section 2 
showed that there was a prima facie case for the development of an 
ecological theology. There were same writers who questioned whether 
an ecological theology could still be a distinctively Christian 
theology; this question lies behind Toynbee's and White's calls to 
return to pantheism. (141) The survey undertaken in this section has 
shown that the existence of a Christian ecological theology is 
certainly plausible. That ·is sufficient for the present discussion, 
and the issues will be debated at greater length in Chapter Two. 
This chapter has shown· that the ecological crisis affects 
theological discourse at several levels. The next section shows 
how this thesis will attempt its examination of the effects of the 
crisis on the theological approaches evident in recent ecumenical 
discussion. 
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4. The future course of the thesis. 
The-preceding sections have served to show that. the ecological 
crisis has theological overtones ·and implications. Some expressions 
have been used there, with little or no explanation of their meanings 
or their interrelationships; expressions such as 'ecological theology', 
'theology of nature', 'theological response to the environmental 
crisis', and the 'doctrine of creation'. None of them is self-
explanatory. There are some questions about the expression 
'ecological theology': Does this conjunction of adjective and noun 
result in a meaningful expression? Or 1 to put it another way, how 
may theology be 'ecological'? Is there any difference between 
a 'theology of nature' and an ecological theology? How do they differ 
from (Christian) environmental ethics? Since the expression 
'ecological theology' is not a standard tenn of theological discourse, 
and since to my knowledge no one has yet attempted a definition from 
the viewpoint of systematic theology, I will make the attempt to canvass 
the issues and define the tenn in my Chapter Two. That chapter will 
help show what may be involved in the enterprise of writing an ecolog-
ical theology, how the task may be approached, and how such a theology 
may relate to the traditional concerns of theology. Thus Chapter 
Two provides the formal justification for this thesis and my candidacy 
for a degree in systematic theology. 
In Chapter Three, I proceed to the second part of my thesis, namely 
the analysis of the discussions undertaken in the Church and Society 
programne of the World Council of Churches from 1966 to 1979 1 with a view 
to studying the approaches to ecological theology evident therein. 
Four main approaches emerge from this survey: an 'emancipatory' 
approach, which sees nature as a hostile force from which man is to be 
liberated by means of his science and technology; a 'theology of hope' 
which adds an eschatological dimension to the discussion of nature and 
the doctrine of creation; a process theology approach; and another 
approach, informed by the Orthodox tradition. The main features 
of these four approaches, their strengths andweaknesses and their 
ethical implications inasmuch as they can be readily discerned, will be 
examined in turn in Chapter Four. A brief final chapter .will then 
state my conclusions and. my theological evaluation of the Church and 
Society programme. 
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CHAPTER TWO: The concept of an 'ecological theology'. 
The last chapter sketched the history of the so-cal led 
'ecological crisis' during the decades of the sixties and seventies, 
by way of: introduction to the central theme of my thesis, ecological 
theology. It also gave a brief sketch of the main features of 
Western theology during that period, and stated some of the theolog-
ical issues associated with the discussions of environmental questions. 
The larger questions, as to whether systematic theology could or 
should respond to the crisis, and if so, how it may respond, have been 
deferred to this present chapter. My aim here is to define the term 
'ecological theology' and to legitimate its claim to fall within the 
purview of systematic theology. This is done in four stages. The 
first section defines the necessary terms and introduces the question: 
Whether ecological theology may be part of systematic theology, or 
not? The second section introduces two objections to an affirm-
ative answer, and these objections are then debated in the third 
section. 
ative. 
The concluding section settles the question in the affirm-
1. Utrem: the question 
This section defines the central term of the thesis and poses 
the fundamental question, whether the noilll 'theology' may be qualified 
by the adjective 'ecological' without loss of meaning. The discuss-
ion of this question occupies the remainder of this chapter. 
The word 'ecology' was coined by the German biologist Ernst 
Haeckel in the eighteen-seventies, though the special study of the 
ecologies of species was not firmly established until the nineteen-
thirties. The word was a technical and scholarly term in the sole 
possession of the life-sciences, until the ecological crisis of the 
sixties and seventies brought it into wider circulation. Technically 
ecology may be defined as: 
'the study of the interrelationships between organisms 
and their environment and each other. ' ( 1) 
such study differentiates between the relationships 0f an 
individual organism with its environment (autecology) and the relation-
ship of a community of organisms or a species with its environnment 
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(synecology), C2i.) • But what relevance may such a study have to 
systematic theology? It- is not at all straightfo:rward or self-
evident that 'ecological theology' is a meaningful expression. (3) 
Several possible meanings of the expression will now be eliminated, 
in order to prepare the way for the fol1Ual definition. 
The impetus for the study of ecological theology comes from a 
concern about •the world as it is known to science and affected by 
technology-- the 'natural' world. Nevertheless, 'ecological 
theology' is not a branch of natural theology if 'natural theology' 
is taken as the anti thesis of 'revealed theology' ~ ( 4) Such an 
ecological theology would use the scientific insights about the 
ecological unity and interdependence of the universe as data for its 
theological task, without reference to the testimony of revelation. 
That is a constriction upon my study of ecological theology and on 
my understanding and use of the term. ·: 
The term is not a synonym for 'theology of nature' • The latter 
is an ambiguous term, but its most straightfo:rward interpretation in 
this context is: theological discourse about the natural world which 
attempts to answer questions about the place, meaning and purpose of 
the world of nature in God's overall plan in creation and redemption. 
(5) Such theological reflection is extremely important in attempts 
at dialogue between scientists and theologians, as both seek a cormnon 
and coherent interpretation of the reality which meets them in their 
experience of the natural world. (6) But in the expression 'theology 
of nature', the second noun refers to the universe apart from man, as 
the object of scientific observation and technological control, and 
this exclusion of humanity from nature presents complex problems of 
definition. (7) Since I want the expression 'ecological theology' 
to accommodate all the information about the ecological structure and 
order of the universe, including the relationship of the human species 
to its environment (human synecology), I must go further than the 
expression 'theology of nature'.(8) 
'Ecological' does not refer to the method of doing theology, or 
describe the structure of systematic theology. The various domains 
of systematic theological discourse are interrelated in diverse and 
complex ways, and none can be expounded in total isolation since the 
theological formulations and developments in one domain pre-suppose 
and in their turn influence those of the other domains. One may 
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therefore speak of an ecological method and structure within systematic 
theology. (9) As I use the tenn, however, the adjective refers more to 
the content and the language than to the method and the structure of 
the theology itself. 
I also wish to distinguish ecological theology from the necessary 
and ongoing task of Christian environmental ethics. (IO)'. I am using 
'theology' to mean Christian systematic theology, a discipline which 
operates according to the canons of discourse presently accepted by 
the academic community of systematic theologians and congruent with 
the particular traditions it has inherited from preceding generations 
of systEmatic theologians. In the light of Chapter dne above ,it is 
evident that ecological theology has gained some impetus from Christian 
ethical concern about the environment, and is undertaken with an eye 
to its ethical implications. Nevertheless in this thesis 'theology' 
is always used with strict reference to Christian systematic theology. 
The examples so far have shown what ecological theology is not; 
but in so distinguishing them, I have given some hints towards the 
definition of what it is. It is not a branch of natural theology, but 
it attempts to relate ecological (and scientific) insight about the 
natural world to theological discourse. It is not a theology of 
nature, because human synecology is part of its reference. It is 
theology, systematically undertaken and developed, which takes its 
place in the intricate complex of the various theological domains. I 
will now give these hints substance by stating my fonnal definition: 
Ecological th~lo~ is theological discourse about 
tbe systemic unity of the cosmos, with specific 
reference to humanity's place in and influence upon 
it, and which incorporates the provisionally valid 
insights of the science of ecology and the life, 
natural, and social sciences generally. 
This definition demands some elucidation. The basic debate in 
this chapter concentrates on whether the use of the phrase 'theological 
discourse' in the definition is really begging the question. The 
tenn 'systemic unity' requires elaboration, and the specific reference 
to humanity needs to be . explained. The reference to the evidence of 
ecology and the sciences needs to be justified in principle, as does 
the implied need to refer to human· culture in a theology which is 
ecological. 
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I wi 11 be using the tenn 'system' and its cognate ' systemic' 
in their specialised and technical sense, which it has in the compound 
'ecosystem' , for example. The global ecosystem includes the atmosphere 
as biosphere and the celestial bodies with their effects upon earth's 
life. The global ecosystem is itself the interlocking and inter-
relationship of the innumerable milieux of individual living organisms. 
If the ecosystem is reduced to its separable components, then the 
whole is more than the sum of its parts, for the reduction loses the 
(ecological) infonmation stored in the network of interrelationships 
which .link. the separate components. There is more scientific know-
ledge of the ecosystem to .be gained if the interrelationships are 
studied with the behaviour of the components. It is therefore 
possible to study the ecosystem as a system of components linked in a 
complex of interrelationships; and it is also possible to generalise 
the ideas involved, and fo.rtnuiate the broader concept of a 'natural 
system'. The emergence of isomorphic theories and parallel concepts 
in various natural and social sciences makes such a generalisation 
possible, and pennits the study of systEmic (organisational) 
invariances. (11) This has led to the develotment of a 'systems 
philosophy'. (12) I am using the term 'system' in the sense of 
systems philosophy, though J do not wish to imply that ecological 
theology is necessarily bound to espouse the tenninology and method 
of systems philosophy. 
The global ecosystem depends on factors beyond the globe for its 
maintenance, such as solar energy input and the tide-influencing 
gravitation of the moon and the planets. The earth and its life does 
not fonn a self-contained systemic unity, but is integrated into the 
systemic unity of the cosmos. The cosmos is the only self-contained 
and self-complete systemic unity, and it exhibits a hierarchical 
structure of celestial subsystems (including that which relates to the 
earth), each of which influences and is influenced by the others. This 
is why my definition referred to the systemic unity of the cosmos 
rather than to the global ecosystem. (13) 
The reference to humanity is justified by the need to give 
direction to the theological discourse about the cosmos, by placing 
it in the context of the hUITh1U1 situation and concern. The ecological 
crisis refers to life on this planet, and arises from a concern that 
human activity on earth may jeopardise the su:rvival of some of its 
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species, including the human species. (14) Ecologically, the human 
species is an aristocrat, which occupies the surru:nits of food chains 
and pyramids and is the lord of the living manor. Beneath him are 
lesser lords on the summits of their own lesser pyramids . (tiger, eagle, 
robin, mole, etc.). But humanity is unique on earth, in its 
capacity to accumulate and transmit knowledge, and to use that know~ 
ledge for its own welfare. The human enterprises of science and 
technology are manifestations of this capacity, and are also the 
objects of some environmental misgivings. They are inherent in 
humanity's ecological aristocracy and influence upon the earth and, 
through space exploration, beyond its immediate confines. The 
reference to humanity in the definition of ecological theology is 
therefore justified by the fact that this theological reflection on 
the cosmos is prompted, initially, by the need to respond to a 
terrestrial situation resulting from human activity. 
problem of human synecology. (15) 
It is a 
Why, then, the reference to the natural,life, and social 
sciences? The Scriptures contain information about man and his 
relationship to his environment, and some biblical theology has 
attempted to relate this to the contemporary ecological crisis.(l6) 
It can be argued that, in principle, the biblical material says all 
that theology needs to say. Conversely, it may also be argued 
that the biblical texts do not envisage.the experience and intellectual 
foundations of a scientifically and technologically moulded modern 
world, and that they live from experiences and intellectual foundations 
that are now debased currency - geocentrisrn providing a case in point. 
The latter argument makes this issue into one of hermeneutics and 
apologetics. Even if the biblical material is all that is necessary 
in principle for ecological theology, however, it is not sufficient 
in practice, because theology responds to changes and developments in 
scientific understanding. Scientific insight does not necessarily 
contradict biblical statements, but it may demonstrate their historical 
relativity and create a new conceptual framework and perspective 
within which they are to be interpreted. My reference to the 
sciences is therefore necessary for methodological clarity (and 
honesty), for it is the sciences which help inform man about human 
synecology, the point and manner of his existence in the cosmos. (17) 
It. is also an apologetic· necessity, if theological discourse is to be 
credible to those whose conceptuality is formed by the sciences and 
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who are aware of what the sciences regard as admissible interpretations 
of the observable world. ( 18) 
+n the definition of ecological theology, I referred to the 
contemporary insights of the social sciences as well as the natural 
and life sciences. This reference to human culture is necessary 
because the human effect upon the environment through science and 
technology is a phenomenon of human culture. Contemporary science 
is the fruit of generations of scientists' accumulating, modifying, 
and transmitting their interpretations, and this is culture in the 
temporal sense. It is culture ih the geographic sense as well, as 
scientists in different cities and nations collaborate, and 
dissEminate the results of their labours in internationally circulated 
journals. Science and technology are also culturally relative, as 
financial constraints upon research and the decisions of governments 
both affect the type of research undertaken, the information sought, 
and the technological processes perfected.(l9) Therefore, since 
ecological theology is to concern itself with human synecology, it 
must concern itself with science, technology, and the phenamena of 
human culture generally. That is, the subject matter of ecological 
theology demmds reference to hunan culture,· and this is why it is 
necessary to incorporate the insights of the social sciences into 
the discourse of ecological theology. Nevertheless, these insights 
are only secondary for ecological theology, for the cultural dimen-
sions mentioned above presuppose the use and shaping of the environ-
ment by man and by every other living being fur the purpose of 
securing the elanents necessary for life.. The reference to the 
socia 1 sciences themselves is secondary and subordinate to the 
consideration of: human synecology. 
So far, I have defined ecological theology and explained the 
theologically unusual features of my definition, but I have not yet 
explained the phrase 'theological discourse'; what is the function 
of the adjective 'theological' in the definition? Its use in this 
context must be clarified in the discussion of this chapter'B central 
question, whether or not ecological theology as ·defined above may 
be part of: systematic theology. .Stated thus, the question seems to 
be concerned about what may or may not constitute theological dis-
course and acceptable theological method (with reference to the 
sciences in particular) • . :t.£ this were so, the question could be 
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answered simply and without further ado, according to the personal 
predilections and professional inclination of the individual 
theologians to whan it is put. (20) But the. question is really about 
the internal coherence and. consistency of my proposed definition of 
ecological theology; namely, whether scientifically-infonned 
discourse aJ::x:mt the cosmos may be theological discourse without 
contradicting its own nature. For the purpose of brevity, I stated 
in the introduction to this chapter that it would debate the basic 
question, whether ecological theology may be part of systematic 
theology? In fact, the chapter debates the equivalent question: 
Whether discourse about the systemic unity of the 
cosmos - undertaken with reference to human syne-
cology and the insights of the life, natural, and 
social sciences - may be theological discourse? 
Section 2 argues from a hypothetical Barthian perspective, that the 
question must be answered in the negative, so to that I now turn. 
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2. Videtur: two objections from a Barthian perspective. 
In both the Old and the New Testaments, as well as in the early 
controversies with Gnostic and Manichean heresies 1 the Church has 
affirmed that discourse about the cosmos is part of the ongoing task 
of theology. Traditionally, such discourse was undertaken in the 
context of the doctrine of creation, which dealt with the existence, 
origin, and structure of the phenomenal universe. (21) The question 
at issue in this chapter is not whether discourse about the cosmos 
may be theological, but whether such discourse may be theological if 
it is informed by scientific insight, and where the boundaries lie 
between the two questions. This section raises two objections to 
the internal coherence of my definition of ecological theology and 
argues, therefore, that scientifically-informed discourse about the 
cosmos cannot be theological discourse. These objections are hypo-
thetical, and they are raised from a Barthian perspective; they arise 
from the discussion of 1 Man in the Cosmos' in the second part-volume 
of 'The Doctrine of Creation' in Barth's Church Dogmatics. (22) 
There are. three reasons for choosing the Barthian perspective. 
First, Barth has addressed the issue of ecological theology, though 
in a different context and using different terminology, in that part 
of the Church Dogma tics mentioned above. So there is a specific 
reference to work on and a sustained argument to debate.(23) Second, 
his putative objection is raised on the grounds of theological 
necessity; it arises from the complex logic of his elaboration of 
dogmatics, and not from any a priori assumption about the possibility 
or impossibility of relating scientific insight and information to 
theological discourse. (24) Third, the hypothetical objections from 
the Barthian perspective have added significance in their implications, 
if sustained. The Word of God is the criterion of dogmatics, and 
all theological discourse must be referred to that Word to check its 
legitllnacy.(25) Therefore, if the objections are upheld, the 
enterprise of ecological theology is theologically illegitimate, and 
is to be abandoned, opposed, and repudiated in deference to the prior 
and overruling claim to obedience of the Word of God. 
A Barthian theologian may object to my definition of ecological 
theology on two grounds, thus: 
(i) Theologically, discourse about the cosmos is discourse 
about man, which lies beyond the legitimate realm of 
' 
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ecology and the empirical and social sciences, is 
independent of them and unaffected by their insights; and 
(ii) Since ecological theology attempts to relate faith to a 
world view which is non-theological (because it is 
scientifically informed), it is necessarily self-
contradictory and internally inconsistent. 
These objections will now be expounded in turn. The exposition 
will proceed by drawing together some texts from the pertment sections 
of the Church Dogma tics. 
(i) First objection. 
The first objection has three parts: (a) theological discourse 
about the cosmos is discourse about man; (b) theological discourse 
about man is discourse about the man, Jesus; and (c) the exposition 
of theological anthropology and the conduct of the scientific enterprise 
are mutually independent. 
(a) Man is the key to the theological understanding of the 
cosmos, because of the incarnation: 
'We knowof man - ,only of man, but of man from the 
Word of God -- that God Himself wills to have dealings 
with him and to make him His partner in the history 
between them; and that at the climax of this history 
God Himself willed to become and did become what man 
is - the Creator a creature, this creature, not a 
stone or plant or animal, but man. Here in man, then, 
we see what we do not see in the cosmos around him. 
We see here in fact the inner mystery of the relationship 
between God and His Creature.'(26) 
Thus this distinction of the human species sheds light on the cosmos 
and illuminates its relationship as creature to its creator. 
Theological discourse about the cosmos must and can only return to 
this point. Man is the point in the cosmos where the thoughts of its 
Creator are disclosed. 
of the cosmos, since it 
In this disclosure, man represents the whole 
'has for us no intrinsic light and cannot reveal the 
divine plan which governs it. ··D;. is man in covenant 
with God who reveals this plan. He does so 
representatively for the whole cosmos. • •• He alone 
sheds light on the cosmos. As he is light, the 
cosmos also is light. As God's covenant with 
him is disclosed, the cosmos is shown to be 
embraced by the same covenant. ' ( 2 7) 
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Thus theological discourse about the cosmos must be theological 
anthropology, since God's revelation about the cosmos has been made 
in man and not elsewhere, and in man as pars pro toto, 
(b) Theological discourse about man is discourse about the man 
Jesus. The distinction of man which makes him the object of 
theological anthropology (and which implies that, no other creature 
in the cosmos may be the object of theological discourse) is that only 
man stands in this uniquely representative relationship before and 
with God. Thus theological anthropology asks what kind of being is 
it which stands in this relationship to God. (28) This is a question 
about human nature as such, about the creaturely essence of man, and 
is fraught with difficulty because the Word of God shows man as the 
sinner embroiled in his own self-contradiction.(29) Nevertheless, if 
'by the Word of God we are denied any capacity of 
our own to recognise our h.t;rnan nature as such, it 
is the same Word of God which enables us to know 
it, in a free demonstration of the free grace of 
God apart from and against our own capacity.' (30) 
That is, human sin and its oonsequences hide the theological knowledge 
of the inner reality of human nature from man who seeks that knowledge 
and is detennined by it; but the grace of God is primary and the sin 
of man secondary. Barth then argues that 
I the attitude Of God to SinfUl man I in WhiCh the 
order of grace and sin is present and revealed, 
is primarily and originally His attitude to the 
man Jesus alone.' (31) 
The rest of the passage is then devoted to e~unding the following 
proposition: 
'The nature of the man Jesus alone is the key 
to the problem of human nature.' (32) 
Thus, the proposition that 'theological discourse about man is 
discourse about the man, Jesus' has a double reference: to the sin of 
man, which denies to sinful man any knowledge of his inner reality; 
and to the grace of God, which allows the inner reality of man to 
be shown forth in a historical man, the man Jesus. 
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(c) The exposition of theological anthropology and the conduct of 
the scientific enterprise are mutually independent. This follows 
from the theological blindness consequent upon man's sin. The 
sciences can reveal nothing theologically certain about man, for 
'if we were referred to a picture of human nature 
attained or attainable in any other way [than through 
the man Jesus], we should always have to face the 
question whether what we think we see and know 
concerning it is not a delusion, because with our 
sinful eyes we cannot detect even the corruption of 
our nature, let alone its intrinsic character, 
and are therefore condemned to an increasing 
confusion of the natural with the unnatural, and 
yice versa.' (33) · 
The sciences are strictly limited. They can only offer 
'statements to the effect that man as a phenamenon 
is to be seen. and understood by man according to 
this or that standpoint and in this or tha~ aspect 
of his constitution and development, as determined 
by current knowledge of these facts accessible to 
human enquiry. • •• Where it is simply a question 
of man as a phenomenon -- and exact science as such 
can go no further -- there can be no perception of 
man as the creature and covenant-partner of God, 
and therefore of his true reality and essence, and 
the task of theological anthropology is thus un-
touched. Hence we cannot admit that scientific 
anthropology has already occupied the ground we 
propose to cover.' (34) 
Extensive attention to man as an ecological phenomenon cannot 
be theological, unless it transgress the limits of scientific discourse. 
If it does so, it becomes a speculative theory of man and is to be 
condemned. Its origin is in that 'arid comer' where, at the start 
of human self-knowledge, man makes the confident assumption that he 
can perceive some knowledge of his own inner reality. But 
'we cannot enter that sterile comer, nor can we 
argue from it. The Christian Church does not belong 
to that corner. It would cease to be itself .if it 
wished to do so ••• There can certainly be no question 
of theological anthropology being constrained or 
even able to enter the frame work of an anthropology 
which has such a different basis. The difference 
of theological anthropology [i.e. in the Word of God] 
is its frontier against all speculative anthropologies. 
And it goes without saying that we must always guard 
this frontier.' (35) 
Hence, in treating man as an ecological phenomenon, the sciences 
must separate themselves from theology. Conversely, if theology 
attempts to treat man as an ecological phenomenon, it is false to the 
source of its anthropology and thereby surrenders its claim to be a 
theological anthropology. 
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The three propositions (a), (b) and (c) together establish the 
first objection from the Barthian perspective, viz.: 
'Theologically, discourse about the cosmos is discourse about man, 
which lies beyond the scope and legi tirnate purview of ecology and the 
empirical and social sciences, is independent of them and unaffected 
by their insights.' 
(ii) Second objection. 
The second objection states that any attempt to relate faith to 
a non-theological world~view must necessarily result in self-
contradiction and internal inconsistency. This objection is drawn 
from the observation of the Church's history and the silent example of 
Holy Scripture. Barth notes that Holy Scripture does not propound a 
world-view which is theologically binding upon belief, but has always 
made more or less critical use of alien views.(36) Faith is non-
corrmittal in its relation to existing world views; but when 
'we think we detect an absolute union of faith with 
this or that world-view, we are not really dealing 
with faith at all, but with a partial deviation from 
faith such as is always possible in the life of the 
Church and of individuals.'(37) 
He acknowledges that it has been taken as axiomatic, throughout the 
history of the Church, that there is 
'at least a partial obligation towards dominant 
world-views'.(38) 
Nevertheless, 
'insofar as faith is true to itself, i.e. to its 
object, and in so far as its confession is pure, 
its association with this or that world-view will 
always bear the marks of the contradiction between 
the underlying confession and the principles of 
the system with which it is conjoined. If there 
can be no confession of the faith without a cosmo-
logical presupposition or consequence (however 
tacit its acknowledgement), faith can always guard 
itself against the autonomy of its alien associate. 
Thus even in the conjunction of faith with alien 
world~views its opposition to the latter will 
always find expression.' (39) 
Therefore, since ecological theology attempts to marry theology and 
faith to a world-view based on scientific insight (including the 
insights of human synecology), it will founder ultimately in self-
contradiction and incoherence. 
objection. 
This establishes the second 
In this section, I have cited material from Barth's Church 
PogmaticsHto show that. my definition of ecological theology may be 
meaningless when viewed from a Barthian perspective; the implication 
being that ecological theology therefore cannot be systematic 
theology. The objections are to be debated in the next section. 
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3. Sed contra: exploring the Barthian path. 
Throughout the Church Dogmatics, Barth challenges the assumption 
that-one theological choice is as good as another. This means that 
the objections lodged in section 2 cannot be dismissed by a theological 
statement that says, in effect, I do not accept these objections or 
the assumptions on which they are based, so let us go our separate 
theological ways. The Barthian way of doing theology places all 
theological discourse under a massive moral obligation to justify its 
claim to be theology, by giving some plausible demonstration of its 
congruity with the Word of God. (40) This obliges me to debate the 
objections from the hypothetical Barthian on grounds which he and Barth 
would acknowledge as legitimate, or to provide an ecological theology 
which is demonstrably born of obedience to the Word of God. The 
latter course is beyond my scope in this thesis, and I am therefore 
co:rnmi tted to the · fonner. 
Before I launch into the debate with this hypothetical Barthian, 
it is necessary for me to clarify my intention in this section. My 
purpose is expressed in the word 'explore' used in the title of this 
section, ·arid in the word • debate'. Barth is far too complex and 
subtle a theologian for me to lay claim to a • refutation' of the object-
ions in the next few pages. Instead, I lay claim to a serious 
grappling with the issues he raises, and to sustaining a sympathetic 
engagement with his thought. This will help clarify some aspects of 
the definition of ecological theology, and show that a Barthian 
ecological theology may be possible, at least in theory. But anything 
further than this would require a thesis of its own. 
The first objection was formulated in ter:ms of three propositions: 
(a) theological discourse about the cosmos is necessarily discourse 
about man; (b) theological discourse about man is necessarily discourse 
about the man, Jesus; and (c) the exposition of theological anthropol-
ogy and the conduct of the scientific enterprise are mutually 
independent. The lynchpin of this objection is proposition (a), 
which permits theological discourse about the cosmos to concentrate 
on the doctrine of man, and on which basis proposition {b) may be 
maintained. Further, even if (a) were accepted unequivocally, its 
conjunction with (b) would not necessarily yield (c), even in Barth's 
exposition. His later exposition makes it clear that the fundamental 
issue in proposition (c) is the theological relevance of the insights 
available from the sciences. This is exactly the issue at stake 
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in the second objection. Thus, in order to debate both objections, 
it is only necessary to consider the first proposition (a), and to 
clarify the theological relevance of scientific insight. This will be 
done in two subsections. Then, in the first:subsectionof section 4, 
I will describe a recent attempt to write an ecological 'theology from 
a Barthian perspective. 
(i) Theological·. discourse about the cosmos 
When Barth states than man is the Pars pro toto of the cosmos, 
he is operating within the constraints of theological knowledge access-
ible to man through the WoDd of God. The argument.cited above was 
that the cosmos has no intrinsic light to reveal the divine plan which 
governs it, but that this plan has now been revealed in the incarnation 
of the Word. That God willed to become and did became what man is 
therefore sheds light upon God's relationship to the whole of his 
creation. Barth acknowledges that this illumination is only partial 
(which implies that I may have some room for manoeuvre), stating that 
• the attempt to penetrate to the inner secrets of 
the relation between God and the rest of creation, 
and the consequent attempt to explain and present 
the latter from the standpoint of this relation, 
can never be more than exercises in pious surmise 
or imagination. This does not mean that these 
attempts are strictly forbidden. But it is to be 
noted that Holy Scripture does not lead us to make 
them. • (41) 
He continues therefore with the claim that 
• It is enough for us in fact to know the relation-
ship between God and man. We know this from the 
Word of God. • (42) 
Thus, in stating that theological discourse about the cosmos is 
necessarily discourse about man, Barth is prudently limiting himself to 
the area of relative theological certainty as opposed to speculative 
philosophies. He is concerned only with the revelation of God in 
Christ and the testimony to that revelation in Holy Scripture, and not 
with any other knowledge. Thus he is not concerned with building 
bridges between science and· theology, or between the biblical account 
of creation and scientifio theories about the world. God has 
already said all that needs to be said about the cosmos and man • s 
place in it, and the insights of the sciences are only decorative -
the icing upon the cake. 
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His theological certainty is derived from his understanding of 
Holy Scipture. In the.key section to the first part-volume on the 
doctrine of creation, he argues that according to the biblical witness, 
'the purpose and therefore the meaning of creation is 
to make possible the history of God's covenant with 
man which has its beginning, its centre and its 
culmination in Jesus Christ. The history of this 
covenant is as much the goal of creation as creation 
itself is the beginning of this history.' (43) 
The covenant is the internal basis of the creation, and the creation is 
the external basis of the covenant. (44) The basis for his work on 
the doctrine of creation is found in the exposition of the two Genesis 
creation sagas, in the first part-vDlume. This is then elucidated 
by forging the link between creation and Christ by means of the 
concept of the covenant. It is on this basis, and only on this basis, 
that Barth is able to concentrate theological discourse about the 
cosmos on the theological understanding of man and therefore on the 
man, Jesus. Proposition (a) therefore rests on the exegesis of the 
two Genesis creation sagas undertaken in the first part-volume. I 
question the adequacy of this basis, and then make use of scroe of the 
room to manoeuvre that Barth has allowed me by implication. (45) 
Barth's conscious aim throughout the Pogmatics is to listen to 
what the Word of God is telling forth, and to expound the same. This 
implies and includes the need for careful attention to the witness of 
Holy Scripture.(46) With regard to the exposition of the doctrine 
of creation, however, Barth has listened selectively: his exegesis of · 
the two Genesis sagas is shaped and overshadowed by his prior convict-
ion that creation must be ],inked to Christ and that the concept of the 
covenant is the only means to this end. This results in an exegesis 
which is scroetimes ·artificial, subjugating the historical content of 
the text and the purposes of the original writers to the later and 
more authoritative revelation which the text is seen to prefigure and 
forwhich purpose ·it was written. This is particularly the case 
in his exegesis of the second saga.(47) It also results in a strong 
emphasis on the pre-eminence of humanity in the cosmos, derived from 
the pre-eminent glory of Christ. (48) 
The effect of this selective attuning to the covenant is to 
ignore or underplay other features of the biblical witness about the 
cosmos and man's place therein. An important part of the biblical 
reflection on creation is concerned wi.th God's relationship to all 
nature. The natural world has a reality of its own, and its own 
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existence before God, as part of the complex matrix of human existence 
and salvation. (49) This means that theological discourse about the 
cosmos and the theological appreciation of its place in the divine 
economy cannot be subsumed under or exhausted by theological discourse 
about man. Barth's attempt to build a doctrine of creation solely 
on the basis of Christology and covenant fails on exegetical grounds, 
and with it the first objection to ecological theology is called into 
question. 
In his subsequent volume on 'The Doctrine.of Reconciliation', 
Barth included a lengthy discussion of the creaturely world as the 
stage and setting for the drama of redemption-- an idea easier to grasp, 
easier to work with, and more congenial to my proposal for an ecolog-
ical theology, than that of making Christo logy and covenant the 
detenninants of God's relationship to his creation. (50) Thus having 
raised a serious question about the validity of the first hypothet-
ically Barthian objection, on grounds that Barth himself would acknow-
ledge as legitimate, it is now possible to look at his later work and 
be encouraged. 
In the later discussions, Barth affirms and supplements his 
earlier approach by developing it in a new direction. He quotes 
Calvin with approval, stating that the creaturely world 
'is the theatrum gloriae De~, the external basis 
of the covenant which conversely is its internal 
basis (C.D. III, 1, 41).' (51) 
The governing metaphor becomes that of the theatre and its lights, 
lights which derive their illumination ultimately from the shining of 
the one true light, the gloria Dei, the light of life, from which they 
are kindled.(52) The reason for this supplement to his earlier 
position is based on an awareness that the incarnation meant involvement 
in the phenomena of daily human existence and susceptibility to the 
regular and oDdered behaviour of the natural world.(53) The question 
is, how ~he_theatrum in its own existence may be related to the 
~ia Dei; more precisely, how the many lights of God's creation may 
relate to the one light of God in Jesus. Barth concludes that the 
lights are meaningful only in relation to the Light of Life. (54) 
lights have a service, 
These 
'the service of the self-witness of the world that in 
its existence and nature it is a real world, which 
is sustained and upheld, which has a basis of constancy 
as the sphere of the occurrence and revelation of the 
grace of God in Jesus Christ, and which as such may 
have continuing essence and existence. What is 
reflected in them as they perfonn this · service .is the 
fact that the Creator is faithful to His creature 
with the eternal faithfulness which· is active and 
powerful and revealed in His act and revelation of 
grace in Jesus Christ, and which He has sworn to it 
with its very creation. • (55) 
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Once the constancy and service of the lights and words and truths 
of the cosmos are grounded theologically, it becomes possible (in 
theory) to fill out some of the details needed to complete the discuss-
ion of a theological anthropology based on the man, Jesus, by reference 
to the universal phenomena of human existence which he shared in his 
historical experience.(66) 
Seven propositions may now be adduced, which may serve as a 
basic outline for a Barthian perspecti~e on ecological theology: 
(1) The cosmos has its reality in intellectu as well as in re, 
and its constancy and the rhythm of its converse with itself in man 
are willed, defined, and accepted by God as the appropriate sphere in 
which His self-revelation may take place.(57) 
(2) Within this sphere, the human species is constant in 
its inner reality and is known in the man Jesus. (58) 
(3) The constitution of His human nature is the same as ours; that 
is, the constitution of humanity (as the object of empirical knowledge) 
is a constant within the constancy of the cosmos (59). 
(4) The regularities of the cosmos (as provisionally observed 
and interpreted by modern science) describe the limitations placed 
upon the human constitution and apply to the man Jesus as they apply 
to the commonality of historical human existence. His susceptibility 
to them defines and expresses humani ty• s susceptibility to them, and 
His response to them defines and expresses the inner reality of 
humanity's response to them. 
(5) Therefore, in order to understand the cosmos and humanity's 
place therein in theological tenus, it is sufficient to understand the 
place of the man Jesus in the cosmos and the laws of the cosmos (as 
provisionally understood), as they impinge upon human existence. 
(6) It is also necessary, since failure to recognise the limit-
ations which these laws impose upon common human'existence eventually 
implies a Docetic Christology.(60) 
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(7) This is the context in which the theologicaLreference and 
relevance of_ ecological laws and the related <]J.estion of the ethics of 
humanity's relationship to the created world, is to be developed. 
A Barthian ecological theology has already been attempted, in 
outline, along lines similar to those stated above. I will describe 
it briefly in section 4. But the second hypothetical objection. is yet 
to be debated, and the Barthian path explored. further, since the 
objection.implies that any attempt to write an ecological theology will 
necessarily be self-contraqictory because of its dependence on scientific 
insight, the debate about the first objection notwithstanding. 
(ii) The theological status of scientific· information 
The first objection included the statement that theological 
discourse about the cosmos was ultimately theological discourse about 
the man, Jesus, to which scientific infonnation about the world and 
its structures and processes was totally irrelevant. Such information 
it was claimed, does not illuminate the inner reality of man in his 
relationship to God, or of the cosmos in its relationship to God. This 
has been debated to some extent in the preceding subsection, but the issue. 
of the theological status and relative authority of this infonnation 
was not broached. The second objection states that any attempt to 
relate faith to a non-theological world~view will necessarily result in 
self-contradiction. I intend to show in this subsection that this 
objection is based on a misinterpretation of Barth's argument, and that 
the issue at stake is really that of the theological relevance of 
scientific insight. Then, I wish to clarify my definition of ecological 
theology by specifying a theological function, status, and authority for 
scientific information, in a way which remains sympathetic to Barth's 
concerns for the integrity and autonomy of theology. 
The second objection is supported in its statement by 
quotations from Barth • s discussion of 'Man in the Cosmos • • ( 61) These 
were all taken from an extensive passage, in which he is arguing that 
• It is no doubt true that human faith has always expressed 
itself in a particular conception, and human witness in a 
particular presentation, of the Word of God, and in so 
doing they have attached themselves to certain cosmologies, 
assimilating them, understanding them and interpreting 
them in their own sense, appealing to them to some 
extent and allying themselves with them ••• The fact that this 
has continually happened does not mean, however, that the 
Word of God itself • • • contains a specific cosmology 
which it is our duty to expound. ' ( 62) 
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The thesis he is maintaining is that the communication of the faith 
has, can, and may make use.of.existing cosmological opinions, but that 
there is no cosmology to which Holy Scripture is unequivocally commit-
ted - and that it is therefore futile for theology to accord any 
cosmology definitive status. Thus Barth rules out any attempt to 
accord scientific insight anything more than a secondary status in 
theological discourse. ·At the same time, he implies that the theolo-
gian may use such cosmologies in his exposition, provided their infonn-
ation is kept within its proper (scientific) limits.(63) In fact, 
faith, in its relationship 
'to the cosmological presuppositions and consequences 
of its witness and confession could and can only be 
supremely non-committal. It never accepts the material 
of changing world-views for its own sake • • • It is 
always free in relation to all such conceptions.' (64) 
The point at issue is therefore that of the theological status and funct-
ion of such scientific information at hand which the theologian deems 
relevant to his theological task. 
Barth holds the empirical sciences in high esteem. Within their 
limits, they contribute positively and helpfully to the life of man, 
who cannot live without them, even though they cannot penetrate to the 
inner theological reality of existence. They have their proper and 
theologically legitimate place when their findings about man, for 
example, are evaluated by the theological knowledge of the inner reality 
of man gained from the Word of God. (65) But if and when their find-
ings are elevated to theologically authoritative and definitive statl)s, 
that elevation is to be opposed.(66) 
The debate about the second objection need not, therefore,focus 
on the necessary self-contradiction of ecological theology which it 
alleges; instead, it must concentrate on the function and status of 
scientific information in theological discourse about the cosmos. This 
will be done by showing that Barth accords real authority to scientific 
insight into the cosmos, that this authority is nevertheless relative, and 
that it may be used in the exposition of the faith provided it does not 
jeopardise its autonomy. In the special case of ecological theology, 
this will raise the question as to whether the emphasis on the systemic:_~; 
unity of the cosmos and the evidence of the ecological and other 
sciences necessarily constitutes a threat·to the autonomy of theology• 
Barth gives serious and lengthy consideration to the reality of 
the world's existence and the reliability of its regularity and rhythms, 
as noted in the preceding subsection. This consideration has two foci 
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in its exposition: the existence and significance of this regularity 
and the relationship of this creaturely regularity (the lights of the 
t!!eatrum) to the Word of God. (67) 
The world has real existence, and the partial knowledge access-
ible to humanity through the processes of observation and analysis of 
its reality is also real knowledge: 
,'On the presupposition and under the condition and 
limitation that it is created and ruled by God, the 
world has its distinctive being.. It belongs to 
this distinctiveness, however, that it is not merely 
in re but in intellectu. • • • the being of the world 
is· one which is known by man and in this way knows 
its own being. ' (68) 
This reality in intellectu means that the lights and words and truths 
which shine in the creaturely world may be seen and heard by man, in 
spite of his sin and in spite of the provisional reliability of his 
perception, and independent of his attitude to the Word of God. Hwnan 
knowledge of the cosmos is part of the cosmos's conversation with 
itself, as a being which is known, contemplated, and apprehended by 
man and therefore knows, contemplates, and apprehends in man. ( 69) 
This unique position of man in the cosmos as the one who sees and hears 
the lights and words and truths which adorn it, constitutes 
'a surrrnons and invitation to the active ordering and 
shaping of things. • • • As the intelligible cosmos 
exists wholly for the intelligent, it desires and 
demands that· in its own way and work the latter should 
also exist for it. To put it dramatically, it yearns 
and cries out to be humanised.' (70) 
Such 'humanising' is only conceivable and possible on the basis of the 
reality and constancy of the lights and words and truths which shine 
in the creaturely world. The cosmos and its constancy is the sphere 
in which the drama of redemption is enacted as a particular happening 
within the matrix of the general and predictable features of daily 
existence. Its constancy is guaranteed by God's faithfulness to his 
creation, who elects and wills and posits that it should take place in 
this matrix even though it transcends it in its reality. This means 
that the reality of the cosmos, even if apprehended only partially by 
human science, is guaranteed by its Creator, and willed by Him to fonn 
the context and provide the vocation for human existence.(71). It 
also means that the human scientific knowledge about .. the cosrrt0s has 
an authority appropriate to the realisation of the human vocation within 
the cosmos. 
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The reality of the cosmos and. the partial scientific knowledge of 
it is limited by human frailty and in two other ways as well. The 
unity and totality of the Word of God contrasts with the plurality and 
diversity of the lights and words and truths which adorn the creaturely 
world: it is obvious 
'that there are world loqo;b, but it is eq~ally obvious 
that there is no world logos. i.e. , no word in which 
the creation expresses itself in its unity and totality. 
From this angle, the problem of all creaturely truths 
is that there are so many of them, that they make them-
selves known only as partial truths, that none of them 
is the one whole truth. To those who perceive it 
the shining of the one whole truth, the light of life, 
which is the Word of God, Jesus Christ, always proves 
itself to be the standard by which the relativity of 
all creaturely lights is unequivocally manifested.' (72) 
Further, the reality of the cosmos (and therefore of any scientific 
knowledge thereof) lacks theological finality. Barth shows a shrewd 
insight into the process of scientific research, when he states that 
in the dialogue which the cosmos maintains within itself through man, 
there are 
'provisional assumptions to which man is invited and 
constrained but which he is summoned to transcend, 
deepen, amplify or correct by similar assumptions. 
None of the agreements or corrmon statements reached 
in this dialogue, whether speculative, logioo-
empirical, moral, aesthetic, scientific or mytho-
logical, can pretend to be a final and authentic 
declaration concerning existence.' (73) 
Therefore, 
'when we speak of genera~ validity (as in the case 
of scientific statements], we refer to the agree-
ments and oorrmon statements of many or all men. The 
certainty of these disclosures thus stands or falls 
with the self-certainty of man, and confidence in 
their validity with his self-confidence. Centrally 
therefore, it is the self-confidence of man, of all 
men, which, if it is not negated or destroyed or 
even shattered by the Word of God spoken to him, is 
certainly called in question and relativised ••• ' (74) 
For the present discussion, this means that the scientific enterprise 
is based on God's faithfulness to his creation (as,noted above), but 
that the knowledge of the oosmos which ·it yields is partial and of 
secondary importance and authority· to the Word of God. This is a 
function of human sin. As and when ·scientific knowledge is taken into 
the service of theological discourse, therefore, it must be accorded 
a status corrmensurate with its secondary and provisional authority. 
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It cannot be allowed to jeopardise the autonomy of theology; if it 
attempts to do so, the second objection will apply, and the theological 
discourse so propounded' will founder in self-contradiction. But as 
long as the evidence of the ecological and other sciences is kept to 
its appropriate sphere of reference andauthority in ecological theol-
ogy, such ecological theology is possible from the Barthian persp~9tive 
and need not be internally inconsistent. 
It may now be charged that the defini ~,tion of ecological theology 
given above invokes a scientifically-informed world-view and makes it 
impossible for the ecological and other sciences to be kept to their 
appropriate sphere of reference and authority; it defines the cosmos as 
a 'systemic unity' , and its concentration on the science of ecology 
shows that that science is to govern the exposition of ecological 
theology. I must now attempt to answer this charge. 
The real question is: to what extent do the concerns for 
ecological sustainability, environmental conservation, and the apparent 
need for a distinctively Christian environmental ethic, take precedence 
in ecological theology over what the Word of God is saying to man, and 
distort it according to an a~iori ecological-ethical interest? The 
answer devolves upon what the Word of God is saying to contemporary man, 
with particular regard to the doctrine of creation and the God-given 
context of human existence. My account of Barth's thought helps 
provide the answer here, for it is evident from his discussion of the 
lights and words and truths which shine in the creaturelyworld that 
the Word of God wills and establishes the boundaries, constraints, 
parameters, and goals of human existence within the cosmos. Holy 
Scripture establishes the existence of such limits and directions, but 
only in principle, for it does not attempt to describe them in any 
final way or in a way that attempts to match the precise but neverthe-
less provisional formulations made by scientists. The 'summons and 
invitation' given to humanity 'to the active ordering and shaping of 
things' is one such statement of general principle (Genesis 1: 26-28) • 
It receives its specific content in the endeavours and future planning 
of each succeeding generation, which interprets the world's yearning 
and crying out to be 'humanised' (75). The reality of the cosmos in 
intellectu, which vouches for the reliability and relative autho:ti!=-Y 
of the lights and words and truths of the creaturely world, also implies 
that the specific articulation of· these lights and words and truths 
to each generation are part of the address of the Word of God to that 
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generation. Part only; a part which contrasts in its diversity and 
relativity, with the single ultimate absolute finality of the word of 
God; but a part of His address nonetheless. (76) • 
The question may now be answered. Ecological theology, on 
Barth • s tenus, may be understood as the theological articulation and 
delineation of the boundaries, constraints, parameters, and goals of 
human existence within the cosmos, in the fonn of an address to the 
contemporary generation. That generation is aware(through the 
scientific enterprise and its investigation of the creaturely lights 
willed and established by God) that these l.llnits and directions include 
ecological constraints on the human species. These limits and direct-
ions, whose existence is stated or implied in general tenus in Holy 
Scripture, receive some of their specific content in ecological terms 
-- this is how their theological articulation may be appropriately 
described as •ecological'. This gives content to the expression 
•ecological theology• which does not allow the ecological concern to 
jeopardise the autonomy of theology. Instead, the validity of 
ecological discourse specifies, assists, and promotes the theological 
articulation of the Word of God addressed to the contemporary generation. 
This means that the second objection made by the hypothetical 
Barthian theologian need not be upheld either. At best, the debate 
about the objections may only imply that a Barthian ecological 
theology is possible in principle -- a rather uninteresting conclusion, 
because of its indefiniteness. The next section shows that ecological 
theology may be part of systematic theology, by adducing a Barthian 
ecological theology, an ecological theology from the perspective of 
process theology, and then discussing how ecological theology may be 
undertaken with reference to the biblical testimony and the traditional 
concerns of systematic theology. 
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4. Responsio: Exposition and settlement of the question. 
So far, this chapter has been concemed with defining the term 
'ecological theology' and debating whether or· not ecological theology 
may be part of the discipline of systematic theology. The results 
of sections 2 and 3 show only that an affirmative answer may be possible 
in theory. But. existence in theory is neither as interesting nor 
as convincing nor as satisfying as the demonstration of existence. So 
this section will begin with brief descriptions of two ecological 
theologies which have appeared in recent literature; the first, 
appropriately, frcm a Barthian perspective (subsection (i))., and the 
second from that of process theology. The third subsection will then 
show how the task of ecological theology may be undertaken with refer-
ence to biblical scholarship and the traditional topics of systematic 
theology. 
My purpose in adducing the ecological theologies of Hermann 
Dembowski and John B. Cobb, Jr., is to show that there are systematic 
theologians attempting to write ecological theology in the sense I 
have defined. It is not my purpose to analyse or criticise the merits 
of their attempts, only to describe and explain. 
( i) Hemann Dembowski: a Barthian ecological theology 
The German journal Evangelische Theologie has devoted two issues 
to theological discussion of the environmental crisis, in 1974 and 1977 
respectively.(77) The paper by Dembowski which is described here 
appeared in the later issue, and was titled 'Ansatz und Umrisse einer 
Theologie der Natur'.(78) The editor stated in his introduction to 
that issue that Dembowski 
'spricht-- unter eigenst&ndiger Fortfflhrung Barth'scher 
Tradi tionen - von einer "Soteriologie der Natur", die 
auf Grund der in Jesus vorgegebenen "Wahrnehmung der 
Natur" zur einer unentfremdeten Praxis der Naturumgangs 
beitragen rntlsse.' (7.9) 
The paper itself was one of several discussion papers presented at a 
conference held at the Evangelischen Akademie, Hofgeismar, in 1975. 
My inunediate aim is to describe the logic underlying Dembowski's 
exposition, even though his paper is presented in programmatic outline. 
I will do this by letting Dembowski speak for himself. 
The following concepts are basic to his exposition: the concept 
of the world-house ( das Haus der Welt) and the house of peace ( das 
Friedenshaus) ; the concept of pervasive alienation (Entfremdung) ; and 
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the concept of perception (Wahrnehmung) , which· is central to his whole 
approach. I will describe these concepts in turn. 
The world-house is the meeting place of nature and culture. 
Nature 
'ist zu verstehen als ~s allem Erkennen und Handeln 
des Menschen Vorgegebene, soweit es nicht durch 
dieses Erkennen und Handeln bestirrmt ist.' (80) 
Thus nature surrounds man and includes him; its centre of gravity 
(Eigengewicht) is within and around humanity. Culture 
'ist zu verstehen als das Integral von menschlichem 
Erkennen und Handeln, die Natur als das dem Menschen 
vorgegebene wahrnehmen.' (81) 
CUlture has the dimensions of work and interaction, and as the 
totality of human behaviour finds its centre of gravity in relation-
ships. Neither nature nor culture exists without the other, and they 
are ambivalent in themselves and in their relationship to each other. 
They meet in the world-house: 
'Natur und Kultur treffen sich im Haus der Welt als 
der geschichtlichen Heimat des Menschen. Dies Haus 
der Welt wird unumkehrbar von der Natur wie der 
Kultur her. Es ist ambivalent. Es wird zur Heimat 
wie zur Fremde, von Natur wie von Kultur her.' (82) 
This world-house may be a house of peace, if the complex of relation-
ships between God, man, nature and culture is maintained in the right 
perspective (perceived rightly), and each is accorded its due signifi-
cance. (83) But this is not the case, and the blame for the present 
situation lies with man: 
'Dieses Haus des Friedens von Natur und Kultur 
ist immer schon in ein Haus des Streites verkehrt. 
Es ist zerfallen. Die Heimat ist Frernde. 
'Wodurch geschieht dies? Es Geschieht durch den 
Menschen. Der lOst sich von Gott und Natur und 
seinesgleichen aus Angst und im Streben nach abso-
luter Autarkie.' (84) 
The result is alienation. 
'Der Partner - Mensch, Natur, Gott - wird zum 
Feind oder zum Material, das man ausbeutet. 
Entfremdung trennt das in Frieden Verbundene. 
Das Haus der Welt zerf~llt. Es wird zur Fremde ••• ' (85) 
And this alienation is all-pervasive. God becomes an enemy, against 
whom man must assert himself. Humanity is self-estranged, as man 
struggles against humanity. Nature 
'wird zum getretenen, ausgebeuteten Sklaven der 
BUltur, zur Fremde, die ein spiegelndes Abbild 
der Fremdheit des Menschen ist.' (86) 
But the exploited slave rises against man and threatens him in his 
struggle for autarchy, by asserting and demonstrating humanity's 
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(ecological) dependence upon nature. It be<;;otnes ' demonic' • ( 87) In sum, 
'Auf diese Entfremdung ist die Welt vom Menschen her 
festgelegt. Es liegt ein Bann fiber ihr, der Bann 
der Entfremdung. Das ist Unheil. Dieses Unheil 
bestimmt die Wirklichkeit von Welt.' (88) 
Man is homeless. Homeless man, alienation, and ecological crisis 
characterise the human situation.(89) 
The task of an ecological theology (Theologie der Natur) is to 
address this crisis of alienation: 
'Theologie der Natur wgre eine Soteriologie der 
Natur ftir den Menschen, ••• Aufgabe der Theologie 
der Natur ist das Wort zur rechten Wahrnehmung von 
Natur in Kult.ur angesichts der faktischen 
Entfremdung. ' ( 9 0) 
It does this through Jesus Christ. He is the exorcist of the 
demonic powers unleashed by human sin, he is the one who disa(gnS the 
power of alienation. He does this 
'im Durchbrechen des Bannes von Angst und Entfremdung, 
in rechten Wahrnehmen von Gott und Mensch und Natur. 
Diese Enbmachtigung ereignet sich als Aufkl~rung, die 
sehen macht, was ist, warum es so ist, was sein kann 
und sein soll; ••• sie ereignet sich als das Stiften 
neuer, unentfremdeter Beziehung von Gott und Mensch 
und Welt, von Natur und Kul tur und sie ereignet sich 
als die Provokation, in neuem Verhalten und neuen 
Ver~ltnissen Gott und Mensch und Welt in der 
Beziehung von Natur und Kultur anders, neu und recht 
wahrzunehmen ••• ' ( 91) 
These passages, and the statement in Dembowski's summary passage that 
'Der Zauberspruch lautet: rechte Wahmehmung!' 
highlight the importance of the concept of Wahmehmung.(92) What does 
he mean by the tenn? 
He states that it links three elements together, namely 
recognition, action, and truth; but the 'recognition' is defined in 
tenus of perceiving, so there is but little help there.(93) But this 
is the nub of the problem. The realisation of perception in human 
experience and history has been ambivalent: 
'Sie vollzieht sich in den Dimensionen von Arbeit 
und Interaktion, einer Polari Wt, die nicht auf-
zuheben ist, in der das Zueinander der beiden Weisen 
immer neu zu suchen und zu finden ist. Sie vollzeiht 
sich im Gegensatz von Sftnde und Heil und ist damit immer 
wiooer durch Schei tern und die Chance des neuen Anfangs 
der durchlililt, bestimnt .• ' (94.) 
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And man in his self-contradiction has forfeited the capacity to 
perceive rightly. Thus the human task in theological ecology (in 
theologischer 8kologie) is to achieve the right perception of nature, 
and to direct human life an~ enterprise according to that perception, 
in obedience to the Word of God. For man 
'seine Wahrnehmung von Welt setzt die Wahrnehmung von 
Welt durch Gott voraus' 
and therefore 
'weil Gott Weltwahrnehmung recht vollzogen hat, hat 
der Mensch rechte Weltwahrnehmung zu vollziehen.' (95) 
Of himself, man in his self-contradiction cannot perceive the 
inner reality of the relationships between God and humanity and nature 
and culture, as God sees them and intends than to be seen. The 
theological problEm is insoluble except in the person of Jesus: 
'Theologie ••• hat dem zu entsprechen, was in Jesus 
als dem Christus heilsam getan und daraufhin vom 
Mensch zu tun und zu lassen ist. Das Wirken Jesu 
Christi ist bestimmt durch seine Interaktion mit 
Menschen, ihran Verhaltenund ihren Verh~ltnissen. 
Diese Interaktion vollzieht sich als Wahrnehmung.'(96) 
His work is twofold: he shows the required rechte Wahrnehmung, 
and addresses the crisis of alienation. This means that the world-
house may beccme once more the house of peace. This is the ultimate 
result, which may be realised proleptically through the work of the 
Holy Spirit. (97) 
The twofold work of Jesus is discussed at length in section VII 
of Dembowski's paper, where he expounds the thesis that Jesus' 
historical existence revealed the right perception of nature and culture. 
(98) For example, 
'Jesus Christus n:i.mnt Natur im Menschen wahr, indem 
er ihr speisend und helfend und heilend und Leben 
spendend das Ihre gibt: Leiblichkeit ist das Ende 
der Wege Gottes~ ••• l):r] nimmt Natur urn den Menschen 
wahr, indem er sie entgottet und profanisiert, in 
ihrer Eigenwirklichkeit und ihrem Eigengewicht sehen 
macht, in ihrer Sch~nheit und Drohung· anspricht und 
sie als Lebensraum und· Lebensmi ttel auf den Mens chen 
bezieht. ' ( 99) 
But Jesus also reveals that the alienation between God and man is the 
root of all evil and all other alienation, including that which exists 
between nature and culture. He removes the fundamental alienation 
and leaves humanity the task of overcoming and removing the others. (100) 
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This work of Jesus expands the breakthrough from death to life of his 
resurrection, which therefore transfonns nature as well as ht:nnani ty. 
This transfonnation 
'ist wirklich ••• von der Entfremdung zur wahr-
nehmungsreichen Beziehung, von der LUge zur Wahr-
heit, von der Knechtshaft zur Freiheit. (Sie] ist ein-
deutig in ihrer Tendenz des Uberwindens von 
Entfremdung und der Er5ffnung unentfremdeter 
Beziehung von Gott und Mensch und Natur ••• so wird 
aus dem zerfallenen Haus weltlicher Fremde das neue 
Haus, die neue Heimat. Der unbehauste Mensch 
findet sein Haus in der recht wahrgenommenen Einheit 
von Natur und Kultur.' (101) 
In section X, Dembowski outlines some of the practical implications 
of this new situation. There is a twofold relationship between 
humanity (culture included) and nature, and the two types of relation 
are differentiated yet belong together. Jh the work-relationship, 
' geht der Mensch so mit Na tur urn, dall er sie als Vorgabe 
distanziert, in ihrer Eigenart erkennt und aufgrund 
dieses Erkennens erfindungsreich verl:lndert/, gestal tet 
und nutzt, ohne sie zu zersWren' ; 
in the relationship of interaction, ht:nnanity deals with nature 
'da(1 er sie als Partner hegt, pflegt, zS.hmt und sie 
zu dem Ihren kommen lR /1 t, indem er zu dem Seinen 
kommt, in vertrauter, unentfremdeter Nl:lhe.'(l02) 
This is part of the right perception of nature within and around 
humanity for which it has been entrusted to man. This has the evident 
implication that ht:nnan science and technology should adapt themselves 
and their processes to the needs and processes of the natural order, 
though Dembowski does not draw this out. The insights of ecology and 
the scientific analysis of structure and process have clear relevance 
at this point. But Dembowski is content to conclude his programnatic 
outline of ecological theology with a cautious statement about the need 
for further interdisciplinary discussion (at Hofgeismar immediately, 
and generally thereafter). (103) 
The description of Dembowski's paper which I have given shows that 
it represents a deter:mined attempt to write an ecological theology 
fran a Barthian perspective. Dembowski's central concept is that of 
the rechte Wahmehmung, and the object of this right perception is the 
canplex of interrelationship between God, nature, humanity, and ht:nnan 
culture. This perception is revealed by Jesus Christ in the total work 
of his historical existence (including death and resurrection), which 
overcomes the alienation between man and God. This alienation is 
the root of the other alienations which characterise the existence 
of man in his self-contradiction, and of which the contemporary 
ecological crisis is but a symptom. With the overcoming of the 
fundamental alienation between God and man, the task of overcoming 
the consequent alienations has been entrusted to man. This can 
only be carried out by taking proper account of the scientific 
insights into nature, so that man's interaction with nature may be 
rightly perceived, guided, and enacted. This is the task of 
theology, and of ecological theology in particular: 
'Sie nimmt wahr, was Gott - Not wendend - getan hat, 
tut und tun wird. Sie n:immt wahr, was der Mensch 
daraufhin zu tun und zu lassen hat • • • Als Theorie der 
Praxis Gottes und der ihr entsprechenden Praxis des 
Menschen ist Wahrnehmung rechten Handelns das Ziel 
von Theologie.' (104) 
It ·is this view of the theological task which enables Dembowski to 
attempt an ecological theology, which 
'pat im Horizont der notwendenden Praxis Gottes im 
Wechselbezug von Kul tur und Natur konkrete Not und 
deren Wende wahrzunehmen.' (105) 
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Dembowski's paper therefore shows that ecological theology as defined 
•in section 1 above may be part of the discipline of systematic 
theology.· 
The next subsection adduces another example of a systematic 
approach to ecological theology - from process theology. 
(ii) A process theologian's perspective: John B. Cobb,Jr. 
I have four reasons for choosing my second example of a 
systematic ecological theology from the ranks of the process 
theologians. 
First, I need to show that my definition of ecological theology 
admits a number of different approaches to the task. The definition 
would be misleading if ecological theology were possible from the 
Barthian perspective and no other, since it would then be a 
peculiarity of that tradition which the definition should take into 
account. As it stands, the definition is stated in general tenns 
and its generality implies that, if ecological theology is part of 
systematic theology, it may be undertaken from any theological 
perspective. So a second example of existence is needed to justify 
the generality of the definition. 
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Second, process theology may be regarded as an unusual type of 
systematic theology. , J;t",is based on a pre-determined cosmology, 
that derived from the metaphysic of Alfred North Whitehead on the 
basis of the then contemporary scientific understanding of the world, . 
and supplemented by new scientific insights as necessary. Thus it 
appears to be a type of theology which Barth v.ould oppose, raising the 
objections of section 2 but on whose behalf the argurrents of section 3 
are not tmmediately. applicable. The choice of process theology 
therefore adds ·an element of richness and variety to the present 
discussion. 
Third, process theology makes a strong claim to provide a viable 
environmental ethic and the only world;.;.view which will ground such an 
ethic theologically. Thus John B. Cobb's book• J;~It Too Late? A 
Theology of Ecology is divided into tv;o parts: part one speaks of 
' . 
'The need for a New Vision', and part two describes 'The New Vision 
We Need'. (106) 
lf¥ last reason for choosing process theology relates to the sub-
seql.lent development of this thesis: I will be concerned with the 
discussions which have taken place in the Church and Society programme 
of the World Council of Churches. :Process Theologians have been 
active in these discussions, particularly Charles Birch, though Charles 
Hartshorne, John CQbb and David Griffin have also contributed. (107) 
But their contributions generally have taken the fonn of protests 
against the rrore tradi tiona! theological views , represented in the 
discussions, and which the process perspective finds inadequate. For 
their part, they have failed to give consistent articulation of the 
theological and philosophical background to their protest, and have 
concentrated on the ethical questions instead. (108) So this sub-
section provides a convenient place to air the ecological theology 
which underlies the process theologians' approach to. the Church and 
Society programme. 
As with Dembowski's paper, 1"I will describe but not criticise or 
evaluate. I am not concerned to debate the philosophical adequacy of 
Whitehead's metaphysics, .nor its adeq1.1acy in tenns of the contemporary 
scientific insight into the world's structl.J;res and processes. I am not 
concerned· to debate the claims process· theolog.i:ans ·.make ·about the 
inadequacies of classical theism, their claim. (against possible 
Barthian objections, fur example) to be regarded as theologically 
'legitimate', or even to debate any of the claims Which Cobb makes in 
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his exposition. My sole concern is. to demonstrate that, on the 
basis of the process theology assumptions and ways of arguing, ecol-
ogical theology may be part. of a process systematic theology; and 
therefore that the question at issue in this chapter may receive an 
affinna tive answer. ( 109) 
Jhave chosen John Cobb as my main exemplar-- as against 
Charles Hartshorne, the 'father' .of process theology, and Charles 
Birch, the main proponent of process theology in the ectnnenical forum 
-- because he has given the most sustained theological attention to 
the ecological crisis. My sources includes his books God and the 
World; A Christian Natural Theology Eased on the Thought of Alfred 
North Whitehead; Is It 'lbo Late? A Theology of Ecology; and a joint 
work with David Griffin which includes a chapter by Cobb titled 'The 
Global Crisis and a Theology of Survival'.(llO) Birch, however, has 
not published such an explicit articulation of the process stance, but 
since he and Cobb have worked in cooperation, an exposition of Cobb's 
approach may serve as an introduction to that of Birch.(lll) 
' I turn now to the logic of the process theology approach, as 
interpreted by Cobb. In God and the World, Cobb argues that 
'when the affinnation of the world is cut off from 
faith in God, it ultimately undercuts itself, and 
that a devotion to the divine which turns its back 
upon the 'WOrld is a rejection of the God known in 
Jesus Christ.' (112) 
His underlying conviction is 
'That the vision of the 'WOrld as creation is the 
context and presupposition of Christian belief and 
theology • • • The importance of the 'WOrld derives 
from its relation to God, and this relationship is 
such that faith in God expresses itself as the 
affinnation of the 'WOrld and involvement in it.' (113) 
The book's final chapter is titled 'Is Christian Theology Still Ibss-
ible?', and argues that the vision of the .world as creation has been 
lost to modern theology in its response to Htnne and Kant; he cites 
Barth, Bultmann, and Tillich as witnesses.(ll4) He then answers that 
Christian theology is not possible if the modern (Htnne-Kant') vision of 
reality is accepted as context and nonn, but that it may be possible on 
the basis of a 'postmodern' vision. He then states that 
• the Whiteheadian understanding of the world is post-
modern in the requisite sense. • • • it offers us a 
new interpretation of the world as creation, which 
provides an adequate and advantageous context for 
meaningful formulation of the central affirmation 
of Christian faith.' (115) 
72 
Whitehead's philosophy is strongly ecological in its view of the 
world's structure and in its general character, and Cobb describes it 
as an 'ecological philosophy'. The ecological character of the 
foundations is evident in the ethical and theological edifices Cobb 
builds upon them. It is on ecological grounds, for example, that 
Cobb finds the concept of stewardship inadequate as a description of 
the ethic of man's relationship to the nonhuman world. He suggests 
instead that the image of co~participat±on in a process of healing and 
growth would be more appropriate.(ll6) In part, this is based on 
the understanding of man's ecological continuity and congruity with 
the animal world. (117) But it is also based on an understanding of 
God • s relationship to the world: man is coparticipant with God as 
well as with nature. This helps give theological grounding to process 
theology's environmental concern. 
The theological grounding is supplied by the understanding of 
God's relationship with the world. God lures the world on, fran 
rroment to manent, with the aim of maximising 'beauty' and 'enjoyment'. 
Ideally, the process of healing ·and growth 
'makes for life and the enrichment of life, variety 
of forms,intensity of experience, consciousness, 
and love.' (118) 
The evolutionary process is interpreted in these terms, as a process 
of novelty and cornplexification which maximises beauty and enjoyment. 
( 120) Process theology also maintains that the world's history 
affects God in his consequent nature, so that ecological maladroitness 
on the part of man frustrates the lure of God, at least 12ro t~. 
Because 
'God is the unified experience of all things, [heJ 
is impoverished when the rich complexity of the 
biosphere is reduced ••• The divine experience is 
most enriched as it receives the widest variety of 
types of enjoyment. To simplify, even for the 
sake of the individually most .important contriliutor 
[man], is still to impoverish. This appeal to God 
simply brings to consciousness our prereflective 
sense that we live not only for our own enjoyment 
but also for the Whole of which we are parts.'(l21) 
This grounds an ecological ethic in two ways. First, comnibnent to 
God seeks to align human life with the creative process, to promote 
life in its variety and intensity; but also to maintain a sensitivity 
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to the total long- and shorb-te:r:m ecological consequences of human action, 
in order to promote and maxiinise 'beauty'. (122) Second, since God's 
purpose is the evocation of beauty throughout his created world (in 
which all entities are constituted by the capacity to experience), the 
human alignment with God's purposes respects the experiencing subject-
ivity of the nonhuman world and its contribution to the total beauty of 
the world: this results in a reverence and respect for the nonhuman 
world based on its subj~ctivity.(l23) As a free agent, man may choose 
not to align himself with God, in which case he is not a coparticipant 
with nature and God in the creative process, but a source of evil and 
destruction. (124) 
Process theology is based on an ecological understanding of the 
world, media ted through Whitehead's metaphysics, and includes a theolog-
ical sensitivity to the world's ecological structure which lends itself 
to and expresses itself in an ecological ethic (if only in ei'!JPrvQ).{l25) 
But does this make all process theology 'ecological' ',P Not in the sense 
in which I have defined the tenn 'ecological theology' • Ecological 
theology concentrates on the cosmos and the human place and influence" 
therein. Thus the process theologians' discourse about the cosmos in 
its relationship to God is not, in itself, ecological theology. Nor is 
their theological anthropology, insofar as it is concerned with human 
existence per g~, as in the discussion of the human soul or the struct-
ures of human existence in te:r:ms of consciousness and experience.(l26) 
The locus of ecological theology from the process perspective is the 
discussion of the human relationship to the cosmos. This has two 
aspects. First, process theology stresses the biological and ecolog~ 
ical congruity of the human species with the animal-natural world. 
Second, it affi:r:ms the positive value of human science and technology, 
if directed aright, in the achievement of God's creative purposes for 
the world. 
Process theology charges that the imago Dei tradition has been 
magnified out of proportion in Christian theology. This has led 
' to a threefold distindtion of God, man ·and nature 
against the more basic biblical distinction of 
creator and creation. It is the image of creature-
hood which we need now to recover without the loss 
of the biblical sense of man as the apex of 
creation.' (127) 
The image of cocreaturehood seeks to redress the balance by taking 
seriously man's inclusion within nature. In biological and ecological 
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tenus, humanity is a species and may be studiecf and understood by the 
same general means· as those used in the biological and ecological studies 
of other species. Man has evolved with and from the nonhuman world 
to which his life is still inextricably linked, and Cobb states that this 
insight is of 'great importance' for 'man's fundamental self-understand-
ing'. (128) He discusses the assertion that 'man is his body', which 
seems to provide adequate theological stress on man's inclusion in 
nature.(l29) But this assertion presents problems with respect to the 
notion of 'person'. These are best resolved, says Cobb, if man is 
regarded as fully a part of nature, whose distinctiveness within the 
natural order is manifest, but is also contiguous with the qualities 
evident in that order to such a degree that of itself this distinctive-
ness does not provide adequate grounds for separating man from nature. 
He concludes that 
'To know myself as within nature is to know that the 
ecological system of interpenetration and inter-
dependence includes me, both my body and my person-
ality • • • ~it is to cease to think of [an indi viduaU 
"person" as existing prior to or independently of his 
relations [which] extend throughout the body and through-
out the wider environment.' (130) 
The other aspect of the human place and influenc~ in the cosmos 
relates to the power of self-actualisation given to man as a free and 
creative agent in the cosmos. Cobb argues that 
'God seems to call every living thing to a self-
actualisation in which immediate satisfaction looms 
large. That means that God values intensities of 
feeling even at ,the price of endangering harmony and 
order. ~~·the long run, future entities· can them-
selves achieve higher values only when this risk is 
taken. The evolutionary process has finally led to 
man, who is capable in principle of unlimited concern 
for others; and where this capability is present, God 
calls for its fullest actualisation.' (131) 
The' price of endangering hannony and order' may, because of human 
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activity, be paid in the coin of human self-destruction; but this is a 
risk which God is prepared to take for the sake of his goal of 
maximising the creation's novelty, camplexi ty, and beauty. Is the.goal 
worth the risk? Yes, if the human concern for others (including the 
subjects of the nonhuman world) is fully actualised in man, for then 
'process theology maintains that science guided by 
imaginative vision can find ways whereby a relatively 
large (though certainly limited) human population 
can enter into new and finer forms of enjoyment that are 
compatible with sharing the earth with· many other 
species.' (132) 
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Process theology claims to supply the imaginative vision that is needed, 
in terms of alignment with God's creative purpose and process, co-
participation in the process of healing and growth, and in tenus of 
belief in God: 
'To believe in God is to trust his creative work 
amongst and within us, to adapt ourselves to it, 
to attend to it a~ it operates in all creatures, 
to sensitize ourselves to it as it works in us, and 
to respond to its call to new risks. Belief in God 
is thus • • • a part of a total vision within which 
science and technology can become servants of life 
rather than conquerors of nature.'(l33) 
That is, God's lure of creative-responsive love may also IDrk through 
human science and technology to achieve and realise God's ultimate 
purposes, as long as these human enterprises are directed to the 
enrichment of life and the rnaxiriri.sing of 'beauty'. 
It is not possible for me to do justice to the complex and 
specialised ideas and vocabulary of process theology, or the subtle-
ties of its arguments, in the space of a few pages. I have supplied 
only the barest sketch necessary for the purpose of this subsection, 
namely to show how ecological theology may be part of systematic 
theology undertaken from the process perspective. Two aspects of 
Cobb's treatment stand out: the stress upon humanity's continuity and 
congruity with the nonhuman world, and the conditionally positive 
affinnation of science and technology as agents of God's responsive-
creative-luring relationship to the world. 
, It is interesting to make a brief comparison between Cobb and 
Dembowski at this point. Both ecological theologies include the 
concept of a 'right perception' of nature and the complex of inter-
relationships between God, the human species, human culture, and nature. 
For process theology, this is the imaginative vision necessary for 
belief and cornmi tment; this perception is infonned by the sciences and 
by Whitehead's metaphysical interpretation of nature, man and God. 
But for Dembowski, this perception is informed theologically, in the 
man Jesus Christ. He and Cobb are, ·methodologically, poles apart. 
Yet both agree that the human relation to nature involves nurture and 
cultivation wl)rch-a-llows-nat;u;J;e-tG-'-ooms'-intG-it-s-Gwn-' ().;)ernOOwsk-i-)-anEl..---
to enhance the richness and complexity of life (Cobb). Dembowski 
speaks of partnership between man and nature, Cobb of coparticipation 
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with nature and God in the creative process. Science and technology 
may play their ·part in this nurturing:· Dembowski is silent about their 
evaluation, but Cobb gives them a positive, if conditional, affinuation. 
This means that, ultimately, Cobb and Dembowski are saying similar 
things about environmental ethics, in spite of the differences in 
theological approach. If the charge recorded in Chapter One -- that 
Christian theology has fostered an aggressive and exploitative attitude 
to nature - has any truth in it, then at least two recent ecological 
theologians have sought, from their different perspectives, to set the 
record straight again. 
To conclude this chapter and to settle its thanatic question in 
the affinuative, it is necessa:ry to show how ecological theology may 
be undertaken in the light of biblical scholarship and the traditional 
concerns of theological discourse. 
section. 
This is done in the next sub-
(iii) The Bible and ecological theology. 
This chapter has debated the question· whether the discipline of 
systematic theology may include ecological theology. Two recent 
ecological theologies have been described, to add definiteness to the 
plausibility of an affinna.tive implied by the debate to the end of 
section 3. But there is another question, not yet touched on: the 
question of resources for the task of writing an ecological theology. 
The science of ecology and the other sciences in general provide 
the necessa:ry technical and infonna. tional resources. , In the practical 
task of writing, this resource may supply the vocabula:ry and the body 
of concepts needed to give an infonned, coherent, and convincing 
ecological character to the theological discourse. Subsection 3(ii) 
above discussed the status of this technical resource, concluding that 
it may be pr~:ry and authoritative (as in process theology), or 
seconda:ry. If it is to be seconda:ry, then it is necessary to 
ascertain the extent of the primary theological resource available for 
the task. 
The Bible provides an obvious resource, since it includes theolog-
ical interpretations of the cosmos and humanity's place therein, and 
since it is traditionally esteemed as a gereral theological resource of 
unique authority. so this section will concentrate on the relevance of 
the biblical witness for the task of ecological theology. 
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There are two other reasons for paying special attention to the 
biblical witness at this point in the debate. As noted in Chapter One 
above, it is sometimes statecl that the Bible has provided the inspir-
ation for and the proof texts to justify an aggressive and exploitative 
attitude towards nature, and is therefore a significant contributory 
cause of the contemporary envirornuental :imbalance and crisis • As well, 
it is sometimes stated that the Bible fosters an attitude of contempt 
for, and therefore (ecological) neglect of, this historical world in 
favour of the world to come. Both of these charges imply that there is 
a need to find out what the Bible actually does say about the cosmos 
and humanity's place in it, by examining it afresh. (134) 
The s~cond reason is that there is evidence of some malfunction in 
the process of theological application of biblical scholarship, and this 
has appeared in one of the theological discogrses relevant to ecological 
theology -- the doctrine of creation. There is a close correspondence 
between the theologians' and the biblical scholars' interpretations of 
the biblical material on creation, which in itself would be a healthy 
consensus, except that their common view is not faithful to the breadth 
and complexity of the biblical reflection on creation. The consensus 
has been that the biblical interest in creation is secondary to the 
biblical concern about man and his salvation; this has led to an 
impoverishment of the theological attention to the place of nature in the 
divine economy.(l35) This gives added impetus to the need mentioned 
above, to take a fresh look at what the Bible has to say about the 
cosmos and man' s place in it. 
Two new approaches to this problem have appeared in recent years, 
which I will now describe briefly. These are by Claus Westermann, the 
distinguished Old Testament scholar, and the biblical theologian Odil 
Hannes Steck. 
In 1968, Westenuann published Der Segen in der Bibel und im 
Handeln der Kirche. (136 ) There he argues that the word 'salvation' 
has been used uncritically and imprecisely, and that this usage has 
been assumed to correspond to the Greek <t"'-'TtfP~• This has led to a 
confusion between the event of deliverance and the state of having been 
delivered, and the event has come to (an unwarranted) theological 
prominence at the expense of the condition the deliverance initiates. In~ 
its turn, this has led to a non-biblical view of God's dealings with 
mankind. Theology has had a one-dimensional view of salvation, as 
act-of-deliverance; the Bible has a two-dimensional view, in which God's 
blessing is there alongside his deliverance.(l37). 
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In his saving acts, God is experienced.· as· the one who comes to 
his people. These acts do not of themselves supply the eleuent of 
continuity and constancy necessary for human existence, and which is 
the sphere of God's presence amongst his people as the one who blesses 
and sustains. Thus Westenmann argues that 
' In addition to (God' s "mighty acts"] , experienced in events, 
God's work with his people includes things manifested not in 
deeds but in processes (such as] the growth and multiplying 
of the people and the effects of the forces that preserve 
their physical life • • • l).ncluding] growth, prosperity, 
and success in all their forms.' (138) 
The task of speaking of God in the. light of the meaning and significance 
of blessing, and of God's bestowal of blessing, is the task of elabor-
ating a 'theology of blessing'.(l39) Here the Priestly corpus represents 
an extreuely important source, for it includes within its scope the 
entire history of blessing, with all its possibilities. 
in Genesis 1, 
For example, 
'the concept of blessing has the widest meaning that it 
has anywhere in the Bible. The creator blesses what 
he has created -- all mankind and all living 
creatures ••• ' (140) 
Subsequently, Westennann developed these insights into the concept 
of blessing in his massive commentary on Genesis, using the concept of 
das Urgeschehen. This is, in sum, 
'die Bedingung der Erfahrung, auch der geschicht-
lichen Erfahrung, es stellt den MBglichkeitsraum 
elementarer Erfahrung zusammen. Urgeschehen ist 
das, was "in, mit, und unter" jeder Erfahrung 
miterfahren wird.' (141) 
It relates to the universal history of God with his creation, and the 
regularities of the phenomena of human existence; in Barth's tenus, the 
lights and words and truths which shine in the creaturely world. Thus 
Westermann is following a line in biblical scholarship parallel to that 
traced by Barth for systematic theology (and discussed briefly in my 
section 3 above) • 
I have mentioned Weste~1's work because it marks a new direct-
ion in biblical scholarship's concern to ascertain what the Bible does 
say about the cosmos. There is another reason, linked to the subse-
quent course of this thesis. One of the main theological contributors 
to the conference on Faith, Science and the Future (1979) based his 
theological and exegetical approach on Westennan' s category of dag 
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Urgeschehen, stating that this concept justifies ~kolog~sc!2e AusJ,~ 
of the biblical texts. (142) I will discuss this in Chapter Four, Sect-
ion 3 below. 
My other example of a new approach arises in direct response to 
the theological challenge implied by the environmental crisis. 'Ih 1978 
Odil Hannes Steck published Welt und Umwelt,. in which he sought to 
answer the question about the relevance of the Bible to this oomtempor-
ary crisis.(l43) Steck is a young biblical scholar, who received his 
doctorate in New Testament studies in 1965, and is now Professor of Old 
Testament at Zurich. To my knowledge, his book represents the only 
lengthy and detailed examination of the biblical material which has been 
undertaken specifically with an eye on the theme of man's relationship 
to the environment. However, his material plays no further part in 
the development of this thesis, so I shall give only a very brief out-
line of what he says: this cannot hope to do justice to his book, but 
this brevity is justified by the direction of my thesis. 
His biblical source material includes most of the New Testament, 
but is more selective in its reference to the Old Testament; there, 
he uses only the Yahwist's and the Priestly pre-histories, and Psalm 
104. He investigates seven aspects of the Old Testament statement: 
statements about 
(1) the widening perspective of the natural world, and environment; 
(2) the natural world and environment as creative and initial event; 
(3) the natural world and environment and what is known of it in the 
world picture; 
(4) the gift of life as the basic experience which gives man his 
bearings in his perception of the natural world and environment; 
(5) Yahweh and the natural world and environment; 
( 6) the view taken of man and his shaping of the natural world and 
environment; and 
(7) the problem of the natural world and environment as creation,in 
the light of negative experiences of its power. 
The New Testament investigation is briefer because there are 
fewer texts on the subject, and because many of them presuppose (but 
do not add to) Old Testament insights already described. In the 
New Testament section, therefore, Steck concentrates on the new 
insights and supplenents to the Old Testament statements. ( 144) . 
This results in four·more thematic investigations,of 
80 
(l) Jesus Christ as God.' s entry into the natural world and environment; 
(2) the natural world an~ environment in the light of Christ's corning; 
(3) the future of the natural world and environment in the light of 
Christ's coming; and 
(4) the preservation of the natural world and environment as the goal 
of faith. 
The YIOrk does not penni t easy surrrnary. Two citations may serve 
to give sane of its flavour: the biblical testilnony .implies 
'that true validity and primacy should be conceded to 
the elemental, fundamental value of natural life, 
both human and nonhuman, for this is in accordance 
with the Creator's acts.' (145) 
Creation itself is an ongoing process which is directed towards all the 
living, and which includes and gives value to man and nature equally. 
Therefore 
'to preserve the natural world and environment as a goal 
of faith in action is therefore love of our neighbour 
in a form related to our experience of God the creator. 
This experience must be given expression in appropriate 
acts of love on the part of the believer. In our 
present situation especially, this love of our neighbour 
is certainly not restricted to the elemental life of men 
and women in their natural, given world. • • • Such 
neigbourly love, since it also means "cocreatureliness" 
on the part of man, certainly also includes nonhuman 
life. For according to the New Testament, the world 
of creation is not only for man,but,together with him, 
is prepared for God's future salvation.' (146) 
It is interesting to note here that Steck is implying an 
environmental ethic similar in its general tenor to that espoused by 
Dembowski and Cobb. This consensus may represent a yielding to 
environmentalist pressure on the part of theologians, or it may 
represent a recovery of an under-emphasised Christian truth. But 
that makes another thesis. 
The biblical material itself indicates that an ecological theology 
which takes its cue from the Bible will draw on at least three areas of 
theological discourse: the doctrines of creation, theological anthro-
pology, and eschatology. Steck touches on each of these in his expo-
sition. They are unavoidable because the Bible points the inquirer 
in these directions. It speaks of the cosmos as created and sustained 
by God (Genesis 1 and 2, Psalm 104, Hebrews 11:3): of humanity's place 
in it as steward, image of God, and vulnerable creature; and of a new 
heaven, new earth, and celestial city (Revelation 20 and 21, Ezekiel 48), 
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the resurrection of the physical body (1 Corinthians 15), and the 
eschatological liberation of the nonhuman world- from its bondage to 
futility and decay (Romans 8: 18ff). These areas may be held together 
in a Christology of cosmic significance -(JDhn 1, Colossians 1); this 
functions as a sort of theological synthesis. (147) The concrete aspect 
of the biblical witness is found, however, in the doctrines of creation, 
anthropology, and eschatology, and ecological theology will elaborate 
these in conjunction with scientific insight into the world's structure 
and processes, including human synecology. ( 148) 
If 'creation' is understood as the theological discourse about the 
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cosmos in its own reality and in its relationship to God; 'anthropology' 
as discourse about man as he is in himself (with his culture and his 
capacity for science and technology and hence environmental manipulation) 
and about man specifically as he is in relation to his environment 
(including his biological contiguity with the nonhuman world, and h±s 
ecological vulnerability) ; and 'eschatology' as discourse about the 
metahistorical Kingdom of God, in all its aspects (including the degrees 
of continuity and discontinuity between this contemporary historical 
existence, and the rri.etahistorical), 
then 'ecological theology' may be understood as the attempt to 
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coordinate theological discourse about creation, anthropology, and 
eschatology with the insights· available from ecology and the life, 
natural, and social sciences. In this way ecological theology may 
have a biblical frame of reference. 
************************ 
· -:r have shown in this present chapter that ecological theology may 
be defined consistently and coherently, as theological discourse about 
the systematic unity of the cosmos and humanity's place and influence 
therein, with special reference to the provisionally valid insights 
of ecology and the sciences generally. I have shown that ecological 
theology so defined may be part of the discipline of systematic theology, 
and may be undertaken from several theological perspectives. 
Ergo: I conclude that ecological theology, as defined in Section 
1 above, may be part of the academic discipline of sys·tematic theology. 
This justifies my attempt to write a theological' survey of ecological 
theology in the .context of the Church and 'Society programme of the World 
Council of Churches. 
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CHAPTER I:ti: The M.I.T. Conference and its Ba.ckground. 
The MITconference was an official function of the subunit on 
Church and Society within the World Council of Churches. It was not 
a function of the World Council itself, even though its official 
report is subtitled 'Report of the World Council of Churches' Confer-
ence on Faith, Science and the Future'.(!) 
The Church and Society subunit is a subunit of the Programme Unit 
on Faith and Witness. (2) It is the direct descendant of the Life and 
Work Movement, which was founded at the World Missionary Conference at 
Edinburgh in 1910, and held its own conferences at Stockholm (1925) and 
Oxford (1937) before its merger with the Faith and Order Movement at 
Utrecht in 1938 and the fonnal inception of the World Council of Churches 
at Amsterdam in 1948. (3) It is now headed by Paul Abrecht, who has 
been with the subunit since 1954. The subunit has a committee which 
prepares programme plans for approval by the World Council's Central 
Committee; this is the Working Group on Church and Society, and it is 
presently chaired by Charles Birch. As a subunit, Church and Society 
is bound by the wee Constitution, and therefore may not issue any public 
statement without the prior approval of the Central Committee (or an 
Assembly). (4) 
This means that the MIT conference has an official and bureau-
cratic history within the World Council, but that its historical back-
ground and theological endeavours are to be placed in the context of the 
ongoing Church and Society programme. Since the world Council's 
inception, the only other conference in that programme, comparable to 
MIT in size and scope, was that held in Geneva in 1966 on the theme 
'Christians in the Technical and Social Revolutions of our Time'. 
This conference provides a natural starting point for an account of 
the background to MIT , though the evolution of the MIT conference 
theme itself must be traced through the broader regions of World Council 
social ethics. 
This chapter aims to provide a historical and theological intro-
duction to the MIT conference in the context of the Church and Society 
programme and beginning with the 1966 Geneva Conference. This is 
done in the first two sections, by tracing the evolution of the confer-
ence theme (Section 1) and the Church and Society programme and its 
theological characteristics prior to MIT (Section 2). The ecological 
theology of the MIT conference itself is then examined (Section 3) • 
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This survey of the Church and. Society materials will show that there 
are four main theological approaches represented therein during the 
period 1966-1979; they will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four. 
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l. The conference theme and its evolution. 
The Fifth wee Assembly at Nairobi (in 1975) authorised a continu-
ing prograrmne to explore 'the Contribution of Faith, Science and 
Technology to the Struggle for a Just and Sustainable society'. (5) 
The Working Group on Church and Society outlined a prograrrme of study 
and action on the scientific and technical problems and the ethical 
issues involved in the transition to a just, participatory and sus-
tainable society, leading up to a world conference on this theme in 
1979; this formed part of its proposed five-year programme for 1976 -
1981. (6) The new Central Corrmittee gave its approval, adding that 
this conference was to be the main concern of the C&S subunit. (7) 
Such are the fonmal origins of the MIT. conference. 
The official theme of the conference was 'The Contribution of 
Faith, Science and Technology to the Struggle for a Just, Participatory 
and sustainable Soeiety' ._ (8) In this section, I atterrpt to trace the 
history of that theme in two parts. The first relates to the broader 
issue of the struggle for the just and. participatory and sustainable 
society, and falls within the history of the World Council's social 
ethics; it is the subject of the first subsection. The second relates 
to the particular concern of the C&S subunit within that social ethic, 
namely the way faith, science and technology .impinge on the achieve-
ment of that goal; this specialist subtherre is discussed in sub-
section (ii). 
{i) The conference theme in the hist0:cy of wee social ethics. 
Since its inception, the wee has sought to define and articulate 
its conception of a, b~!te.r earthly society, compatible with Christian 
commitment and for whose realisation Christians shoUld strive. It 
began with the goal of the 'responsible' sGciety, but the current goal 
is the Jr!BS ~the just, participatory, and sustainable society. This 
sub-section attempts to ·chart the transition. 
The First WCC Assembly, at Amsterdam in 1948, fonnulated the 
concept of the responsible society. Such a society is 
'one where freedom is the freedom of men who acknow-
ledge responsibility to justice and public order 
and where those who hold political authority or 
economic power are responsible for its exercise to 
God and to the people whose welfare is affected by 
it. (9) 
l 
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The concept of the responsible socie~ was used there to present an 
alternative third course, between socialism on the one hand and 
laissez-faire capitalism on the other. (10) The concept itself is the 
brainchild of Joseph Oldham, and it is clear from his exposition of 
it that the responsible society depends upon an ethic of justice and 
the ideal of participatory decision-making.(ll) The Amsterdam Assembly 
endorsed these: 
'For a society to be responsible under modern conditions 
it is required that:the people . have freedom to control, 
to criticise. and to change their governments, [and] 
that power ••• be distributed as widely as possible 
throughout the whole corrnnunity. It is required that 
economic justice and. provision of .equali.ty of oppor-
tunity be established for all members of society. • ( 12) 
The theological heart of the responsible society is given in terms of a 
Christian understanding of man's nature: 
'Man is created and called to be a free being respon-
sible to God and to his neighbour. • (13) 
The responsible society concept featured in the World Council 
discussions for the next twen~ years, making its final appearance at 
the Fourth Assembly, at Uppsala in 1968. The Second Assembly 
(Evanston, Illinois, 1954) gave the concept a critical focus; it was not 
an alternative social systEm, but 
'a criterion by which we judge all existing social 
orders and at the same time a standard to guide us.' (14) 
The Evanston Assembly then set forth a series of criteria by which 
Christians could assess political institutions, and these criteria 
were subsequently endorsed by the New Delhi (Third) Assembly of 1961. ( 15) 
By then, the international climate had changed significantly. The 
East-West power-bloc conflict was still a powerful force in world 
politics, as it had been in 1948; but the concerns of postwar recon-
struction had given way to those of econcmic development and the 
emergence of independent but politically inexperienced nation states.(l6) 
The responsible socie~ concept took on a global perspective. ( 17) 
Within these new nations, the need for government strong enough to 
promote heal thy economic develo);lllent, but in practice lacking the 
experience, traditions and structures that would facilitate such 
government, meant that the question of cormni tment to public order must 
be faced anew because it may conflict with the corrmitment to" jp.stice. (18) 
What Amsterdam had joined together new circumstances were putting 
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assunder. Thus, by the late sixties, several ecumenically-sponsored 
conferences had called for a review of the responsible society concept 
because the knsterdam formulation seemed inapplicable and inappropriate 
in the new circumstances. (19) 
The 1966 e&s conference in Geneva had used the responsible 
society concept, but began to Bubsti tute the humanum as an alter-
native concept; that is, 
more explicitly around a 
future and purpose.(20) 
the goal of. social ethics was to be framed 
theological understanding of man's nature, 
The Uppsala (Fourth) Assenbly noted this, 
and that there had been a convergence of interests in several wee 
depart:rrents, relating to the nature and destiny of man. This led to 
the foundation of the Humanum Study. (21) At the time, it was hoped 
that e&S would participate in and benefit from this study. As it 
happened, it went in a different direction and is not particularly 
relevant to the MIT background; a parallel and complementary study 
within the e&s programne, the Futurum project, will be more im}?Ortant 
for my purposes and will be discussed in detail in section 2.(22) 
Historically, the Humanum study marks the first stage of the transition 
from the responsible society goal to that of the JPSS. 
The reference to the criterion of the human represents a re-
formulation rather than a change of direction in ecmmenical social 
ethics, occasioned by new economic, political and global circumstances. 
The kusterdam definition had been based on a theological understanding 
of man, and the ethic of justice together with the ideal of participa-
tory decision-making were both retained in the new approach. (23) 
Ecumenical social ethics was thus digging deeper, to the roots of the 
responsible society concept.(24) Justice and participation were 
regarded as essential to a society which did not thwart the full 
developnent of man that God intended for him at his creation. 
The transition from the responsible society concept to that of 
the JPSS is therefore fairly smooth and self-evident, as it passes 
through the criterion of the human and the disappointment of the 
Humanum study to its present refonnulation. (25) The only item which 
needs further explanation is the adjective 'sustainable': how did it 
enter ecumenical social ethics? 
In the late sixties, ecumenical thought about science and tech-
nology included a great measure of enthusiasm about the opportunities 
they offered for human welfare.(26) The only concern about the 
world's resources related to their equitable distribution within the 
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human community, so that the resources for economic development 
would be available to all; in the case of scarce or diminishing 
commodities, there was a. prevailing optimism that science and tech-
nology would be able to invent satisfactory substitutes. (27) The 
New Delhi Assembly had drawn attention to the need for an understand-
ing of the relationships between God, man, and nature, but the 
subsequent Geneva conference approached only the social and economic 
implications of scientific and technological progress without calling 
its assumptions into question or attempting what New Delhi had called 
'a theology of nature'.(28) 
The ecological crisis helped call one of those economic 
assumptions into question. Economic growth could only be maintained 
within the global Limits of resources available, and a policy of 
'development for all' would lead to the collapse of the economic 
system. This undercut the traditional social justiceethic at its 
foundations, since it implied that plans for social revolution to be 
followed by ever-increasing economic development were 1 at best 
problematic, at worst futile or destructive'. (29) Thus it was 
necessary to redirect social ethics towards a global society whose 
economic structure was in some sort of equilibriun"with the world's 
resource capacity. 
It was also necessary to consider the effects of contemporary 
action upon future generations, since it was realised that science and 
technology may improve the lot of the present generation by rrortgag-
ing the welfare of future generations to an unacceptable level. For 
example, a just and participatory society which depends upon a non-
renewable resource such as petrol for the continuance of its structure. 
will have its structure jeopardised if that resource is exhausted 
before a substitute can be invented or an alternative non-dependent 
social structure developed.(30) Justice and participation in future 
societies may depend on wise husbandry of resources by this generation, 
and intergenerational justice is inextricably linked to sustain-
ability. (31) 
The C&S world conference at Bucharest in 1974 drew these threads 
together and defined the 'sustainable' society as a long-term goal for 
social ethics: 
'Once the material conditions of today' s poor have 
been improved, the crucial objective will become the 
avoidance of forced.regression (e.g. through the 
collapse of a .,highly stressed agricultural system) 
to a less desirable state. The goal must be a 
robust,. sustainable society, where ea{;;h.::_individual 
can feel secure that his/her quality of life will 
be maintained or improved. We can already· 
delineate some of the necessary characteristics 
of this enduring society. First, social stability 
cannot be obtained without an equitable distribution 
of what is in scarce supply or without common 
opportunity to participate in social decisions. 
Secondly, a robust global society will not be 
sustainable unless the need for food is at any time 
well below the global capacity to supply it, and 
unless the emissions of pollutants are well below 
the capacity of the ecosystem to absorb them. 
Third, the new social organisation will be sUstainable 
only as long as the rate of use of non-renewable 
resources does not outrun the increase in resources 
made available through technological innovation. 
Finally, a sustainable society requires a level of 
human activity which is not adversely influenced 
by the never ending, large and frequent natural 
variation in global climate.' (32) 
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The sustainable society is therefore something oLa utopia, and was 
consciously modelled on the utopian idea. (33) ;, .. ;rJ:s content is also 
similar to the concepts of 'global equilibrium' and • equilibrium state • 
of the (first) report to the Club of Rome, which had helped to 
popularise the limits to growth thesis in secular debate when the 
report appeared in 1972.(34) 
Following the Bucharest conference, the World Council's Central 
Committee proposed that C&S investigate 'the socio-economic and ethical 
implications of the idea of a sustainable and just society'.(35) After 
the Nairobi Assembly, the new Central Corrmittee expressed its social 
ethic under the heading of 'The struggle for the Just, Participatory 
and Sustainable Society' , and authorised C&S to explore the ways in 
which faith, science and technology impinge upon that concern. (36) The 
World Council social ethic and the MIT conference theme thus achieved 
their final contemporary forms in 1976. 
In accepting that the goal should include some concept of sustain-
ability, the question was immediately raised, as to how concern for 
sustainability should relate to the traditional concerns for a partici-
patory and just society. In case of conflict, where do the 
priorities lie? 
The question of participation in a sc~tifically and technolog-
ically oriented society is vexed by the need for specialist information 
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about the foreseeable consequences and implications of proposed actions, 
and the existence and feasibility of alternatives. Thus vested interest 
may effectively. control 'participatory' decision-making, by witholding 
information. This may result in extravagant use of resources, based 
on lirunediate economic expediency rather than concern for sustainability 
in the long-term. On the other hand, if the common will be that 
the standard of living (and therefore of resource .consumption) be 
increased or maintained at a high level, as in the affluent nations, 
then full participation may jeopardise the achievement of sustain-
ability. It may also jeopardise the achievement of justice, as the 
rich and powerful compete for an ever-diminishing supply of resources 
in order to secure their standard of living. 
There is no easy and direct relationship between sustainability 
and participation. The possibility of open conflict between the goals 
of sustainability and justice makes the JPSS concept even more difficult. 
This conflict of priori ties has erupted frequently in the ecumenical 
forum, and was given typically forceful expression at MIT in one 
participant's paraphrase of 1 John 4:20 
'If you claim to be concerned about the tmborn humanity 
that you cannot see, but show no regard for the human-
ity that you can see all around you, then you are a 
liar.' (37) 
The long-term perspective is implicit in the sustainability goal and 
extends to future generations, but it adds a complicating factor to 
the relationship between sustainability and social justice. (38) 
The Bucharest report had emphasised that sustainability had to be 
achieved in relation to a new measure of human solidarity and justice, 
and this link was later emphasised by Charles Birch in his address to 
the Nairobi Assembly.(39) The C&S working group also linked the two, 
in its corrrrnent that 
'A sustainable society which is unjust can hardly 
be worth sustaining. A just society that is un-
sustainable is self-defeating.' (40) 
Nevertheless, the Nairobi Assembly asked that the relationship of sus-
tainability to justice and participation be studied further, 
especially in the context of the continued rapid spread of science and 
technology throughout the world. (41) In 1977 I the wee Central 
Carmittee appointed an Advisory Corrmittee on 'The Search for a Just, 
Participatory and Sustainable Society', which presented its report 
to the Central Corrmittee in 1979. It concluded that 
'more clarity and fuller articulation were needed, 
especially regarding the sustainability aspect.'(42) 
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The report itself had given little attention to the sustainability 
concept, or its relationship to justice and participation. 
Thus the complex of ideas associated with the sustainable 
society requires further elaboration and exploration in the World 
Council's social ethics.(43) One fact is clear fvam its definition 
in the Bucharest reports: that its foundation is the concept of 
humanum, a theological understanding of man's nature and dignity. ( 44) 
Its relationship with justice and participation is problematic, but it 
nevertheless shares a common foundation with those concepts, in 
Christian anthropology. This is confi:rmed by the Nairobi Assembly's 
guidelines for future programmes, in which the struggle for the just 
(participatory) and sustainable society is placed in the sphere of the 
struggle for true humanity: 
'all programnes should be conceived and .implemented in 
a way that expresses the basic Christian imperative 
to participate in the struggle for human dignity and 
social justice • • • /)'he programneEi/ will have to 
acknowledge that in struggling for true humanity we 
are confronted with the power of sin and evil mani-
fested in human injustice and oppression. [This 
guideline irnplie~ the continued search for the foundation 
of a just and sustainable society, taking into account 
both the need for a new international economic order 
and the concern for self-reliant and participatory fo:rms 
of developnent ••• '(45) 
In this subsection, I have shown how the social ethics of the 
World Council of Churches has passed through three provisional formu-
lations: the 'responsible' society (Amsterdam, 1948), the humanum 
concept (Uppsaia, 1968) ,and the subsequent Humanum Study), and the 
present concept of the 'just, participatory and sustainable' society 
(Nairobi, 1975) • The concept of sustainability and its relation to 
justice and participation requires further exploration; though this 
need has been felt, the issues remain unresolved in the report of the 
JIBS Advisory Cormnittee (1979) • ·rt: has also been shown that the 
theological heart of the three provisional fonnulations of World Council 
social ethics has remained constant in expression, if not specific 
interpretation: A Christian theological understanding of man's nature, 
dignity, and destiny. 
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This places the social ethic part of the MIT conference theme in 
ecumenical and historical perspective. I turn now to the particular 
concern of the Church and Society subunit, namely 'the contribution 
of faith, science and technology' to the realisation of this ethical 
goal. 
(ii) The MIT conference in the C&S context. 
The World Council's concerns about the social implications .of 
scientific and technological progress have provided the stimulus for 
the Church and Society programme since its inception. This has 
involved C&S in two extended investigative programmes, and two confer-
ences on the grand scale.(46) This subsection will.trace the 
development of C&S attitudes to and assumptions about science and 
technology, and show that the MIT conference is the conceptual heir 
of the Futurum project. 
Ecumenical thought has long been concerned with the impact of 
industrialisation (science and technology) upon human existence. The 
StockhoLm conference declared in 1925, that 
'the soul is the supreme value [and] must not be 
subordinated to the rights of property or to the 
mechanisms of industry ••• Therefore we contend 
for the free and full development of the human 
personality.' (47) 
In this it was followed by the 1937 Oxford conference. (48) For the 
1948 Amsterdam Assembly, J.H. Oldham prepared a study on 'Technics and 
Civilisation', and the Assembly itself listed 'undirected developments 
of technology' as one of the main factors contributing to the contem-
porary disorder of society. ( 49) The Rapid Social Change study 
(1955 - 1961) was concerned with social change ~r s~, with particular 
reference to the problems of the underdeveloped nations. Though not 
directly concerned with science and technology, this study took up the 
allied theme of economic expansion; the transference of western 
technology and capital was seen as the most effective means of 
achieving economic development in the developing countries. Resources 
are there for the using, provided by God for the appropriate use of 
science and technology to improve the quality of human existence; one 
conference report states that 
'it still remains true that it is· proper for man 
to glorify God in the use of the riches of the 
earth ••• To make use of what we have for widen-
ing the opportunities before us and for searching 
out God's will is, we believe, to please Him,' 
and states that, in the matter of economic development, the most 
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important means to a more equitable distribution of wealth is a more 
thorough use of the world's resources. (50) The subsequent New 
Delhi Assembly was unable . to cope with all the issues raised by the 
Rapid Social Change study, and suggested the need for further 
ecumenical analysis and consultation. It also took up the proble-
matic connected with nature, the natural sciences and technology, 
stressing the significance of scientific discoveries as an aspect 
of man's dominion over nature; it also regarded the task of develop-
ing a 'theology of nature' as important. (51) 
The C&S Geneva conference of 1966 was therefore part of a long 
heritage of concern and investigation. The concern, however, was 
with the social impact of science and technology, and how they may 
best be directed towards human welfare. · It was accepted without 
question that scientific and technological progress, rightly directed 
and organised, was God's way of providing the abundant life for all 
mankind, and was automatically beneficial. The only problem was to 
detenmine how they could be 'rightly directed and organised' in 
practice. (52) 
Following the Uppsala Assembly, C&S was authorised to embark upon 
a five-year stt:d.y programme, on 'The Future of Man and Society in a 
World of Science-based Technology', the ~t~ project.(53) It began 
with the inherited confidence that science and technology could make a 
positive contribution towards the achievement of the wee goal in 
social ethics, if properly harnessed to the needs of develop:nent. This 
optimism was qualified during the course of the programme, receiving 
its first shocks at the opening conference of the Futurum project, 
held in Geneva in 1970. 
The third world participants at that conference charged that 
technology transfer reinforced the political, economic and technolog-
ical dependence of the recipients. The obverse to this claim is that 
science and technology, in conjunction with the structures of inter-
national econc::mics, may provide the means to maintain the dependent in 
their dependence; in the extreme, they become weapons of oppression and 
exploitation.(54) That conference also recognised that science and 
technology are ideologically based, ratherthanindependent value-free 
enterprises. Thus one of the working groups called for 
' the examination of the ideological presuppositions 
anct the interests served by the systems of tech-
nology in modern society, so that we may be clear 
about the function they serve and the l.imi ts 
within which their rationality operates'.(55) 
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This means that science and technology are now seen to have feet of 
clay: it cannot be assumed that the contribution they make to any 
society will be automatically positive, but instead their social 
effects and costs must be constantly monitored and carefully assessed. 
Another qualification to the inherited optimism came from the 
scientists and technologists themselves, as they drew attention to the 
risks and the ethical dilemmas inherent in their progress in the fore-
seeable future.(56) In 1970, the C&S head wrote of 'the new awaken-
ing of the physical scientists to the social and human consequences 
of their work', and this was probably one of the many factors that 
enabled C&S to involve a number of scientists (not necessarily 
sympathetic to the Christian cause) in the discussions associated with 
the Futurum project.(57) The 1970 Geneva conference reflected the 
contemporary scientific mood, as the ecologist John Black, chemical 
engineer Frederick Knelman, and biologists Ernst von Weisz~cker and 
Charles Birch demonstrated.(58) The next event in the Futurum 
project, the 1971 meeting at Nemi (Italy), reported that 
'The changing pattern of scientific work, the wide-
spread suspicion of the power of science, the great 
dependence of modern society on science and tech-
nology and the awakening conscience of many 
scientists all combine to highlight the need for 
not leaving the scientists alone. An increasing 
number of scientists ask not to· be left alone and 
seek help in defining their responsibility in 
shaping the society of today and in the future.' (59) 
This concern about the social responsibility of scientists, evidenced 
in the scientific community itself, shows a .marked change fran the 
inherited optimism about scientific and technological progress. In 
the Amsterdam definition of the responsible society, the only question 
marks had been over those who exercised political and econanic power; 
now there was a new and unexpected question mark over those who 
exercise control over the direction of scientific research and the 
uses of technology. 
The questions about social responsibility of scientists, tbe 
ethical dile:nmas posed by their achievements (actual and potential) , 
and the ideological basis and ramifications in international economics 
of the whole scientific-technological enterprise, remained as 
persistent concerns throughout the C&S programme. They underlie the 
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Working Group's five year plan for 1976 - 1981, the planning for the 
MIT conference, and its deliberations. (60) 
As noted above, one of the working groups at the 1970 Geneva 
conference had called for an exanunation of the ideological presupp-
ositions served by technology. In response to this call, an 
ecumenical working party was convened at Zurich in July 1973; its 
report was titled 'A Theological Critique of Scientific Rationality'. 
This working party considered that the main issues were the relation 
of theology to ethical decision-making, criteria for measuring the 
quality of life, and social justice in relation to the eschatological 
future. It did not grasp the nettle and attempt a critique of 
scientific rationality, nor address the issues of 'dialogue' between 
science and theology, in spite of a significant theological evaluation 
of technology by Langdon Gilkey.(61) The concluding conference 
of the Futurum project, at Bucharest in 1974, was however quite 
specific in its call to address these very issues: 
'Because of the ecol9gical crisis and its destructive 
effects on social justice throughout the world, 
science and technology as well as theology are 
challenged to proceed with self-examination, to find 
new approaches •••• [we therefore call for'J a further 
study prograrrnne on 11 rethinking theology.. • •• 
(which] will involve a creative dialogue between 
theologians, scientists and philosophers of science ••• ' (62) 
The following year, C&S convened a consultation in Mexico 
City, in cooperation with the Comnission on Faith and Order. Its 
theme was 'Christian Faith and the Changing Face of Science and 
Technology'. (63) A few months later, the Nairobi Assembly spoke of 
the 'encounter' of science and faith, in tenus of new ethical 
challenges on the one hand, and the necessity for dialogue on the 
other; it stated that theology needs to work out a doctrine of 
creation which incorporates the valid insights of modern.science into 
the nature and structure of the created order.(64) This concern 
for a dialogue was reflected later in the C&S proposal for its 1976 -
1981 programme.(65) It also appears as one of the specific concerns 
in the planning for the MIT conference, which devoted two plenary 
addresses and one section report to it. (66) 
It is evident from the foregoing that 'the contribution of faith, 
science and technology' to the wellbeing of any society (let alone the 
achievement of the JPSS goal) is a large and complex issue, which has 
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been the mainspring of the C&S prograrruue since the beginning of the 
Futurum project. It now remains to show that the M1T conference is 
the conceptual heir of the Futurum project. 
Paul Al:;>recht stated in the preparato:cy material for the 
Bucharest conference that the Futurum project had already pushed 
ectunenical thought in four new directions: 
1 (1) an evaluation and interpretation, in ethical 
perspective, of the present debate on the limits 
to growth with the :iJu:l2liG9-_t:Lpn~ for the right use 
of the environment and resources~ (2) [the impli-
cations for social justice of this new situation]; 
(3) the meaning of new scientific and technological 
discoveries for the quality of life ••• · ( 4) the 
need for a new theological critique of scientific 
rationality, and a new understanding of Christian 
doctrine concerning the relation between man and 
nature before God. 1 (67) 
These directions focussed the attentions of the working groups at the 
Bucharest conference, and are developed in the conference report. (68) 
The report, representing the conclusion of the Futurum project, was 
presented to the wee Central Comnittee which received it enthusiastically 
and urged that it be circulated widely for study and discussion, with 
the Nairobi :Assembly in view. It also requested C&S to highlight 
issues which· had emerged during the course of the project, so that the 
' 
Assembly could include them in its consideration of future programme 
directions. (69) The Assembly consequently directed the C&S prograrrme 
to explore the contribution of Christian faith, science and technology 
to the Struggle fOr a jUSt and SUStainable SOCiety 1 highlighting the 
ethical encounters between science and faith, and the ethical problems 
involved in the transition to such a society. (70) Abrecht's four 
directions had been condensed into two, but when the C&S working Group 
met in 1976, it revised the four in the light of the JPSS concept.(71) 
The five-year plan for the C&S programme, put forward by that 
meeting, included a proposal for what eventually became the MIT 
conference. It is no accident that the Mrr conference planning 
committee structured the conference programme around the following four 
themes: 
' 1. The relation between science and faith as fonns 
of human understanding and the role of faith in 
detennining the right use of science and technology. 
2. The analysis of ethical problems resulting from 
present and prospective developments in particular 
areas of science and technology. 
3 • The economic and political problems relating to 
world resource use and distribution, and the more 
equitable sharing of science and technology. 
4. The new expressions of Christian social 
thought and action, which are both attentive to the 
promises and threats of modern science and tech-
nology and engaged in the search for a just, 
participatory and sustainable society.' (72) 
Comparison with Abrecht's 'four new directions' shows a perfect 
correlation. 
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It is also noteworthy that the preparatory volume for the MIT 
conference was titled Faith, Science and the Future, and that this 
shorthand was given semi-official status as the conference theme. (73) 
It suggests that the planning committee were conscious that they 
were continuing and developing the Futurum enquiry, at least in spirit. 
This subsection has placed the specialist subtheme of the MIT 
conference theme, namely ' the contribution of faith, science and 
technology', in the context of the C&S programme generally and of the 
Futurum project in particular. This section, taken in its entirety, 
traces the conference theme and its evolution, and therefore provides 
a historical introduction to MIT. The aim of the next section is to 
provide a theological introduction, by looking at the theological 
emphases in the C&S programme from the 1966 Geneva conference onwards. 
2. A theological introduction to· the Church and Society .Programme, 
1966 - 1979. 
The preceding section placed the MIT conference theme in the 
context of the World Council's concerns in social ethics and the C&S 
special concerns about science and technology. It showed that the 
MIT conference was the conceptual heir of the Futurum project of 
1969 - 1974. This present section aims to provide a theological 
introduction to the MIT conference, by looking at the tendencies mani-
fest in the Futurum project and the C&S programme subsequent to the 
Nairobi Assembly. This is done in five subsections. The first 
gives a history of the main events from Geneva 1966 to MIT, and the second 
summarises the results of a recent analysis of the Futurum project 
by the Finnish theologian Martti Lindqvist. The third subsection 
presents a refinement of Lindqvist's results, and the fourth extends 
the survey period beyond 1975. The final subsection attempts to 
relate the material of its predecessors to my general theme of ecological 
theology. 
(i) Main events in the C&S programme. 
This .sUbsection' sets the historical background for the theological 
analysis to follow. My concern in this sub:section is to trace the 
history of and some of the influences in the C&S prograrrme. 
The roots of the Futurum project lie in the 1966 Geneva conference 
and the 1968 Uppsala Assembly. (74) Following the Assembly, the Working 
Group on Church and Society presented a prospectus to the WCC Central 
Comnittee at its meeting in August 1969, which outlined the purpose and 
shape of the new project on 'The Future of Man and Society in a World 
of Science-based Technology'. Its· concern was expressed as follows: 
'Whilst science-based technology and the ability to 
predict on the basis of it grow rapidly, the ability 
to use it for agreed social purposes grows much more 
slowly and the necessary change in social institutions 
and structures comes slower still. People lack the 
basic infonnation as well as the ethical criteria 
for making responsible choices between the new options 
which technology makes possible.' (75) 
A three-phase approach was suggested, setting out from a description of 
technical progress and its influence, proceeding to evaluation, and 
then finally to the organisation of appropriate ecumenical responses. 
Special mention was made of the problems peculiar to highly developed 
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scientific-technological conununities (pollution, the anns race, 
urbanisation, and genetic technology, inter alia). (76) The project 
was therefore com:ni tted to a high level of participation from 
specialists in.science and technology, in order to make decisions on 
the basis of accurate and pertinent information. In practice, this 
specialist participation continued throughout the project and was not 
confined to its early description-oriented stages.(77) 
The project got under way with a meeting of experts in Geneva 
in 1970, whose task was to outline the central problem areas and set 
priorities for their investigation.(78) In the light of this confer-
ence, it was decided to focus on three themes: 'Science and the Quality 
of Life', 'Political and Economic Choices in a Technological Era', 
and ' Jinages of the Future' • The C&S Working Group met in Nemi 
(Italy) in 1971, to plan the next steps in the project. Thirty 
distinguished scientists joined the theologians and others who 
participated in this meeting, which issued three reports, one on each 
of the above themes.(79) 
The project then split into two concurrent approaches. One was 
regionally based, designed to relate the total enquiry to the problems 
of particular regions. Three conferences were held: in Accra (Ghana) 
for the African region: in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) for the Asian region; 
· and in Pont-a-Mousson (France) for the industrialised nations of 
Europe and North America. (80) 
The other approach consisted of a number of specialist consult-
ations on pertinent themes. In 1972, the World Council's represent-
ation to the United Nations' Conference on the Human Environment at 
stockholm was organised by C&S as part of the Futurum project. (81) At 
Cardiff, Wales, there was a specialist consultation on 'Global 
Environment, Economic Growth, and Social Justice' • In 1973, there were 
two consultations in Zurich, the first on genetics and the quality of 
life, the second on the theological problematic of the Futurum project. 
That year, there was also an enlarged meeting of the C&s . working 
Group, which prepared a paper on population policy in view of World 
Population Year 1974.(82) 
Two books were published in connection with the Futurum project. 
The first was prepared by Thomas Sieger Derr at the request of the 
working Group, and appeared in 1973: Ecology and Human Liberation, A 
Theological Critique of the Use and Abuse of our Birthright. (83) This 
book stimulated intense discussion, drawing rejoinders from several 
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process theologians •. ( 84) The Orthodox theologian Paul Verghese also 
prepared a rejoinder, which was completed in manuscript in February 1974 
but was not published until 1978: the manuscript was titled The Human 
Presence, Reflections on. the Role of Hurranity ·in an Evolving Universe. 
(85) These books are the subject of special study in Chapter Four 
below, in sections 2 and 5 respectively. 
The Futurum project then concluded with a world conference at 
Bucharest (Ranania) , titled 'Science and Technology for Human Development 
- The Ambiguous Future and the Christian Hope' .(86) The report of 
this conference was presented to the Central Ccmuittee, who received it 
enthusiastically and, in effect, endorsed the continuation of the 
Futurum project. After the Nairobi Assembly had added its endorsement, 
the C&S programme was then designed to extend the project and to hold a 
world conference as part of its deliberations.(87) 
Thus there were more specialist consultations, leading up to the 
MJT conference. There have been two consultations on science and 
theology at Mexico City (1975) and Cambridge, England (1978); two on 
nuclear energy, at Sigtuna, SWeden (1975) and Celigny, SWitzerland (1978); 
one eonsul tation on energy for a just and sustainable society, at 
Glion, SWitzerland (1976) ; one on political economics, ethics and 
theology, at Zurich (1978); and one theological consultation on 'Humanity, 
Nature and God', at Zurich in 1977. (88) 
The new chainnan of the C&S Working Group, Charles Birch, published 
Confronting the Future. in 197 5, and Verghese' s Orthodox rejoinder to 
Derr's book appeared in 1978.(89) These two books were not sponsored 
by C&S directly, bnt were nevertheless written by people closely assoc-
iated with its work as part of their personal contributions to its 
ongoing programme. They represent part of the background to the MIT 
conference. 
During the period under review, the C&S programme has been both 
diverse and intense, and the MIT conference reflects this background • 
. It would be another thesis to ·analyse the whole of the Futurum project 
in detail, let alone extend the analysis to the whole of the 1966 -
1979 programme. Fortunately, same of the work on the Futurum project 
has already been surveyed; the results of that survey will be described 
in the next subsection, modified in subsection (iii), and extended in 
subsection (iv). 
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(ii) Martti Lindqvist' s analysis of the Futurum Project. 
In his survey Economic Growth and the Quality of Life, An Analysis 
of the Debate within the WOrld Council .of Churches, 1966 - 1974, Martti 
Lindqvist is addressing the social, ethical, and economic issues which 
are bound up with the theological problematic of man's relationship to 
nature. This problem comes to particular prcrninence in the Futurum 
project, and is the subject of special study in his survey. (90) 
Lindqvist has undertaken a thorough survey of the project, extending 
to the papers presented to the various conferences, the conference 
reports, minutes of Working Group and Central Corrmi ttee meetings, other 
relevant World Council documents, and documents from the contemporary 
secular debate.(91) It therefore presents an authoritative foundation 
on which my own analysis can be built according to the orientation of 
my theme. This subsection presents Lindqvist's results in·summary 
fonn, preparatory to later use. 
Lindqvist's own summary evaluation of the C&S programme from 1966 -
1974 is that 
' the ecumenical camnuni ty has taken a remarkable 
initiative ••• in opening the dialogue with the 
world-wide scientific corrmunity. [It] has in some 
respects had more success than was expected. 
Representatives of the social and natural sciences 
as well as economists have shown great willingness 
to participate in this exchange, chanelling both 
their knowledge and their moral concern to the 
ecumenical forum ••• ' (92) 
For this achievement, the wee and Church and Society in particular must 
be congratulated. (93) Nevertheless, Lindqvist has several fundament-
al criticisms to make of the prograrrme in general, as follows: 
1. The theological discussion on the man-nature theme is by nature 
reactive, in that it is problem-centred, concerned with discerning 
theological implications and solution models from non-theological 
situations. Basic concepts such as 'economic growth' and 'quality of 
life' have been taken over directly from the contemporary social 
debates, and the 'sustainable society' concept relates very closely to 
the concepts of 'global equilibrium' and 'equilibrium state' used by 
the Club of Rome report. There is therefore a common set of concepts 
which facilitates dialogue with society, but it has also led to 
theological diversity and imprecision. This problem-centred approach 
has also led to discontinuity in the project, as different theological 
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approaches have been applied to different problems, but the Futurum 
project has failed to integrate these into one single holistic 
response. ( 9 4) 
2. The material is mainly descriptive of the world situation and its 
problems, setting out various research results, theories and statistics 
- though this is more evident in the background papers than in the 
reports. This has been part of the conscious effort at inter-
disciplinary ethics and theology, but it has yet to bear fruit. There 
is no evidence of a singlelarger conference where the method of 
dialogue between theologians and lay specialists has 'worked' • (95) 
Thus, from Lindqvist's survey, the World council's debate on 
economic growth and the quality of life (and therefore the background to 
its search for the just, participatory and sustainable society) has been 
hampered by its inability to form concepts and to integrate diffuse 
theological approaches, as well as the failure of its dialogues with 
specialists. With regard to the Futurum project particularly, 
Lindqvist continues: 
'If the project is evaluated against the methodological 
solution advocated by the Zagorsk Consultation [in 1968] 
the work now concluded must be held as but the first 
stage in the ecumenical undertaking on these questions 
• • • completion of the discussion requires ( 1) a 
systematic and holistic theological evaluation of the 
material collected and (2) an ecumenical consensus 
when these questions appear • • • on the agenda of 
representative ecclesiastical bodies.' (96) · 
Lindqvist discerns three main theological approaches in the C&S 
reflection on man's relationship to nature, and these will be discussed 
below. Two traditions are conspicuous by their absence from this list, 
the Roman Catholic tradition and the biblical theologians.(97) The 
latter are allegedly represented only once, by Joseph Sittler at the 
1970 Geneva conference. This may only conceal a question of 
terminology, since Derr's book may be regarded as 'biblical theology' ( 
even though Lindqvist classifies it elsewhere. (98) 
The three main approaches Lindqvist discerns are 'the traditional 
western theology of history' , process theology, and Orthodox theology. 
The 'traditional Western theology of history' , emphasises man's 
uniqueness in his relation to the rest of creation, seeing the basic 
distinction betwenen man and nature in the radically historical 
character of human existence. (99) In the early sixties, this was 
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represented in ecumenical circles by Arend van Leeuwen, and at the 
1966 Geneva conference by Richard Shaull and Harvey Cox.(lOO) During 
the course of the survey period, Lindqvist observed that the qualita-
tive distinction between man and nature was still stressed, but that 
more emphasis was laid on the fact that biologically man is part of 
nature and fully dependent on it.(lOl) Alongside the ethic of 
responsible stewardship, increasing emphasis was laid on the openness 
of the future, thus underlining man's responsibility for the quality 
of his own future and that of the earth as well. But despite these 
shifts in emphasis, Lindgvist says that 
'the radical historicisation of man's existence and 
the interpretation of nature in the light of man's 
emancipation have been maintained as the central 
factors in the debate.' (102) 
I believe that this category of Lindqvist's needs refinement, and this 
will be undertaken in the next subsection. 
Process theology has gained a foothold in the deliberations of 
the Futurum project, partly through the influence of the biologist 
Charles Birch.(l03) This approach sees the very essence of nature 
as history, as a series of processes and 'events' in time and space. 
It emphasises that there is a qualitative as well as a biological 
continuity between man and nature; man is at the top of a hierarchy of 
rights and values apportioned according to sentience, and the existence 
of this hierarchy provides a basis for ecological ethics.(l04) Though 
the process theology approach has been vigorously advocated during the 
latter part of the Futurum project, no conference report endorses its 
approach.(l05) Its basic solution concerning the value of nature 
had already been rejected implicitly in the reports of the 1973 Zurich 
working party on scientific rationality, and the Pont-~-Mousson 
conference.(l06) The advantages and disadvantages of the process 
theology approach will be argued in Chapter Four (section 4) below. 
The main Orthodox contribution to the Futurum project has cane 
fran the Jhdian Paul Verghese. (107) He rejects any attempts to make 
a qualitative distinction between nature and history, since they and God 
are not three distinct entities with definable boundaries, enabling one 
to be separated from the others and considered in isolation.(l08) 
Verghese evaluates nature sacramentally, and proposes a 'reverent-
receptive attitude to nature' as a necessary corrective to the object-
ifying and analytic attitude which characterises science and technology. 
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This, together with an analogical application of the· doctrine of the 
Trinity to the doctrine of creation, was particularly inf1uential in 
the theological section of the Bucharest report.(l09) The advantages 
and disadvantages of the Orthodox approach, as expounded by Verghese, 
will be argued in Chapter Four (section 5) below. 
The viewpoints of Verghese and the process theologians coincide 
in their emphasis on the qualitative continuity between God and nature. 
(llO) As implied above, however, their combined influence has not 
been strong enough to replace the tradi tiona! Western theology of history. 
Lindqvist also pays same attention to the theological evaluation 
of technology, and to the dominium terrae tradition.(lll) The moral 
ambiguity inherent in technological progress has received increasing 
emphasis, which in its turn has led to a more sanguine estimate of 
technology's value as an instrument of human liberation.(ll2) The 
project has not denied the value of technological progress per s~, but 
has attempted instead to reinterpret man's responsibility for nature in 
the light of his capacity for technological manipulation and control of 
nature. This is the ethical correlate of the traditional Western 
theology of history approach. Lindqvist notes four ways in which the 
dominium terrae tradition has been approached: 
First, man has been called to rediscover his responsibility for 
nature before God, and eschew irresponsible technological triumphalisrn. 
This responsibility extends to future generations as well as to contem-
poraries, since failure to bequeath them adequate living conditions 
is a sin against fellow humanity.(ll3) Second, a 'companionship' 
ethic has been proposed, which calls for an 'appropriate' technology; 
that is, one which is non-violent, following the processes of nature 
and adapting itself to them. (ll4) This companionship ethic emerges 
in the Bucharest report, when it points out that 
'we are passing from an attitude of power, of mastery 
over creation, to one where we need to participate 
in it, live within its midst, hold it in respect.' (115) 
A third approach relates dominion to reconciliation and service, though 
this has been an isolated contribution within the Futurum discussion. (116) 
The fourth and final approach rejects the stewardship concept as 
inadequate. This rejection, by Verghese, 
'questioned the validity of the theological framework 
applied for the most part during the Futurum project 
in deliberations on environmental issues: the concept 
of stewardship, the distinction between nature and 
history as well as nature and man.• (117) 
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For the most part, however, the Futurum project materials have attempted 
to reevaluate and correct old theological interpretations rather than 
fonn tiate consistent new ones. Thus Verghese and the process theo-
logians were swimming against a strong stream. 
Lindqvist does not address the question as to why the •tradition-
al Western theology of history• should have achieved such influence in 
the Futurum project, but an answer may be inferred from his account. 
The project was committed to the method of dialectical interaction and 
interdisciplinary cooperation. This lends a conservatism to its 
theological reflection, brought about by the pressures of the 
conference situation and the need to produce a consensus report. There 
is no time to develop consistent new models in response to the 
specialist detailed infonnation imparted at the conference, so that the 
reports tend to be commentaries from existing theological positions.(ll8) 
Within the Futurum project, this tendency has been exacerbated by the 
marked lack of continuity of personnel and theme from one conference to 
the next; each meeting had an identity of its own, and tackled its 
issues independently of the other meetings in the project.(ll9) This 
explains why no new theological position was developed within the 
project, and why the traditional approach represents the theological 
continuity in the project. That it is a traditional Western view 
follows from the fact that the Futurum project has been markedly 
western in its centre of gravity, in its concern for the problems of 
industrialised nations and its under-representation of socialist 
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countries and certain parts of the Third World such as Latin America. (120) 
Lindqvist•s survey only covers the years to 1974, so I will need 
to extend the survey from the Bucharest conference up to MIT. This will 
be done in subsection (iv). The next subsection attempts to 
elucidate (and then to modify) one of Lindqvist•s important theological 
concepts. 
(iii) The concept of a • traditional Western theology of history~ • 
In Lindqvist•s survey of the C&S programme from 1966 to 1974, the 
theological approach which figures most prominently in the programme 
is one which he designates a • traditional Western theology of history• • 
My present aim is to determine more specifically the character of that 
approach. As it stands in his survey, his concept is too broad and 
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requires subdivision, into an 'emancipatory' approach and an. approach 
based on a theology of hope. This subdivision will permit more mean-
ingful discussion of the C&S f>rogramme in the next two subsections. 
At the end of his exposition of the traditional Western theology 
of history, Lindqvist cites three features as common to that theolog-
ical approach, namely: 
'~n insistence] on man's distinctive position in 
the whole of nature, interpreting the value of 
nature from an anthropocentric aspect. Secondly, 
there is in the sources a line of interpretation 
which emphasises man's emancipation-- mainly in 
the context of the alevelopmehtdilerrma. Thirdly, 
the future is seen as an open process where man 
has the responsibility for choice between hope and 
disaster.' (121) 
Of these features, the Orthodox would accept the first and third, 
interpreted appropriately. Process theologians would accept the third 
as fundamental, but perhaps add the codicil that God will salvage what 
good he can from the wreckage consequent upon man's free decisions. (122) 
This raises the question as to what separates the traditional western 
theology of history from these other approaches, and puts one question 
mark over the adequacy of Lindqvist's concept. 
There is a question mark over the accuracy of his tenninology as 
well, for his exposition of the tradi tiona! western theology of history 
includes as exemplars other approaches which cannot be described as 
'traditional Western'. For example, Lindqvist cites Richard Shauu· 
and the 'theology of revolution'. (123) Shaull is a North American 
whose theology has been strongly influenced by Arend van Leeuwen, and 
his theology may be described as a theology of history and its develop-
ment. But the dominant perspective is Latin American protestantism .. 
of a more radical variety, a perspective whose origin lies in his twenty 
years experience as a missionary, pastor and teacher in Colombia and 
Brazil. (124) Shaull is not 'traditionally Western'. Neither is the 
Indian economist M.M. Thomas, who interpreted history as a three-fold 
process of liberation from enslavement to nature (through technological 
mastery), from exploitation and oppression, and from bondage to past 
history via the 'open future'. (125) 
Thus Lindqvist' s category is under suspicion because it is too 
inclusive; in fact, it is ambiguous and ill~defined. In order to 
discern the positive and distinctive character of his concept, it is 
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necessary to refer to the. onl:y fonnal definition of it, which he gives 
in a footnote. The tenn 'traditional Western theology of history' 
'is not an established expression in theological tenn-
inology. In the context of this study, it is used 
to express the traditional theological approach common 
in the Western Christianity, which sees the basic 
distinction between man and nature in the radically 
historical character of human existence (Geschicht-
lichkeit). • •• (see] Altner [scMpfung am Abgrund], 
86 - ll9; Faith and the Order Studies 0~God in 
Nature and History'], 9-11, 14-16, 21-22, 26-27. 
This approach can be illustrated by the following: 
"The God who historicises human existence frees man 
from entangling bondage to the powers of nature, 
and calls him to come of age and to become the 
master of the powers whose slave he previously was" 
Faith and Order Studies p.26 • ' (126) 
Here it appears that the qualifiers 'traditional' and 'Western' play a 
substantial part in the definition of the concept, but which its subse-
quent exposition belies. Instead, the exposition makes it clear that 
the point at issue is not the tradition or the westernness, but the 
theology of history in relation to a particular theological evaluation 
of nature. This explains the references made in the definition to 
the study 'God in Nature and History' and to the chapter of Altner's 
book which is concerned with the secular debate about nature and history. 
(127) 
Lindqvist's exposition of the traditional western theology of 
history draws most upon Cox's contribution to the 1966 Geneva conference 
and upon Derr's book. (128) The course of his exposition suggests 
that the following four emphases serve to characterise the traditional 
western theology of history: 
(1) the radically historical character of human existence as the basic 
distinction between man and nature;(l29) 
(2) the future as an open process, in which man has the responsibility 
to choose between hope and disaster; (130) 
(3) nature as demythologised and therefore made available to man for 
his purposes, though man is· answerable to God for his stewardship of 
nature; (131) and 
( 4) man's emancipation from nature through science, technology and 
economic development. (132) 
Since Lindqvist's tenninology is misleading, I would like to 
replace it by one which highlights (4), the most distinctive of the 
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four characteristics. I therefore.propose to substitute the tenm 
'emancipatory approach' for the 'traditional Western theology of history' 
approach. In Lindqvist's estimation, Derr's Ecology and Human Liber-
ation epitomises this approach, and so I have selected it. for exa:rhination 
in the next chapter. 
Lindqvist's account of the emancipatory approach poses further 
questions. He corrments that there was an open conflict at the 1973 
Zurich working party, allegedly concerning Derr's emancipatory approach 
and rejecting process theology; at that consultation, the approach 
arising from the theology of hope was found frui tf'ul in examining the 
relation between man and nature.(l33) · It is possible that there was 
another area of disagreement, between those who espoused a thorough-
going e~tl,¢ip.£sm· (Derr) and those who leaned more to 'hope' (Langdon 
Gilkey). This suspicion is given further plausibility by Lindqvist's 
estnnate of the Bucharest conference, which 
'evidenced the failure of the Western theology of . 
history to answer the problem of the relation . 
between man.and nature in the context of the Futurum 
project. The theological section of the confer-
ence sought new solutions to the question mainly 
on the basis of Orthodox theology.' (134) 
At Bucharest, the theological power in the Western tradition was Gilkey 
rather than Derr.(l35) He espouses a theology of hope which does not 
emphasise man's emancipation from bondage to the irrational powers of 
nature. 
Lindqvist has included this 'theology of hope' within the emanci-
patory category. (136) On the evidence of the Zurich working party 
and the Bucharest conference reports' use of the 'hope' approach, it 
is necessary to ask whether the 'hope' approach should be separated from 
the emancipatory. For example, the Zurich report marks a turning 
point for the status of the emancipatory approach, since it questions its 
basic assumptions - the distinction between human and non-human on the 
basis of human history and man's St@posed emancipation from bondage to 
nature were both challenged by the awareness. of man's fundamental 
dependence upon nature and the limits that dependence imposes. The 
working party concluded that theological discussion generally requires 
an entirely new orientation which will relate nature and history (which 
are divorced in the emancipatory approach). (137) 
Within the working party proceedings, Gilkey had presented a paper 
which questioned technology's instrumental value in achieving man's 
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emancipation, either from human oppressors or from nature.(l38) He 
claimed that technical progress, if emancipatory, was only ambiguously 
so; this 
'is only to admit the;: humanity of science and 
technology; that- despite their creativity and 
glory, they too are partial and relative, subject 
to misuse, /"Potentially] creative/destructive or-
destructive/creative ••• '(139) 
He then argued strongly that 
'our technological control over our environment 
and over others threatens to become a "fate" 
that contro~s and determines us.' (140) 
It could be claimed that this is an .individual's contribution, isolated 
within the project and not representative of it. But this has been a 
very influential individual; he chaired the Zurich working party, and 
drafted one part of the theological section of the Bucharest report. 
There are thus good grounds for separating the emancipatory 
approach and the 'theology of hope' approach, and stating that the 
Zurich working party .of 1973 marked the turning point in the project, 
from emancipism to 'hope' • The 'Western' theologians at Bucharest 
were therefore looking beyond emancipation to consider what Christian 
hope may mean in a technologically dominated society.(l41) 
This separation of the two approaches requires that the character 
and enduring significance in the C&S programme of the theology of hope 
be examined. The question of its persistence is (necessarily) 
deferred to the next subsection, in which the later period of the C&S 
programme is surveyed. The remainder of this subsection determines 
the characteristics of the theology of hope espoused in the later 
stages of the Futurum project. 
The theology of hope approach is epitomised by that portion of 
the Bucharest report drafted by Gilkey.(l42) The concern there 
'is with the Christian hope for the historical 
future in the light of technology and science, 
not forgetting that such "temporal" hope is 
grounded in the transcendent.' (143) 
;In the section titled 'Hope for the New Life', five characteristic emp-
hases may be discerned, in which the ultimate gives meaning to the 
penultimate, and the christological gives meaning to the historical: 
(1) history is not meaningless, but derives its meaning from the 
eschatological and ultimate purposes of God in creation and redemption; 
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{2) history re:nains open to man, since every situation includes 
new possibilities given by God for the creative transfonuation of the 
present; 
{3) the suffering and death evident in history are overcome in 
Jesus Christ, who is the foundation of man's hope for new life; 
(4) the central symbols of promise {the Kingdom of God, the New 
Jerusalem) orient us towards a new life and a new age in the future; 
and 
{5) there will be both continuity and discontinuity between this 
age and the next, but the existence of elements of continuity directs 
human enterprise towards discerning them and then striving to realise 
the eschatological goals they indicate for and in proximate historical 
existence. {144) 
Iwill take these characteristics as the desiderata of the 
theology of hope approach. The first two characteristics show that it 
has some comnon ground with the emancipatory approach, and explains why; 
Lindqvist combined the two approaches into the single 'traditional 
Western theology of history'. approach. Both are theologies of history, 
but from different perspectives. The key to the emancipatory approach 
is the biblical concept of dominion, and that approach looks backward 
to the mandate given at creation; whereas the key to the 'hope' approach 
is the eschatological goal of the Kingdom, for whose realisation human 
dominion has partial instrumental value. This difference in perspect-
ives gives a sound theological reason for separating the two approaches, 
and complements the historical argument for the separation given above. 
In st:nmnary: this subsection has shown the need for further 
clarification and precision in Lindgvist's theological analysis, 
particularly with regard to his concept of the 'traditional Western 
theology of history' and its differentiation from the other theological 
approaches influential in the C&S programme from 1966 to 1974. I have 
substituted the tenu 'emancipatory'. for 'traditional Western theology 
of history', and selected Derr' s Ecology and Human Liberation for 
special study as the exemplar of the emancipatory approach. The 
emancipatory approach was questioned at the 1973 Zurich meeting, and 
replaced by a theology of hope at the 1974 Bucharest conference. The 
character of this latter approach has been outlined, and its survival in 
the later stages.of the C&S programme will be examined as part of the 
next subsection. 
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(iv) The consultation on 'Hurnanity,Nature and God', Zurich,l977. 
Since Lindqvist's survey period ceased with the 1974 Bucharest 
conference, it is necessary to attempt an extension of that survey into 
1979, to ascertain how the theological approaches have survived and/or 
been modified, and whether any significant new· approaches have emerged 
in the C&S programme. Though the source material extends (theoret-
ically) from late 1974 to mid-1979, the only significant primary source 
for my ecological theology theme is the 1977 Zurich consultation. 
Hence the title of this subsection, which examines the Zurich consult-
ation in the light of the ritain theological approaches already evident 
in the C&S programme. 
The main events in the C&S programme were listed in subsection 
(i) a}:x)ve, and the period since Bucharest stands out as a time of 
specialist conferences exploring themes and issues which had emerged 
from the Futurum project. Apart from the MIT conference, considered 
in the next section, the only two exceptions are the publication of 
Birch's book Confronting the Future, and the WCC Fifth Assembly at 
Nairobi. The Assembly failed to tackle in depth the issues which the 
Futurum project (and the Bucharest conference in particular) had raised. 
,· Instead, it endorsed and reiterated the more urgent ethical concerns 
without deeper theological reflection -- in spite of Birch's challenging 
address. (145) Of the specialist conferences since Bucharest, only 
one has devoted much attention to the issues of ecological theology 
per se. The others have confronted particular ethical concerns 
(nuclear energy, genetic experimentation) or theoretical considerations 
(science and theology dialogue, the JPBS theme), but have not given 
direct attention to ecological theology.(l46) The source material 
for my analysis of ecological theology within the C&S programme from 
Bucharest to MIT is rapidly narrowed down to the materials associated 
with the theological consultation on 'Humanity, Nature and God', held 
at Zurich in 1977. These have been reprinted in no.25 of 
Anticipation, and include the following: 
(l) the report of the consultation, pages 22 - 39; 
(2) paper-s· presented to the consultation, pages 40 - 68; and 
(3) a corrunentary (by the Working Group) on both this report and the 
report of the Cambridge, England, consultation about science, 
pages 69- 73.(147) 
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The papers reprinted are by two Protestant biblical theologians, 
Klaus Koch ·and Jolm Austin Baker; two process theologians, Charles Birch 
and no less than Charles Hartshorne; and Paulos Gregorios (i.e. Paul 
Verghese) • ( 148) 
In its introduction, the report states that it deals 'primarily 
w.i th the htman control of nature' , but this .is misleading. Later .in 
the introduction .it states that 
'we urgently need a new vision that will motivate 
and guide the concern for a sustainable, just and 
controllable world.' (149) 
It .is really the search for a new vision that controls the report, and 
the process theologians have ensured that their approach receives a 
measure of attention and prominence that .it failed to achieve during the 
Futurum project. Other theological approaches are represented .in the 
report, but .its theological heart (sections II and III) consists of two 
approaches, juxtaposed, but with no attempt at synthesis or recognition 
of significant d.i vergence. ( 150) The two approaches are those of 
process theology .in section II, 'Underlying Conceptual Issues', and the 
Protestant orientation of Koch and Baker .in section III, 'The Biblical 
Interpretation of Nature' • Gregor.ios' approach .is barely perceptible 
in the report, which .is in contrast to the strong Orthodox .influence at 
Bucharest. (151) 
Since both the process theologians and Gregor.ios were represented 
at zurich, the only theological 'unknown' .is the approach adopted by 
Koch and Baker. Do they agree? And, if so, do they continue the 
Bucharest theology of hope or do they .introduce a new theological 
approach? They do agree, and they espouse the Bucharest theology of 
hope. 
Koch's paper .is a specialist paper, based on the analysis of three 
types of Old Testament text: the Yahw.ist.ic pre-history, the Priestly pre-
history of Genesis l and 9, and apocalyptic. His topic .is 'The Old 
Testament View of Nature', and he challenges the assumption that the 
'very kerygma of the Old Testament' .is that there .is an unbridgeable gap 
between God and creation/nature. 
OT authors are concerned, 
His conclusion .is that, as far as the 
'there .is no human history that .is separated from the 
history of nature. • • • [Ifj they speak at all of 
revelation and the relationship between God and man .in 
tenus of history, that history is about the fate of 
mankind in relation to the fate of the world.' (152) 
112 
Baker's paper is a survey paper which attempts. to describe and 
interpret the views (plural) of nature found in both Testaments. Koch 
and Baker agree in their interpretations and the inferences drawn when 
they are discussing the same texts, but Baker's paper obviously goes far 
beyond Koch's in its development •.. It is Baker's paper which provides 
the backbone for section III of the report, which incorporates whole 
passages verbatim. 
Much of Baker's material is standard in contemporary biblical 
scholarship · ·- for example, the use of the kingship motif to interpret 
the dominion concept, with a concomitant emphasis on the exclusion of 
exploitation from the ideal of kingship.(l53) In the context of the 
C&S prograrrme, what is theologically new is Baker's use of the Wisdom 
tradition to justify a pragmatic science-based (natural law) ethic. It 
is an Old Testament principle 
'that by observing the way in which nature functions 
we can arrive at moral guidance for human life •.• 
since it was the wisdom of God which made the world, 
he must have had scme purpose in every detail of its 
ordering ••. There are, then, in the OT elements to 
justify a pragmatic, science-based ethic, at least 
in scme such general tenus as these: that what by 
observation we discover really to work best, both 
for man and for other creatures, is something which 
loyalty to God requires us to put into practice.' (154) 
This ethic reappears in Baker's summary of the OT utterances about 
nature, where it is immediately followed by the statement that 
'if we are so guided, then we may hope even to 
improve the condition of nature • • • there is a work 
of salvation to be done in it, as well as in 
humanity, as part of God's eschatological purpose, 
and this salvation is part of man's responsibility 
for nature.' (155) 
such redemptive work is allegedly possible, because nature has been 
demythologised, and it is achieved through human enterprise, skill, and 
wisdom. Baker does not discuss how this hypothetical redemption may 
be achieved by sinful man, whose sin has so disrupted the cosmic order 
that he has become 'the enemy of all living things' (pp.42f), nor does 
he discuss how any human work may be 'redemptive' in its effects upon 
nature. 
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Baker• s pragmatic ethic has a teleological reference, which re-
interprets the concept of dominion. Man • s vocation is to use his 
dominion over nature as his part in fulfilling 'God's intention in 
creation'.(156) Baker uses the cosmic significance of Christ to 
put this human vocation in perspective. The biblical basis of the 
•cosmic Christ• theme is found in Colossians 1:15ff, Hebrews 1:3, 
and John 1: 1 - 4, through which shines 
•a conviction that the whole universe, could we but 
see it, is in its essential nature in hannony not 
merely with same unknown divine power but specifi-
cally with God as revealed in Jesus, and that 
therefore there must be some modus vivendi between 
man and nature which, even if not yet attained, is 
in keeping with all that is best in both.' (157) 
This gives •cash value• to the New Testament claim that the reconciliation 
of the universe is made possible through Christ. Thus Jesus• life and 
his work of redemption, cosmic in its significance, becomes the trans-
cendent ground for our present historical endeavours and shows that they 
are not ultimately meaningless or futile. Even though the new heaven 
and the new earth will not be • evolved on our drawing boards • we may 
nevertheless, on this Christo logical basis, hope that our endeavours may 
provide • images and foreshadowings of them.•. (158) 
This account of Baker's paper shows that his perspective is that 
the ultimate gives meaning to the penultimate and the christo1ogica1 
gives meaning to the historical; and Baker • s paper exhibits the five 
characteristics of the theology of hope approach exemplified by Gilkey 
at Bucharest.(159) The only new elements in Baker's paper are the 
intensification of the Christological foundation, and the provision of 
the pragmatic science-based ethic which helps to answer 'the possibility 
of a new care for the earth and its creatures • hoped for at Bucharest. 
(160) • 
Section III of the report is titled 'The Biblical Interpretation 
of Nature • , and relies heavily on the papers by Koch and Baker. some 
modifications have been made, the most substantial being the introduction 
of the •creativity• theme to the discussion of human dominion. (161) This 
interpolation shows Gregorios • style and is also highly congenial to the 
process theologians• approach. It makes for some confusion in the 
subsection, however, since two concepts of dominion stand side by side: 
on the one hand, human dominion over the earth is a coordinate of God • s 
dominion over humanity; on the other, it is the continuation of God • s 
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creativity throughman's agency. This highlights the question of 
the relationship between human and divine creativity, which is not 
resolved in the report.(l62) 
Baker's paper had led him to the hope that human scientific and 
technological enterprise might produce • images and foreshadowings • 
upon earth of the eschatological kingdom, and Koch • s paper had also 
hinted at this possibility. (163) This raises the question as to how 
the developnent of science and technology may relate to an eschatologically 
oriented hope, and this is the focus of a subsection on • Eschatology 
and Futurology•. Its conclusion calls for a new theological vision 
which will rightly discern what it is that science and technology may 
(or may not) oontribute to the corning life of the Kingdom of God. (164) 
The questions of relating human and divine creativities, and of 
eschatology and futurology, are theological issues basic to the C&S 
programme and to its social-ethical concern about the right development 
and use of science and technology. Section III of the Zurich report 
helped to pinpoint some of the issues, and represents an advance on the 
theological section of the Bucharest report in this respect. But 
because it was unable to give substantial discussion to these issues, it 
represents little real advance in the theological part of the C&S 
programme. 
What may be said of the report in toto? In structure, it is 
basically a series of position papers, where each position has been 
subjected to editing by its competitors. Thus section II shows process 
theology authorship, with occasional interpolations from Koch, Baker, 
or Gregorios, while section III has the interpolation on 'creativity• 
mentioned above. (165) This makes for a patchwork, disjointed report. 
This consultation had been a step in the right direction bringing 
together theologians from the three major approaches evident in the 
C&S programme~ but it is not internally coherent, nor does it even 
further the discussion. The report only reiterates positions 
already articulated and established within the C&S programme. 
Thus the 1977 Zurich consultation missed its theological oppor-
tunity. Strategically, this put the theological success of the MIT 
conference at risk. The Zurich consultation was the only specifically 
theological consultation convened since Bucharest and prior to MIT, 
and it was convened with MIT in view, to approach the most fundamental 
issue (in the Working Group's perception). Together with the inter-
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disciplinary consultation about science and theology (Cambridge,U.K., 
1978), Zurich 1977 and its papers was to provide the foundation for the 
theological and ethical deliberations at MIT. (166) It was tragic, to 
let such an opportunity slip~ the fact that such a slip occurred will 
be discussed in my general conclusion, when I examine some of its impli-
cations for the C&S programme organisation. 
This subsection has examined the 1977 Zurich consultation on 
'Humanity, Nature and God', as the only C&S event since the 1974 
Bucharest conference which is signifcant for the study of ecological 
theology in the C&S context. It has shown that three theological 
approaches were represented there -- process theology, Gregorios' 
Orthodox theology, and the christological theology of hope articulated 
at Bucharest by Langdon Gilkey. The zurich consultation has been 
criticised for its failure to develop the theological discussion by 
staying at the leve 1 of statements of position. 
The next subsection will draw together the substance of this and 
the preceding subsections, by relating their discussions to my central 
theme of ecological theology. 
(v) Ecological theology prior to MIT. 
So far, this section has been concerned with providing a map of 
the theological terrain by taking bearings on the theme of the human 
relationship to nature. Now it is necessary to complete the map by 
drawing same of the details relating to ecological theology. This 
subsection is not concerned with assessing the actual or potential 
contribution to ecological theology that any of the main theological. 
approaches may make; that is the task of the sections which discuss 
their representative authors, in Chapter Four below. Rather, this sub-
section is concerned solely with the observation of trends and with 
pointing out the broad theological issues that emerge from my surveil-
lance of the C&S source materials.(l67) 
The term·ecological theology is understood in the sense outlined 
in Chapter Two above. That is, an ecological theology is 'a theological 
attempt to coordinate doctrines of creation, anthropology, and 
eschatology, with the empirical evidence about the systemic unity of 
the created order and man's capacity for the technological manipulation 
and control of that order'. 
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There is a consensus in the C&S programne that the envirornnental 
crisis and the limits to growth thesis require theological as well as 
ethical reflection. The problem has been to locate the appropriate 
focus for that reflection. The 1973 Zurich working party on 
scientific rationality pointed out the need for a theology of nature 
in conjunction with a theology of history, requiring 
'a new orientation for theological discussion of every 
theological doctrine or sy.mbol ••• directed not only 
to what the "new" God is doing in the future of 
history but also to his activity in the future of 
nature ••• neither history nor nature can be theolog-
ically conceived except in relation to each other. 
This intrinsic interrelation is especially evident 
when the future of nature seEmS to threaten the 
future of history. ' ( 168) 
This theological insight is fundamentally correct, but remains un-
realised in the C&S programme. 
In 1974, the Bucharest conference stated in its report that 
'Theology, in pursuing the doctrine of dominium terrae 
has opened the door to thoughtless exploitation and ' 
destruction.' (169) 
It then called for a creative dialogue between theologians, scientists 
and philosophers of science, to focus upon the following two issues, 
inter alia: 
'(b) The attempts to overcome the rupture between 
nature and history as conceptualised in philosophical 
and theological thought ••• 
' (e) The theological search for a comprehensive 
concept which overcomes the fragmenting theologising 
in relation to God, creation, humanity, and the 
Church.' (170) 
Here the Bucharest report has articulated three themes which have 
persisted throughout the C&S search for an ecological theology. First, 
the consensus that (Western) biblical theology has got it all wrong, 
and needs reconstruction in the light of the envirornnental crisis and 
pertinent scientific evidence. (171) Second, the call to reexamine 
the relation of humanity and history to nature; the problem has been 
seen in terms of nature/history rather than the related problem of 
fonnulating a 'theology of nature' • ( 1 72) Third, the call for a unify-
ing cosmology which will relate the cosmos to God. 
The first theme relates to the doctrine of creation, and reflects 
some of the criticisms of the churches' interpretations of that doctrine, 
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as made in the. secular debate by Lyrm White., Arnold Toynbee, and 
others. (173) The C&S programme has turned to an interpretation of 
that doctrine which sees it as concerned with God's continuing relation-
ship with the world, rather than as an attempt to explain the world's 
origin. (174) An early C&S statement said that 
'For too long Christians have thought of creation as 
having to do with the beginning of things instead 
of understanding it in terms of God's continuing 
work and man' s continuing responsibility. ' ( 17 5) 
This raises the question of man's relationship to the world vis-~-vis 
God's relationship to the world, the question of man's status as 'image 
of God' and his dcminion over the earth. The 'emancipatory' approach 
had interpreted man's dominion as a responsible freedom to use nature 
to create and sustain the course of human history, and thus had brought 
the second theme to prominence. The rejection of the emancipatory 
approach by the 1973 Zurich working party represented a call to reopen 
the question of nature and history. , Since then, a 'theology of hope' 
approach has emerged in the C&S prograrmne, which uses eschatology and 
christology to give meaning to both history and nature. The non-human 
world has an eschatological future, guaranteed by the resurrection, 
as the 1977 Zurich consultation emphasised.(l76) The theology of hope 
shares this view with the Orthodox tradition. For their part, the 
process theologians have approached the question of nature and history 
from the perspective of (Whiteheadian) metaphysics. Thus the very 
essence of nature is history, and on this basis they undertake to provide 
a radical new understanding of God's relationship to the world (as 
required by the first theme), claiming at the same time to have answered 
the question of nature and history (second theme) and to have provided 
the unifying cosmology required in the third theme. ( 177) Within the 
C&S programme, it is the process theologians who emphasise the third 
theme most vociferously; Gregorios agrees with the need for a unifying 
cosmology but does not press the point; and the theology of hope approach 
barely mentions the need for a unifying cosmology but nevertheless agrees 
with Gregorios in finding its elements in a christological orientation. 
(178) The 1977 Zurich consultation was the first deliberate attempt 
in the C&S programme to explore these themes more deeply, by bringing 
together representatives of the various theological approaches, but 
it failed to go beyond its position papers. 
By it~s definition, ecological theology requires that creation, 
anthropology and eschatology be coordinated with scientific insight 
and with a theological evaluation of the human capacity for technology. 
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The e&S programme could have made some progress here, but the result so 
far has been disappointing. Little theological use has been made of 
scientific insight., and the nature of technology has not been explored 
theologically. 
Lindqvist's assessment of the Futurum project is valid for the 
whole e&s programme from the 1966 Geneva conference up to MIT, as sub-
section (i) above showed, namely that 
'the empirical examination of problems has occupied 
a central position. Natural scientists have 
daninated the dialogue both quantitatively and 
qualitatively'.(l79) 
This problem-centred approach has made the reports into corrmentaries on 
the existing situations, and has hindered theological developnent. (180) 
Generally speaking, the dialogue between' theologians and lay specialists 
has been found unsatisfying by both parties.(l81) This implies that 
the theologians involved in the e&s progra:tmi1e have been unable to incor-
porate scientific insights into their attempts at theological reconstruct-
ion. This is confirmed by the generality ·of the discussion about 
scientific insight. There was only one place where one can observe 
scientific insight playing any part in theological argument, and that is 
the Bucharest report. There, it was stated that there may be consider-
able time-lag between the first appearance of a pollutant in an ecological 
chain and its eventual toxic effect upon man; thus contemporary concern 
about pollution is linked to society's present responsibility to safe-
guard the welfare of future generations. (182) That is, the evidence about 
the systemic unity of creation was used to confinn a position already 
held. (183) Otherwise, there has been little evidence of any theological 
reconstruction at all, let alone one which incorporates the valid insight 
of science. 
The reasons for this failure may.be inferred from Lindqvist's 
methodological criticism of the C&S programme. Between the 1966 Geneva 
conference and the 1968 Uppsala Assembly, a consultation was held at 
Zagorsk (U.S.S.R) under the joint auspices of e&s and the Faith and 
Order eorrmission; it represented a significant effort to came to tenus 
with issues of ecUmenical method and theological questions of principle 
in wee social ethics. It advocated the method of dialectical inter-
action, but did so 'on a very high level of· abstraction'. (184) 
Lindqvist' s methodological criticism of the C&S' programme is that 
'there is no explicit deliberation of the method 
question • • • the significance of empirical analysis 
has been emphasised, in line with the proposal made 
by the Zagorsk consultation. It has not been 
shown, however, how such an analysis affects 
theology • • • If the [Futurum] Project is evaluated 
against the methodological solution advocated by 
the Zagorsk consultation, the work now concluded 
must be held but as the first stage in the 
ecumenical undertaking on these questions, for 
the emphasis has been so strongly on the inductive 
approach. Completion of the discussion requires 
(1) a systematic and holistic theological evaluation 
of the material collect3d and (2) an ecumenical 
consensus Cwithin the context of an Assembly or 
similar body].' (185) 
The C&S programne has attempted to move beyond the ' first stage' 
by taking up the broader theoretical issues of dialogue between 
scientists and theologians (as at Mexico City in 1975, and Cambridge, 
England, in 1978). But this has been done at the abstract level of 
epistemology, and there has been no practical application of the results 
of this dialogue to ecological theology. Meanwhile, the C&S programme 
continues to elicit material for 'first stage' discussion, without moving 
to its systematic and holistic theological evaluation. 
The C&S programme has let another opportunity slip, in failing to 
explore theologically the human capacity for technology. This 
capacity has been assumed as a ~tum for all discussion, which has then 
concentrated on the second (nature/history) theme where the main question 
has been the relationship between man's technological progress in 
transforming the world, and the eschatological transformation of the 
world in the Kingdom of God. (186) This reflects the World Council's 
general concerns in social ethics, in particular the value of tech-
nology for improving the quality of life. It reflects the concern of 
the industrialised nations, whose social systems are teelhnologically 
organised. It reflects the concern implied by the limits to growth 
thesis, that priorities be established for the future development of 
scientific and technological enterprise.(l87) Most importantly, it 
is an area of common concern on which the differences between the 
theological approaches do not preclude discussion and common consent. 
This agreement to discuss the future of technology has forestalled 
discussion of the nature of technology, except in isolated instances. (188) 
I have argued that the C&S programme has not been able to develop 
an ecological theology, though it appears to have the potential (as a 
promoter of interdisciplinary discussion) to do so. My survey so far 
has illuminated several underlying theological questions, which could 
fonn the core of a potentially fruitful exploratory project within 
the C&S context. They will be touched on at various stages in this 
thesis, but I list them together here in order to conclude my survey 
of ecological theology in the C&S context prior to MIT with some 
indication of what may be done to make up for the C&S deficiency to date. 
First, the C&S programme could further its study of the theoret-
ical issues of science-theology dialogue by conducting a parallel study 
in ecological theology to provide practical experience in, and a working 
example of, that dialogue. 
Second, there is a need to relate human creativity in the world 
to God • s creativity. This is what lies behind the discussion of 
eschatology and futurology, and was raised as an issue for further 
discussion by the 1977 Zurich report.(l89) 
Third, C&S could explore the advantages and disadvantages of each 
of the main theological approaches represented in it, particularly the 
recent three of 'theology of hope', Gregorios' Orthodoxy, and process 
theology. I am attempting such an exploration in Chapter Four below. 
Fourth and finally, the C&S consensus that (Western) biblical 
theology is partly to blame for the ecological crisis raises the question 
whether any biblically-oriented theological reconstruction is possible, 
and the question of the relevance of the biblical texts to such 
reconstruction needs to be explored. The C&S discussion has not yet 
aired this question thoroughly, but it has never been far from the 
surface, as the following shows. 
The Futurum consultation on genetics in 1973 made the following 
statement, which has since achieved something of a canonical status in 
the C&S programme as a statement of theological policy: 
'Churchmen cannot expect precedents from the past to 
provide answers to questions never asked in the past. 
On the other hand, new scientific advances do not 
determine what are worthy human goals. Ethical 
decisions in uncharted areas require that scientific 
capabilities be understood and used by persons and 
communities sensitive to their own deepest convict-
ions about human nature and destiny. There is no 
sound ethical judgment in these matters independent 
of scientific knowledge, but science does not itself 
prescribe the good. • ( 190) , 
This has sorre very significant implications. It justifies the C&S 
policy of seeking specific evidence from professional scientists, 
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so that ethical decisions may be informed by accurate and pertinent 
information. (191) But it also raises the suspicion that the biblical 
material may be completely irrelevant to contemporary ethics and 
theology when they face issues arising from scientific.or technological 
developments; a suspicion to which the alleged under-representation 
of biblical theology in the Futurum .project gives some support. (192) 
Another reason for this apparent neglect .of the biblical material may 
be the influence of process theology. in the C&S programme, through 
Charles Birch as the Chainman of the Working.Group. Process.theology 
agrees that Western theology has got it all wrong, and should there-
fore be abandoned in favour of process theology which pays more attention 
to science. ( 193) This conceals another claim, .. that a biblically-
oriented theology. is inherently incapable of addressing environmental, 
scientific, or technological concerns. This hidden claim has not been 
argued within the C&S prograrrme but it needs to be explored in the 
context of my final question before any progress may be made in 
ecological theology without alienating its biblical basis. 
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3. Ecological theology at MIT. 
Section I surveyed the development of the World Council's ethical 
vision of the 'just, participatory and sustainable society', and placed 
the MIT conference theme in that perspective: the contribution of faith, 
science and technology to the struggle for a just, participatory and 
sustainable society. Section 2 traced the progress of the main events 
of the C&S programne relevant to my theme of ecological theology, from 
the preceding World Conference on Church and Society in Geneva (1966). 
It also described the four types of theological approach to the question 
of man's relationship to nature which have emerged during that pro-
gramne: the 'emancipatory' approach, a 'theology of hope', process 
theology, and Orthodox theology. Thus the historical and theological 
background to MIT has been surveyed, and it remains to analyse the 
conference itself, including its immediate background, its proceedings, 
and its report. (194) This will be done in two subsections, the 
first dealing with the organisational aspects of the conference and 
the second with its ecological theology. 
(i) Conference organisation. 
The concept of a globally sustainable society had been proposed 
in the report of the 1974 Bucharest conference, and accepted by the 
Nairobi Assembly in its mandate for a continuing C&S programne: to 
explore 'The Contribution of Christian Faith, Science and Technology 
to the Struggle for a Just and Sustainable Society'. (195) The C&S 
Working Group met in 1976 and outlined a prograrrme of study and action 
on the scientific and technical problems and ethical issues involved 
in the transition to such a society, leading up to a world conference 
on this theme. (196) The wee Central Committee endorsed this proposal. 
(197) The conference mandate was 
(1) to receive reports from sections and groups and commend them to 
the churches~ 
(2) to make recormnendations to the World Council of Churches~ and 
(3) to issue statements in its own name on topics pertaining to the 
agenda of the conference.(l98) 
The MIT conference thus followed the tradition of ecumenical 
conferences organised by wee programne units and sub-units - that 
of providing infonnation, perspective, and advice to the churches, 
without attempting to speak on their behalf. (199) At MIT, the conference 
was to concentrate on four areas of special concern: 
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( 1) the relation between science and faith as forms of human 
understanding, and the role of faith in detennining the right use 
of science and technology; 
(2) the analysis of ethical problems resulting from present and 
prospective developments in particular areas of science and tech-
nology; 
(3) the economic and political problems relating to, world resource 
use and distribution, and the more equitable sharing of science and 
technology; and 
(4) new expressions of Christian social thought and action, which 
are both attentive to the promises and threats of modem science and 
technology, and engaged in the search for a just, participatory and 
sustainable society.(200) 
In its approval of the C&S five-year programme proposal for 1976 
- 1981, the World Council's Central Committee had urged 'that there be 
more emphasis on the social sciences and social technology'.(201) The 
MIT conference concems, and the Council's ethic of the just, partici-
patory and sustainable society, make it necessary for proper and 
adequate discussion of the issues, that the social sciences (particu-
larly the economic and political specialists)be represented substantially 
at the conference. As it happened, the balance of participants was in 
the favour of the natural scientists and the technologists at the expense 
of the social scientists. and theologians.(202) 
I argued in section 1 that the MIT conference was the conceptual 
heir of the Futurum project. That project has been criticised for its 
concentration on gathering specialist data about scientific and 
technological advances and then failing to coordinate that with 
theological evaluation and development.(203) The same has been true 
of the C&S programme since the Futurum project, as section 2 shows. 
This emphasis on information-gathering has persisted into the planning 
of the MIT conference and therefore to same extent into the course of 
the conference itself. In the introduction to the second volume of the 
report, C&S director Paul Abrecht stated that 
'The choice of plenary topics and speakers was made in 
the light of the fact that the issues of science and 
technology were to be uppennost in the conference, and 
it was important for the churches to listen to the 
scientific corrununity which thus far had had little 
opportunity to be heard in church circles. This 
specific focus • • • detennined the composition of the 
oonference: about 50 percent physical and natural 
scientists and teclmologists with social scientists, 
political thinkers and. others making up the rest.' (204) 
124 
Thus the favouring of the natural scientists and technologists, and the 
infbnnational diet, was based on the planning ccmni ttee 's interpre-
tation of the conference concerns and how best they could be 
discussed. 
The planning committee attempted to overcame the under-
representation of theologians by giving them strategic praninence in 
the conference programme. After the opening fonnali ties, there were 
plenary addresses by Philip Potter, 'Science and Technology: Why are 
the Churches Concerned?' , by the astronomer Robert Hanbury Brown on 
'The Nature of Science' , and the Orthodox theologian Paulos Gregorios 
on 'Science and Faith: Complementary or Contradictory?' • The emphasis 
on science-theology dialogue was followed by a morning.of straight 
theology: 'Nature, Humanity and God in Ecological Perspective', by 
Charles Birch; 'Solidarity in Conflict', by Gerhard Liedke; and 
'Christian Perspectives on Creation in a Time of Ecological Unsustain-
ability', by the Russian Orthodox Vitaly Borovoy. The second day 
continued with the discussion of other basic issues, after which the 
conference moved ·to its other themes - 1 Perspectives and Futures 1 , 
'Particular Problem Areas', and 'Participation and Power'.(205) Thus 
the programme structure was designed to encourage the conference to 
look first to its theological foundations before responding to 
particular problems. 
The main conference programme had two dimensions, apart from the 
fonnalities and the gatherings for worship and bible study. The 
conference met in· plenary sessions, and in ten working sections. The 
plenary meetings predominated in the early days, with nine plenaries 
in the first two days; but gradually the balance shifted to the work . 
of the sections. Finally, the sections reported their findings to 
the conference in plenary, where they were discussed and amended and then 
sent to the Editorial Committee for inclusion in the Conference 
Report. 
The purpose of the Plenary addresses was to convey ideas and 
in£opnation on issues that concerned the conference as a whole. The 
sections did the more specialised work, focussing on particular 
themes: 
I. 
rr. 
III. 
IV. 
v. 
VI. 
VII. 
VIII. 
IX. 
The nature of science and the nature of faith. 
Humanity, Nature and God. 
Science and Education. 
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Ethical issues in the biological manipulation of life. 
Technology, resources, environment and population. 
Energy for the future. 
Restructuring the industrial and urban environment. 
Economics of a just,participatory and sustainable society. 
Science and technology, political power,and a more just 
world order. 
X. Tbwards a new Christian social ethic and new social 
policies for the churches.(206) 
Each participant was a member of one of the sections I - IX, and 
section X was composed of representatives from the other nine sections. 
Its report therefore represents an interpretation and surrnnary of the 
ethical issues emerging in the conference discussions, plenary and 
sectional.(207) It is evident from the titles of the section reports 
that the conference focussed on specific problems and attempted to 
fonnulate some Christian (ethical) response to them. The only sections 
devoted to theological themes were I and II~ and only the work of section 
II is pertinent to my theme of ecological theology. I will report on 
the work of section II in my next subsection. 
Before proceeding to the discussion of the conference's theological 
work, it is appropriate to outline here same of the participants' 
responses and evaluations of their conference experience. 
The first 'official' appraisal came within the month, when the 
wee was represented by:paul Abrecht and Paulos Gregorios at the United 
Nations' Conference on Science and Technology for Human Development, 
held in Vienna that August. In his presentation, Gregarious outlined 
five of the many insights gained at MIT. In the light of his 
audience's concerns, it is natural that he emphasised the ethical 
rather than the theological issues.(208) 
The Ecumenical Review of October 1979 reprinted some of the 
plenary addresses given at MJT, and the reactions to the conference of 
four of its participants.(209) The tone is one of exasperation and 
disappointment. There was 
'little fu.rward progress in ecumenical theology 
or social ethics.' (210) 
The conference was 
1 over-planned, over-progranmed, and over-structured 
••• the process very nearly undennined the agenda 
altogether. 1 (211) 
The programne assumed 
'that all participants were pocket-size supermen 
and superwomen capable of sustainining fourteen days 
of unexampled intellectual exertion.' (212) 
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One participant pointed to the disparity in the allotment of theolog-
ians to sectional tasks: 
'the composition of sections had much to do with 
the substance and style of section reports. For 
some reason, professional theologians were allowed 
to congregate largely in the sections with grand 
themes like "Nature of Science,· Nature of Faith" 
and "Humanity, Nature .and God" - or in the sections 
on the two science-related topics which ••• have 
became most fashionable for the churches these days: 
genetic engineering and nuclear energy. This 
lineup tended to deprive the other topical sections 
••• of serious and sustained theological conversation. 
The obverse was the related lack of systematic social 
content in the reports most heavy-laden theologically.' (213) 
The next wave of evaluations came in 1980, with the publication of 
the conference reports. In his introduction to the first volume, the 
editor, Roger Shinn, noted three areas of strong consensus and two of 
major disagreement at the conference. There had been agreement that 
there was no ' technical fix' for the contemporary basic social problems; 
no 'religious fix' either; and the scientists and theologians did not 
divide on party lines, but there were scientists and theologians 
together on both sides of the issue in the big debates. The disagree-
ments were over the appraisal of science: some saw it as a search for 
knowledge and a methode of solving problems, and others as an instrument 
of oppression and exploitation which gave more power to the powerful. 
The:othercontention was over the relative importance of forthright action 
as against continuing inquiry. Shinn concludes, cautiously, 
'that the conference is, at a minimum, an impressive 
testimony that the churches and the world have an 
tmmense stake in the uses of science and technology.' (214) 
However, neither Shinn nor the editor of volume 2 ·(Iaul Abrecht) attempts 
any theological appraisal of the conference. Abrecht emphasises the 
advisory nature of the conference; it could only 
'help the churches understand the immense promise and 
threat of modern science and technology, the challenge 
these present to traditional Christian thinking, and 
the desire of many scientists to work with the churches 
in detennining their social responsibilities.' (215) 
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The final evaluations. from within the conference came in reports 
given by the various participants to their sponsoring churches or 
other interested bodies. A selection of these was published in 
Anticipation (May, 1980). Abrecht noted in his editorial that the 
reports and interpretations of the conference received by then had 
shown some consensus on seven issues, two of which are worth quoting 
here: 
'The conference did not resolve the theological-
philosophical issues underlying the debate about 
faith, science and society; but it revealed a new 
awareness of their importance as well as the need 
to make a breakthrough, one applicable in a world 
context ••• 
'The conference did achieve some measure of agree-
ment on one critical issue: our Christian under-
standing of creation. But the implications of this 
have still to be developed within the Christian 
cc:mrnuni ty and between it and other relgious trad-
itions and ideologies. The conference offers 
helpful lines for pursuing this debate in the future.' (216) 
Here, I think Abrecht has been over-optinustic in his statement about 
the Christian understanding of creation, as the next subsection will 
show. 
(ii) Ecological theology at MIT 
The selection of sources for this theological analysis of the 
MIT conference proceedings is governed by one criterion only: a 
document represents a useable primary source if it addresses one of 
the dimensions .of ecological theology, as the tenn is understood in 
my:second chapter. Of the conference plenary addresses, those by 
Charles Birch, Gerhard Liedke, and Vi taly Borovoy are primary sources. 
The papers by Birch and Liedke are discussed §ibseqpently, in Chap-
ter -Four, and so are only surrmarised here; Borovoy' s paper is 
treated at greater length here, since it plays no further part in the 
thesis. 
Apart from sections I, II, and X, the sections address particular 
problems and present little· in the way of theological argumentation. 
Section I is concerned with the theoretical issue of science-theology 
dialogue, rather than with the practical outworking of· that dialogue 
in ecological theology. Section I I, on 'Humanity, Nature and God' , 
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is an obvious primary source. Section X is concerned with social 
e:thics, and so is not obviously relevant to ecological theology. 
However, it does aim to draw the conference threads together, and it 
does include some material pertinent to ecological theology. It will 
serve as a control group, to ascertain whether section II was 
theologically typical of the conference as a whole; this is only 
possible because section X drew its membership from each of the other 
nine sections. 
Birch was the first of the three to address the conference, and he 
propounded eight theses, pointing out the inadequacy of a mechanistic 
world-view and the appropriateness of the process theology approach. 
The fonner leads to a 'disjunct view' of the relationship between 
humanity, nature and God, while the latter fosters a unitary 'ecological 
view'. He argues that 
'the ecological view of nature, humanity and God has 
developed as a reaction firstly to the ecological 
crisis, secondly to the inadequacy of the disjunct 
view to provide a guide to the ecologically sustain-
able and socially just society, and thirdly to the 
failure of the scientific-technological world-view 
to account for that which is most important in life.' (217) 
The expression 'that which is most important in life' refers to 
the alleged ecological ethic of the disj\]Ilct view, and its apparent 
failure to relate science and faith in such a way that the integrity of 
the Christian practising scientist is not automatically jeopardised. 
It refers to the mystery of human experience as well as the wonder and 
mystery of the existence and ordered structure of the universe; 
according to Birch, the biblical paradigm for this 'personal encounter 
with the universe' is found in God's interrogation of Job (chapters 
38 - 42) • (218) Birch then argues that process theology offers a 
viable alternative to the traditional disjunct theology, with a ready-
made ecological ethic. 
Chapter Four, section 4. 
This claim will be assessed below, in 
Gerhard Liedke spoke next, and included same criticism of process 
theology as an unnecessary alternative. It is 'unnecessary' because 
it is still possible to revise biblical theology. He attempts such a 
revision of Protestant continental theology by reinte:rpreting key 
biblical texts and by drawing attention to contemporary theories of 
conflict coming from the social sciences, the work of Johan Galtung in 
particular. (219) Liedke agrees with Birch that western theology has 
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allowed man and nature to be separated by too great a distance and, by 
way of correction, he reexamines Romans 8: 18ff and the dominium terrae 
texts of Genesis 1 and 9. His conclusion is that the dominion .of 
Genesis 1 represents an ideal . which was never realised, but that the 
dominion text applicable to contemporary sinful humanity is the post-
deluvian Genesis 9:2. Here man • s relationship to nature is one of 
conflict, even to the extent .of Holy War. The Romans passage 
presents a christological and pneumatological reinterpretation of these 
Old Testament texts. Since Christians have the Spirit, they are the 
hope of liberation for the suffering creation, and are obliged to reduce 
its suffering wherever possible (by prudent ecological management, for 
example). In terms of Galtung's theory of conflict amelioration, 
man in general and Christians in particular are called to 'solidarity• 
with nature in the conflict. · This has a theological as well as a con-
flict-theoretical basis: 
• God • s relation to us human beings is likewise one 
of solidarity in conflict. By voluntary renunciation 
of his power, God in his Son Jesus Christ has put 
himself in solidarity with us and so resolved the 
conflict. Man as image of the merciful God is called 
to the same kind of solidarity in regard to the non-
human creation.• (220) 
Liedke • s position represents a development of the • theology of 
hope • approach: harmony between man and nature is an eschatological 
goal which receives its guarantee through the resurrection, and for whose 
realisation humanity must strive throughout its historical existence. 
Liedke's particular contribution is his use of the 'conflict' metaphor, 
borrowed from the social sciences, to propose a • theology of hope in 
conflict'. The strengths and weaknesses of his approach will be 
outlined below, in Chapter Four, section 3. 
Vitaly Borovoy is a protopresbyter of the Russian Orthodox Church, 
which he represented at MIT~(221) In his plenary address, he outlined 
a tentative theological appraisal of technology, and called for a re-
appropriation of • classical theandric theology' with its emphasis on the 
divine-human unity. His paper concluded with a brief exposition of the 
thought of a little-known Russian, Nicolay Fedorov. (222) 
Borovoy' s appraisal of technology looks at the contemporary situ-
ation, the process of 'technization' itself and its effects upon mankind, 
and his own ·theological response to the situation. Technology is 
'humanity' s own product, the creation of . its own 
genius, a child of the human spirit. Humanity has 
succeeded in setting free and using for its own 
purposes the hidden forces of nature. But humanity 
has not succeeded in possessing and controlling 
the results of the process. Technology has become 
stronger than humanity, and enslaved it.' (223) 
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Technology is ambiguous. It can be made to serve human welfare and 
noble societal goals, but it may also serve as a means of destruction, 
oppression, and exploitation of other humans as well as of nature. 
Its enslavement of mankind therefore represents a crisis for 
Christian thought and a 'judgement on historical Christianity'. (224) 
In this crisis, Christians have been caught unawares and find them-
selves unable to respond, because originally Christianity was 
intimately related to· the soil and the patriarchal way of life, but 
technology has now severed this relationship and created a completely 
new reality in religious terms.(225) 
Borovoy states that this ,.new reality is characterised by organ-
isation. Humanity organises 1ife -- great human masses, scientific 
activity, the economy, technology, life itself -- yet cannot itself 
be the object of organisation. It always retains an 'organic, 
irrational, mysterious element' which prohibits its organisation. 
Here 
'Christianity can help people to define creatively their 
relation to the new epoch, to master technology to 
serve their purposes. The [human] spirit can be an 
organiser, it can master technology for its spiritual 
purposes, but it will resist its own transfonnation 
into a tool of the organising technological process.' (226) 
He then proceeds to put the questions of technological progress and 
human creativity into a social perspective, stating that 
'Human creativity presupposes society as the aim, but 
at the same time it presupposes the preservation of 
the peculiarities of the creative identity of 
humanity ••• As the image of the Creator, the human 
being is a living being with a capacity for creation.' (227) 
At this point, the problem of technological enslavement requires the 
recovery of the 'classical theandric theology' to address 
'the problem of humanity, the problem of saving the 
human i:ndi vidual from disintegration; it is the 
problem of the vocation and goal of humanity, the 
problem of solving urgent questions of society and 
culture in the light of the Christian truth about 
humanity.' (228) 
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These problems involve the questions of the interrelationships between 
the individual and society, and between humanity, nature and God. 
Borovoy now turns to Fedorov. Fedorov' s eschatology and his 
interpretation of the book of Revelation in particular show that the 
vocation of humanity is to unite and actively vanquish the forces of 
nature: 
'The life of the world is ruled by the irrational 
"elemental" forces of nature. These forces must be 
regulated, subjugated to reason and knowledge ••• 
If people will unite for the "co:mrron cause", for the 
existential realisation of Christian truth in life, 
if they will struggle against the elemental, 
irrational, death-dealing forces of nature in brotherly 
union, then there will be no reign of anti-Christ, 
no end of the world, no Last Judgment, and humanity 
will pass straight into eternal life. Everything 
depends on the activity of man. And Fedorov preaches 
an as-yet unheard-of activity for humanity which must 
overcome nature, organise cosmic life, conquer death 
and raise the dead.' (229) 
The vocation of humanity, united in brotherhood, is to explore, to know, 
to inhabit and to possess the whole cosmos -- 'This is what humanity is 
created for', says Fedorov.(230) 
Borovoy's paper makes no direct attempt to relate his contribution 
to the theme of the just, participatory, and sustainable society. His 
concern is for the brotherhood of man, which is instrumental for the 
achievement of humanity's goal of emancipation from bondage to nature 
through scientific and technological progress. That is, the achieve-
ment of the JPSS goal contributes to a dramatically powerful and 
successful science and technology, not vice-versa. Borovoy presents 
an Orthodox version of Lindqvist's 'traditional Western theology of 
history'; he is an Orthodox emancipist. 
It is worth making a brief camparasion between Borovoy and Paulos 
Gregorios.(231) The latter emphasises the inherent unity of humanity, 
nature and God, whereas Borovoy has the attitude that nature is a force 
of bondage from which man must br~ak free. Gregorios proposes that the 
scientific-technological attitude towards nature must be complemented 
by a 'reverent-receptive attitude'. This attitude is both individually 
and socially based, whereas Borovoy emphasises the global social 
attribute of brotherly unity. This unity has a christological 
foundation, hence his insistence on . the 'classical theandric theology' , 
though this is not made clear in his paper. The classical theandric 
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theology and the unity of historical humanity which Orthodoxy infers 
from it, is t.he only corrmon theological foundation which Borovoy and 
Gregorios share. 
The three plenary addresses have all agreed on one point. In 
his personal account of the conference (interpolated into the confer-
ence report), Roger Shinn corrmented on their agreement that 
• the dominant theological traditions of modem times 
have not only been inadequate to the social issues 
coming out of science and technology but have in some 
ways been responsible for the human misappropriation 
of technology ••• However this agreement within the 
conference led to great differences in the proposals 
for theological reconstruction. While all the 
speakers found biblical bases for their theological 
proposals, they diverged in their uses of the Bible, 
tradition and contemporary scientific knowledge.• (232) 
Thus the conference had hit upon one of the continuing unresolved 
problems in the C&S discussions of ecological theology: the place of 
the Bible and its testimony in theological reconstruction, as mentioned 
in subsection 2(v) above. 
What of the conference's fonnal attempt at theological recon-
struction? This was undertaken in the report of Section II, on the 
theme 'Humanity, Nature and God'. (233) The titles of its subsections 
show that the report intends to pay attention to the biblical testimony 
in its reconstruction; after the introduction, the.titles are as 
follows. 'The Relationship between God, Humanity and Nature in Modem 
Western Th0ught', 'The Relationship between God, Humanity and the Non-
Human Creation in Biblical Thought', 'God, Humanity and Creation: the 
Biblical Testimony in the Context of the Scientific and Technological 
World', and 'The Christian Understanding of God, Humanity and Nature in 
Relation to NeighbOurs of Other Faiths •; the section report then concludes 
with two pages of • Recommendations • • 
Some of the themes which have persisted throughout the discussion 
. of ecological theology in the course of the C&S programme appear again 
in this section report. (234) They appear as calls to further action, 
indicating that the section made no progress beyond the theological 
ground already gained by the C&S programne. This may be seen in its 
recorrmendations, from which I quote two passages at length: 
'Within our section and in the conference generally 
the dialogue between theologians, scientists and 
social scientists has been carried a stage further. 
The discussions have revealed that the crisis of 
science and teclmology, of the industrial nations 
stems from the present confusion about the right 
relationship between humanity 1 nature and God. The 
discussions also reveal that we are not yet in 
agreement about the. proper relationship. We recorrmend 
that the wee ensure that the debate continues 1 and 
urge a particular focus on the following questionS: 
'How to ground and explain theologically the 
relationship between hurnani ty, nature and God in the 
dialogue with contemporary science. 
'How to interpret the biblical mandate for 
humanity, with regard to a responsible dominion over 
the earth. Today this means worldwide ecological 
responsibility and stewardship in the face of blatant 
misuse and exploitation of the world, its people and 
its resources. 
'How to express this responsibility through 
science and teclmology; the problem of developing 
ethical reflections in the different scientific 
disciplines; and the critique of the hidden ethos 
that teclmology expresses.' (235) 
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The second passage seeks to relate the Christian hope to the scientific 
understanding of the future: 
'What has the Christian message of hope to say about 
the future? This question was repeatedly asked at 
the Conference but no single answer prevailed. We 
recorrmend that [two wee bodies] explore the meaill.ng 
of Christian eschatolqgy in relation to the human 
future of promise and threat arising from the rapid 
and seemingly uncontrollable developments in science 
and technology.' (236) 
I now wish to focus on five features of the section report: the 
persistence of the Western concern, the failure to provide a meaningful 
relationship between eschatology and futurology, the failure of real 
dialogue between science and theology generally, the call for the 
reinterpretation of biblical texts and concepts, and the dominance of 
the 'theology of hope in conflict' approach. The first three will be 
touched on briefly, the last two will be disussed in more detail. 
The conference planning committee had sought to place the 
discussion of science and theology and of science and society in a 
global perspective, and therefore attempted to ensure the widest 
possible participation of scientists and non-scientists from all over 
the world. (237) I~~tthe section report, however, the first part 
focusses on 'modern Western thought', and the first recommendations 
are concerned with 'the crisis of science and technology of the 
industrial nations' (as quoted above). The fourth part of this 
section report is a Western concession to other ways of· viewing things, 
emphasising the need to enrich (Western) theology·with insights from 
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other faiths. Within the section report generally, the Third World 
and even the Orthodox contributions are barely evident, save for the 
occasional codicil. (238) rt has been claimed that the conference 
generally was Western in its bias. (239) 
The question of futurology and eschatology was 'repeatedly asked' 
but without a single answer emerging. Notionally, this question should 
have been discussed in part 3 of the section report, which concentrated 
instead on reinterpreting the traditional concepts of dominion and 
stewardship or with broad statements of general principle -- for example, 
that the theology of hope 'gives the work of science and technology a 
basis, meaning and direction'.(240) Generally, it ignored technology's 
potential for evil, destruction, and exploitation, a potential which 
dominated the thinking of the 'problem-area' sections of the conference. 
(241) Section II failed the conference badly in this respect -
perhaps because there were too many theologians and not enough hard-
headed scientists.(242) 
The recorrmendations state that 'the dialogue between theologians, 
scientists and social scientists has been carried a stage further' • The 
section report itself yields no evidence of such progress. Its themes, 
symbols, and language are all those of traditional western theology and 
include only superficial reference to science and technology, and this 
gives the impression that the theologians of section II have corrmented 
on, but not engaged with, the problems of science and its progresss. 
The only exception is a paragraph in part 3, which mentions the need 
for common structures and elements of language in dialogue. (243) In 
the conference planning, the 'dialogue' question was the province of 
section I, 'The nature of Science and the Nature of Faith'.(244) The 
practical success of dialogue is basic to ecological theology and to the 
work of Section II, but here again it has fallen short. 
Itum now to the two features receiving longer exposition: the 
call for reinterpretation of biblical materials, and the dominance of the 
'theology of hope in conflict' approach. 
The section report recomnends that the wee continue the debate on 
the humanity-nature-God relationship, including a focus on the (re-) 
interpretation of .',the biblical mandate for humanity, with regard to a 
responsible dominion over the earth' in view of the need for 'ecological 
responsibility and stewardship'. The· concepts of dominion and 
responsible stewardship have retained their centrality in the section 
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report., and the question is how they may be related to the contemporary 
western technological context. ·· · Th.rt: 2 marshalls the biblical evidence 
about the relationship between God, humanity and the non-human creation, 
and part 3 attempts to build on this with one eye on the technological 
situation. It attempts tO reinterpret the @omini1lm terrae and the 
imago Dei traditions: 
'What needs to be emphasised today • • . is· the relatedness 
between God and his creation rather than their separate-
ness.. The dignity of nature as creation needs to be 
stressed and humanity's dominium must be bound up with 
our responsibility for the preservation of life ••• The 
biblical concept of dominium is developed today in 
various ways. Two-such ways can be distinguished: 
humanity as the maker (homo faber) and humanity as the 
cultivator ••• What we need is a view which integrates 
these two approaches, sets a limit to the maker and 
opens the way for creative imagination, a view in which 
the reshaping of nature is embedded in cooperation with 
nature. Such creative and cooperative relationship with 
nature can be a parable of God's own activity as Creator. 
This • . • is included in the imago Dei. ' (245) 
The discussion of the JIBS theme is then based on the statement that the 
imago Dei and the dominium are 'the birth-right of all human beings' (246) 
However, the quotation above represents .the core of . the section report's 
discussion of these biblical concepts (apart from the marshalling of the 
evidence in part 2); it is a discussion of what is necessary for further 
progress. 
Liedke's call for the re-interpretation of biblical texts and 
concepts has been accepted by section II, and his influence, may be 
discerned in parts 2 and 3 of its report. These refer to 'solidarity 
in conflict', and to nature's inability to speak for itself, so that 'we 
human beings must make ourselves its advocates and defend its rights to 
live'.(247) The Gilkey-Baker-Liedke theology of hope approach dominates 
the section report, in fact. For example, 
'As Christians we speak of humami ty and nature in the 
context of the work of God as Creator and his goal for 
his creation ••. God remains free in relation to his 
creation. In his faithfulness he grants it contin-
uity and permanence. He is always at work in his 
creation; enters it in Jesus Christ and purposes to 
complete and perfect his com:nunion with it. This 
cannot be· deduced from a scientific view of nature but 
only from our knowledge of God in the history of Israel 
and through Jesus Christ. But it gives the work of 
science and technology a basis, meaning and direction.' (248) 
Or again, 
'The cross of Jesus Christ points to the way of 
participation and the creative transformation of 
suffering. This is one aspect of following the 
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cross in our scientific and technological world.' (249) 
This espousal of the theology of hope in conflict, and the Western 
tenor of this section report, have combined to reject (implicitly) the 
approaches of Birch and Borovoy and Orthodoxy generally. Process 
theology is listed amoung the 'counter-currents in western thought' in 
Bart 1 which have failed to 'correct' the alleged dualistic tendency 
in traditional Western Christianity. (250) Its theodicy is repudiated. 
(251) Borovoy shares the same fate. In its call to reinterpret 
the dominium concept, Rlrt 3 speaks of man as maker and cultivator, 
without mentioning man's capacity to organise and his resistance to 
being organised, central to Borovoy' s theological appraisal of 
technology. (252) Orthodox theology is given a paragraph in<l?art 1, 
but the discussion of the eucharist in !2art 2 is taken almost verbatim 
from Liedke' s book, SUpplemented by a vague statement that 
'the eucharistic view of the world shows that our Christian 
hope for human beings and the non-human creation is not 
unfounded. These are foretastes of the coming kingdom 
of freedan.' (253) 
This amendment may have been Orthodox in origin, but has been over-
written by the theology of hope approach. · It, is certainly far 
removed from the characteristically ~odox eucharistic teaching 
arout 'union-participation', mentioned in Part 1. (254). 
Thus the report of section II has adopted the theology of hope 
approach at the expense of other approaches evident in the C&S 
programme 1966-1979. The survey of ecological theology in that 
programme (in subsection 2(v) above) highlighted three persistent 
features: the consensus that traditional western theology needs re-
construction in dialogue with science, the call to reconsider · the 
relationship of nature and history, and the need for a unifying 
cosmology to relate the cosmos to God. The first of these features 
is clearly evident at MIT in the report of section II; what of 
the others? 
The question of nature/history has been subsumed under the 
theology of hope approach, and is not considered separately in its own 
right as it had been at the 1977 Zurich consultation.(255). Section 
II treats nature and history together within the 'hope' perspective; 
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thus Bart 2 deplores the separation of creation, salvation in Christ, 
and eschatological hope. (256} The language of the section report 
is of' God' s history with his creation' or: of. God's work 'as Creator 
and his goal for his creation'.(257} The statement in the intro-
duction is typical, that 
'Humanity and nature belong with God's history with 
his creation in which justice and injustice, even 
life and death, are· in conflict. But this history 
is also under the pratiise of God who will fulfil it 
in justice and peace. It is from this perspective 
that we see the future and co:rmnit ourselves to it.' (258) 
This approach includes nature in history from the human and christo-
logical perspective; in adopting this approach, the section has 
implicitly rejected the process theology approach, which sees history 
as the very essence .of nature's existence. 
The process theologians have called for a unifying cosmology, to 
correct.the failures of the disjunctive cosmology which separates man 
from nature. (259} Birch's influence in the Working Group has meant 
that the C&S theological discussion has been officially directed towards 
the exploration of the relationship between humanity, nature and God, 
as it was in'the 1977 Zurich consultation and is now in section II.(259a) 
It is clear that section II accepted the title for its report, but felt 
that its main concern was to discuss the imago_De,;h and dominium terrae 
traditions, with a view to their reinterpretation. The on~y concess-
ion to the call for a unifying cosmology is that portion of the 
recormnendations that admits that the section failed to agree about the 
proper relationship between humanity, nature and God, and calls for the 
dialogue with science to be continued with that in mind. (260) 
In sum, the report of section II is thoroughly Western, and 
contiguous with the main features of the C&S programne which had 
preceded it, even to the rejection of the process theologians' approach. 
But was Section II representative of the MIT conference as a 
whole? This question must be asked and answered in the light of the 
comment made by one participant, that the theologians tended to con-
gregate in certain·sections (one of which was section II), thus giving 
a definite imbalance to the sections' deliberations. (261) Since the 
other sections worked independently of each other and· of section II, 
except for section X which was composed of representatives from all the 
other nine sections, I will use section X as my control element. 
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The. report by section X was titled 'Towards a New Christian 
Social Ethic and New Social Policies for the. Churches' , andccontains 
fifteen parts (plus re.corrme.ndations) of which two are. theologically 
oriented. (262) The. tenor of the. report generally is less 
western than that of section .II, and the. concerns of the. Third 
World for social justice. and relief from technological oppression are. 
echoed more. strongly in section X than they were. in section II. 
In its introduction, section X adopts a theology of hope., though 
it is not stated as strongly or as distinctively as it was in section 
II. Since. the. section's primary concern was social ethics, its 
theology tends to lean towards the. social and historical in ht:rrnan 
existence.. Nature. is not ignored, however: 
'Humanity is one. member of the. ecosystem ••• · Practices 
destructive. of the. ecosystem will also destroy human 
society. In this respect justice characterises a 
human relationship with the. whole. ecosystem as well 
as the. relationship with other human persons and 
groups.' (263) 
This extends Liedke' s 'solidarity in conflict' to include. an ethic of 
justice in humanity's e.alings with nature.. 
Section X agrees with section II that the way forward, theolog-
ically, is to reinterpret the traditional biblical concepts of dominion 
and stewardship. It admits that 
'it is often argued that the. western approach to science 
and technology is rooted in a Christian understanding 
of the creation, which sees nature as given to human 
beings for their exclusive. use', 
but maintains that such an argument is ill-founded: 
'It cannot be. affirmed too strongly that whatever truth 
there. is in this opinion as a comnent on the. way some 
Christians have. treated the. natural world, it rests on 
false. understandings of the. Bible. and tradition. We 
repeat our earlier affirmation [quoted above.] that 
justice. includes the. human relationship within the 
ecosystem.' (264) 
The part of the section report from which those. quotations were. taken 
was titled 'What is the. relation between human "dominion" and 
Stewardship?' , and is concerned with reinterpretation rather than 
exploring new theological approaches. 
One. of the. features .of section II report was its dismissal of the. 
process and the. O::thodox theological approaches. This part of the. 
section X report contains four sentences which reflect the common 
thought of Birch and Gregorios: 
1 
• • • the authority of human beings over nature is of 
an interdependent kind. We should perhaps think of 
ourselves as the self~conscious intelligence of the 
whole created order, with authority to act with. and 
for it, not over it, We are therefore to care for 
nature, as if it were the body of humanity. This 
is good theologically, and it is good biolog-
ically. 1 (265) 
140 
They have had more success here than in section II, but otherwise 
section X has ignored them and Borovoy as well. 
Thus virtually all of the features of the section I I report recur 
in the report of section X, though expressed more moderately. Section 
II may therefore be regarded as tyPical of the MIT conference discuss-
ion of ecological theology. 
This means that the MIT conference is a disappointment, as far as 
the developnent of ecological theology within the C&S prograrrme is 
concerned. It has failed to make any significant advance. It 
has continued the failings of the C&S prograrrme which preceded it, and 
in particular of the Futurum project of which it was the heir; that is, 
it has retained its bias towards the concerns and the traditional 
theological approach of the West, it has failed to relate the Christian 
eschatological hope to the technological future, and it has failed in 
its attempt at dialogue between theology and science. It has also 
failed to tackle a number of fundamental theological issues, such as the 
relevance and authority of Scripture in theological reflection on the 
ethical challenges of scientific and technological advances. The 
reasons for these failures have already been discussed; they include a 
dominating concern for social ethics in the World Council, which means 
that theological reflection for its own sake must take second place; a 
concentration on eliciting accurate and pertinent scientific information 
in order to infonn ethical decision-making; and the pressures inherent in 
the conference situation, pressures which were particularly evident at 
the MIT conference. All of which means that the basic issues and areas 
that I listed on pages 120~ above still require attention in the 
ongoing C&S programme. 
The foregoing appraisal of ecological theology within the Church 
and society programme generally and at the MIT conference in particular 
shows that it is necessary to explore the different theological 
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approaches which have appeared therein. Each must be examined on 
its own merits, with special reference to its suitability as a 
response to the environmental crisis and the lirni ts to growth thesis; 
and the general problem of living in a scientifically and techno-
logically oriented world. This task is undertaken in Chapter Four, 
to which I now tum. 
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CHAPI'ER FOJJR: The Four Main lbsitions Examined. 
The survey of the C&S debates from 1966 to 1979, undertaken in 
Chapter Three, showed that four theological approaches to the problem 
of humanity's place in the cosmos were represented. These were 
descrilied as ·the emancipatory approach , the theology of hope 
approach , the process theology approach, and·. , the Orthodox approach 
of. Paulos Gregorios • This chapter describes and evaluates these 
approaches in turn. 
This chapter has five sections. The first section concentrates 
on the method: that is, on finding a way in which the approaches may 
be described and compared. The next four sections describe, analyse, 
and evaluate the approaches, one by one. The features common to the 
four approaches, and the conclusions that follow from these common 
features, will then be stated in my next chapter, 'Conclusions'. 
1. The method. 
As defined in Chapter Two, ecological theology is theological 
discourse about the cosmos and humanity's place and influence2 therein, 
which also makes special reference to the interpretations of the cosmos 
contributed by ecology and the sciences generally. It is therefore an 
interdisciplinary endeavour, undertaken in dialogue with science. But 
as theological discourse, it may and must be analysed and evaluated 
according to the standards applicable to all theological discourse; this 
chapter proceeds on this basis. This section aims to state and justify 
the tenus of reference for my (theological) analysis and evaluation of 
the four ecological theologies represented in the C&S discussions. 
The discussion of the foregoing chapters suggests that the 
following list of questions 'WOuld serve to isolate the main features 
of each approach. The questions relate to the cosmos, its place in 
eschatology, humanity's and God's relationship to it, and to science 
and technology. · Precisely stated: 
(1) With regard to the cosmos, what is its theological status? and 
how is the cosmos described? 
(2) Does the cosmos have a place in eschatology? 
(3) What are the dimensions of the human relationship to the cosmos? 
This includes, for example, the theological assessment of humanity's 
biological contiguity with nature, its capacity to transcend nature by 
mental and technological process,' and the imago Dei and dominium terrae 
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traditions. It will also include the theological assessment of the 
limitations placed upon human existence by the 'laws' and. regularities 
of. nature. 
( 4) What are . the dimensions of God's relationship to the cosmos? 
(5) What is the theological assessment of science and technology, 
as human enterprises? 
These questions are some of the obvious questions, which emerge 
from the discussions in Chapters Two and Three particularly, and from 
that of Chapter One as well. It would be possible to describe each 
of the four main positions with the aid of these five ·_questionc:;. This 
would provide four concise summaries of the four positions, but no means 
of comparing them except by correlating their responses to the question-
naire. It would not provide an overview of possible inter-relationships 
within a position or between positions. Jf it is possible to obtain a 
systematic perspective on all four, then that will supplement the 
questionnaire style of description, illuminate similarities and contrasts 
between them, and make for a more penetrating analysis. 
Lindqvist has already attempted such an analysis in his survey 
Economic Growth and the Quality of Life, using 'history' as his main 
interpretative and analytic category. I have already argued in Chapter 
Three that his approach has tended to mask the significant differences 
between Gregorios' Orthodox stance and that of process theology, as well 
as combining the emancipa tory response with the theology of hope 
(section 2, subsections (;Li) and (iif), :esp., pages l04f above). Therefore 
I must seek elsewhere for the appropriate systematic perspective. 
I intend to adapt H. Richard Niebuhr's survey, Christ and Culture, 
and survey the four main positions according to their responses to the 
theological question of the technological culture. (l) This survey 
suggests itself for adaptation and use in this context, for the following 
reasons. First, Niebuhr's survey has won' wide general acceptance as 
an authoritative systematic account and evaluation of the various 
theological responses to the question of culture in the life of the 
church. second, the question of technology is necessarily involved 
in the discussion of humanity's relationship to the cosmos and in 
theological response to the environmental crisis, and the technological 
enterprise falls within the scope of. the 'culture' of Niebuhr's study; 
the theological question of technology is therefore a special aspect of 
the wider question of culture. And finally, I hope to show that the 
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adaptation of Niebuhr's survey to the specialist question of disciple-
ship in. the technological culture does in fact provide an illuminating 
perspective on the four. positions under review, with the added merit of 
elucidating the theological orientation. which each position gives for 
living in the environmental crisis situation and the technological 
culture with which it is inescapably bound. 
I have argued in Chapter one that technology plays a central part 
in the issues of the environmental crisis (section 1, pages 6-8 esp.) 
The rapidly increasing population requires a vast and intense techno-
logical enterprise for its sustenance: the technological control of 
species which canpete with man for food is essential if the necessary 
food supply is to be forthcoming; yet the long-tenn effects of this 
control may jeopardise the survival of the human species either by 
cumulative chemical poisoning or by destroying the ecological substruct-
ure to such an extent that it loses homeostasis and the quantity and 
quality of its food yield is irreparably diminished~ How, then, may 
the Christian respond to this grim dilerrrrna? My survey will show that 
several responses are possible.(2) 
'Iwo things must be attempted before embarking on my survey of 
'Christ and the Technological Culture'; or, as I will call it, 
'Discipleship in the Technological CUlture' . First, the concept of 
'the technological culture' must be made precise. Second, a relation-
ship to Niebuhr's original survey must be established, and this will be 
done by translating the types analysed by Niebuhr into recognisably 
similar types of response to the technological culture. 
will occupy me for the remainder of this section. 
These tasks 
In order to develop the idea of the technological culture, I begin 
with Niebuhr's own definition of culture: 
'What we have in view when we deal with Christ and 
culture is that total process of human activity and 
that total result of such activity to which now the 
name culture, now the name civilisation; is applied 
in common speech. Culture is the· "artificial 
secondary environment" which man superimposes on 
the natural. It comprises language, habits, 
ideas, beliefs, customs, social organisation, 
inherited artifacts, technical processes, and 
values.' (3) 
Some of the chief characteristics of- culture, he stated, are that it is 
social; a human achievement,· purposefully oriented towards the establish-
ment, realisation, ancd conservation of human values; but also pluralist, 
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'partly because men are many'.(4) His definition suggests that the 
technological culture to which the individual Christian responds would 
be the aspect of his culture which is associated with its technical 
enterprise, the economic theories and legal constraints which govern 
its daily operation, the relations between management and workforce, 
the relationship of the scientific enterprise to industry, the 
institutions and systems for the dissemination· of scientific and 
technological information, the impact of technology upon human health 
(pollution) and on the culture's language, habits, ideas, beliefs, customs, 
and social structure. But there is a hidden presupposition involved in 
attempting to define technological culture this way: namely, that 
technology only affects those societies which are technologically 
(industrially) oriented, such as those of Western Europe and North 
America. This presupposition is invalid at the biological level. Food 
chains do not respect national or territorial boundaries, they transfer 
chemicals from one geographic region to another, so that the inhabitants 
of non-industrial nations may nevertheless absorb industrial chemicals 
through the hunter's quarry. (5) On the other hand, international 
economics is geared to a level of productivity which can only be 
achieved by technological means, and modern conventional (i.e. non-
nuclear) weaponry requires sophisticated technology; this means that the 
non-industrial nations are under strong pressure to. develop technolog-
ically in order to maintain living standards and independence. (6) The 
presupposition is therefore invalid at the cultural level as well as the 
biological. Thus 'technological culture' cannot be defined as a 
dimension of culture in a technologically advanced society. 
Technological development has global implications at both the 
cultural and biological levels. The individual Christian is implicated, 
no matter what the technological character of his national culture may 
be. So it is better to understand technological culture in the broadest 
possible sense, and say that 
technological culture includes both the cultural 
phenomena of scientific and technological enter-
prise and their implications for human existence 
around the world~· 
For a Christian in an industrial society, this will include all the 
dimensions listed above (the physical structures of industry, lal:x:>ur 
relations, etc.). For a Christian in a non-industrial society, it 
includes the pressures of his society to increase its industrialisation, 
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the results of these pressures in terms of societal goals and values, 
economic policies, political and. legal structures, and. the types of 
institutions developed. and. programnes initiated. The reality of this 
aspect of technological culture may be seen in the following quotation 
from one of the Working Group reports to the 1970 Geneva conference, 
reflecting on the Asian and African situation: 
'Some of these countries experience a profound 
cultural conflict between their traditional 
values and the habits of thought and life which 
the management and control of technological power 
require. Christian faith may be caught 
creatively in the middle of this conflict. Its 
biblical sources may help a non-Christian culture 
both to rediscover the human values it represents over 
against modern technological rationality and to 
come to grips constructively.with the power and 
promise which technology brings to man. This will 
require however a profound rethinkin9· of the Christian 
message, with the help of human values contributed 
by traditional Asian and African cultures.' (7) 
This quotation serves two purposes. . It confirms the insight above, that 
technological culture is international in extent and that it must be 
defined for the global context. My definition has attempted to do 
this. The quotation also shows that the problem of technological 
culture may have a theological dimension, when Christians c6ncerned with 
their nation's culture seek to relate their social and Christian aware-
ness to technological development. It is on this basis that I attempt 
to survey attitudes to discipleship in the technological culture. 
It is clear from the definition above that there is only one 
technological culture, global in extent. It will have different 
expressions in different cultures, corresponding to differences in 
culture and in technological development. Nevertheless, I shall refer 
to the technological culture and tllke account of its localised express-
ions only when it is necessary to do so. 
It is now necessary to attempt a translation of Niebuhr's survey 
to the new context of the technological culture. My· survey of the 
four main approaches in the C&S discussions will show that they fit into 
the natural adaptation of Niebuhr's schema. 
Niebuhr distinguished five types of theological response to the 
question of culture. 
turn. 
I shall delineate and translate each of them in 
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The first type of response emphasises the opposition between 
the demands of Christian corrnn.itment. and those of. the culture in which 
the believer lives. The Chris'ti:.ian is not bound by the customs of 
. his society, and rejects as valueless the human. achievements which his 
culture values. The rejection of culture extends to the criticism 
of all its institutions, including its political, economic, legal and 
religious institutions. 
Against Culture' type. (8) 
Niebuhr calls this type of answer the 'Christ 
A similarly thorough repudiation of the 
technological culture could be regarded as a 'Christ Against the Techno-
logical CUlture', rejectionist, type. In fact, this type of response 
is not represented in my survey, so I will not attempt to specify its 
theoretical characteristics any further •. (9) It has occurred outside 
Christian theology .. in response to technology and the environmental 
crisis, for example in Theodore Roszak's. The Making of a 
Counter-CUlture, and in the Marxist philosopher Herbert Marcuse, One-
Dimensional Man. (10) In particular, the lesson from Marcuse's indict-
ment of technology is that the repudiation of technological culture 
need not entail the repudiation of culture in general, since Marcuse 
denounces the technological culture for creating a one-dimensional 
humanity, yet also names art as the great transfonning agent for human 
existence.(ll) It is also theoretically possible for the individual 
Christian to reject the technological culture, yet at the same time turn 
in another response to the question of Christ and culture. 
The second response in Niebuhr's typology recognises the existence 
of a fundamental agreement between Christ and culture. Christ works in, 
with, and through society and its institutions, fulfills its hopes and 
aspirations, and brings its ge:r:minal faith to fruition. This response 
feels no great tension between church and world, the gospel and the 
laws of society, human effort and the workings of divine grace, the ethics 
of salvation and the ethics of social conservation and progress. 
Niebuhr calls this the 'Christ of CUlture' response. (12). It is 
possible to speak of a similar response to the technological culture, which 
would see the technological culture as the instrument of man's growth to 
full maturity and the development. of his perfect humanity. Christ v.:orks 
in, with, and through the agencies of technological development; human 
technology enables man to realise his full human· and spiritual potential, 
and is also the means by which God. brings. the cosmos to its appointed 
. destiny. This could be called the 'Christ of Technological Culture' 
approach, but for brevity I shall call it the sypthesist approach. 
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It. allows for a theological synthesis between the claims of disciple-
ship and the teclmological culture. 
Niebuhr describes three other responses which together comprise 
the middle ground between the two extremes of the 'Christ Against 
CUlture', and the 'Christ of Culture' types. These three median 
approaches agree that the fundamental theological issue does not lie 
between Christ and culture but between God and man. They agree that 
human culture is an inescapable part of human existence because God 
has created humanity as a social and cultural being, and recognises 
that his creation is 'good' (Genesis 1:31). This rules out a simple 
opposition between Christianity and culture. Simple ·cultural accormuo-
dation is also ruled out, because the median positions agree on the 
universality and radical nature of sin whereas the extreme positions 
tend to minimise its effect. The median positions also agree on the 
primacy of God's grace, the necessity of works of obedience, and the 
hope of redemption in Jesus Christ. Niebuhr says that they represent 
'the great majority movement in Christianity, 
which we may call the church of the center. ' ( 13) 
Because of their fundamental agreement at this level, the three 
responses which comprise the median are more closely related to each 
other than any one of them is to either of the extremes. Nevertheless, 
the church of the centre does not admit one simply ordered answer to 
the problem of culture. On the understanding that they are median 
positions and share the theological characteristics of the median stated 
above, Niebuhr speaks of 'Christ Above Culture' , of 'Christ and 
CUlture in Paradox', and of 'Christ the Transfonner of Culture'. (14) 
With regard to the teclmological culture, there is also a position 
which may be called 'median'. It recognises the universality and 
radical nature of human sin, the primacy of God's grace, the necessity 
of works of obedience, and the hope of redemption in Jesus Christ. 
It is not so evident that the teclmological culture is an inescapable 
part of human existence, established by God at the creation and 
canparable to man's social nature. But it may nevertheless be regarded 
as an inevitable aspect of human existence, since God has created man 
as a social and cultural being, with the capacity to manipulate the 
environment:, to develop technological . ways of manipulating it, and to 
corrnuunicate his knowledge to other humans. The teclmological culture 
may therefore be regarded as an aspect of the 'good'creation willed and 
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established by God, and accepted as part. of the context in which 
contemporary Christians are to live out their commitment. If a 
theological position shows this sort of. acceptance. of the technological 
culture, in combination with the views of sin and. redemption already 
described as 'median' 1 I shall call it a .median position. As it 
happens, three of the positions examined in my su:tvey are median 
positions. 
Niebuhr's 'Christ Above CUlture' response seeks to maintain some 
sort of harmony between Christ and culture by bringing them both into 
one system of thought and practice. It is a 'both - and' synthesis, 
which accommodates Christ and culture 1 God's work and man's, the 
tempora:l·. and the eternal, law and grace, together. It is able to 
provide for willing and intelligent cooperation between Christians and 
unbelievers in carrying on the work of the world, at the same time 
maintaining the distinctiveness . of the Christian faith and life. Like 
the 'Christ of CUlture' response, it sees a basic agreement between 
Christ and culture, but explores this agreement from the theological 
perspective of the median. (15) A similar approach may be taken with 
regard to the technological culture. It would emphasise the human and 
spiritual benefits of technological advance, as obedience to the injunct-
ion to subdue the earth and have dominion over it. The personal 
involvement of a Christian in science, technology, or industry, may be 
regarded as a genuine Christian vocation, where the 'Christ Against the 
Technological CUlture' would condemn such involvement. As a median 
position it will recognise that humanity is fallen and that sin pervades 
and corrupts all human activity, including all the levels of technological 
enterprise and the outworking of its cultural implications. Within this 
context, the technological culture is part of humanity's contribution 
to the achievement of the divine purpose in the cosmos. Because it shows 
a sympathy for the technological culture, but does not match the 
wholehearted theological corrmi tment to the technological culture which 
the synthesist displays, I will refer to it as the sympathetic approach; 
human technological effort may be in sympathy with the divine purpose, 
but never identified with it. 
Niebuhr's second median position is that of 'Christ and Culture 
in Paradox'. It. sees a basic opposition between Christ and culture, 
as does the 'Christ Against CUlture' type, but explores this opposition 
fran the theological perspective of the median. Obedience to God 
requires obedience to the institutions of society and loyalty to fellow-
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citizens, as well as obedience to a Christ who sits in judgment on that 
society. There is a polarity and tension involved in accepting the 
cla.llns of: the two discordant authorities, which means that life is 
lived precariously· and. sinfully in the hope of: a jlhstification which lies 
beyond history. (16) Translated to. the context of technological 
culture, such an attitude would see teclnology and the technological 
culture as necessary evils whose existence forces the Christians into 
continual compromise; for example, when he pays his taxes to a govern-
ment which will devote some of his money to weapons research. The 
Christian who adopts such an approach might admit, perhaps grudgingly, 
that agricultural and transport technologies must be developed in order 
to feed the world's population, yet be painfully aware that the 
pollution associated with these technologies despoils God's good 
creation. Thus he may seek to limit technological developnent to that 
which is necessary for human survival (at a level corrnnensocate with the 
earth's resources and with distributive justice in the sharing of those 
resources), and to technological processes which minimise environmental 
deterioration. But he will know at the same time that the task is 
hopeless, and compromised at every tum. Only Christ can redeem the 
situation. This may be called the 'Christ and the Technological 
Culture in Paradox' response, but for brevity I will call it the 
arnbivalent.type. The ambivalence is in the technological culture 
itself; it benefits human existence, yet is bound up with sin in its 
daily operation, and presents the Christian with innumerable occasions 
for sin. 
The last of Niebuhr's median positions sees Christ as the trans-
fonner of culture. It sees the potential of human existence (at the 
individual and social levels) in tenns of an existence transfonned by 
by the grace of God made effective in contemporary history, and enabling 
life to be lived for God's glory within the matrix of human culture. 
This approach sees creation as 'good' in its own right; it acknowledges 
the sinfulness of man and adds that this is perverted goodness and thus 
still capable of a degree of goodness in a way that total corruption is 
not; and it looks for the fruits of redemption to be manifest proleptically 
within present historical existence. This position has a more positive 
and hopeful attitude towards culture than that of the 'paradox' type, 
and pays greater attention to the effects of human· sin and the primacy 
of God's grace than does the 'Christ Above Cui ture' type. For the 
latter sees goodness in culture, ner ~e, in spite of the distortion 
_151 
caused by sin. This approach looks for the transformation of culture 
by the work o£ grace. (17) The parallel approach could be called 
'Christ the Transfonne.r o£ the Technological Culture', but for brevity 
I will call it. the. conve:rsionist approach., It acknowledges the work 
of God in the technological culture, taking human achievement and 
transfonning it now for his historical and eschatological purposes. In 
this way,Christ redeems human effort; for the sympathetic type of 
response (Christ above technological culture), the human effort needs no 
redemption because, in furthering the development of the technological 
culture, it is ipso facto good. This response, however, seeks to 
understand God's purposes in history and in the consummation of history, 
and to direct its efforts towards their realisation, just as the 
Christian strives for holiness in his historical existence. It also 
looks hopefully for signs of the coming Kingdom in the historical 
present. In this way it gives a hopeful evaluation of the techno-
logical culture, even in the face of such.negative experiences of it 
as pollution and distributive injustice: God is working to transfonn the 
technological culture for the sake of the whole creation. 
This completes my plausible but nevertheless hypothetical 
translation of the types of responses to the theological question of 
culture, to types of responses to the theological question of the 
technological culture. I claimed earlier in this section that this 
translation would provide a useful systematic perspective on the four· 
main theological approaches represented in the Church and Society 
programne, as studied in Chapter Three. The next four sections put this 
claim to the test. 
Each approach will be dealt with in three subsections, after a 
brief introduction. In the first, the approach itself will be 
described in its own terms, by aa exposition of the primary sources 
which best exemplify and represent it. This will be structured around 
the five questions about the cosmos and about humanity, listed at the 
beginning of this section. The second subsection will relate the 
approach to the spectrum of responses to the theological question of 
technological culture, by means of the hypothetical typology constructed 
above. The third subsection will then concentrate on the strengths 
and weaknesses of the approach. 
I begin with the approach which dominated the C&S discussions from 
1966 through to 1973, which I called the 'emancipatory' approach. I 
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will discuss its successor (the 1 theology of hope 1 ) 
1 
in section 3
1 
after which sections 4 and. 5 will discuss ·the approaches of process 
theology and of Paulos Gregorios respectively, and so complete 
my anaylsis. 
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2. The emancipatory approach. 
The tenn 'emancipatory' is used to describe this approach, 
because one of its characteristic views is that nature is a power from 
which humanity must liberate itself by scientific and technological 
skill. In his survey Economic Growth and the Quality of .life, Lindqvist 
described it as a theology of history and typified it by the statement 
that 
'the God who historicises human existence frees man 
fran entangling bondage to the powers of nature, and 
calls him to come of age and to become the master of 
the powers whose slave he previously was.'(l8) 
I have already argued that 'history' is not the right interpretative 
category for my present purpose; the quotation above makes it clear why 
I substituted the tenn 'emancipatory' to describe Lindqvist's 
'traditional Western theology of history'. 
Lindqvist states that 
'the most profound analysis of the relation between 
man ·and nature in the framework of the Futurum 
project' 
is that given by Derr in Ecology and Human Liberation.(l9) Since Derr 
represents the emancipatory approach, his book will serve as a primary 
source for this examination of the emancipatory approach. Another 
significant representative is the Faith and Order document 'God in 
Nature and History', which is based largely on a study by Hendrikus 
Berkhof that appeared, in Study Encounter(l965) under the same title. (20) 
Comparison of the two documents shows that the Faith and Order document 
represents only a slight modification of Berkhof' s paper, and that the 
principal source of its emancipatory type of theology is Berkhof's 
study. It is therefore more convenient, and more faithful to the 
emancipatory position, to use Berkhof' s study as one of· my primary 
sources. Derr's book is actually an exposition of Berkhof's theolog-
ical position with special reference to the environmental crisis. (21) 
This means that I can describe the emancipatory position on the basis 
of Berkhof's paper, and use Derr's book for the subsection on disciple-
ship in the technological culture. Then the third subsection will 
evaluate their approach. 
(i) Expc?si tion. 
As indicated in the plan proposed for this analysis, the descript-
ion of· the emancipatory position will be based on the five questions 
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listed at the beginning of section 1. 
(1) The cosmos. Berkho:E begins with a r~r;>id survey of the changed 
view of nature implied by scientific research. He seeks 
'a new and better mutual relationship bet:ween the 
Christian message and the modern view of life and 
of the world' , 
starting from the biblical perspective. (22) His main category is 
'history', so he explores the way hmnan history may relate to nature as 
it is presently understood.by science. The theological question arises 
fran an awareness of the structures . and processes of the cosmos, and its 
answer is given in terms which make this awareness secondary. For 
nature is only understood through . history and on the basis of the human 
relationship to God: 
'After God's character in his historical deeds is 
discovered, this character can also be discerned 
and these deeds seen prefigured in the processes 
of natlllre.' (23) 
Nature, on the other hand, with history and consurrmation, are inseparable 
links of a chain whose 
'true character and unity fcan be seen] only from 
the middle of God's revelafury deeds in history, 
whence both a backward ·and a forward look are 
possible.' (24) 
The cosmos has same theological status, therefore, but of a strictly 
secondary kind. Nature comes first in the order of being, but history 
comes first in the order of theological knowledge because God makes 
himself known in history and not in nature. (25) History is dynamic, 
with God's purpose of revelation and redemption; nature is dynamic, but 
without purpose. (26) 
(2) The cosmos in comsurnmation. The new 'NOrld will be this earth, 
renewed and re-created according to the new humanity in the risen Christ. 
The eschaton 
'will be the canplete and glorified unfolding of what 
God has already begun in history in his son and in his 
Spirit.', 
which involves a measure of discontinuity for both history and nature in 
their consummation.(27) Some elements of this present historical 
existence will continue, .however. In . particular, 
'consummation will mean a new and far more thorough-
going display of man's freedom and dominion' ~ 
for its part, 
'natu:::e will completely lose its uncertain, 
chaotic and threatening character and will 
be entirely subservient to :rran. ' (28) 
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Thus nature will play the role God intended for it in its creation, 
unimpeded by the effects of htmtan sin. (29) What was evident in the 
life of Jesus will be universal in the coming KingdOm.(30) 
It is clear fran this account that the primary theological 
category is human existence and history, that the cosmos is secondary 
to that and only seen as instrumental to the truly htmtan life. It 
does not merit theological discourse in its own right, either with 
respect to historical or eschatological existence. 
(3) The human relationship to the cosmos. Berkhof lists seven 
aspects of the man-nature relationship. (31) First, man is the product 
of nature; he is the fruit of an evolutionary process, but biblical 
thought agrees that htmtan existence is rooted and grounded in nature 
(Genesis 1 and 2) • Second, man is nurtured by nature, and this nurb.1re 
extends to such dimensions of human existence as the biological and the 
aesthetic. Third, man is threatened by nature's arnbigui ty; if he does 
not resist nature, she can 'swallow and suffocate him'~. Fourth, 
true humanity consists in the mastery of the ambiguous and threatening 
nature which confronts man. Fifth, man guides and transforms nab.1re -
the product of nature's evolution becomes nature's leader. This is a 
purposeful leadership, in which man realises GOd's;purposes for his 
creation by controlling and harnessing the purposeless process of 
nature. Sixth, man is the master of nature. Human dominion is 
interpreted by analogia relationis; as God is the Lord over his whole 
creation, so he elects man as his representative to exercise his lord-
ship in His name over the lower creation. Thus Genesis 1 and Psalm 8 
show that 
'God stands no longer on the side of nature over 
against man, but on the side of man over agai rnt 
nature.' (32) 
Finally, nature has meaning and value for its own sake, apart ·from man. 
This acknowledgement functions as a corrective to possible distortions 
of the preceding statements about dominion and true htmtanity. 
Berkhof then excludes two other conceptions of the hunan relation-
ship to the cosmos. He excludes existentialist conceptions because 
they deny the importance of both nature and history; and he excludes 
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those views which 'biologise' man and 'naturalise' history by seejng man 
as nothing more than a product of. nature, .and which therefore cannot 
explain the moral and. historical dimensions of human existence. (33) 
(4) God's relationship to the cosmos. The view of human 
dominion as analoqia relationis suggests that God's relationship to the 
cosmos is mediated .through humanity alone. Nevertheless, God has his 
own relationship to the cosmos. (34) Conversely, the cosmos may be an 
instrument of God's revelation to man, though 
' there is no direct encounter with God in the 
phenomena of nature' .(35) 
Theologically, God's relationship to the cosmos can only be a secondarY 
and speculative theme. For 
(5) 
'man is the junction, where all the lines between God . 
and his earthly creation came together. The [biblicalj 
world view is geocentric ••• because revelation is 
addressed to man, and man bears no responsibility 
except for his own world'.(36) 
Science and technology. Berkhof says that nature's 
'unconscious ends are now sub:ni tted to man's 
conscious planning'; 
that is, science and technology are ways of bringing order to the chaos 
of nature, of guiding and transforming it. (37) This is part of the 
lordship of the creation delegated by God to his image, for 
'when Genesis 1:27 says that God created man in his 
own image, the whole passage 1:26-28 makes it clear 
that what is mainly thought of is man's dominion 
over nature'. (38) 
It is clear that the human vocation in history is to pursue the subjuga-
tion of nature and humanity's emancipation therefrom, by means of science 
and technology. This is possible because nature has been desacralised 
and de-demonised and so became acessible to scientific and technological 
handling; and it is necessary because it is God's cammission to ro.an. (39) 
Christians should welcome and rejoice in the immense progress in control-
ling and using nature that science and technology have made possible, 
thus bringing 
'relief to innumerable men in their struggle for 
life and [disclosing] innumerable riches for a 
deeper · humanisation of mankind' • ( 40) 
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Berkhof doe.S not give way to strident ti tanism, however. The 
achievements of_ science and technology are signs of the kind of life 
God intends for his children at. the consummation, but for the present 
we live in a sinful world. He suggests that three critical questions 
must be put to the technical generation about their science and tech-
nology: What kind of dominion is being exercised? What are the aims 
of man's technical dominion? And what are its effects upon human 
existence? ( 41) There is sound ecological and humanitarian sense 
behind Berkhof' s exposition of these questions, and they are as pertinent 
and necessary in 1982 as they were when published in 1965 (well before 
the impact of the envirornnental crisis on the C&S discussions, in 1971). 
For example, human dominion must be of such a kind that it pennits nature 
to display her 'sister-aspect' to man; dominion for its own sake, which 
ignores this aspect of nature's sister-relationship to man, 
'will hollow out and undermine his humanity'.(42) 
Berkhof's pastoral observation is that 
'Modern man is deformed. First he was enslaved to 
nature, now he is enslaved to his mastery of 
nature'. (43) 
His general conclusion is that, with regard to technical development, man 
'has to do not less, but more. But he has to 
subjugate his technical possibilities to the other 
relations of his life, instead of allowing technics 
to supersede these other relations. otherwise he 
will lose as much as he gains, and in the long run 
he will lose far more than he gains'. (44) 
This is the necessary corrplement to Genesis 1: 28. The next quotation 
sums up Berkhof' s theological assessment of science and technology and 
the human vocation in the cosmos. 
'Technics are not sinful in themselves; on the 
contrary, they are a means towards fulfilling God's 
comnandment. But they are a means in the hand of 
sinful man; • • . the arnbigui ties in technics are 
in reality t.he ambiguities of man himself.' (45) 
(ii) Discipleship in the technological culture. 
It is evident from my account of Berkhof.' s paper that he 
represents one of the median positions in my survey of discipleship in 
the technological culture. There can be no . simple opposition between 
Christian comnitment and the technological culture, because that culture 
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is not evil in itself but is rooted and grounded in God's good creation 
and. the commission he has given man. On the other hand, the technolog-
ical culture is in the hands of sinful. humanity, so it is not automat-
ically good. in itself either. Finally, Bexkhof recognises the primacy 
of God's grace, the necessity of works of obedience, and the hope of 
redemption in Jesus Christ. (46) . He therefore shares the common 
assumptions which characterise the church of the centre. 
It is also evident that he does not represent the ambivalent 
type of response (Christ and the technological culture in paradox). He 
does not see the technological culture as a source of polarity and tension 
within Christian life, making life precarious and sinful, as the believer 
lives in the hope of a justification beyond history. Nor does he con-
centrate on the redemptive transfonuation of the present by the effective 
grace of God, as does the conversionist who sees Christ as the trans-
fanner of the technological culture. Instead, the expansion of the 
technological culture is the present task of humanity;. the redemption 
and transformation of historical existence will take place only at the 
end, while in the meantime humanity strives to work out its obedience to 
God. 
This suggests that the ernancipatory approach represents a 
sympathetic attitude to the technological culture (Christ above the 
technological qulture). This subsection intends to show that this is 
indeed the case, by e~arnining Derr's book which deals specifically with 
the question of the technological culture in the context of the environ-
mental crisis. As mentioned above, Ecology and Human Liberation starts 
from Berkhof's position and explores its implications for the environ-
mental crisis. 
Derr's attitude to the broader question of culture is of the Christ 
above culture type, which suggests that his attitude to the technological 
culture will be similar. And so it is. There is a basic harmony 
between the claims of reason in society and its institutions, and the 
claims of a' €hristian corrmi tment based on biblical theology and ethics. 
With regard to the technological culture and ·the sp~cial issues of the 
environmental crisis, the social realities inherent in the questions of 
resource-sharing, monitoring of pollution, and the control of population 
size and rate of increase, all require action at ·the level of international 
cooperation within transnational institutions. These institutions 
provide humanity with the practical means to exercise its God-given 
dominion over the earth according to the stewardship ethic. 
For the institutions, the important social cwestion is, 
'What. style of life. is compatible with both 
sound. ecology and social justice?' (4.7) 
In the limits to growth debate, Derr argues that it is 
'nearly axiomatic that a growth ~~4ewill 
institutionalise poverty', 
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a situation which the Third World will naturally resist to the uttermost. 
(48) In fact, 
'the tensions generated by such a situation will 
provoke a political and economic collapse of major 
proportions, perhaps well ahead of any likely 
ecological collapse'.(49) 
Thus humanitarian and prudential considerations point to the need for a 
global policy which incorporates efforts to meet the needs of the Third 
World for development. Derr discusses this in a chapter titled 
'Stewardship, Property and the Politics of Resource Sharing', in which 
he argues that the basic question is that of stewardship of the earth's 
resources for the good of man, and that the ethic of property and 
resource ownership must be interpreted in this light. (50) The social 
ethics of property ownership act as constraints upon human dominion, and 
therefore 
'enviromnental policies rest unavoidably on a sense 
of fitting stewardship of God's creation' . (51) 
The normative exercise of human dominion is the 
'careful, socially responsible husbanding of all 
God I S giftS I I 
and this makes a prima facie case for the equal sharing of the earth 1 s 
resources. (52) This, in its turn, highlights the need for a substantial 
reordering of the international situation and structures of international 
economics. (53) In his next chapter, he shows how the theology of 
dominion and the ethic of responsible stewardship point in exactly the 
same direction as the humanitarian and prudential considerations noted 
arove. (54) 
The same agreement between social policy and sound theology may 
be noted in his discussion of. population. The exponential growth in 
population will inevitably be curbed, sooner or later, 
'by catastrophe if not by social forethought. We 
must, then, begin to limit our numbers now'. (55) 
The humanitarian and practical reality is that 
'even parenthood comes under the rule that- no 
right is so absolute that- it. can be exercised 
without regard to other people' • (56) 
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This corresponds perfectly with ·nerr' s interpretation of the biblical 
injunction to be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth (Genesis 1:28). 
'We should note that the command comes as an integral 
part of the comnission to man to "have dominion" over 
the earth, where "dominion" is the central point of 
the text. A certain population level is. obviously . 
needed to diversify and enrich life, making man's 
mastery a fact. But beyond a certain point the 
numbers of people have a reverse effect, so diminish-
ing the quality of life that man's mastery over the earth 
is actually weakened. Overpopulation is the enemy of 
dominion, not its partner.'(57) 
As in the question of resources and economic growth, the locus of the 
congruence between Christian commitment and the technological culture 
is found in the theology of human dominion. This is Derr' s general 
position, as his interpretation of Genesis 1:26-28 shows; it 
•.intends a blessing on the works of civilisation by 
referring them to the divine co:rrrrnand. • • • Its wise 
and tempered humanism says that man is emancipated 
from nature for history, that he creates civil-
isation as a work with an historical dimension, a 
conscious shaping of the environment in accord 
with human purposes • • • which must also show respon-
sibility to God'.(58) 
Derr shows the same . positive esteem for science and technology as 
Berkhof does. They have made life more human for the average man, and 
opened up numerous 
'humanising possibilities'. (59) 
Man is the image of God, and therefore 
'cannot live without exercising his non-natural 
dimension' , 
which means that 
'man's dominion over nature must continue to be 
exercised, [though] with greater skill and wisdom 
than in the past. ' ( 60) 
Hence Derr shows that., like Berkhof, ·he believes that the image of God 
is the desideratum: of human existence and finds its expression in the 
human enterprises of science and technology. They become the 
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expressions of man's true humanity. Like Berkhof, Derr shows that 
this is not titanism but a carefully controlled and restrained call to 
human dominion, qualified. by the ethic of responsible stewardship. For 
Derr, however, the desacralisation·bf· nature and its historicisation 
..._ 
provide the only possible bases for ecological theology and for socially 
responsible, prudent, and humanitarian ethics. He discusses, and rejects, 
some of the alternatives 'proposed for theological ··response to the 
environmental crisis, and concludes that no· other theological source is 
open. Man 
'cannot • • • abandon his responsible dominion 
over the earth without ethically unpalateable 
consequences'.(61) 
Thus Berkhof and Derr represent the median response to the tech-
nological culture, which I call the sympathetic type; their central 
themes are the theology of human dominion and the ethic of responsible 
stewardship which qualifies it. 
position. 
(iii) Evaluation. 
The next subsection evaluates their 
Niebuhr's Christ and Culture evaluates the 'Christ above CUlture' 
position as one which is 'necessary', but he adds that it is less than 
evident that it is the whole truth and nothing but the truth. (62) My 
account of Berkhof and Derr shows that the theological issues of the 
technological culture are very different from those of culture in 
general, which means that it is not possible to transfer Niehbuhr's 
evaluation of the Christ above culture approach and apply it straight-
forwardly to the sympathetic approach to technological culture. In fact, 
my assessment of the emancipatory position is that it is by no means 
necessary; and it remains an open question whether its benefits may be 
preserved by another theological approach which avoids the pitfalls of 
the emancipatory view. 
Nonetheless, the eman.c lpatory approach has several advantages, 
including the following: 
First, it makes sense of ·humanity's increasingly extensive 
mastery of nature. As Berkhof points out, nature is ambiguous and 
seemingly purposeless. She is both mother and enemy to man, bringing 
furth thorns and thistles as well as flowers and grain. Hurricanes, 
floods, droughts, earthquakes, and fire are powerful examples of nature's 
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torc!3 and man's vu.lne:tability. Against such potential hostility (which is 
part. of. nature.• s ambiguity) , the emancipatory approach emphasises the 
achievements of human skill and ingenuity which enable man to control 
nature, in part, and to harness some of: its power. Against the 
apparent purposelessness of nature, it emphasises the purposeful aspect 
of human existence, to bring nature to order and thereby to realise 
God's purposes. in his creation. It therefore gives a theological 
interpretation of the human faculty for technology, and one which is 
particularly congruous with the experience of nature in industrialised 
societies. This interpretation is also highly plausible because it 
pays due ·respect to the uniqueness of the human species. Derr speaks 
of the vast achievements of human culture and the human spirit, and 
concludes: 
• to affimi that man is special among creatures, a 
uni~e factor in the natural world, is not 
to be arrogant but to state the obvious • ; 
while conversely, 
'the uncontrolled wild remains a symbolic threat 
to us because it is the antithesis of the 
human. • (63) 
This is exactly how technological man sees his relationship to nature. 
The emancipatory position is able to give a theological perspective on 
his uniqueness within the natural world, as the agent appointed by God 
to bring nature under control. 
Second, the emancipatory position accompanies this perspective 
with the acknowledgement that humanity is biologically contiguous with 
nature. In essence, this is the biblical view of man, for the bible 
sees man as 
•a unity of the biological and the spiritual, always 
both at once, never separate from nature, and never 
without his unique daninance over nature•. (64) 
This acknowledgement serves to restrain the titanism involved in a one-
sided emphasis on human dominion. It emphasises that the biosphere 
is to be nurtured and cared for in swh a way that it (and the human 
biological species it contains) may exist in the ecological harmony 
for which it was created by God. Theologically, the acknowledgement 
also safuguards against possible deprecation of the body and matter 
generally which may arise from. the emphasis on humanity• s moral, spirit-
ual, historical and technological transcendence overi.nature. Thus 
technology is part of the human purpose in history, with the proviso that 
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that- it- be pursued with respect. for the wholeness and health of all 
God's creation. So this acknowledgement- seeks to provide environmental 
and theological balance to the emancipatory position, thus protecting 
the biosphere and the necessary concern ·for global social justice, and 
giving priority to the needs of the human species should any conflict of 
priorities arise.(65) 
Third, the emancipatory position is able to justify the involvement 
of Christians in the scientific, industrial, and technological enter-
prises. They are helping humanity to achieve, at least in part, the 
goals which God intends man to achieve within his creation. As the 
primal creation brought order out of chaos, so the human capability to 
manipulate and control nature may harness its chaotic forces for the 
benefit of both mm1 and nature. There is no question here of potential 
conflict between Christian cormni tment and employment in the technological 
culture, in principle, though there may be conflicts arising in special 
circumstances such as engagement in a weapons research project.(66) The 
question of continual compromise does not arise either. Instead, the 
Christian may enjoy the many benefits of technological progress with a 
clear conscience and a grateful heart, ·and diligently play his part in 
furthering that progress; for the general aim of science and technology 
is to make humanity more human and so fulfill God's intentions for human 
existence.(67) The env±ronmental crisis presents a clarion call to the 
the Christian to be involved in the technological culture and work for 
its refonn along the lines governed by the theology of dominion, 
responsible stewardship, and their implications in tenns of resource 
sharing, pollution control, and the control of population size and the 
rate of its increase. There are ethical problems in the scientific 
and technological enterprises, and areas which need refonn (their 
benefits need to be distributed more evenly to all mankind, for 
example) • But the ethical problems are not inherent in science and 
technology, they arise from the fallenness of the humanity involved in 
those enterprises. The Christian may therefore live with and involve 
i himself in the technological culture without preju9fe to his integrity. 
This is reassuring to those Christians who live in industrialised 
societies, where the technological culture circumscribes their existence 
and exerts continual pressure upon them. 
In sum, then, the ernancipatory position ·seems to be environmentally 
and theologically balanced, able to deal theologically with the realities 
of contemporary existence in the technological culture and its pervasive 
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influence, and able to rejoice in its significant benefits to mankind. 
Nevertheless, i.t. has theological disadvantages which, in my opinion, 
render i.t- unsuitable. 
The first- disadvantage relates· to the view of nature which the 
ernancipatory position holds. In every way, nature is distinguished 
negatively from man. Man has the image. of God, nature does not. The 
historical character of human existence differentiates that existence 
from nature, for nature has H.istorie but not Geschichte. Nature is 
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without apparent purpose, a chaotic power that needs to be tamed and 
brought under human control; this can be achieved through human science 
and technology within the context of God's purposes for man in history. 
Nature is a hostile force which holds man in bondage and which may 
threaten human existence. Man must gain his freedom from nature, he must 
emancipate himself. Thus the attempts made by Derr and Berkhof to 
qualify the titanism inherent in the theology of human dominion (as they 
interpret it), by affirming that man is biologically contiguous with 
nature, are drowned out by their other assertions about. the great dis-
parities between man and nature. This may be taken further. Man is 
closer to God than he is to nature. God is the God of history and purpose, 
man is a being who lives purposefully in history, whereas nature has 
neither history nor purpose. This raises the question of how nature m9-y 
be related to God. Why has the God of order and purpose created nature 
in the orderless and purposeless form in which it meets man? If its 
disorder is the result of Adam's sin which disrupted the cosmic harmony, 
then it is perverse for God to deliver it to the sinner who continues to 
sin (and so continues to disrupt the cosmos}. with a commission to restore 
order.(68) Given the great disparity between humanity and nature to 
which this position holds, and the contrast between the character of 
nature and the character of God, it is only a short step to the 
deprecation of nature. This tendency is already evident in this 
approach. The doctrine of creation relates to history and not to the 
matter of the cosmos, except in a derivative and secondary way. Even 
further, the language used of nature has overtones which indicate that it 
may be 'demonic'. It is a power of chaos, with which humanity must 
contend, and strive to conquer; a power which· holds man in such bondage 
that when he liberates himself from it, he becomes more human; and a 
power which will be made perfectly subservient- (to man) in the eschato-
logical Kingdom.· Dualism is just- around the corner from this approach, 
which is tempted. to deny the doctrine of creation at its material heart. 
This weakens the theological grip of the stewardship concept on which the 
emancipatory approach relies so heavily for its environmental ethic. 
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Second., the emancipatory approach welcaues technology because 
it makes man 'more human' and opens upcgreater possibilities for 
'humanisation'. What are the criteria here? N~ne are given, and 
only one is implied, namely that technology may make human existence 
more comfortable for those who enjoy its benefits. (69) This comfort 
is the fruit of liberation frau the tyranny of nature. But in Berkhof 
and Derr, the human is defjned in tenns of history, purpose, and 
relationship to God; so it is hard to see how technology can affect 
these any more than any other area of daily human conduct and enter-
prise may. What has happened instead, is that a pres~position about 
technology has been smu;rgled in to the theological discourse from 
sauewhere else. I contend that it is Bacon and Descartes who have 
been the main influences here. Derr' s attitude to the emancipatory 
potential of science and technology may be compared with Descartes' 
famous sentence: with 
'the general good of all mankind' 
in view, Descartes published his Discourse· on the Method because his 
analysis showed him 
'that it is possible to attain knowledge which is 
very useful in life, and that • . . we may find a 
practical philosophy by means of which, knowing the 
force and action of fire, water, air, the stars, 
heavens, and all other bodies that environ us ••• 
we can employ them in all the uses to which they 
are adapted, and thus render ourselves the masters 
and possessors of nature'. (70) 
Mastery and possession are not far from Derr' s interpretation of the 
:Fid: I and. of human daninion, though he gives the fonuer. a Pelagian 
twist: 
' if there is environmental significance in the 
account of the Fall , it must lie in the corruption 
of man's dauinion over the earth. Recovery, 
redemption, lies not in abandoning man's mastery 
but in restoring it to the Creator's design.' ('?.1) 
This may be compared with Bacon's statement that the advancement of 
science 
• is a restitution and reinvesting (in great part) 
of man to the sovereignty and power • • • which he 
had in his first state of creation'. (72) 
In other words, the prelapsarian dominion lost through.Adarn's sin may 
be regained through science and technology, and Derr follows Bacon's 
lead. This is why technology makes man 'more human'; in 
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regaining dominion through his technology, man becomes more like the 
prelapsarian Adam and- therefore undoes sane of the damage wrought 
in human nature by human' sin. Berkhof andDerr have thus unwittingly 
allowed their position to came perilously close to Pelagianism.(73) 
The emancipatory position therefore combines technological 
optimism with great confidence in the rede:nptive value of human effort. 
This leads them to take a • soft' view of the effects of human sinful-
ness. (74) On the one hand, the biblical theology on which both 
Berkhof and Derr take their stand makes it plain that human sinfulness 
is a destructive and distorting force to be reckoned with in all aspects 
of human endeavour, and they acknowledge this. On the other, they 
show great optimism about the human spirit. So Derr says that 
'the human situation remains ambiguous for the fore-
seeabl:e future, and we must never discount the 
effects of sin, of man's capacity for evil. Perhaps 
.i.rrnnediate optimism is not very wise, but neither is 
despair. Historical humanism never forgets the 
capacity of the human spirit to triumph over adverse 
surroundings. • •• {The 1969 moon-landing] was a 
genuine triumph of the human spirit [but it only] said 
what the history of science is always saying, that 
man's possibilities are ever evolving, that his future 
with nature is open. • •• [The biblical vision is] 
that the whole of creation awaits its rederrption. And 
in the evolution toward "new creation" man is to be 
the priest of the transformation. • (75) 
Such an optimism fails to reckon with the measure of human sin which 
inevitably accornpanie$ and sometimes impels technological progress, 
and qualifies its value to both man and nature: exploitation of lal:x:mr, 
the maintenance of unjust international trading structures for the sake 
of vested interest, decision-making in the interests of profit and 
short-tenn expediency at the expense of long-tenn risk, environmental 
mismanagement, and the use of technological power for oppression. 
The C&S discussions make it quite clear that this is the aspect of the 
technological culture which is most evident to the Third World, who 
subsidise the cost of the liberating and humanising effects of 
technology in the developed nations. (76) lt is clear that both Derr 
and Berkhof are compassionate and socially concerned Christian men. 
But it is equally clear that the inadequacies of their theological 
position force them into the invidious situation of swe:eping this cost 
under the carpet. 
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The emancipatory position has followed Bacon and Descartes in 
another respect as well. It sees technology and its culture in sub-
stantial alignment with God's purposes for humanity and nature. Human 
science and technology, qualified by the ethic of responsible steward-
ship, enable man to exercise his dominion over nature, to benefit his 
fellows, and to bring order to the chaos of nature in line with God's 
intention for its ordering and subservience to man. It does this by 
interpreting science and technology through the imago Dei and dominium 
terrae traditions. This interpretation is confirmed by the dc:rninion 
over nature which Jesus exercised in the course of his earthly ministry. 
He was the image of God in the fullest sense, and the human to whom 
eschatological humanity will be conformed, so that dominion is seen to 
prefigure the dc:rninion which eschatological humanity will exercise. (77) 
The spectacular success of science and technology adds plausibility to 
that interpretation. Iit may be questioned on the grounds that it 
equates technological progress· with growth in grace, thus making in-
dustrialised nations •more Christian• than the under-developed; to which 
the Third· World can· counter that technological development depends on 
exploitation, oppression and injustice, and is therefore a sign 
of spiritual malaise if it bears any relation at all to spiritual 
condition. But this interpretation is weak at another point. It fails 
to do justice to the breadth and complexity of the biblical witness 
about humanity• s relationship to the cosmos. Humanity lives in the 
regularity and rhytinn of the creaturely world as one of its creatures. 
and alongside its fellow-creatures, because God has willed that this 
should be the sphere of his life and that these rl}ytbms and regularities 
should mark out the boundaries of their common existence. So humanity's 
historical existence is that of a creature among creatures (Psalm 104, 
Job 38-42); and the eschatological Kingdom inaugurates humanity's 
peaceful coexistence with nature (Isaiah ll: 1-9, Revelation 21: 1-4, 
22: 1-5, etc.). (78) Thus it would be more faithful to the biblical 
position to interpret science and technology within the context of 
'harmony• and avoid the more aggressive nuances of 'subjugation•. Derr 
overstates the case when he says that 
• true harmony with nature, a sound balance between 
man • s needs and environmental preservation, requires 
the subjugation of nature by all the technical wisdom 
we can surrmon •. (79) 
The biblical testimony implies that humanity's technological dominion may 
be exercised within the constraints of harmonious coexistence with nature, 
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as far as that. is possible within the histor.ical circumstances. Derr 
and Berk:hof. have followed Bacon and Descartes in reversing the biblical 
order and. stating that: hannonious coexistence can only be achieved 
through the exercise of dominion. 
It is evident that the emancipists have canonised Bacon and 
Descartes. Their assumptions lie behind this position's sympathy 
between Christian corrmitrnent and the technological culture. The tech-
nological enterprise must be developed so that humanity regains the 
mastery and possession of nature, and the dominion which it lost through 
Adam's Fall. Recovery and redemption lie in the restoration of man's 
mastery over nature according to God's design. (71) All this takes 
place within the framework marked out by Bacon and Descartes. It means 
that the work of obedience to God may consist simply in orienting the 
human scientific and technological enterprises towards achieving the 
cultural ideals implicit in that framework. Thus the emancipatory 
position suffers the persistent temptation from within, to become 
cultunal Christianity (the approach Niebuhr described as 'The Christ 
of Culture' approach). It becomes a precarious posi:tion to maintain, 
as its own internal logic exerts a centri-fugal rather than a centri-
petal force and thereby jeopardises its coherence and consistency. (80) 
The clear implication of.my argument so far is that this position 
is not worth maintaining because its advantages are qualified by 
numerous and significant disadvantages. Moreover, it is not really an 
option for a contemporary ecological theology which attempts to remain 
close to the biblical witness as Derr and Berkhof did in their time, 
since recent biblical studies have deprived this position of its 
exegetical support. 
The emancipatory position takes Genesis 1:26-28 as its main 
text, as the most important one defining the human relationship to the 
non-human world according to the divine intention in creation. Man is 
made • in the image of God', and this is interpreted by identifying the 
command to dominion with the possession of the image. As Berkhof puts 
it, the 'image' is the 'dominion'. (81) This by no means the only 
possible interpretation of the image concept. (82) The actual text, 
however, is notorously difficult to interpret, precisely because it 
is the locus of unspecified ideas which remain undefined in the Old 
Testament and whose meanings must be inferred from all the pertinent 
infonuation available (linguistic and archaeological studies, and a 
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knowledge of the. religious customs and. be-liefs of other ancient Near 
Eastern cultures) . Dominion over the. cosmos is certainly a fact 
within the text-, but- its interpretation and connotations and significance 
can only be established within the limits of the text itself and the 
canons and parameters· of exegetical method. Recent Old Testament 
scholarship suggests that they rule out the emancipatory position's 
simple equation of the image of God in man with the human dominion over 
nature. (83) One scholar argues that there is no explicit definition 
of the imago Dei, and therefore that the author was either referring to 
something already so well known to his readers that it needed no 
elaboration or, more likely, that he was being deliberately but 
reverently vague. Thus the author of Genesis 1:26 - 28 
'believed it to be of less importance to spell out 
exactly how man resembled God and the divine beings, 
than to make the emphatic statement that, however 
distinct the creator is from his creatures, he 
nevertheless chose to reveal sane of his .transcendent 
nature· in man, the crowning glory of his creation.' (84) 
That is, it is not the interpretation or the content but the fact of the 
resemblance which is important. This effectively deprives the 
e.nancipatory approach of its e~egetical support. It is no more or less 
'necessary' an approach to the theological question of technological 
culture than any other. 
It is significant that the emancipatory approach was dominant 
in the C&S discussions until the 1973 Zurich working party on science 
and technology, when it was rejected on grounds which stenmed from the 
environmental crisis and the 'limits to growth' debate. (85) That is, 
it was rejected on practical rather than theological grounds. The 
next section considers whether its replademenb, the 'theology of hope' 
approach, is any more successful theologically than its predecessor. 
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3. The 'theology of hope.' approach. 
The 'theology of hope' in the C&S discussions represents a 
conscious response to the ecological crisis. I named it the 'theology 
of hope' approach, because it added an eschatological dimension to the 
theological consideration of humanity's relation to the cosmos. The 
emancipatory approach'had taken the dominion relationship as the focus 
for its eschatological thought about the human relationship to nature; 
by contra§t, the theology of hope compares the present condition of the 
world with the eschatological future promised by God, and derives guide-
lines for present action from its understanding of the espatological 
goals such action should seek to realise. Its approach is similar to 
that of Moltmann's Theology of Hope, described in Chapter One, section 
3 (ii.i) above. 
My aim in this section is to let the representatives of the C&S 
theology of hope speak for themselves, to evaluate their ecological 
theology, and to explore their answer to the theological question of 
technological culture. The approach was first put forward in the 
C&S forum by Langdon Gilkey, at the Bucharest Conference in 1974.(86) 
Since then, both Liedke and Baker have covered similar ground but in 
greater depth. My primary sources for this account of the C&S theology 
of hope will be Baker's paper to the 1977 Zurich theological consultation 
and Liedke' s paper at the MIT conference; supplemented by extensive 
reference to Liedke's Im Bauch des Fisches (on which his MIT paper was 
based), with occasional references to Gilkey's paper on technology 
to the 1973 Zurich working party, and that part of the Bucharest 
report from his hand.(87) This section will follow the procedure 
outlined in Section 1 above, namely an exposition of the primary sources, 
the discussion of discipleship in the technological culture, and the 
evaluation of their approach. 
Though I have already referred to a similarity between Moltmann's 
and the C&S theologies of hope, my survey will not be concerned with 
Moltmann's work. I am not seeking to establish relationships, dependency, 
correspondences, or dissimilarities, or in any way to link the one with 
the other. Instead, I take the theology of hope as it stands in the 
C&S discussions, since they are the explicit concern of this thesis. (88) 
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(i) Exposition. 
The exposition of the C&S theology of hope will be based on the 
five questions listed in Section 1 above. 
(1) The cosmos. Liedke's book is a protest against the loss of 
nature from the theological discourse. The doctrine. of creation has 
entered a phase in which it has nothing to do with nature, but has 
become instead a datum for the interpretation of history. (89) This has 
had disastrous consequences for theology and for environmental ethics 
as well. In concentrating on history and on the relationship between 
God and man, theology has lost·. sight of the biological aspect of human 
existence and its implications. In retreat from science, theologians 
have left nature to the scientific and technological enterprises and 
given no guidelines for scientific and technological conduct nor any 
reason for the exercise of environmental restraint. (90) This has been 
exacerbated by the Western Ch(ristian acquiescence to Descartes' 
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separation of man fran nature (res· cqgitans, ·res extensa) and his 
Pelagian interpretation of human dcminion. (91) Therefore theology 
needs a reconstruction which will reinstate nature as a theme of theo-
logical discourse, reinterpret the doctrine of creation with the 
material world in mind, reinterpret the dominium terrae tradition with 
a view to the ecological constraints on human existence, and which will 
use an 'ecological exege$iS' of the biblical texts when this is appropriate. 
Such ecological exegesis is based on the need to coordinate modern 
exegesis with the scientific understanding and interpretation of human 
existence in the cosmos; I will give an account of it in subsection (iii) 
below. (92) 
Liedke uses ecological exegesis to understand the creation texts 
of Genesis 1 and 2. The cosmos is ecologically structured, and this 
is evident in the Priestly account of the creation in which each 
creature is assigned to the habitat created for it by God. Thus the 
stars (not dead bodies, in the ancient thought, but living beings) are 
assigned to the heavens, acquatic animals to the sea, birds to the air. 
There is no overlapping of habitats, except with the land habitat which 
is to be shared by humanity with the land animals. Such an assignment 
contains the potential for disputes about food and living space. 
(2) The cosmos in eschatology. The ecological structure of the 
cosmos and the possibility of conflict that that structure implies was 
established in the beginning. The mechanism for conflict resolution 
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which had been built- at- the same time has, however, broken down; the 
result is a lgood_l creation marred by violence~ (93)" ·This violence 
begins with man and affects the entire creation; it characterises the 
present:- cosmic ·existence.· The eschatological' prorn:Lse of God is that 
this vid>lent conflict- will be resolved and removed (Isaiah 11: 1 -9, 
Romans 8:18 - 22) • (94) ·Thus the nonhuman world has a peaceful 
eschatological future. It. is based on the resurrection and redemption 
accomplished in Christ, which shows that the peace 1s preceded by a 
radical transformation. Thus Baker states that 
'the kind of transfigured eternal existence promised 
to humanity in the resurrection of Jesus is to have 
its counterpart in the transfonnation of the cosmos' ; 
which Liedke confinns -
'Die Rettung des Mehschen in Christus vollzieht 
sich ••. auf dieser Erde, in dieser Welt. Deshalb 
ist auch dieser Kosmos in Rettungsgeschehen ein-
bezogen. Gottes entgtlltiges Ja zu seiner 
Sch~pfung in Jesus Christus kann die Wel tangst 
nehmen' • (95) 
None of the representatives so much as discusses the eschatological 
future of 'dominion'. Instead, the emphasis is on the eschatological 
harmony and the transformation of the cosmos adumbrated in the 
ressurrection. 
(3) The human relationship in the cosmos. This has five aspects. 
First, the approach emphasises the biological contiguity of the human 
species with the cosmos from which it has evolved, and the ecological 
constraints this contiguity imposes on human existence (see no.l above). 
At the same time, it recognises that the .irr@go Dei and dominium terrae 
traditions are to be taken seriously, rightly interpreted, and their 
implications for humanity's relationship to the cosmos explored. (96) 
Second, as noted in no.2, humanity is the source of the disruption of 
the ecological hanuony established in the cosmos at· its creation. 
Third, the approach emphasises that humanity is technological by nature. 
This is a fact of experience as well as of biblical testimony; thus 
Liedke argues that 
'die Beendigung der Manipulation der Natur ••• 
nicht die geeignete Therapie [ist]. Sie wlirde 
den Menschen eines wesentlichen Elementes seines 
Menschseins berauben. Der Mensch hat - sei t er 
existiert- irmner die Sch5pfung manipuliert'. (97) 
Fourth,nature itself is a source of guidance for the human activity in 
and manipulation of nature. The human interaction with nature must 
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learn from the intricate character of its order, respect and preserve 
that order, and adjust its technology towards that preservation and 
respect.. (98) Fifth, humanity's relationship to the cosmos can .only 
be understood by reference ·to the person and work of Christ. As noted 
in no. 2, resurrection and. redemption give hope for. the eschatological 
future of nature as well as of humanity. Christ's life provides 
material for an environmental ethic and anchors the eschatological hope 
for the whole creation in the events of history: 
'Christus selbst, seiri Urngang rni t Mensch und Welt, 
ist das Vor-Bild ffir unser Umgang rni t der Sch~pfung 
Gottes' • (99) 
( 4) God's relationship to· the cosmos. God is the creator, and 
all his creation depends on him for its existence. Humanity is 
equally 'creature' with all other creatures. 
use of the word Sch~pfung states this clearly: 
Liedke's policy about the 
'Der Titel Sch~pfung soll ..• zum Ausdruck bringen, 
dats nichts in der Natur, in der Welt, unabhangig 
vam Sch~pfer sein unrl gedacht werden kann.' (100) 
He emphasises that 
'der Mensch Teil der Sch~pfung ist'.(lOl) 
Unlike the ernancipatory position, however, God's relationship to 
nature is not necessarily concentrated on man. The cosmos exists for 
its own sake and for the sake of God's delight in it, rather than as raw 
rna terial which is to be vanquished and shaped by humanity according to 
God's purposes.(l02) God's eschatological relationship to the cosmos 
is mediated through the man Jesus, the first born of all creation 
(Colossians 1:15) 
(5} Science and technology. Humanity generally is differentiated 
from the animals by being God's image upon earth, and 
'just as God rules his world with care, so man is 
to rule the animals and cultivate and preserve 
the earth'. (103) 
The lesson of the environmental crisis and the human experience of 
science and technology is that humanity has failed to exercise tbe care 
required. It must now reduce its technological manipulation of nature, 
and work for its salvation and transfonnation according to the character 
of: its creator. (104) The human vocation· with nature is to deal with 
it in such a way that its intricate corrplexity and lire are cultivated 
rather than jeopardised wantonly and unnecessarily: . 
· ··'Die Herrschaft tiber die Tiere und die Erde dient 
demLeben des Menschen und der GesamtschOpfung ••• 
und. gehOrt in den Rahmen des Segens [Gottes]'. (105) 
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This will be a step towards the ha:tmonious coexistence of man and nature 
promised fo~ the eschatological Kingdom. But it is only a step. 
That harmony 
~ist fOr das Endgeschehen verheillen (Jesaja ll) 
jund] komnt aber nicht durch das Handeln von 
Menschen, sondern durch die Tat Gottes zustande'.(l06) 
Baker concludes his paper by saying that 
'our responsibility towards nature cannot be fulfilled 
simply by developing our positive and creative skills; 
it also involves denying ourselves and taking up the, 
cross daily. All we can do will not be enough of 
itself to turn earth into paradise; but that after all 
is something for which we have to wait upon him who 
is both Alpha and Qnega. The new heaven and earth 
are not of a kind to be evolved on our drawing-boards; 
all we can hope for here are images and foreshadowings 
of them' . ( 107) 
Thus the hl.UTian vocation in the cosmos permits the restrained and 
careful pursuit of technology and science, but with the caveat that 
these efforts cannot achieve the state of haxmonious coexistence 
between hl.UTiani ty and the cosmos which God desires in his creation. 
This is grounded in the eschatological promise of God, adumbrated in 
Christ and his resurrection, and extended in the New Testament to the 
whole cosmos; it is also grounded in God's blessing given at the 
creation, and in the awareness that since God rules his world with care, 
man is to rule it carefully as well. 
(ii) Discipleship in the technological culture. 
The preceding account makes it clear that the Baker-Liedke 
theology of hope represents one of the median positions in roy survey 
of responses to the theological question of the technological culture. 
It shares the common ground which characterises the median: it affixms 
that God's creation is good and that technological culture is an ines-
capable dimension of hl.UTian existence within that: good context; it 
acknowledges that hl.UTian sin is universal and pervasive in its effect, 
and extends that. effect into the whole created order;- and it recognises 
the primacy of God's grace, the necessity of works of obedience, and the 
hope of' redemption in Christ. 
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It. is also evident. thatLiedke ap.d Baker do not represent the 
'sympathetic' approach to the. technological culture. They do not. 
interpret science. and technology as works of- obedience to the divine 
injunction of Genesis· 1: 28, simpliciter. They· do not see science and 
technology as enterprises which make hurrianity more 'human' or as one 
of the principal means by which God's·purposes in the cosmos may be 
brought to fruition. Gilkey, Baker, and Liedke agree that this is the 
lesson of experience, namely that the technological culture cannot be 
simply equated with the Q2Y~.(l08) 
Is the theology of hope a representative of the 'arnbi valent' type 
of response? That type of response recognises that the teqnological 
culture is inescapable and therefore lays its own clalins upon the 
individual believer, and adds that those claims are continually in 
conflict with, or tend to compromise, his loyalty to Christ. Thus the 
Christian lives in a polarity and tension which arises from the nature 
of the technological culture which God has allowed man to establish; he 
resolves this polarity and tension in the hope of redemption and 
transhistorical justification. But Gilkey and Baker and Liedke give 
rather positive accounts of the technological culture. It is a means 
by which humanity may thrive upon the bounty of the earth, yet at the 
same time preserve and increase that bounty for future generations. It 
enables man and nature to live in harmony, and provides the means by 
which nature ma.Y be brought to reflect, in part, the character of its 
creator. This shows that a positive correlation exists, at least in 
principle, between God's purposes for humanity and the cosmos on the 
one hand, and the ideal functioning of the human technological enterprise 
and the technological culture on the other.(l09) This ideal function-
ing is marred by sin, so that there may be conflicts in practice, 
between the clalins of obedience to Christ and involvement in some 
aspects of the technological culture. Gilkey states that these 
conflicts originate in the fallenness and consequent ambiguity of man, 
and not in thei1nature of the technological enterprise itself; the only 
hints of a negative statement about technology in Baker's paper are his 
cormnents that . it will . never discover the way to 'wisdom' or bring in 
the eschatological Kingdom: Liedke' s attitude is that science and 
technology, have gone astray because they built their enterprise on 
an unsound philosophical and. theological foundation,· so that the 
appropriate remedy is to change their understanding of the relationship 
between humanity and nature and thus put them on a firmer foundation. (llO) 
176 
The C&S theology of. hope is therefore fundamentally different from, and 
rrore positively oriented. towards the technological culture than, the 
ambivalent: approach (which sees Christ. arid the techno'logical culture 
in paradOx) • 
Instead, the theology of hope sees the potential of human 
existence (and the technological culture in which 'it is inextricably 
involved) in tenns of. an existence transformed by' the grace of God 
effective in present history, and enabling life within the context of 
the technological culture to be oriented towards and to be lived for 
God's glory. This is particularly evident in the christological-
eschatological understanding of the human relationship to the cosmos; 
in Liedke' s solidarity-in-conflict ethic in which the Christians 
represent the incarnate hope of redemption for the whole creation; and 
in the recognition that human technological achievements, though 
inadequate in themse-1 ves, may foreshadow. the coming. of God's Kingdom. 
(lll) This kind of theology thus looks for the fruits of redemption 
to be manifest in contemporary historical existence and in the techno-
logical culture in particular. Its focus is on the eschaton and on 
the eschatological promises; in the light of faith, they show the 
bearings for contemporary action. Thus the C&S theology of hope 
exemplifies the conversionist type of answer to the theological question 
of the technological culture. 
(iii) Evaluation. 
The theology of hope, represented in the C&S discussions by 
Gilkey, Baker, and Liedke, has a number of points in its favour. It 
takes theological account of the human contiguity with nature; it safe-
guards the unity of God's action in creation, redemption, and 
consurrunation; it allows for an environmental ethic on a theological 
basis, but which also corresponds to the environmental ethic deemed 
appropriate on practical considerations; and it is well grounded 
exegetically, taking account of. the fullness and complexity of the 
biblical testimony about God, humanity, and the cosmos. I will deal 
with each of. these in turn. 
Both biblical texts and modern science show that man exists as 
body and. 'soul' in some sort of. differentiated· unity. The emanci-
patory position, because of its adherence to the Cartesian .division of 
reality into res cogitans andres extensa, faced a coherence problem 
at this point. It needed to maintain the unity of human existence, 
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yet. emphasise the superiority of the mind. over the material world; there 
was a persistent. temptation to make human life in the world 'ghostly' 
by concentrating on its mental, moral, ·and. historical aspects, thus 
bringing dOminion to ·.prominence at the expense of ecological vulner-
ability. The C&S theology of hope, however, starts from the environ-
mental crisis and its accompanying· question of human· survival, and 
therefore takes the corporeal aspect of human.existence very seriously. 
Humanity is seen as a biological species, as subject as any other to 
the ecological laws of survival and coexistence with other species. This 
is given theological interpretation in Baker's wide-ranging exegetical 
survey, and in Liedke's proposal for an 'ecological exegesis'.(ll2) 
Such exegesis represents an attempt to take all the information available 
about human existence and relate it to the biblical testimony and its 
theological explication: 
'Eine Auslegung, ••. die die Naturals gikos 
(Haus) des Menschen und den Menschen alszurn 
oikos anderer Lebewesen geh~rend ansieht, nenne 
ich eine ~kologische Auslegung'.(ll3) 
Liedke devotes a lengthy chapter to the ecological exegesis of the Old 
Testament texts relating humanity and nature, and the creation sagas in 
particular. (114) He therefore allows for the human distinctiveness in 
nature, and also for new interpretations of the imago_ Dei and 
dominium terrae texts within the constraints of humanity's biological 
contiguity with nature. · Thus the dominion and image themes are not 
pennitted to compromise the other theological truth about man, thathe is 
created as a biological species.(ll5) 
The approach safeguards the unity of God's relationship to the 
cosmos. The Creator and the Redeemer are one, and the work of the 
Spirit in hurnarn history is aligned to the consummation of that history. 
Thus the creation's hope may be founded in God the Creator, and the focus 
of that hope may be located in the redemptive work of Christ, his 
resurrection, and the ultimate consurrrrnation in which the kind of trans-
figured eternal existence promised to humanity in Christ's resurrection 
will extend to the transformation of the entire cosmos. The environ-
mental crisis has drawn attention to the present condition of the \\Drld, 
which some theologians have interpreted. in tenus of nature's bondage to 
futility and decay, and its groaning as ·it awaits ·its liberation 
(Romans 8:19 - 22). This theology of hope· interprets these groans 
as groans of a suffering which will bear fruit and whose fruitfulness is 
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guaranteed by the resurrection- they are not the groans of futile 
and hopeless anguish. Thus the futur.e. becomes a realm of hope rather 
than of despair, for. both humanity·and nature. (116) This hope is 
grounded in the faithfulness· of the Creator to· his creation, and of the 
Redeemer and the Spirit to the eschatological· promises implied in 
Christ's resurrection. In safeguarding the unity of God's relationship 
to the cosmos, this theological position also gives hope and meaning to 
conterrporary historical existence in which the circumstances could easily 
induce nihilism and paralysing despair. ( 117) 
It also yields a plausible and appealing environmental ethic, in 
accord with the practical assessments of the situation. Humanity 
engages in technology as part of its humanity, but technology itself 
is not denounced. It is possible, at least in principle, to harness 
technology for the purposes of human development and wellbeing. Unlike 
the emancipatory · approach, the theology. of hope is able to. draw the 
line and say that technology has gone far enough: it must now reduce its 
manipulation of nature, for nature's sake and for the sake of humanity 
as well. Further, this neutral attitude towards the technological 
enterprise allows for economic growth and technological development in 
the areas of the Third World where this is appropriate, and for the 
technological restraint in the overdeveloped 'WOrld which the environ-
mental crisis and the limits to growth thesis have shown to be necessary. 
It is more amenable . to the World Council's goal. of the Just, . Participatory 1 
and Sustainable Society than its emancipatory predecessor.in the C&S 
discussions. . This is only because the theology of hope has chosen not 
to align itself .with the development of the technological culture, and 
this choice is the source .of its ethical strength with regard to science, 
technology, and the environment. 
Another aspect of the theology of hope ethic is that it allows for 
Christian participation in the daily affairs of the technological culture. 
Liedke' s approach implies that the Christian may work to God's glory in 
a scientific or technological way, by developing technological 
processes which are appropriate environmentally, and so 'awaken to new 
life the creation's hope of freedom. ( 118) Baker· speaks of a 'WOrk of 
salvation to be done in nature, so that it: reflects more perfectly the 
character of its creator; and of the need· to adjust technology so that 
it. preserves and cultivates the intricate character of nature's order. 
(119) These are tasks in which a believer may :inmerse himself, with 
a clear conscience. 
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Finally, this approach has good exegetical support. Th.is is 
evident. from Baker~s paper, which attempts to describe and interpret the 
manifold. canplexity and eli ver.sity of the biblical· testimony about humanity 
in its relationship to2oosmos: ancL crea:tor. Both· Baker and Liedke have 
attempted to seek new theological bearings in the envirornnental crisis by 
turning to the scriptures·· and interpreting their testimonies with the 
current situation in mind; this is the nub of Liedke's ecological exegesis. 
The basic principle of the theology of hope approach is also exegetically 
sound. God has made promises to his creation and to human existence 
in history, and he has proved faithful to his promises. The Kingdan of 
God is bound up with the promises of God, and there are promises which 
may be described as 'eschatological promises' -- such as those which promise 
hannony between humanity and nature, or those which speak of the radical 
transfonnation of the human body in the resurrection of the dead. The 
theology of hope is basE:d on the exegeticaL observation that the Kingdom 
is inaugurated already in Christ and is present proleptically in contem-
porary existence. This means that the eschatological.pramises a~e not 
remote, or irrelevant to daily life; instead, they give meaning to that 
life, meaning which is discernible by faith. Thus faith discerns how to 
act and live in the world according to God's ultimate purposes for the 
world and its history. The C&S theology of hope is therefore congruent 
with the biblical witness, both in its basic principle ( ' the Kingdom of 
God is at hand') and in the detailed outworking of its implications with 
regard to humanity's life in and relationship to the cosmos. 
It is evident that this theology of hope is of great merit in deal-
ing theologically with the envirornnental crisis, in providing a foundation 
for environmental ethics, and in preserving some necessary Christian 
truths. It is a theologically necessary response to the question of the 
technological culture. In its own way, it has the same advantages as 
the emancipatory approach, but without its crippling disadvantages. 
Nevertheless, the C&S theology of hope must also be called into question. 
Advances in science and technology have enabled Western industry to 
transfonn nature into something over which man has considerable control: 
the environment of Western industrialised man reflects· his enterprise, 
his ingenuity, and. his power to transfonn. The theology of hope looks to 
an eschatological transfonnation of nature· on the basis of the promises 
linplied in the resurrection of Jesus. But there is no way of relating 
these two different types of transformation. The resurrection is God's 
act of discontinuity in the world's history, inaugurating the eschato-
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logical Kingc;lan; the flesh is the. link between contemporary historical 
existence and the transfj_gur.ed. existence in the· Kingdom. The act of 
resurrection· marks out: the freedom and radical. discontinuity of God's 
activity in comparison with human capability. Thus the tension between 
what is and what ought to ·be (on the basis ·of the· eschatological 
promises), the tension which is to guide contemporary life and action 
and the life of the technological culture in particular -- this tension 
provides no criteria ·for action. As at Good Friday, human activity 
can only wait for God's response to the situation. It cannot decide 
how it may imitate the resurrection process through its own scientific and 
technological enterprises, or use the paradigm it provides, in order to 
start realising the eschatological goal of resurrection for the cosmos 
in its present crucifi.xion of human and environmental suffering. The 
criteria for present action cannot be found in the crucifixion-
resurrection paradigm; they must be sought elsewhere. . This becomes clear 
in Liedke's presentation. He concentrates on the need to reduce the 
technological manipulation of nature. This is. based on.his ethic of 
solidarity-in-conflict, which in its turn is drawn from a sociological 
theory of conflict amelioration applied to the situation of conflict 
between man and nature which his ecological exegesis has discerned. (120) 
It is clear from the course of his ecological exegesis, however, that 
the conflict motif has been imported from elsewhere and allowed to dominate 
and shape the exegesis; Liedke's concern for technological restraint 
(which has its origin in his understanding of the environmental crisis) 
has detennined the results of his exegesis and allowed him to 'prove' 
what he had already assumed.(l2l) Thus his theology of hope is not 
grounded pre-eminently in the promise of the resurrection and its impli-
cations, but in his own prior understanding of the contemporary situation. 
His example shows that the C&S theology of hope is vulnerable to exactly 
the same criticism that was levelled against Moltmann's early theology 
of hope with reference to the theology of revolution: it provides an 
apparently theological cloak for fashionable dynamic activism or, in this 
case, fashionable environmental concern. It is the same problem for 
both Molbnann and the C&S theologies of hope: the problem of giving 
specific content to the eschatological promises in the contemporary 
historical situation.(l23) 
This may also be seen in the section on eschatology and futurology 
in the report of the 1977 zurich theological consultation. It is dominated 
by the C& s theology of hope, and shows how difficult it is to translate 
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this type of theology into the concrete and practical situation. It 
states that. the contemporary task is that. of discerning 
'what. is our present state in· reqard to the Heils-
geschj,chte, what is our duty in the new futur~ for 
the building of the Kingdom of" God, ·and what are 
our eschatological hopes' • ( 124) 
Christians must act now, on the basis of what they discern by faith. But 
then the report dissolves, immediately, into vague generalisation. It 
concludes with an exhortation which has neither substance nor direction: 
'Prophetic pronouncement of the final destiny of man 
in nature presents a vision and not a scientific 
discernment. Man needs such a vision of his 
destiny. More than ever before in our days 
eschatological faith only presents us the set of 
coordinates for human activity today and tomorrow. 
The establishing of a specific and provisional 
eschatology may be necessary in every period of 
church history. But certainly it is our task in 
the present. It is within this set of coordinates 
that the Chris.tian hope finds new meaning for the 
achievement of science and technology. Concisely 
our awareness of the possibilities opened up by 
science and technology helps us to discern this set 
of coordinates.' (125) 
This is a call to action, to relate the theological vision to the contem-
porary situation. My argument is that the problem of their relation 
cannot be solved by the theology of hope, because it leaves the fundamental 
problem untouched, and therefore needs to be supplemented. This quotation 
from the Zurich report assumes that there is some correlation between 
human achievements and prospective advances in science and technology, on 
the one hand, and the eschatological faith: science and technology provide 
the supplement needed, but at the expense of the discontinuity between 
this world and the next. Liedke has supplemented his theology of hope 
by his a priori decisions about 'conflict' and the need for technological 
restraint. 
What other supplements are available? They are only available 
(by hypothesis) in contemporary historical existence, as that is 
interpreted by science, technology, history and the social sciences, 
philosophy, · exegesis, and theology. In theology, they all take their 
orientation from the beginning, from the understanding of God's purposes 
for humanity and the cosmos as laid down in the creation texts and 
interpreted: perfectly in the life of Jesus. This is a perfect summary of 
Baker's approach. What. it means, however, is that it. becomes an 
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eschatologically-conscious version of another type of. approach based 
on the doctrine of. creation, and loses its character as a 'theology of 
hope'. The internal logic of the 'theology' of hope'' exerts a 
centrifugal rather than a centripetal. force, and compromises its 
integrity. 
The C&S theology of hope represents a conscientious and 
deliberate attempt to address the environmental crisis theologically, 
which has many advantages as theological discourse.. . But it is unable 
to touch the problem at its heart, the need for theological direction 
to practical action, and so it becomes a purely theoretical construct. 
It has nevertheless succeeded in becoming the dominant theological 
approach in the C&S discussions relating to the environmental crisis and 
ecological theology. 
The emancipatory approach and the theology of hope which replaced 
it are the 'major' theological approaches in the C&S forum. r 1:.:,_ turn 
now to the two 'minor' approaches represented there, and associated 
with the individual contributions of Charles Birch (section 4) and 
Paulos Gregorios (section 5) • 
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4.. Charles.Birch and. process theology. 
One ':P:tocess' ecological theology has· already been described in 
this thesis - that~ of: John B. Cobb, Jr., introduced in Chapter Two, 
section 4 (ii) • It was stated there that Cobb's theological stance 
could serve as a suitable introduction to Birch'.s approach, and that the 
articulation of the process stance within the C&S forum had concentrated 
more on ethics and science-theology dialogue than on specifically theo-
logical statement of its position. 
The latter claim may sound somewhat surprising, because the C&S 
discussions have included the contributions of several eminent represent-
atives of process theology: John B. Cobb, Jr., and David Ray Griffin, 
who are directors of the Center for Process Studies, in California; and 
Charles Hartshorne, pioneer of the systematic theological adaptation of 
A.N. Whitehead's process metaphysic. · Cobb and Griffin contributed 
to the debate provoked by Derr' s Ecology and Human Liberation, which had 
contained an account of process theology that the process theologians · 
were eager to correct.(l27) That was Griffin's only contribution to 
the C&S programne. Cobb collaborated with Birch to produce a joint 
paper for the 1974 Bucharest Conference, to which I will refer in my 
exposition, but othe:rwise Cobb has been absent fran the c&s _ scene. (128) 
Charles Hartshorne made his only contribution at the 1977 ,, Zurich 
theological consultation, with an inconsequential and somewhat peripheral 
paper.(l29) Birch's paper to that consultation was far more convincing 
and much better articulated. Birch has been the most prolific and 
consistent representative of the process theology stance within the C&S 
discussions, while Hartshorne, Griffin, and Cobb have supported it from 
the sideline. 
Birch's contribution has been more ethical than systematically 
theological. This is particularly evident in his addresses to the 
Nairobi Assembly and to the MIT conference. (130) There, the message is 
that the dominant mechanistic world view of science and technology, to 
which theology has adapted itself 'unccrnfortably', is wrong and leads 
to ecological disaster; that science is now changing its world view 
under the pressure of its own develorment and analysis of the world and 
for the sake of consistency with its own internal logi.c; that theology 
needs to pay closer attention to this new world view,because this will 
bring humanity, nature and God into ·unified and coherent perspective, 
and point the theological path to·ecological good sense.(l31) 
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Birch's theological contributions are all variations on the one 
thane, spelled out- in his 1965 book Nature arid Godand reiterated in 
two articles for biologists published outsiC!e· the C&S context. (132) 
I have chosen to concentrate on one of·those articles, namely his paper 
'Participatory Evolution: the Drive of Creation', which appeared in 
1972. This will be supplemented by references to his other works, in 
order to elucidate more fully themes that were touched on but not 
developed in that paper, or which were not discussed there at all. 
(i) Exeosition. 
The philosophical and theological assumptions underlying process 
theology have already been introduced in Chapter Two, Section 4 (ii) above. 
So my exposition may focus on the five questions listed in Section 1 
above, and highlight emphases and attitudes which complement the 
exposition of Cobb's ecological theology already described in Chapter 
Two. 
(1) The cosmos. Birch views the world and its structures and 
processes from the specialised vantage point of the evolutionary 
biologist. That perspective has shaped his theology in a definite 
direction, though it is not his starting point. In the preface to 
Nature and God,lie states that he would not have written 
'had I not discerned something for myself that 
makes sense of the world of specialised know-
ledge in which I live', 
and tells of how he discovered Whitehead, Hartshorne, and Tillich, when 
he was 
'a young research student, dissatisfied with the 
answers of what called itself orthodox Christianity, 
and excited about science'.(l33) 
In the C&S programme he stated that, as a biologist, he was 
'little interested in a theology that does not 
contribute a dimension of understanding to the 
facts as we know them in biology. Process 
theology ••• does this at least for me and same 
of my colleagues' • ( 134) 
The cosmos itself poses three fundamental questions to biologists: 
about the origins of life, about the emergence of consciousness by 
evolution from apparently unconscious matter, and about the origin and 
rationale of teleonomy in biologiC'al processes. (135) As an 
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evolutionary biologist, Birch reaches a professional. conclusion that 
'the only explanation ·that makes sense to me is 
that. the stuff o:E the universe is ordered and has 
the potential of being further reorganised and that 
the ordering principle· is an aspect. of rrdnd'. (136) 
He concludes that the ·ordering pri~ciple is all-inclusive, and provides 
the overall coordination of the ordering without. which there. would be 
chaos in the universe. He also argues that the.ordering principle is 
'democratic' in the sense that it is not rule by coercion and fiat but 
j 
by the 'persuasion' of responsive entities. This presupposes a degree 
of 'consciousness' and 'sentience' , analogous to those phenomena in 
human existence and experience; the hypothesis is that they are manifest 
at all levels of evolutionary development, from humanity to hydrogen 
atans. Thus all matter is 'conscious'. (137) But what of the order-
ing principle? Birch follows Whitehead's extrapolation, and names 
'the unitary actuality of the universe to which 
entities respond, with the name God 1 • ( 138) 
The cosmos is established as a subject of theological discourse, there-
fore, in virtue of the panpsychism which Birch infers from the 
scientific interpretation of the cosmos, and the panentheistic 
interpretation which he adds to it. (Incidentally, this answers ro. 
4,about God's relationship to the cosmos, except for one aspect which 
will be dealt with there.) 
(2) The cosmos in consummation. Birch barely touches on this 
theme,since he· is moreconcerned with contemporary historical existence, 
its associated ethical problems, and the availability of a coherent 
interpretation of its present reality. Nevertheless, his ideas may be 
inferred. In Nature and God he argues that 1 creation' is the 
concrete realisation of what is possible in potentia, the lifting of 
restraints on matter, and accanpanied by an increase in 'awareness 1 
of the whole creation; and that it is the unity of nature in God, who 
is redeemer as well as creator.(l39) This existing creation is 
manifestly incomplete and imperfect, by these criteria, and it seems 
logical to infer that the Kingdom of God should consist in the 
completion and consummation of this process; this is the internal 
logic of such a process, is consistent. with Birch's view of participatory 
evolution,· and is similar to the· process eschatology· expounded by Cobb 
and Griffin. (140) The implication is that the process will continue 
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uninterrupted, though erratically because of the freedom of the beings 
involved_, until eventually it. :reaches the level of beauty, complexity, 
harmony, and integri.ty towards which the orderihg-·principle is lurir):g 
and. persuading it .. 
This becanes a ·humanised eschatology. Humanity is now the 
spearhead of evolutionary·progress, the species· which holds the destiny 
of the earth in its decision· and may bring it to wreck or glory. Human 
progress advances the cosmos 1 and progress already achieved grounds hope 
for further progress in the future. Birch believes 
'in · .the transforming power of hope' 1 
and therefore 
'our destiny is in our hands; ••• our participation 
in the future of man can be influential and perhaps 
decisive [for the future of the cosmos]'. (141) 
This is made real in the process of cultural evolution,. in which man is 
a conscious participant in the direction and course of the evolutionary 
process. (142) The taskof this evolution is to exalt society by setting 
appropriate goals for human development and implementing then by 
persuasion and good will rather than by coercion. However, 
'the frightening aspect of our present predicament 
is that we have no agreement on the goals of man-
kind, on what people are for, while at the same 
time science and technology are piling up means 
that could be used to almost any end' ; 
which means that the imnediate goal is to 
'bring these two concerns together in some 
creative partnership'.(l43) 
Thus by setting the right goals and the right ordering of priorities, 
and by harmonious collaboration of man with man for the good of the 
whole cosmos, humanity may hasten the caning of the Kingdom, which 
means the consummation of historical existence and of the ongoing 
evolutionary process. 
(3) The human relationship to the cosmos. Some aspects of the 
relationship are already clear from no. 2, namely that humanity is to 
take the ·cosmos forward to God and to his Kingdom. . And ·it goes without 
saying that the evolutionary biologist also takes ·• seriously the biolog-
ical contiguity of humanity with the nature fran·which it has evolved, 
accomnodating that contiguity in his theological discourse. This may 
also be seen in his use of human.experience as a paradigm for the 
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sentient experience of all nature. 
One aspect of the human· relationship to ·the cosmos has not. yet 
been dealt with, and that is the dimension of personal encounter. This 
is expressed at the MIT conference, and it is· new to Birch's present-
ation. It finds its origin in Gregorios' 'reverent-receptive 
attitude' to nature. ('144) As with Gregorios, the main idea is that 
the scientific-analytic attitude to nature leads to an objectifying 
approach which does not accord with the human experience of nature. 
This experience includes elements of delight, wonder, and mystery, and 
may include encounter of the ultimate kind: Job 38 - 42 describes such 
an encounter, according to Birch. (145) His theological perspective, 
with its unitary conception of hurnani ty, nature, and God, and of all 
nature as sentient, admits the possibility of such personal encounters 
with nature; they are social occasions between sentient subjects, a 
possibility that the mechanistic-scientific view cannot comprehend. 
(4) God's relationship to the cosmos. As noted in no. 1, the cosmos 
is interpreted panentheistically; and it was noted in both nos. 1 and 2 
that God is the ordering principle who lu~s and persuades the cosmos 
to its consummation. 
Associated with the concept of persuasion is Birch's rejection 
of the 'efficient cause' concept of God. Instead, 
'God acts in relation to entities which have 
their own measure of self-determination', 
by persuasion and never by coercion.(l46) Some events do indeed have 
greater significance than others, but this is not because God has 
intervened more in them than in the others: 
'Significant events are significant because they 
happen to open up a new realm of possibility 
heretofore closed. The history of the Jews is 
rich in such events. The life of Jesus is such 
an event; it opened up for mankind new possibilities 
of compassionate understanding, creativity, and 
hurra.n brotherhood 1 • (14 7) 
The locus of God's relationship to the cosmos becomes the cosmos' 
response in general and humanity's response in particular. 
only persuade. 
For God can 
( 5) Science and technology. It is the. philosophical assumptions 
which undergird the activities of science and technology that are the 
object of Birch's questioning and criticism. They have led to a 
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'factory view' of. nature which pits hunanity against nature; and they are 
no longer good science now that physics and biology have moved beyond 
the epistemologies of Bacon and Descartes. (148) So it is necessary to 
change the underlying world views of science and technology, to move away 
from mechanism towards the sort of vitalism advocated by process theology. 
New developments in science show that a change in world-view is necessary, 
and so Birch claims that science 
'has rendered religion, perhaps even revelation, a 
service' 
by showing it the path of truth. (149) 
This shows a very positive attitude towards science, which is no 
surprise in a professional scientist .• It is positive in.principle, but 
it is also aware of the deficiencies endemic to same social manifest-
ations of the scientific enterprise. Technology receives a similarly 
qualified positive evaluation. It is a resource for human development, 
but only a limited resource: 
'The problems arising from technology and mismanage-
ment of the environment cannot be solved only by 
the application of more and better technology. 
Improved technology can be part of the answer, but 
to suppose that the problems of technology can them-
selves be solved purely by technology is self-
defeating. Softer technology helps but it will 
not redeem the world'. (150) 
The appropriate corrective is softer technology in combination with a 
world view which gives value and sentience to non-human existents. The 
world view is of central importance. There is a connection between the 
way man thinks of nature and the way he relates to it. (151) Since the 
future of the cosmos lies at the mercy of humanity, a deficient world 
view may jeopardise that future severely, as the advent of the ecological 
crisis shows; but on the other hand, it was noted in no. 2. that the 
combination of the right world view with the· right goals for human 
existence may save the cosmos. 
(ii) Discipleship in the technological culture. 
The foregoing exposition (an¢i the exposition of Cobb's ecological 
theology in Chapter Two above), makes it abundantly clear that process 
theology returns an answer of the 'Christ of Culture' type to Niebuhr's 
theological question of culture. There is a fundamental agreement 
between Christian discipleship and the.airns of' the culture in which it 
is lived. Christ works in, with, and through society and its 
institutions, fulfills its hopes and aspirations, and leads it onwards 
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to its consumnation. This is particularly clear from Birch's discuss-
ion of 'cultural evolution' • Humanity is at. the cutting edge of the 
world's progress; this progress is ordered persuasively by God, who 
employs humanity to bring the cosmos to its consurrmation in himself; 
humanity does this through its social action, and particularly by 
developing its·scientific and technological enterprises so that they 
exalt society and benefit the environment. Process theology presents 
humanity with the right world view which orients human activity so that 
it corresponds to and may further divine purpose in the cosmos. Thus 
the title of Birch's 1972 paper is very significant: participatory 
evolution is the drive of creation. 
The spearhead of humanity's progress is its science and technology, 
which enable man· to realise his full potential and the full potential of 
the cosmos as long as they are rightly directed. They function and 
coordinate with the responsiveness of nature to bring it to its consu-
rrmation in God, as long as they respond positively to the creative lure 
of God. Birch acknowledges that it is not all plain sailing. The 
ark may not be made watertight in time to save industrial society. (152) 
The astronomer Fred Hoyle may deny the probability that man .will ever 
gain the upper hand over his fate, and the facts may favour the 
pessimists; Birch counters, that denying probability is not a proof of 
impossibility, so there is room for the transfonning poV~.~r _ of hope. (153) 
This hope acknowledges that the process of creative advance is inherently 
ambiguous; and Birch says that the ecological and economic crises 
'are examples of the ambiguity of creative advance. 
With each new advance there is a cost. The cost 
is a cross' • ( 154) 
That is, suffering is an essential ingredient in and accompaniment of 
creative advance, but hope looks beyond the cost to the new creation it 
will bring. 
However, the overwhelming balance is with hurnani ty in cultural 
evolution and the science and technology associated with and furthering 
humanity's propress. The order of the universe 
'is well established at the level of electrons and 
atoms, less so at the level of living cells and 
organisms, least so at the level of human societies. 
This level is where man's con:scious groping may meet 
the persuasive lure of unrealised possibilities that 
could make a more complete world and more ordered 
lives. Here is where mankind is challenged 
to participate consciously in the ongoing 
creative process'. (155) 
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Birch's approach therefore represents a synthesis between Christian 
commitment and technologica'l culture:· Christ is the Christ. of the 
technological culture as he is the Christ of culture in general. 
Process theology may be analysed and evaluated at many levels; 
its philosophical assumptions and the·coherence of its.foundations may 
be explored, as may its relationship to science, its. conscious rejection 
of traditional theological methods and conclusions, and the adequacy of 
its ethics; even its claim. to be Christiag,theolog_y:rray be debated. (156) 
· If{:; is not my task to attempt a sophisticated criticism on any of those 
grounds, but to evaluate the adequacy of Birch's approach in theological 
terms, after accepting it at face value. Niebuhr has already 
evaluated the 'Christ of Culture' response to the theological question 
of culture, and cond.luded that it is an inadequate and insufficient 
response. (157) Perhaps the particip.~ants. in the C&S .programme have 
sensed same of the inadequacies and deficiencies of this type of theology, 
which would explain why process theology has not taken on there in spite 
of its consistent and eloquent advocacy by Birch. Niebuhr was not 
dealing with process theology specifically, so his evaluation may only 
serve as a guide for my evaluation of Birch's position in the next 
subsection. 
(iii) Evaluation. 
Process theology claims to have it right when everyone else has 
it wrong. Birch and Cobb state that Derr's Ecology and Huma.n Liberation 
typifies 
'the dominant view of nature in Western Christendom, 
!j,JhichJ is gravely deficient both as an interpretation 
of biblical views of the creation and as a basis for 
an adequate contemporary ethics of ecology' . (158) 
But then Birch, after outlining the process stance at Zurich in 1977, 
asked himself: 
'If this approach is so illuminating and motivating 
for me, why has it not caught on in the world of 
science and of theology and in the world of just 
ordinary people who want to find meaning in their 
existence?' (159) 
191 
One who has advocated tilis approach as patiently and. consistently as 
Birch, has eamed the right. to ask. And. his approach has theological 
and. ethical advantages to strengthen its appeal. 
Birch's process theology is congruent with the human capability 
to organise and bring order to nature through science and technology, 
and it satisfies the need for a unified and coherent interpretation 
of experience and reality. 
By· placing science and technology finnly within the context of 
humanity's cultural evolution, Birch gives them potential purpose and 
direction which may prove beneficial to the whole cosmos. The 
experience of science and technology over: the centuries has shown that 
they do indeed have the capacity to benefit mankind and nature, for 
example by eradicating diseases in animal and man, by the preservation 
of species, and by the control of environmental variables such as the 
availability of food supplies.(l60) The ecological crisis shows 
that humanity's touch is far from sure, but his technological history 
shows that the potential is there. So Birch directs his efforts 
towards developing the potential that has already been shown to exist; 
in this way, it answers the crisis with hope Where sane others answer 
with despair. In this way, too, he accepts and acknowledges the 
human capability to bring order to and to organise nature, and gives it 
a positive orientation. 
He is also attempting to provide a coherent unified interpre-
tation of experience and reality. Science and faith are brought 
together into one harmonious scheme, thus resolving potential conflicts 
between what scientists may claim on the basis of their investigations 
and analyses, and what theologians may claim on the basis of revelation. 
Birch's paper at MIT appeals to the conference desire for unity and 
coherence, for peace between science and faith: 
'In [my J view knowledge is not divided ootween science 
and revelation. All truth is inter-related so we 
must concern ourselves with everything. Contin-
uities between the different ways of knowing lead to 
continuities in what is kno'Wn, as for example between 
nature and God, the living and the non-living and 
the human and non-human life'. (161) 
This is why Birch believes that science and technology may work together 
for the good of which humanity senses they are capable. 
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The human experience of nature is included in Birch's interpre-
tation of reality. Man experiences nature in emotional tenus - awe, 
terror, delight, joy - and as one of the vehicles of God's revelation 
to man; as well as his experience of nature in tenns of manipulation, 
control, and investigative analysis. Birch takes the emotional 
experience into account as a social relationship between sentient beings, 
and the revelation which may occur in the personal encounter with nature 
is seen as part of God's persuasion and lure addressed to human 
sentience. 
Humanity also experiences the ambiguity of reality and the tragedy 
which enters life. Birch addresses this metaphysically and theologically. 
Accidents do happen, tragedies do occur, they are a source of disorder 
in the existence of the cosmos. But the exisita:J.ce- _-of an ordering 
principle or agent (God) 
'does not mean there is no . disorder. On the contrary, 
there is no possibility of evolution without disorder-
ing by agencies such as mutation and recombination of 
genes in sexual reproduction'. (162) 
The metaphysical answer couched in biological terms may also be expressed 
theologically: The cross is the cost of each new creative advance. 
'The symbol of the fall is always with us. It ident-
ifies the occurrence of a new leveli of order and free-
dam bought at the price of suffering •••• The cross 
pattern is woven deeply into the fabric of nature.' (163) 
And the contemporary experience of ecological and economic crisis is part 
of the ambiguity of creative advance whose cost is borne at the cross. (164) 
This means that Birch is able to pnovide a holistic theological 
perspective on and interpretation of the reality and experience of 
contemporary man in the technological culture. This is not surprising, 
since process theology makes a deliberate attempt to start with the 
experience of the real world and the knowledge about it which scientists 
may provide. ( 165) 
Process theology therefore has a component of metascience, and t)::lelr 
panpsychism belongs to this component. It is one way of answering the 
question as to how consciousness may have emerged from matter in the pnocess 
of evolution: it answers that all matter is conscious to some degree. 
Theologically, it has two advantages. It establishes the possibility of 
human relationship to the non-human world which goes beyond the sUbject-
object relationship of science to incorporate the dimension of personal 
(sUbject-sUbject,) · encounter. And it makes ' life' the central concept 
in environmental ethics and humanity's dealing with other species. These 
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provide a sound theological and ethical orientation for life in the 
technological culture. Some recent. biblical scholarship has argued 
that. Scripture testifies to the theological importance of the gift of 
life, as the basic experience which gives man· his bearings in his 
perception of the natural world and environment; the miracle of life, 
the withdrawal of life, provision of space and food and time-span for 
life, are ultimately beyond the disposal of the living thing and are 
experienced and recognised as gifts of the Creator. This paves the way 
for an ethic of shared creatureliness and partnership which seeks to 
conserve and enhance life as much as it is in man's power to do so. (166) 
Birch's panpsychism points instinctively in the same direction as do this 
strand of biblical theology and, of course, the professional concern of 
the biologist. 
There are several things to be said against Birch's approach, 
nevertheless. It exalts reason at the expense of revelation. It is 
human reason which has investigated and.analysed the structure and 
processes of the world, providing the scientific interpretation on which 
Whitehead's metaphysic and Birch's metascience are based. !Lis evident 
that process theology is a theological adaptation of revelation so that 
it fits the mould constructed by scientific reason. Thus Christ becomes 
the symbol and epitcme of life in response to the creative lure of God, 
whose life has opened up new possibilities of compassionate understand-
ing creativity, and human brotherhood. (167) The prophetic 'Thus saith 
the Lord' has been considerably muted. Birch spends little time in 
discussing the cross, except to interpret it as part of the built-in cost 
of creative advance and the means by which God's creative love makes up 
for the deficiencies in the cosmic response.(l68) The primacy of 
reason in the process theology approach also makes it difficult for it 
to acccmmodate the biblical understanding of the inadequacy of human 
wisdom: the wisdcm of this world is folly with God, who knows that the 
thoughts of the wise are futile and who catches the wise in their 
craftiness; and St. Paul en:phasises that it is the cross which shows 
those limitations on. human reason ( 1 Corini thians 1 - 3) • Birch does 
attempt to deal with the problem that revelation poses to ratiocination. 
Job 38 - 42 presents 
'an encounter of the ultimate kind • • • Confession 
of incompetence, according to: :the book of Job 1 is 
the beginning of wisdom'. (169) 
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This statement was made at, MIT, in the section of his paper in which he 
is adapting Gregorios' reverent~receptive. attitude to nature to his own 
process theology approach. It represents a new direction in Birch's 
thinking, as he seeks to come to grips with the implications of Job's 
encounter with God in the light of Ills own: presuppositions about the 
sufficiency of human·reason~ The main implication of his expositions 
before MIT was that human reason needed no supplement, that it could 
direct humai:1. life and even the life of the cosmos towards its fulfill-
ment in God. 
Because his approach exalts reason, Birch's process theology has 
problems dealing with eschatology. It can only see the element of 
continuity between historical existence and the Kingdom of God. It 
cannot contemplate the existence of discontinuity (except discontinuities 
of the type which occur in the evolutionary process) • Eschatological 
existence cannot be speculatively described by extrapolation from the 
contemporary insights available to human reason. What eye has not 
seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived, is what God has 
prepared for those who love him ( 1 Corinthians 2: 9, quoting Isaiah 
64:4). Birch cannot incorporate the fullnessof the biblical testimony 
about the last days, which includes an emphasis on the discontinuity 
alongside the continuity, and the transfonnation of, and judgment by 
God upon, all that exists. He fails here because it is not amenable to 
investigation and rational contemplation by man in the light of his 
scientifically-based understanding of the world. 
Birch's exaltation of reason is accompanied by a great confidence 
and optimism about the power of the human spirit. With Cobb, Birch 
believes that humanity can improve the world and save the cosmos as long 
as it chooses the right social goals and directs its scientific and 
technological enterprises toward the achievement of those goals and the 
general enhancement of life in the cosmos. But this approach shatters 
on the grim rock of reality. The task of setting social goals and then 
implementing them requires more than goqd Will and persuasion for its 
success; the continual thrust of the wee discussions relating to 
international economic structures, develop:nent, and the need for a just, 
participatory,and sustainable society, points to the inescapable and 
unpleasant fact that the human species is far from ready to coordinate 
its activities around cosmic goals. The basis of the optimism shown 
by Birch and Cobb is their evaluation of reasom and reason cannot 
deal with human sin in strictly logical-analytic-empirical tenns. 
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For sin is a persistent., pervasive, and disruptive force to be reckoned 
with in social ethics, and process. theology has no· leverage here .at all. 
I have already indicated how the process theology stance sees 
Jesus himself and interprets his life. Niebuhr closes. his evaluation 
of the 'Christ of Ct.il ture' response ·with· a brief discussion of the 
Trinitarian problem: if Jesus is so interpreted (as the man of culture), 
what is his relationship to nature ahd to the power which produces and 
governs the cosmos? ( 1 70) Birch's process theology, like the Christ 
of CUI ture response, cannot answer . this question in a way acceptable to 
the Christian tradition. Process theology andBirch's position 
subjugate redemption and eschatology to creation, so Jesus is seen in 
human and cultural terms which focus on his role in the world's ongoing 
creative process, and is made remote from the Father. The question is, 
Is the God who is the ordering principle of the cosmos also the God and 
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ? Or, to put it another way, Is the God 
whose character is inferred by scientific reason to be the ordering 
principle of the cosmos also the God known by . .revelation as the triune 
God? There is no justification for identifying the two, nor can there 
be. Which means that orienting technological culture and its progress 
around the perceived goals of the ordering principle need not necessarily 
represent obedience and fidelity to the Christian God. 
My evaluation of Birch's process theology is therefore very similar 
in style to my evaluation of the emancipatory approach. Its advantages 
are qualified so stringently by its disadvantages that there is grave 
cause for doubt about the wisdom of adopting such a position, and it is 
necessary to ask whether an alternative approach may maintain and 
strengthen the advantages without falling into the same pitfalls. ( 171) 
When Birch and Cobb introduced their joint paper for the Bucharest 
Conference, they stated that their process theology stance 
'comes nearer to the tradition of Eastern Christendom 
in its valuation of nature than to the dauinant 
thought of Western Christianity'. (172) 
There is a noticeable sympathy between the process stance of Charles 
Birch and the Eastern view of Paulos Gregorios. In the two preceding 
sections, I have shO'wn that the dominant thought of Western Christendom 
(as it. has been represented in the C&S discussions) has been of mixed 
value as theology, without considering its ethical. strengths and weak-
nesses in much detail. I have argued in this section that process 
theology does little better. What, then, of the Eastern tradition? 
That is the subject of the next section. 
l 
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5. The Orthodox approach of Paulos Gregor..ios. 
Paulos Gregorios'has had a long association with the C&S 
program.ne, ·and has contributed extensively to its discussions. (173) The 
Orthodox participation ·in the prograrrme has been relatively small, with 
the notable exception of the 1974 Bucharest Conference which was a 'home 
ga.rre' for the Orthodox. Gregorios' personal contribution has been 
maintained from the sixties right up to the 1979 MIT conference at which 
he was Moderator, Bible Study leader, and contributor of a . paper on 
science-faith dialogue.(l74) My survey in Chapter Three shows that he 
is the logical person to choose as a representative of the Orthodox 
contribution to the C&S debate. 
There is a codicil. Gregorios represents the Syrian Orthodox 
Church, which is a non~nalcedoriian (Monophysi te) church and not 
'Orthodox' in the sense that it is a full member of the communion of 
Eastern Orthodox churches; there is a fraternal bond which stops short 
of full recognition of the Syrians by the Orthodox. (175) Gregorios is 
therefore Orthodox in a qualified and restricted sense, and cannot be 
regarded as entirely representative of Eastern Orthodoxy. Nevertheless, 
his theology is more closely related to the East than to the West,and is 
.informed by the Eastern heritage. His own tradition rejects the work 
of Maximus the Confessor, for example, whereas Eastern Orthodoxy accepts 
it and values it more highly than that of Gregory of Nyssa. Gregorios 
relies heavily on Gregory of Nyssa for his discussion of the human 
relationship to the cosmos, because he is 
'the only philosophical theologian of the undivided 
Christian church who has dealt with these themes in 
any profound way and who is acceptable to the 
authentic tradition' 
whereas Origen, Augusti,ne of Hippo, and Maximus · the Confessor are not so 
acceptable.( 176). But for the sake of the fraternal bond with the 
Orthodox, and for the sake of interpreting the whole Eastern tradition 
in the ecumenical context, Gregorios devotes a chapter of his book to 
Maximus and to the development of Eastern thought. It is reasonable, 
therefore, to regard Gregorios' approach as 'Orthodox' without further 
reference to his membership of. the Syrian Orthodox Church and the 
qualification that. implies. But, given that the Eastern Orthodox 
tradition values Maximus more highly than Gregory of Nyssa, it is now 
clear why Gregorios has·based·his ecological theology on Gregory rather 
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than on Maximus, and. that- his choice will be reflected in the ecological 
theology he propounds. 
The main source- fur my exposition of Gregorios 1 _theology is his 
book The Human Presence .. ---An Orthodox .View· of nature. (177) It was 
written in response to Derr' s Ecology arid Human Liberation, as an 
Orthodox counter-balance to the emancipatory position adopted by Derr. 
I. will be supplementing this by reference to two other works: Gregorios' 
paper in the Humanum symposium on Technology and Social Justice, titled 
''llll.s World and the Other'; and his paper to the 1977 Zurich theological 
consultation, titled 'An Eastern Orthodox Perspective of Nature, Man 
and God'.(l78) Tbgether, these three works provide a representative 
sample of Gregorios' ecological theology. 
The examination of his position will follow the same general out-
line and procedure as the examinations of the other positions: exposition, 
response to the theological question ofthe technological culture, and 
evaluation. Since Gregorios' book. was a response to Derr' s, it will 
be appropriate to refer to · Derr' s position; and since_ Gregorios shows a 
noticeable sympathy with process theology (but without committing himself 
to that stance), it will also be appropriate to refer to Birch's work. 
(179) These references will be made in the exposition, to which I now 
turn. 
(i) Exposition. 
The exposition of Gregorios' contribution will be undertaken with 
the aid of the five questions listed at the beginning of Section 1. 
( 1) The Cosmos. Gregorios argues that the idea of 'nature' as an 
impersonal entity confronting man is an Indo-Hellenic concept. It came 
to prominence again in the Western tradition during its post-Renaissance 
secularist phase; and generally, when society loses its sense of dir~ct 
dependence on and derivation from God, that sort of concept of 'nature' 
comes to prominence again. (180) But this is not the biblical concept 
of nature. In the Genesis sagas, the writers ·had noi_,notion of nature as 
som~thing 'out there' to be de-sacralised and then subjugated. (181) Instead;-
God, and humanity and nature represented a differentiated unity. For 
'God is not ·a reality with precise· physical boundaries; 
man cannot create a space~interval ·between himself and 
God. God is the. reality which sustains both man and 
nature, and it is through man himself and through natmre~ 
that God presents himself to man. In this sense, it is 
foolish to see God and nature as alternative poles 
placed so that if_ man turns towards one he. must 
tum his back on the other.' (.182) 
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Ethically, this leads Gregorios to question Detr' s interpretation of the 
stewardship ethic, since it allows the separation of nature from humanity, 
the temptation to see nature as 
'some kind of property, owned not by us, of course, but 
by God, given into our hands for efficient and productive 
use. . • • But the question goes much deeper than the 
good management of something outside ourselves'.(l83) 
The 'question' is that of humanity's relationship to nature and to 
God. The theological answer is that the cosmos can only be considered 
in its relationship to man. Here Gregorios relies on the work of Gregory 
of Nyssa. 
Gregorios describes the cosmos and~ts relationship to God on the 
basis of Gregory's ontology, which may be surrmarised diagramatically, thus: 
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Man is the crown of the creation, and the intermediary (mesos) ·between the·· ,. __ _ 
inteHectUa.l and the sensible worlds, since he participates in both. The 
structure is basically hierarchical, with man at the 'top' and the 'closest' 
part of. the creation to its creator. Gregory of·Nyssa's ontological 
hierarchy is a synthesis and Christian transposition of different currents 
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of thought, including the Stoic conception of. the hannony of the universe, 
the Platonic division be-tween sensible- and intelligible, and. the fourth-
century Athanasian orthodoxy whl:ch ··separated creator from creation by 
the ~astem~ in order to guard against Arianism and emanationism. (184) 
This ontology makes it clear why the cosmos can only be discussed 
theologically in its relationship to man. Its relationship to God is 
mediated through man (see no.3 below); and humanity, the g_esos, is the 
keystone which holds together the hierarchy of created beings. Gregor-
ios makes the latter point in a different way: 
(2) 
'Humanity and universe are interlocked parts of a 
single system. That system ••• is like humanity's 
body, not like an object outside humanity'. (185) 
The cosmos in consurrroation. Because the cosmos is ontologically 
bound up with humanity and therefore with Christ, its cons1.:1IIUllation is 
also bound up with humanity through Christ's resurrection. Matter and 
nature participate in the redemption, because 
'it was of the earth that Christ's body was constituted, 
the body which was transfigured on Mount Tabor, 
crucified on the tree, and came out through the mouth 
of the tomb, the body in which he appeared to his 
disciples, in which he ascended to heaven'; 
and this shows that 
'God includes the whole universe in his creation 
as well as in redemption in Christ'. (186) 
Matter therefore has an eschatological future. The reference to the 
Transfiguration shows that the eschatological promise for the whole 
creation, implied by the resurrection of the man Jesus, may be realised 
in contemporary historical existence, if only fleetingly. In this 
respect, Gregorios' approach is similar to the theology of hope. But 
he develops his position in a sacramental way, based on the eucharist; 
in the eucharistic act, all dualities between creator and creation, time 
and eternity, subject and object, are transcended. The language is 
liturgical, and refers to humanity's 'priesthood', to the eucharistic 
anaphora in which man offers his labours in the cosmos to God, and to 
God's transfiguration of the cosmos in response. ( 187) Thus Gregorios' 
approach focusses on the eschatological importance of the resurrection 
for the ·future of the cosmos, but. interprets ·it in eucharistic-sacramental 
tenns. 
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(3) The human relationship.to the cosmos. It is evident from the 
exposi.tion so far that this provides the key to Gregorios' position. 
The human relationship to ·the cosmos is dete:tmined by humanity's 
place in the ontological· hierarchy of Gregory of Nyssa, in which 
humanity is the mesos between the intelligible and the sensible. 
Gegorios sees man as 
'the citizen of·two worlds ••• with a special 
vocation to spread the grace of God through the 
whole of creation, animate and inanimate. • •• He 
is akin to both God and matter, a member of both 
families, made to enjoy both the divine and the 
terrestrial. In him and through him, matter too 
is to be redeemed. That is why Christ became man 
and assumed a material body. Man in Christ is 
the saviour of the world: he restores it to God so 
that it may truly be filled with his glory'. (188) 
The explication of this passage will serve to describe most of the main 
features of Gregorios' approach with regard to man's relationship to the 
cosmos. 
The vocation to spread the grace of God through the whole creation 
derives from humanity's ontological position as the mesos, and from the 
concept of participation (metousia) in Gregory of Nyssa.(l88a) Gregorios 
quotes Nyssa, to the effect that man recapitulates and re-presents the 
whole universe, that man is nevertheless not a microcosm, and that the 
cosrOC>s responds consciously to its creator through man. (189) Humanity 
participates in the divine perfections, goodness, and life, because man 
is the intermediary between God and his creation; in this way, the cosmos 
enjoys a mediate participation through man.(l90) 
Hmuanity's participation in the divine, and the mediate partici-
pation enjoyed by the cosmos through man, has been disrupted by the Fall. 
(191) Christ has crossed the diastema which divides the creation from 
its creator, and as the mediator between God and man has restored the 
human participation in the divine; consequently, the whole creation may 
again participate mediately through man in God.· Thus 'man in Christ is 
the saviour of the world'. (192) 
Gregory's ontology and his concept of participation depend on a 
dynamic interpretation of the ¥nago ~ei text, as follows. Adam's sin 
had sullied and obscured the image of God in· man, but man may grow in 
virtue and regain the perfection of·the irnagethroughparticipation in 
Christ. Jn this way, Christ's work may be continued on earth in the 
lives of believers, so that it is humanity united to Christ and in 
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cooperation with him which is 'the saviour of the world-'. Humanity 
united to Christ. and participating in God through him is :potentially 
unlimited in its ability to create good fur man and ·for the cosmos and 
to achieve God's purposes for bothe (193) . This line of thought has 
implications for his assessment of science and technology, which will 
be discussed in no. 5. below. 
This dynamic interpretation of the imago Dei explains Gregorios' 
emphasis on humanity's responsibility to acquire the dominion over the 
cosmos by its own effort. (194) This is stated in organic tenns, made 
possible because man is the meso§ between the intelligible and the 
sensible and because the individual is a body-soul unity: 
'just as the soul in man carmot be located in any part 
of the body, but pervades the whole of it, so man ••. 
is to pervade the whole universe, to regulate it, to 
"hominise" it, as Teilhard put it'. (195) 
The central idea is that man is to make himself the ' soul' of the cosmos 
by means of his science and technology. This is how man may restore the 
world to God and make it free to be filled with God's glory, as stated 
in the conclusion of my thematic quotation above. It will only be 
achieved, however, if science and technology are subordinated to and 
integrated with the quest for justice, freedom, peace, and creative 
goodness, in participation in Christ.(l96) 
That concludes my explication of the thematic passage in The Human 
Presence a.Jwtit humanity's relationship to the cosmos, which covers all but 
one of the main features of his approach. The liturgical aspect remains. 
Gregorios holds that human dominion must be held in tension with a 
reverent-receptive attitude towards nature. This has its roots in the 
tradition of biblical Wisdom and in the human experience of nature as a 
source of awe and wonder and terror and delight, and as a vehicle of God's 
revelation to man. (197) The reverent-receptive attitude provides a 
'necessary complement' to the contemporary scientific-technological 
attitude of analysis and manipulation; it is the attitude of 
'being open to fundamental reality as it manifests 
itself to us through visible, audible, sensible 
realities in the creation'. (198) 
This is part of Gregorios' sacramental-eucharistic· view of nature. But 
there are two sides to this liturgical relationship ·of humanity, nature 
and God. Man in Christ is .the mesi!:es between· the creation and the 
creator, and offers the creation to God, as its priest. This qualifies 
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the titanism which could" be drawn from the other aspects of. the 
human relationship to the cosmos already described, by supplying 
the same sort of restraint· that· the stewardship ethic provided in 
the emancipatory approach. Thus Gregorios states that 
'our mastery of the universe is like the mastery 
of our bodies; it is not that we may have it for 
our own use, but that we may give nature, as our 
extended body, into the hands of the loving God 
in the great mystery of the eucharistic self-
offering. a .Secular technology of mastery 
of nature for oneself is the "original" sin, of 
refusing our mediatory position between God and 
the universe, dethroning God, and claiming 
mastery for the sake of indulging our own 
cupidity, avarice and greed. The mastery of 
nature must be held within the mystery of worship. 
Otherwise we lose both mastery and mystery'. (199) 
( 4) God's relationship to the cosmos. The main features of God's 
relationship to the cosmos have already been adduced; it is clear that 
Gregorios' view in this matter is dominated and shaped by Gregory of 
Nyssa's ontology. 
(5) Science and Technology. This has been dealt with, in part, in 
no.3 above. It was stated there that the pursuit of science and 
technology, if subordinated to and integrated with the quest for justice, 
freedom, peace, and creative .goodness, could enable man to fulfill his 
vocation in the cosmos. It was also stated there that the technological 
mastery of· nature must be held within the mystery of worship. These 
are two of the three main features of Gregorios' position with regard 
to science and technology; one remains to be discussed here, namely 
Gregorios' use of Gregory of Nyssa's concept of the epinoia which makes 
human science and technology possible. 
Epinoia is the power of conception and creatiV:ity, which coordin-
ates understanding, language, and action.(l99a) As a result of 
Adarri.' s sin, the human epinoia is capable of error, false judgment, and 
self-delusion, so it is incapable of knowing the truth in its fullnesli. 
This affects humanity's relationship to its environment, because the 
world of experience is shaped by the admixture of error ··in all hl.ID'lan 
enterprise arising from .. the flawed §Qinoia. But the damage is not 
irreparable, just as the sullying and obscuring of the image. of God 
in man is not. irreparable. 
'Only as the human person is.progressively liberated 
from the evil does his gpinoi§, begin to function as 
it should •••• Only through the transformation of 
his being can the human person arrive at error-free 
understanding, language, and action.' (200) 
In fact, 
' the mind.' s proper functioning is dependent on man 
becoming free, just7 righteous, fully engaged. in 
creating the good'. (201) 
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Therefore, as the human family grows in virtue, the scientific and 
technological enterprises become more accurate, more powerful and 
penetrating, and·.more capable of human:ising the cosmos. This happens 
in a way which benefits the cosmos without threatening or destroying it, 
because it derives from the collective participation in goodness and is 
part of the human fulfillment of God 1 s purposes in his creation. Any 
abuse of this scientific and technological progress will involve a 
diminution in epinoetic power, a corresponding setback to the progress 
achieved, and a proportional frustration of science and technology. 
This concept of the epinoia (and the liturgical interpretation of the 
human relationship to the cosmos), serves to restrain any technological 
wantonness. Conversely, it has the positive function of encouraging 
growth in virtue so that humanity may live in that.peaceful co-existence 
with nature that God intends for the whole of his creation -- when the 
lion shall lie down with the lamb, and there shall be no more death or 
mourning nor crying nor pain f saiah 11:1 - 9, Revelation 21:1 - 4) . 
so the ~pinoia encourages hurnani ty to live as God intends it to live in 
the cosmos, and enables it to fulfill its vocation therein. 
This completes my exposition of Gregorios' theology, and I shall 
now compare it very briefly with Derr's approach which provoked Gregorios 
to set forth his views. Gregorios explicitly rejects the idea of nature 
as something ontologically separate from man, to be subjugated by man, 
and which may be subjugated by science and technology because it has 
been desacralised and is therefore free to human activity. And he 
rejects the ernancipatory distinction between man as the thinking subject 
who manipulates nature as an object.(202) Derr approaches the ecolog-
ical question exegetically, exploring the implications of Genesis 1:26 -
28, and Gregorios approaches the question by exploring Gregory of 
Nyssa 1 s ontology. There are similarities between Derr ·and Gregorios 
nevertheless. Both see the human concern in the cosmos as paramount. 
In Gregorios 1 case, this is because humanity is the key· to the cosmos 1 
relationship to its creator. He expresses ·this forcefully in the 
Hurnanum symposium. Someone may ask, he says, whether it is the universe 
which is the proper object of scientific, technologica·l, and economic 
development? No: 
'It-seems necessary. to shout at the top of one's 
voice that the object of development- is not the 
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universe, but. man ••• If. we want- to develop the world, it is 
not for the world's sake, but for the sake of man, and the 
full manifestation of his being, which is after all the 
image of God and redounds to the glory of God.' (203) 
Both Gregorios and the emancipatory position see the scientific and 
technological enterprises as the means of realising God's purposes in 
the cosmos~ Gregorios uses thEm' to 'create the good', to allow the whole 
creation to participate mediately through man in God, whereas the 
emancipists see them as the means of liberating· nature from its bondage 
to the powers of chaos and subjugating nature to man as God had 
intended it to be. There are other similarities between Derr and 
Gregorios which will appear in the next subsection. 
Gregorios shows great sympathy for process theology. This stems 
from his theology of participation in God's energeia as the constit-
utive principle of all existence. The ~n~rqeia is dynamic and creative, 
by definition, and the cosmos must be viewed 
'as a dynamic movement of God's will and energy', 
which is the source of its value and the justification for environmental 
ethics. (204) It is a short step from this view to panpsy:91isrn, with 
the help of evolutionary biology. Thus Gregorios states that 
'as the technological crisis deepens, we will need 
more and more vitalist interpretations of the 
universe', 
and he mentions Bergson, Whitehead, and Teilhard de Chardin with 
approval.(205) But Gregorios is not a process theologian in Orthodox 
guise. The ontology from which he derives his position implies some 
statements that have a 'process' flavour to them; but it is a fourth-
century ontology which lies within the orthodox Christian tradition, 
is faithful to it, and preserves some of its necessary truths. Process 
theology, on the other hand, is built on an ontology constructed on meta-
scientific grounds and adapted precariously for Christian thought. (206) 
Gregorios is able to interpret sin, incarnation, resurrection, and the 
human relationship to the cosmos generally, within the parameters of 
the biblical testimony and on the basis of Nyssa's · ontology. For 
Gregorios, for example, the resurrection implies that matter has an 
eschatological future. For process theology, on the other hand, the 
eschatological future of matter is ontologically detennined by the 
ongoing process as the culmination of God's luring and creative love; 
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its future is built into the system, .and is metaphysically guaranteed 
independently of_ the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. For 
Gregorios, the eschaton involves radical discontinuity ·.between this 
existence and the nex.t., ·- and the refining judgment upon all historical 
existence; the process- theologians· emphasise· the continuity between 
this existence and the next, and see the discontinuity as no different 
in_ kind or degree from the type of discontinuity known in the evolutionary 
process and inherent in geneticmutation. The differences between 
Gregorios' approach and that of Birch and the process stance generally 
will become clearer in the subsection which follows: 
(ii) Discipleship in the technological culture. 
It is evident from the exposition above that Gregorios' Orthodox 
theology represents a median answer to the theological question of 
discipleship in the technological culture. It shares the tenets which 
the church of the centre maintains: humanity is .capable of science and 
technology, and the human vocation includes the development of this 
capacity within the context of God's good creation: the reality of human 
sin is acknowledged, and its effects are shown to pervade the whole 
creation in a negative and destructive way which can only be remedied 
by God; which means that Gregorios' position also gives priority to 
Christ' s work in redemption and the necessity for works of Christian 
obedience, for without them the creation cannot participate in God, the 
epinoetic faculty atrophies in man, and the death of the cosrros ensues. 
Gregorios' attitude to science and technology generally is far too 
optimistic for the ambivalent (Christ and the technological culture in 
paradox) approach. So either he represents a sympathetic or a conversion-
1st response, or requires a separate classification of his own. As it 
happens, it is not necessary to create a new category to describe 
Gregorios' type of theology. 
His approach shows an affinity with the conversionists who see in 
Jesus the new act of God in human history, redeeming the failures of human 
sin and creating the good in the midst of sin's destructive and negative 
effects in the technological culture. Like the C&S theology of hope, 
Gregorios adds an eschatological dimension: Christ's life, death, and 
resurrection supply the paradigm by which contemporary existence and action 
may be oriented and assessed. Thus 
'the new metahistorical existence, the new creation 
into which the whole of humanity has to be reborn 
through death and resurrection, has already been 
inaugurated through Christ's death, resurrection 
and ascension. He has assumed all humankind into 
himself, and exalted it to the right hand of God'. (207) 
206 
The human vocation is already realised in Christ, and humanity is to 
labour in histor:y for its fulfillment in metahistor:y; as Christ has 
united the divine and the human, creator and creation, transcendent and 
immanent, spiritual and scientific-technological, and thus enabled the 
cosmos to participate mediately through him in God, so now humanity's 
task is to labour for that union and participation (on behalf of the 
cosmos) with all the spiritual and scientific-teclmological means 
available to it.(208) In fact, in Gregorios' theology, it is hard to 
know where histor:y ends and eschatology begins, or where the boundar:y 
lies between humanity as the biological species of contemporar:y histor-
ical existence and as the theological-eschatological humanity united 
in Christ. I shall discuss this in the next subsection. It is clear, 
however, that the eschatological understanding of the human vocation in 
Christ is the determinant for present action. This makes it seem that 
Gregorios may represent a conversionist approach. 
Gregorios' eschatological orientation and expression is derived 
from the juxtaposition of the biblical teaching about the resurrection and 
the presence of the eschatological Kingdom in contemporar:y histor:y, on 
the one hand, with Gregor:y of Nyssa's ontological hierarchy within the 
created realm and the metousia relationship between the creation and God 
on the other. It is only in the eschatological Kingdom that humanity 
in Christ will be able perfectly to fulfill its role in the creation 
as mesos between the worlds of the intelligible and the sensible, and as 
mesi tes between God and his creation. The human vocation is an 
eschatological vocation, connected with the perfect functioning of the 
hierarchy of created beings, with each level participating in God through 
intervening levels. Gregorios' exposition makes it clear that in the 
partnership between Gregor:y' s ontology and eschatological faith, the ont-
ology is the major partner. (209) Human sin disrupted the proper function-
ing of the ontological hierarchy and its participation in God; this 
has been restored in Christ and may be realised proleptically in human 
histor:y; but its full restoration and the proper functioning of the 
hierarchy have been deferred to the eschatological Kingdom when, if Adam' s 
sin had not intervened, it would have been achieved in histocy. (210) 
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The discontinuity between this world and the.. next, namely the last 
judgment. (1 Corinthians 3: l.Off.) corresponds to the ontological disrupt-
ion engendered by Adamr s sin.. This means that the eschatology represents 
only an adjustment to the ·situation which arose from the effects of sin 
in the hierarchy, and the real de.tenninant of Gregorios '· theology is 
Gregory's ontology. This also means that his answer to the theological 
question of the technological culture may be found in the hierarchy 
rather than in considerations of eschatology. 
The proper ·functioning of the hierarchy is · therefore tied to the 
human vocation in the cosmos, 
' to spread the grace of God through the whole 
of creation' 
and to be 
'the priest of creation, as the mediator through 
whom God manifests himself to creation and 
redeems it'.(211) 
This redemption includes the salvific work of science and technology, 
wb;ic:,hcreate the good for the universe by subjugating it to the will of 
humanity in Christ. This hinges on the dynamic interpretation of the 
~ Dei tradition in tenns of theosis, the practice of virtue by human 
effort surrendered to the will of God and culminating in the full 
development of man: 
and so 
'The spirit of man must become like God, who is love. 
The mind of man mUEt become like God, who is wisdom. 
The hands of man must become like God's, full of 
power', 
'we must see science (mind) and technology (hands 
and their ext:.~nsion) as part of the way in which 
theosis itseif takes place'. (212) 
Even in the imperfection and sinfulness of historical existence, science 
and technology are the means by which humanity·may mediate the grace of 
God to his creation, to the human species and to the non-human world as 
well. Humanity is called to engage in, develop,and·intensify the 
technological culture, as part of its obedience to God; and .the techno-
logical culture is the. means, through God's prevenient grace, to the 
world.' s salvation. (213) 
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Gr.egorios' attitude to the technological cul tur.e may be surmnarised 
by saying that the proper functioning of the ontological hierarchy was 
disrupted by human sin but now, through· human ~e§si§ ·and the enterprises 
of science and: teclmology, it may be restored by humanity in Christ. It 
is clear that he returns a sympathetic answer to the question of the 
technological culture, of the type described in section 1 above and 
already exemplified by the ernancipatory approach (section, 2) • There 
are significant differences between Gregorios and the emancipists: the 
theology of history takes man away from nature, whereas Gregory's 
ontology depends on his relationship·to nature; Gregorios' position is 
ontologically-based, whereas Berkhof and.Derr look to an exegesis of the 
'dominion' tradition which follows Bacon and Descartes in seeing the 
scientific and technological enterprises as the means of achieving 
dominion. But Gregorios nevertheless agrees with Derr in his basic 
attitude to the technological culture, even though Derr' s book provoked 
Gregorios to write a corrective. 
The ernancipatory position has been shown to be less than useful 
in meeting the theological needs of the contemporary situation of the 
environmental crisis,primarily· because it is not good theology and is no 
longer viable for an ecological theology which intends to stay close to 
the biblical testimony about the human place in and influence on the 
cosmos. The next subsection investigates Gregorios' approach for its 
theological adequacy. 
(iii) Evaluation. 
Since Gregorios and the ernancipatory approach both represent the 
sympathetic type of response to the technological culture, it is reasonable 
to expect that there will be a measure of sirnilari ty between their 
advantages and disadvantages. This happens to be the case with the 
advantages, but is not so with the disadvantages which are more closely 
associated with their respective articulations of their positions. 
In section 2, I listed four theological -.:advantages to the emanci-
pm:ory positwn: firs't.,it makes sense of humanity's proven ability to 
manipulatE} and control nature to some degree; second, the interpretation 
'-
of humanity's vocation in the cosmos (to be the technological agent of God's 
will for the whole of the cosmos) is accompanied and balanced by the 
acknowledgement of humanity's biological contiguity with nature; third, 
it is able to justify Christian involvement in the scientific and techn-
ical enterprises; and fourth, it is able to acknowledge with gratitude 
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the achievements of. the technological culture and the great benefits 
it has brought. to human existence. Gregorios 1 approach shares these 
advantages, as they are' expressed. within the paramete:ts and language of 
Gregory of Nyssa's ontology. It· is therefore unnecessary to expand 
upon these advantages in Gregorios' case, since they are obtained 
mutatis mutandi from the list of merits of the emancipatory approach. 
Gregorios' theology· has two further advantages, derived from his 
articulation of his position and which serve to strengthen it consider-
ably. He is able to hannonise his theological position with the 
contemporary evolutionary understanding of man, but without jeopardising 
or caupranising his unique status in the natural order; and Gregory of 
Nyssa's ontology provides a sound foundation which is compatible with 
the understanding of the world's structures and processes, yet preserves 
those necessary truths of Christian theology which Birch's articulation 
of the process stance was unable to preserve. 
Gregorios is keen to point out that his approach is eminently 
compatible with the perspective of evolutionary biology: 
' the tradition accepted an elementary fonn of the 
doctrine of evolution thirteen centuries before 
Charles Darwin. Gregory of Nyssa in the fourth 
century held the view that the same force of 
creation, operating in inorganic matter, shaped 
the plant world or vegetative sphere of life, 
the animal world or the bio-sphere, and the 
human world. He went further to say that ••• 
the animal and the vegetative elements exist and operate 
in the human.' (214) 
Such an evolutionary conception is made possible by Gregory's view of 
the dynamic ~ne~eia of God which creates and constitutes all existence. 
The creative energy of God appears (to Gregory) to have taken a 
gradually ascending path, with humanity emerging at the last stage. The 
emergence of man represented 
'a kind of full flowering and fruit bearing of the 
plant of the cosmos. The universe reveals its full 
nature only when it brings forth man; . . . and it 
is on the plant of the universe that the human fruit 
subsists' • (215) 
This metaphor allows, in a very clever way, for the simultaneous acknow-
ledgement of humanity's biological contiguity with the nature from which 
it has evolved, and of humanity's unique place and status in the cosmo~. 
Gregory's rudimentary view of evolution was speculative and derived from 
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the hierarchical structure of his ontology rather than fra:n scientific 
deduction and experiment and. observation; but he was close to the right 
track as far as the modern view is concerned. (216) 
Humanity's place at the 'top' of the.hi:erarchy assures his unique-
ness within the order of created beings, and corresponds to his position 
as the mesQ§ between the two worlds of the intelligible and the sensible 
realities. The fact that Gregorios' view may be hannonised with the 
evolutionary understanding of man refers only to the. manifestations of 
God's creative energy in the 'sensible' side of the· hierarchy. Only a 
part of the hierarchy is involved in the hannony of Gregorios' approach 
with evolutionary theory. But the whole of the hierarchy is very 
versatile and serviceable in Christian theology. 
As alrea9y noted, it uses the Athanasian concept of the £iastemg 
between God and his creation to safeguard against Arianism and emanation-
ism. It also shows why the Word took human flesh, because the whole of 
creation is connected through hurnani ty to God, and so the whole realm of 
the created reality may also be redeemed through the human.species. 
Gregory's concept of participation connects the whole of the creation to 
God through man, allows for the severing and disruption of this connect-
ion through Adam's sin, and its reinstatement in redemption through 
Christ who is the mediator between man and God. Thus it also safeguards 
the theological correspondence between creation and redemption - all 
creation is included in the fruits of the redemption. The advantages 
of this ontology may be seen by comparison with Birch's articulation of 
Whitehead's approach, which I have criticised in the preceding section 
for exalting human reason to such an extent that the Christian truths 
of the incarnation, revelation, and eschatology, could only be fitted into 
the schema by awkward and artificial adaptations. 
Where does the difference lie, between Whitehead and Gregory of 
Nyssa? Both ontologies have hierarchical structures. But two differ-
ences become evident immediately. Gregory of Nyssa. posits a diastemg. 
between God and his creation, which can only be crossed at the incar-
nation in which God becomes incarnate inman. There is no diagterna for 
Birch, who follows Whitehead's panentheistic ·view of incarnation and 
abolishes the diastaua thereby. (217) In Gregory of Nyssa's tenus, 
Whitehead and Birch have confused.the creative energ~ia of God with 
the incarnation of the Son, the creation with the redemption, the 
continual constitution and preservation of the cosmos with the single 
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trajectory in history of. Jesus' life. The second difference is that 
Whi.tehead' s ontology has been. constructed primarily as a metascience, a 
metaphysical construct. and interpretation of' reality founded· on the 
best current scientific information about that. reality; hence Birch's 
high esteem for reason and science.·· But Gregory of Nyssa's approach 
represents· a deliberate·· and purposeful adaptation• of· the scientific and 
philosophical evidence of his ·day, to be used for the orthodox articu-
lation and defense of the Christian faith. That is, the theological 
considerations were of primary importance when the ontological structure 
(nee-Platonism) was adapted to the theological task. Hence the need 
for the concept of the 9!astem~ 1 for example. (218) Thus Gregory's 
ontology values revelation more highly than reason, whereas Birch and 
Whitehead reverse the valuation. 
In basing his theological approach upon the work of Gregory of 
Nyssa, Gregorios has chosen a stout stick to lean upon. The. other 
sympathetic response to the technological culture, that of the 
emancipists, found itself leaning on a broken. stick. Tl;.e criticisms 
levelled against the emancipatory position (section 2(ii.:j.))were specific 
to the articulations of that position by Berkhof and Derr, and do not 
apply to Gegorios' exposition. The emancipatory position differs from 
Gregorios' theology, in many. important respects (for example, in its 
understanding of the imago Dei tradition and in its ontology) , so 
Gregorios cannot necessarily be criticised on the same grounds as the 
emancipists merely because they represent the same general type of 
theological response to the technological CUlture. Instead, my critiqUe. 
of Gregorios is specific to his presentation. 
One weakness of his approach relates to the apparent arbitrariness 
of his positive estimation of science and technology as agents of 
potential blessing and even salvation for the whole creation, instruments 
which enable the grace of God to be spread throughout the whole creation 
by man. There is no obvious theological basis for this estimation, and 
no indication of the criteria on which Gregorios bases his statements. 
The only one implied is that science and technology enable man to humanise 
the cosmos and to make himself the 'soul' of the universe. It is surely 
a statement of great faith in humanity and its enterprises· to see this 
as a blessing to the cosmos, when the environmental'crisis is aware-of 
the poisoning of the cosmos by various· types of pollution. It is also 
a statement of great faith to see science and technology as the means 
by which the grace of God may be spread to the whole of the creation; 
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the ecological structure of the cosmos means . that- benefit. to one area 
of the cosmos is fre@ently of£Set- by cost to. _another, and same 
advances only come at- great cost arid suffurihg· to eXperimental an.imals. 
Gegoriosr positive estimation of science· and technology, at least with 
regard to their potential, is not. based on the conteg1porary experience 
of these enterprises, nor are there any compelling theological grounds 
for that estimateion. 
Another weakness'of·his approach relates to Gregory's epistemology. 
There is no observable correlation between virtue and godliness, on the 
one hand, and analytic intelligenc.e and technical prowess on the other. 
For Gregory of Nyssa, the epinoia was an epistemological concept which 
related to the accuracy of the mind's ordering and structuring of its 
perceptions, the capacity for induction, conception, and synthesis. (219) 
It was plausible for Gregorios to extend this to the human capacity for 
science and technology, and also plausible for him to. relate it to the 
restoration of the image of God inman. Here the plausibility falls 
short of proof,because the. relation of science ahd technology .to the 
epinoetic faculty and the restoration of the image of God in man breaks 
down. The human §R~no~~ is limited by genetic endowrrent, then further 
limited by training in a specific direction at the expense of others, 
opportunity for its exercise, and other environmental factors. It is not 
free to grow without l.imi t in proportion to the individual's growth in 
grace. On the other hand, one need not be a believer to be an excellent 
analytic scientist or engineer. There is therefore no reason to ascribe 
a positive correlation to the human capacity for science and technology 
(and success in those enterprises) with the restoration of the image of 
God in man. But Gregorios' conclusion rests on faulty logic. The image 
of God in man may grow as the individual pursues the'Osis; the ep~ may 
grow more accurate in proportion to the. growth of the image; therefore 
science and technology may grow:_ more accurate, powerful, and penetrating 
in proportion to the growth in virtue of the ii)dividuals involved in 
those enterprises. That logic is sure, if Gregorios' premises are 
accepted. It does not admit Gregorios' conclusion, however, that 
humanity must therefore pursue science and technology as ·the means by 
which theog!~ may take place. (220) 
Gregorios attempts· to address the contemporary· situation of environ-
mental ·and econauic ·crisis on· theological tenns, · -as he states- in the preface 
to The Human- Presenc~by going· back- to the classical Christian. patristic 
tradition. (221) I contend that in aCbpting Gregory of Nyssa's ontology 
he has had to make a choice between fidelity to the eschatological aspects 
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of_ Christian truth, and contanporary relevance to the envirorunental 
crisis and the technological culture. Throughout: his work, there is 
a persistent~ subjugation of the terrporal: to the eschatological which 
confuses the- biological-historical species of humanity with the new 
redeemed eschatological hl..lmanity in Christ. 
the preface, that 
Thus he writes, again in 
'the only humanity that can survive is the new humanity, 
the humanity that has now.been inseparably, 
indivisibly united with God in Jesus Christ.. And 
because of its locus in the one divine-human nature 
of Christ, the new humanity is a mediating humanity 
- a humanity that reconciles and unites God and 
the world. It is an incarnate humanity - a 
humanity that is an inseparable part of the whole 
creation and inseparably united to the creator. This, 
then, is the meaning of the human presence in the 
cosmos. To be . with the one who unites. To_ be in 
Christ, uniting the divine and the human, the creator 
and the creation, the transcendent and the imnanent, the 
spiritual and the scientific-technological. To 
enter the mystery of "Christ in us" .•• as an integral 
part of the whole creation'.(222) 
He is speaking of the human presence in the cos:rros only in ul tirnate and 
eschatological tenns, where the humanity that survives is the Christian 
corrmuni ty. There is a continual tanptation to turn his book into a'.: 
book about the history of the Christian corrmunity, which has a special 
history of its own in relation to the history of the world, and has its 
own future when the world's history perishes in the eschatological 
judgment. When he succumbs to that temptation, his book ceases to have 
any contemporary relevance to those 'outside' the believing corrununi ty; 
the church is deprived of its prophetic witness to God' s will for the 
present circumstances; and even the believer is deprived of theological 
orientation for his life in the technological culture, since that culture 
falls outside the book~s purview which circurnnambulates the church. 
The reason for the persistence of this temptation may be inferred 
from the following passage, which is fundamental for Gregorios' 
understanding of humanity and therefore of the 'human' vocation in the 
cosmos and the 'human' enterprises of science and technology. He 
speaks of the g,!§J;;:~ma as that which fills the gap (diastEma.), and cites 
Ephesians 1:22 -23 which speaks of the Church as the gl'e~orna of Christ. 
Here the church 
'stands for the new humanity which, so to speak, 
"fills up" what is lacking in Christ. Christ, 
together with the new humanity --the "total Christ" 
is the true pl(koma that fills the gap between 
God's being andme universe, and participates 
fully in both. This is the great mystery 
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of humanity - Christ in us, we in Christ. As we 
are identified as members. of his body, Christ stands 
as the mediator between God and the universe. This 
is the true rationale for Gregory's understanding 
of the Platonic notion of man as methoribs or 
mediatOr between God and the uniVerse I aS taking the 
creation into God and God into the creation, break-
ing across all diastema'.(223) 
Thus it is the redeemed humanity in Christ which becomes the mediator 
for the whole creation, which participates in God through the mediation 
of this humanity. For it is man in Christ who is the Saviour of the 
world. 
Why does Gregorios understand man in this special way, concen-
trating more on redeemed eschatological man than on the biological 
commonality of the human species? The answer lies in the concept of 
participation and the effects of sin and redemption upon the function-
ing of the ontological hierarchy. .Adam's sin disrupted the connection 
between man and God through which the creation.was able to participate 
mediately in God; Christ,. as the. mediator between God ancLr:nan, restored 
the connection. So man in Christ becomes the mediator in the 
eschatological Kingdom, and this is the only time when the whole 
creation may participate in God as he intends it to.. It is only in 
the Kingdom that humanity may really. fulfill its vocation to spread 
the grace of God through the whole of creation, animate and inanimate, 
and that human science and technology will be a blessing to the cosmos. 
Therefore, if the hierarchy is to function properly and participation -
metousia is to describe the whole creation in its relationship to God, 
Gregorios can only refer to the eschatological future and to humanity 
as the eschatological and mediating humanity of the redeemed in Christ. 
When he does this, he fails to address the contemporary situation and 
speaks only to the special circle of believers, in order to describe to 
them the circumstances of the life to come and the places of science 
and technology in the life of the Kingdom. 
It was stated in the preceding subsection, that the hierarchical 
ontology took precedence over the eschatological considerations of 
Christian truth; that is, that the ontology detennined the expression 
and exposition of the eschatology. I have now shown that this happens 
because of the concept .of participation, which Gregorios takes over from 
Gregory of Nyssa without question. So it is this concept which is 
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the root of his failure to address the contemporary ecological, economic, 
and technological situation when he addresses the new humanity in Christ. 
It. seems to me that one way out of this· impasse would be to allow the 
concept of participation to operate on a broader level, so that the 
unbeliever may participate in God through the believing humanity of his 
contemporaries around the world (as does the unbelieving spouse, 
1 Corinthians 7: 14). Gregorios does not· consider this possibility at 
all, and so is caught between humanity in general and humanity in Christ. 
If the broader concept of metousia is theologically viable, however, it 
will require great subtlety in its outworking, but it will then have the 
advantage of rescuing Gregorios from a measure of irrelevancy. 
It is evident that Gregorios' version of the Christ above the 
technological culture type is far more successful than the other 
representative of the type, the emancipatory position. As it standsf it 
has only a very tenuous grip on the contemporary situation, and it 
requires some theological care in its fonnulation -- more care than 
Gregorios has given it, as I have. implied above. Lt is certainly 
a position to be explored further, for all the benefits it will yield 
in the task of fonnulating an ecological theory. 
This completes my survey of the four main theological positions 
espoused during the course of the C&S programne fran 1966 to 1979. It 
has been possible to fit them all into the framework of a suJ:Vey of 
theological attitudes to discipleship in the technological culture. 
The infonnation that has been gleaned from my examination of the four 
positions and their attitudes to the teclmological culture, and IllY 
conclusions about ecological theology within the C&S programme from 
1966 to 1979, may now be stated. 
216 
CONCLUSIONS : Ecological Theology Within the Church and Society Programne 
of the World Council of Churches, 1966 - 1979. 
1'1f survey of the Church and Society programne during the period 
under review showed, in Chapter Three, that there were four distinct 
theological approaches to the theological question of humanity's place 
in and influence upon the cosmos : these approaches were designated 
'the emancipatory approach' , 'the C&S theology of hope' , 'the process 
theology approach of Charles Birch' , and ' the Orthodox approach of 
Paulos Gregorios'. The main features of these approaches, their 
strengths and weaknesses, and the theological orientation they offered 
for life in the technological culture, were then examined in Chapter 
Four. :·It is now possible to draw together some of the main features 
of the C&S theology, as they have emerged during the discussions of the 
two preceding chapters. 
The contents of the four theological positions may be described 
with the aid of the five questions listed at the beginning of Chapter 
Four, which dealt with the cosmos itself, the cosmos in consummation, 
the human relationship to the cosmos, God's relationship to the cosmos, 
and the theological evaluation of science and technology. 
The cosmos. There was general agreement that the cosmos and 
its structure, processes, constituent ecosystems, and all its material-
vital reality, was the subject of theological knowledge and discourse 
- at least in principle. The emancipatory approach was weak here, 
with its emphasis on history and purpose as the differentia between 
human and other types of existence. The other approaches accorded a 
high degree of theological importance to the physicality of the real 
world: the C&S theology of hope, represented by Gerhard Liedke, 
attempted an 'ecological exegesis' of the biblical texts; Birch's 
process theology is related to and formulated on the basis of his under-
standing of: the world as an evolutionary biologist; and Gregorios 1 
approach was based on an ontological structure of reality. 
The cosmos in consummation. The consensus was that matter 
had an eschatological future, either on the basis that eschatology is 
the fulfillment of creation (Birch) or on the basis of .::esus 1 resurrect-
ion. Descriptions of that future varied, but in eabh approach nature's 
future was related positively to the human enteq;rises of science and 
technology. These enterprises were important in bringing nature to, and 
maintaining it in, its perfect consurrmated state before God. 
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The human relationship to the cosmos. All approaches agreed 
on humanity's biological contiguity with nature, but accorded it 
dif£erent degrees of theological importance; it was of minor :importance 
as a corrective to titanism in the emancipatory approach, and was of 
f'undarnental importance in the. articulation of Birch's process theology. 
All the approaches agreed that the human faculty for science and 
technology is a datum of human existence, that God has created man 
with this capacity for its exercise within the context of his creation, 
and agree further that the exercif:)e of ·this faculty is required by God 
to be for human benefit and for the benefit of the life of the cosrros 
in toto. The faculty for technology was seen in relation to the 
imago Dei and g~um terrae traditions, especially in the enancipatory 
position, but there has been a shift away from this association to see 
technology as a theologically neutral phenomenon of human existence, whose 
importance derives not from anthropology ~e but from the consider-
ation of htmlanity' s role in the cosmos. There has also been an 
increase in the emphasis on the need for technological restraint, social 
responsibility, and the conservation of species; this has corresponded 
to a new emphasis on humanity's biological contiguity with nature and its 
consequent view that nature is 'sister' to man. So the human relation-
ship to nature has developed from the ema.ncipatory view (that nature is a 
force from whose tyranny man is to free himself by his scientific and 
technological skill) to views which see nature as both material for ht.Jma.n 
work, including that of bringing order to nature,. and as sister to man. 
The concept of sisterhood includes the recognition that nature exists in 
its own right, has value for its own sake, and is fellow and equal 
partner with man in life before God. 
God's relationship to the cosmos. There has been a growing 
consensus that the cosmos exists for its own sake and independently of 
its value for human existence. Birch and Gregorios in particular 
errphasise that there is an ontological contiguity between nature and 
hurranity and God. 
Science and Technology. These are generally highly esteemed. 
None of the approaches denies the worth of technology and the value of 
its benefits to human existence; none seeks the abolition of techno-
logical enterprise; and all seek its re-evaluation, the investigation of 
its assurrptions and social-ethical aspects of its functioning, and the 
refonn and redirection of sore of its aspects. This is congruent with 
the general position of the World Council of Churches. · Its goal of the 
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Just, .Participatory, and Sustainable Society seeks to limit the use of 
technology to the earth's capacity to support the technological 
enterprise (with regard to availability and renewability of resources, 
and the maintenance of ecological homeostasis); to share the benefits 
of technological progress equally amongst the world's peoples; and to 
create social structures which will facilitate progress towards the 
just and· sustainable society, and the rraintenEnce of its proper 
functioning once the goal is achieved. The utopianlsm of this 
vision is reflected in same of the theological evaluations of science 
anld teclmology, particularly in those of Birch and Gregorios. The 
C&S theology of hope, on the other hand, emphasises the arnbigui ty of 
technological advance, and allows for the appreciation of technology 
from the Third World perspective (technology as an instrument of 
oppression and subjWJation, which feeds· upon injustice and exploit-
ation) in a way which the other approaches do not. 
The four main approaches were data for a survey of attitudes to 
discipleship in the technological culture, parallel to H. Richard 
Niebuhr • s survey • Christ and Culture • • I showed in Chapter Four that 
the theological types of response to the question of culture could be 
adapted to the responses to the technological culture, and in fact the 
four main approaches all stay within the Niebuhrian framework as 
adapted. It is not possible, on the basis of Jl\Y small sample of four 
theological positions, to draw general conclusions about the reject-
ionist, synthesist, sympathetic, ambivalent, and conversionist answers 
to the theological question of the technological culture, corresponding 
to those drawn by Niebuhr. It is nevertheless possible to report on 
the results of my survey. 
Generally, the C&S approaches have all stayed within the median, 
as is to be expected since that typically represents the consensus of 
Christian thought. The only non-median response was given by Birch's 
process theology. The rejectionist answer to the technological 
culture was not represented, and neither was the median answer of 
ambivalence. This spectrum: of responses highlights the facts that the 
C&S programme and the wee generally have acknowledged the value to 
hmnanity of the technological culture and seen it as a part (albeit an 
imperfect part in its contemporary manifestation) of God's plan for 
human existence. 
The two conservative approaches, namely the emancipatory approach 
and the Orthodox approach as articulated by Paulos Gregorios, both 
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represented a sympathetic approach to the technological cUlture. The 
roots of the ernancipatory position were associated with the ~eventeE=mtrt 
centu:ry (Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes) ; Gregorios' roots were 
deliberately sought in the fourth century thought of Gregory of Nyssa. 
Their optimistic evaluations of science and technology must be seen in 
this light. It is significant that the other median position, 
namely the conversionist approach taken by the C&S theology of hope 
and Gerhard Liedke in particular, finds its origin in the sixties and 
seventies and the contemporary awareness of the ambiguity of technologic-
al progress and of humanity's extreme vulnerability to the consequences 
of its own ingenuity and skill. Its emphasis is on the transformation 
of the present creation, . which is not yet ' good' , towards the vision of 
goodness granted in eschatological faith. Tt is fundamental to this 
approach that it aims and impels the not-so-good towards the good; so 
it is not at all su:r:prising that the ecological crisis has engendered this 
type of theological response, within the C&S programme and beyond (as 
shown by Moltmann's essay 'Creation as an Open System', discussed in 
Chapter One, section 3(iii) above). 
The optimistic evaluation of technology and science as means of 
uncovering metaphysical reality has engendered the synthesist response 
to the technological culture in Charles Birch's process theology. It is 
significant that· the participants in the C&S programme have, in the main, 
cbnsistently rejected his approach. I have argued for its rejection 
on theological grounds, but I believe there are two other factors at 
work here. First, the C&S programme has encouraged dialogue between 
science and theology, but genuine dialectical interaction has proved 
elusive. Birch's approach supplies a unified and coherent view of 
reality which hannonises the theological and scientific interpretations 
of the world. But it does this with the confidence that science can 
unlock the key to all reality, incTuding that of God. The C&S 
programme is. seeking for dialogue with science, but not at the cost of 
unconditional capitulation to science, and has sensed that this is 
exactly what Birch's approach implies. So it has rejected Birch's 
process theology. Second, it has sensed an incorrpatibili ty between 
Birch's outspoken and impressive concern for the environment, for the 
restraint of. ti tanism, for the right direction of the technological 
enterprise for the benefit of both humanity and the cosmos, as against 
his espousal of the synthesist response to the question of the 
technological culture. The integrity and coherence of Birch's approach 
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depends crucially on his confidence that every one else is wrong and 
that process theology supplies the world view required for obedience 
to God's purposes in creation. But the c&s .programme discussions 
generally take the median positions and stay with the church of the 
centre, and so are inclined to suspect, and reject, non-median 
responses. Also, a lot is at stake if they carmi t thetnsel ves to 
Birch's vision: it is forbiddingly difficult to implement on a global 
scale if he is right, and the consequences are tragic.if he is wrong. 
Within the median approaches, the theological acceptance of 
technology by the sympathetic and conversionist approaches also allows 
for Christian involvement in the technological culture generally, and 
even for direct Christian engagement in the scientific and technological 
enterprises. They agree that science and technology need reform and 
redirection, and that the church (and its individual members) has a 
prophetic witness to declaim with regard to God's purposes for the 
cosmos, for humanity, and for human scientific and technological 
enterprise. But they have failed to provide the necessary theological 
criteria by which reform and redirection may be justified, initiated, 
and subsequently assessed; in fact, I have argued that they fail to 
address the contemporary situation generally. The emancipatory 
approach is the only exceptmn here, and I have argued for its i'E~jectmn 
on other theological grounds. With the C&S theology of hope and 
Gregorios' Crthodox approach, the basic problem is one of articulation, 
and the problem may be solvable by refinement and by further consider-
ation of the issues involved. The theology of hope may be able to stay 
within the conversionist position and address the contemporary situation 
by reducing its emphasis on eschatological faith and the resurrection 
promises (which are difficult to interpret specifically to the techno-
logical situation), and by looking more to the whole biblical witness 
about the human re~lationship to the cosmos and the lights and words 
and truths which shine in the creaturely world. Gregorios' approach 
may be more relevant to the contemporary situation if he were able to 
formulate a new and broader concept of metousia (participation); he could 
perhaps do this in dialogue with Birch, yet retain his approach within 
the ambit of the sympathetic position. The most hope for ecological 
theology within the C&S context lies in the development of these two 
median positions and the refinement of their relatively successful 
representatives; for there is no Er.irna facie reason evident that the 
sympathetic or the conversionist approaches should be incapable in 
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principle of addressing the contemporary situation as their current 
representatives have so far proved to be. 
In Chapter One, I argued in section 3 that there were resources 
available in the sixties for the task of responding theologically to 
the environmental crisis, by looking .at the thought of Bultrnann, 
Tillich, Mol trnann, et al; and I supplemented this in Chapter Two, 
section 4, by referring to ecological theologies from Barthian and 
process perspectives. Bultmann and Teilhard de Chardin provided 
little hope of success, but I argued that there seemed to be hope for 
process, Barthian, ontological, eschatological, and biblical theo-
logians • approaches and responses. My account of the four main 
positions evident i~ the C&S programme shows that some of these options 
have been taken up after its rejection of the emancipatory approach at 
Zurich in 1973. There is a particularly strong resemblance between 
the C&S and the Moltmann theologies of hope, though Moltmann's emphasis 
on the suffering of God has not emerged in the C&S articulation; on the 
other hand, his emphasis that creatio ex nihilo implies creatio:.in 
nihilo is not far from the surface of the C&S position. This shows 
that the C&S programme has reflected some of the main features of the 
theological climate of the sixties (when the environmental crisis first 
became a public issue) and is to some extent a development and outgrowth 
of it. 
How do the four theological approaches rate as ecological theo-
logies in the sense of my definition given in Chapter Two? The theo-
logical discussion of humanity's place in and influence upon the cosmos 
has already been considered, and it is clear that the positions 
generally regard the cosmos as a systemic unity. The discussion of 
creation, redemption, and eschatology has alsp been covered, so it only 
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remains to discuss the interdisciplinary aspect; what use, if any, do 
these theological approaches make of the scientific information avail-
able from the studies of ecology, the natural, life, and social 
sciences? 
It is already evident that the C&S positions have made little use 
of scientific material, except in the most general sense of accepting an 
evolutionary theory of human biological origins, and of accepting in 
principle that the cosmos is a unified hierarchical ecosystem in which 
the earth functions as a subsystem containing the human species. Liedke 
did attempt to use a sociological theory of conflict amelioration in his 
theology of· hOpe approach, but I have argued that his attempt must fail 
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on both theological (exegetical) grounds and on the basis of scientific 
method. 
The dialogue between science and theology which the C&S programme 
seeks to encourage has occasioned good will and engaged the conscient-
ious effort and time of many scientists (as at the MIT conference, for 
example) ; but it has not enjoyed the successes that have occurred 
outside the programne in the works of Arthur Peacocke, GUnter Altner, 
Ian Barbour, Wo,:lf~a"'rt Pannenberg, Mary Hesse, and others, or in the 
journal Zygon which (as its name may suggest) is devoted to the 
pursuance of such dialogue. Lindqvist had already noted this in his 
survey Economic Growth and the Quality of Life, which covered the C&S 
material from 1966 to 1974. The issues were pursued in general terms 
at Mexico City in 1975, and at Cambridge, England, in 1978, and it was 
hoped that the MIT conference would further and deepen this dialectical 
interaction. But the theolbgical preparations for the conference, 
and the pressure of the conference situation itself, meant that this 
interaction did not occur at any significant level beyond the conver-
sational. 
Generally speaking, the C&S approaches have been theologies of 
humanity's place in the cosmos, but without referenc~ to the specific 
scientific information about the cosmos except as the awareness of that 
information permeates the public consciousness_ and influences theological 
discourse at that level; the ill-fated approach by Birch is the only 
exception. This general lack of interdisciplinary involvement on the 
part of theologians is comparable to their inability to address the 
contemporary situation so far. It means that there has been only.one 
ecological theology in the C&S programme, in the terms of my definition; 
otherwise, the theological approaches are all theological responses to 
the environmental crisis made in relative theological isolation. 
As noted above, this response has taken place largely within the 
accepted confines of theological discourse, and has taken the form of 
adjustment: the theological locus of humanity's relationship to the 
cosmos is no longer seen exclusively as the imago Dei and dominium terrae 
traditions; the human biological contiguity with nature is now considered 
in theology; the association of the faculty for technology and science 
with the manifestation of God's image in man is questioned by some 
who regard the technological culture as a theologically neutral aspect 
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of human existence; and there is an increasing tendency to press 
science and technology into the service of environmental conservation 
and the benefit of both human and non-human beings. 
This raises two questions. First, as to how far theology has 
followed the popular pressure towards the conservation of species 
and the need for technological restraint (in order to minimise 
pollution); in Barth's tenus, how far theology has allowed itself to 
be daninated and shaped by non-theological influences. The lat>:k 
of theological leverage on the contemporary situation presses this 
question home, tc see if theology has unwittingly betrayed itself into 
becoming a cloak for fashionable dynamic environmentalist activism. 
The position most susceptible to this temptation is the theology of 
hope, which needs careful formulation so that the promise of the 
resurrection in conjunction with other criteria drawn from the contem-
porary theological and scientific understanding of the vvorld may orient 
and direct contemporary action in specific ways: Gregorios must address 
the community of man and not only the eschatological canrnuni ty of the 
church. The second question is, whether ilialogue with science will 
save theology from this temptation. There has been no space or 
opportunity to consider this question in any detail in this thesis, but it 
does seem plausible that theological failure to address the contemporary 
situation may be related to the theological failure to take account of 
the specific details and interpretations of that situation. 
The organisers of the C&S programme were right to discern that 
the environmental crisis was an issue to be discussed at the theological 
as well as at the ethical level (an insight which, I think, they owe to 
Charles Birch); and they were right to hold theological consultations 
on the theme of humanity, nature, and God, and on science-faith 
dialogue. It is now evident that if their programme chooses to continue 
in this direction it should concentrate on shoring up the positions 
which are theologically viable and refining them in terms of inter-
disciplinary content and relevance to the contemporary ecological-
technological-economic situation. At the same time, it should continue 
to encourage theological discussion and the articulation of new positions 
as it has done in the past, involving as many theologians and scientists 
and others as possible in the inter-disciplinary facets of its 
programme. 
This will require a fresh consideration of the C&S confererxc$ 
procedUre, .as I showed in my discussion of the 1977 Zurich theological 
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consultation (Chapter Three, section 2 (iv)). , -:r 'arglied there that 
the consultation. provided an opportunity which the organisers let 
slip, tragically, and compromised the theological success of the 
MIT conference thereby. The Zurich consultation involved theologians 
of the rank of Charles Hartshorne, Klaus Koch, and John Austin Baker, 
who presented their papers and helped in the compilation of the report. 
But no theological progress was made. The positions espoused there 
had already been established in the C&S forum, and Zurich only re-
fonnulated and re-presented them; there was no meeting of positions, 
little interplay evident in the report, and no systematic overview of 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of the various positions. My 
contention is that the organisers could have, and should have, 
arranged for the availability and presentation of such an overview 
at Zurich. The consultation could then have focussed on comparisons 
and contrasts, merits and deficiencies of the positions, and for the 
modification and improvement of the various positions if no consensus 
position was forthcoming. 
But this represents the dilemma of the C&S programme generally. 
It is concerned primarily, naturally, and properly, with issues of 
social ethics; its budget does not usually allow the luxury of a 
theological consultation unless it is evident that the ethical issue 
at hand demands it; it has no systematic theological (or ethical?) 
perspective on its own programme and the theological positions currently 
represented therein; so when it does hold a theological consultation, 
it is not able to utilise its opportunities to the full. This is 
the wisdom of hindsight, gained in the course of writing this 
thesis~ But it does show that the C&S programme would benefit from 
occasional consideration and review of its theological methods, by 
the use of specialist theological consultants from time to time, and 
the oversight such specialists could provide. 
In stating my conclusions so far, I am conscious that they contain 
a large measure .of criticism. These criticisms are justified by the 
content and argument of this thesis, but they would be unbalanced and 
unfair if they were not complemented by an acknowledgement'.and appre-
cia tion of what the C&S programme has achieved. The C&S programme has 
taken a remarkably bold initiative in seeking to open dialogue between 
scientists and theologians, and to discuss theologically and ethically 
the extraordinarily difficult and complex issues of our day -which 
have recently included the environmental crisis, nuclear and alternative 
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energy strategies, genetic technology and biomedical ethics, as well 
as the perennial issues of national and international social justice. 
Such an undertaking is full of perils and pitfalls, and susceptible 
to unappreciative criticism from many quarters. But my own criticism 
must be set within the context of my desire to further this work and 
contribute towards its success. It is an extremely important work. 
The C&S programme continues to provide Christians with a forum for 
open debate on the one hand, and current specialist infonnation from 
many disciplines on the other, so that they are therefore encouraged 
to face the global situation with realism, vision, and commitment. 
It has enabled many people from every nation on earth to face issues 
which are of far~reaching importance for humanity, and attempt to assess 
the responsibilities which this generation bears for the future well-
being of the human species and the world it inhabits. Its contribu-
tions to the work of the United Nations have been solicited out of 
respect for its achievements, and in return these contributions have 
challenged a significant element of the world's political and economic 
leadership to think carefully about the assumptions and attitudes which 
currently dominate and shape life on this globe. I ttust that the 
histories of the twentieth century world, when they cane to be written, 
will record with gratitude that the response of the Christian churches 
to the new situation of environmental crisis was immediate, urgent, well-
infonned, intelligent, and represented (I dare to hope) a significant 
factor in changing the course of the world's history for the better. 
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FIGURE 1: The place of the Church and Society subunit within the 
World Council of Churches. 
This is an approximate schematic interpretation of the administrative 
structure outlined in the current constitution, 'The Rules of the World 
Council of Churches', Nairobi pp.322-340 
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FIGURE 3: The Futurum project, 1969-1974 
This outline is based on the 'Brief History of the Five-Year 
Ecumenical Inquiry on "The Future of Man and society in a world 
of Science~based Technology"', Anticipation 17 (1974), 60-61 
1969 
Project authorised by WCC Central Committee 
1970 
Exploratory Conference in Geneva: From Here to Where? 
1971 
C&S Working Group meets, augmented by 30 scientistS ,Nemi {Italy) 
1972 
Regional Conference: Accra (Ghana) 
U.N. Conference on the Human Environment: Stockholm 
Global Environment, Economic ~rowth & Social Justice: Cardiff 
1973 
Regional Conference: Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) 
Regional Conference: Pont-a-Mousson (France) 
Derr: ·Ecology and Human Liberation 
Genetics and the Quality of Life: Zurich 
Theological Critique of Scientific Rationality: Zurich 
Population Policy, Social Justice and the Quality of Life: 
Leuenberg (SWitzerland) 
1974 
Verghese completes (and circulates) the manuscript of 
The Human !Tesence 
World Conference 'Science & Technology for Human Development: 
The Ambiguous Future and the Christian Hope' :Bucharest (Romania) 
Results of the Futurum project :(Including the Bucharest report) 
submitted to the WCC Central Camni ttee 
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FIGURE 4: From Bucharest to Mrr. 
This s~hematic sumnary of the relevant parts of the C&S programme has 
been based on the infonnation contained in the various numbers of 
Anticipation. 
<) 
1975 
Ecumenical Hearing on Nuclear Energy: Sigtuna (Sweden) 
Science and Faith: Mexico City 
Nairobi Assembly 
1976 
The C&S Five-Year.Plan, 1976-1981 
Energy for a Just and Sustainable society Glion (Switzerland) 
The WCC Central Corrmittee approves the C&S' Iro:r:;osal 
1977 
Humanity, nature and God: Zurich 
1978 
Science and Faith: Cambridge, England 
Ecumenical Concerns in Relation to Nuclear Energy: Celigny 
(Switzerland) 
A new Economics for the JPSS : Zurich 
1979 
M.I.T. 
U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development: Vienna 
COMMISSION FOR INTERNATIONAL 
JUSTICE AND PEACE 
OF THE EPISCOPAL CONFERENCE 
OF ENGLAND AND WALES 
38-40 ECCLESTON SQUARE, LONDON SW1V 1PD 
TELEPHONE 01-834 5138 
J. McPherson Esq. 
Department of Theology 
Abbey House 
Palace Green 
D U R H A M DH_1_,2RL. 
Dear Mr. McPherson, 
PRESIDENT RT. REV. JAMES O'BRIEN 
Bishop in Hertfordshire 
GENERAL SECRETARY R. S. BERESFORD 
1 December 1981 
I am very sorry that your letter about Catholic theologians and ecology was 
mislaid, and so has not received a reply. 
The Commission has not made any official statements on the matter. The 
Bishops of England and Wales have made two brief statements on nuclear energy, 
the texts of which I append; published references are in the reading list. 
I have put into the reading list the more obvious references that occur to me, 
these are all official or qua~i-official documents except Miss Triolo's pamphlet.· 
To my mind the 'ecology' theme is present in a sense in almost all Catholic 
thinking about morai issues including for example in the well-known teachings 
about abortion, and about artifical birth control. So it would be necessary 
to begin with fundamental moral theology. But perhaps this is not a useful 
approach for you. However, I see the theme in a large part of the documents 
I have included in the booklist, not just in the sections which are noted 
specially. 
know 
I regret that I don'tjoffhand of theologians' discussions on the matter. Barbara 
~lard is a consciously Catholic writer and the booklet we published in July by 
her : Peace and Justice in the World, naturally touches on environmental issues 
in an incidental way. 
If you still need help on Catholic theological writers I would be happy to 
enquire further. 
Encs. 
-
Yours sincerely, 
R S Beresford 
General Secretary 
! 
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CENTER FOR PROCESS STUDIES 
1325 North College Avenue • Claremont, California 91711 
JOHN B. COBB, JR. 
Director 
Rev. J. McPherson 
3 Farnley Ridge 
Neville • s Cross 
Durham DHl 4HB 
England 
Dear Rev. McPherson, 
714 6263521 DAVID R. GRIFFIN 
Executive Director 
November 20, 1981 
As you know, the field of ecolog·ical-theology is far from crowded with material. 
But I can suggest a few sources: 
John Cobb•s A CHRISTIAN NATURAL THEOLOGY, Philadelphia: Westminister Press. 
Charles Birch•s NATURE AND GOD, and other articles of his. ·· 
Ian Barbour• s ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND RELIGION, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. 
* Barbara Swyhart 1 s BID ETHICAL DECISIONMAKING, Philade 1 phi a: Fortress Press. 
* Kenneth Cauthen • s CHRISTIAN BIOPOLITICS, New York: Abingdon 
Conrad Waddington•s various books, articles, etc. 
The World Council of Churches 1 Report, FAITH AND SCIENCE IN AN UNJUST WORLD, 
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980. 
*these books are available from us, if you find them unobtainable.in England 
I hope this is of some help. You might also check the journal ZYGON for relevant 
material, if you haven•t already. 
Sin~/ly you/1 ~or the Center, 
\f4~?· ;a~a,~a 
Philip Ri cards 
Librarian 
AFFILIATED WITH THE SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY AT CLAREMONT AND THE CLAREMONT GRADUATE SCHOOL 
THE E N V I R 0 N M E N T 
Some references in Catholic teaching since 1965. 
1. Gaudium et S~e Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the 
''lorld of Today, .Vatican II, 1965. (CTS Do 363) 
Sections 33-39, 63-72. 
2. J~opulorum P~og:essio Encyclical Letter of Paul VI, 1967. (CTS S273) 
Section 14-34 
Apostolic Letter of P1.ml VI, 1971. (errs ~i288) 
Section 2'1 
4. Redemptor Hominis Encyclical Letter of John Paul II, 1979. 
Sections 8, 15. (CTS Do 506) 
5. Laborem l."xercena Encyclical Letter of John Paul II, 1981. Pagers 99. 
Sections 4-7, 21-22, 24-26. C-i> 5..3Jl", 
6. Barbara Ward : 
A New Creation? Reflections on the environmental issue 
IJontifical Commission Justitia et Pax, Vatican City, 1973. 70 pages. 
No. 5 of a seriea for the 1971 Synod of Bishops on Justice in the World. 
7. The Uni versa1 Pur~se. of_ Crea_!;,e~ Thing5 : On th~ Conference of the Law 
of the Sea. Pontifical Commission Justitia et Pax \vorldng Paper no.?, 
Vatican City 1977. 11 pagee. 
8. Human Labour Texts of John Paul II October 1978-November 1979 
presented by Mgr. Romano RosBi, Vatican City 1981. 
No. 5 of the Pontifical Commission Justitia et Pax 
Beriee : The Social Tenching of John Paul II~ po.ges 60. 
9. Nucl~ar Energz A Christian Concern Sharon L. Triolo 
I,ondon : Catholic Truth Society 1978. (CTS S324)(pamphlet) 
10. United States Catholic Conference Statement, 2 April 1981. 
_!3_eflectio_ns on the EnergY. Crisies 
Printed in Origins, April 23, 1981, VoL 10 no. 1~5, pages 706--719 
11. Statement of the Bishops' Conference of England and Wales 
13 October 1978 on National Energy Policy. 
Briefi~ 20 October 1978, (Vol. 8 no$ 34), page 4. 
12. Statement.of Bishops' Conference of England and Wales 
24 November 1977; Justice and Peace n. 6; 
Brie fin~ 26 November 1977, (Vol. 7 no. 34), page 4 .. 
R. S. B. 
~5 November 1981. 
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NOI'ES 
In the notes which follow, authors and titles are given in 
abbreviated form, and the full bibliographical details are supplied 
later in the General Bibliography. References to reports of ecumen-
ical conferences are given by conference location, year, and page 
number; thus Zurich 1973, 7, refers to page 7 of the official report of 
the 1973 Zurich working party on scientific rationality. Bibliographic 
details of such official documents are included in the appropriate 
section of the Qeneral Bibliography. The MIT conference presents a 
slight deviation from this pattern, because there were three volumes of 
official materials, which will be referred to as MIT/prep (the volume 
of preparatory readings), MIT/1 (which contains the addresses given at 
the conference), and MIT/2 (which contains the section reports adopted by 
the conference) • There are two other abbreviations for books, as 
follows: 
CD Barth, Church Dogmatics 
EGQL Lindqvist, Economic Growth and the Quality of Life 
Journals are abbreviated according to the abbreviations currently in use 
in Religious Jhdex One: Periodicals XV, 1981. Journals which are not 
listed in the Index have been given their full names (Anticipation, 
Study Encounter, etc.). 
CI:IA.PI'lER . ONE 
1. A letter to Britain's Raman Catholic Commission for International 
Justice and Peace of the Episcopal Conference of England and Wales 
in London, produced a bibliography of several short statements and 
two small books; see my Appendix 1. The Church of England has 
produced two reports: in 1970, the report Man in His Living 
Envirmnnent, An Ethical Assessment; and the report Man and Nature 
in 1975. 
2. See Figure 2, p.227. Also Duff, The Social Thought of the 
World Council of Churches , 28ff; Lindqvist, Economic Growth and 
the Quality of Life, 46ff. 
3. Preston, 'A 13reakthrough in Ecumenical Social Ethics?' in 
Technology and Social Justice, 39. 
4. See Abrecht's account of the Futurum project prior to the Bu~harest 
conference, in his 'Jhtroduction' to Anticipation. No.l7; and 
Shinn, 'The Impact of Science and Technology on the Theological 
understanding of Social Justice', Anticipation No.l7, 52-59,esp.53f. 
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5. Deuteronomy 28:1-24, Amos 4, Genesis 3 :1.7-19; see also ' 
Eichrodt, Theology of_ the Old Testament, Volume Two, Ch. XV]I. 
6. Plato, I<PITIA£, rllt~b4-d8, in J. Burnet (ed.) ,,Platonis Cpera IV, 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1902); quoted in translation, Allaby 
and. Bunyard, The Politics of Self-Sufficiency, p.50. 
7. Quoted~ in Black, The Dominion of Man, p.lO. The plaintiff was 
John Evelyn, author of Fumifugium, or the air and smoake of London 
dissipated, together .with some Reneclies humbly proposed. 
8. For a brief survey, see Arvill, Man and Environment, chapter 7. 
9. Arnold s. Nash, 1 Food, Population and Man 1 s environment 1 , in 
PFeston (ed.), Technology and Social Justice; Arvill, op.cit., 
chapter 15. 
10. Black, op.cit., 100. Black has a summary account of Malthus, 
from the viewpoint of the professional ecologist. 
11. Ibid., 100,6. Ecological homeostasis is the capacity of an 
ecosystem to recover its balance after disruption. 
12. Ward and Dubos, Only One Earth, chapter 1. 
13. Black, op.cit, chapter 1; Carson, Silent Spring, pa§s~. 
14. DDT ~ dichloro - diphenyl - trichloro - ethane; see Carson, op. 
cit., 35-38. 
15. Ward and Dubos, op.cit., 81. 
16. Birch, Confronting the Future, 104f. 
17. Ward and Dubos, op.cit., 27. 
18. This is the theme of Carson, Silent Spring. 
19. Birch,op.cit., 105. 
20. Dr. David· B::'ice , of the United States Public Health Service, from 
PUblic Health Reports 74 (1959), 693-699, quoted in Carson, op.cit., 
168. 
21. The result of this cooperative effort is the work by Ward and Dubos, 
op. cit. It has a preface by Maurice F. Strong, the Secretary-
General to the Conference. The experts are listed in the book, 
13-22. 
22. Ibid.' 25. 
23. Ibid., 28. 
24. Jbid., 30. 
25. Ibid., 47. 
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26. London, Duckworth, 1974., second. edition 1980. My re£erences are 
to the second. edition. 
2 7. Thid. 1 Viii. 
28. Jbid., ix, 
29. Ibid, Chapter 7: see also the Appendix (to the second edition), 
'Attitudes to Nature' • 
30. Val Routley, 'Critical Notice: John; Pa$smOre, Mc:m '.s Respgnsibility 
for Nature,.' Australasian Journal of 'Rhilosophy~ 53, August 
1975, 171-185. See also the extended statement of the Routley 
position, Richard and Val Routley, 'Human Chauvinism and Environ-
mental Ethics' , in D. S. .Mmnison et al. , Environmental Philosophy 
96-189. 
31. Val Routley, op.cit., 171, Routley's emphasis. 
32. Ibid., 184: 'this scarcely differs from the argument that murder 
is justifiable because people also die of natural causes'; the 
reference is to Passmore, op.cit., 118. 
33. Val Routley, op.cit.,l73. 
34. Ioc. cit. 
35. ---ll>id., 174, Routley's emphasis. 
36. Mannison et al. shows the present state of play, in which both 
sides are represented and evaluated. 
37. 'Rights for Both, Man and Nature? (An Ecumenical Debate about Process 
Theology's Perspective on the Environmental Crisis)', Anticipation. 
16, 1974, 20-36. 
38. For example: Foster, 'The Christian, Theology and the 1'-bdern Science 
of Natu.re'; Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, Part III A; Oakley 
'Christian Theology and the Newtonian Science: The Rise of the 
Concept of the Laws of Nature' ; Hooykass, Religion and the Rise of 
.M)dern Science. 
39. So cox, The Secular City. Cox speaks of the 'disenchantment of 
nature' as 'an authentic consequence of biblical faith' which 
enables the technological aspect of secularisation to occur (17f, 
21-24). See also my discussion of the 'emancipatory' position 
below, Chapter Four, section 2. 
40. Science, March 10, 1967. Reprinted in Barbour (ed.), Western Man 
and Environmental Ethics; Spring and Spring (eds.), Ecology and 
Religion in History:. My references to White' s paper are to its 
appearance in Barbour's ·anthology. For direct responses to 
White, see theSe anthOlOgieS andt, inter alia, Bennet, I Qn gespond-
ing to Lynn White: Ecology and Christianity'; Khalil, 'The Ecolog-
ical Crisis: an Eastern Christian Perspective'; and Schaeffer, 
,rR:>llution and the Death of Man. 
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41. White, op.cit., 25. 
42 • IDe. Cit .. 
43. Ibid., 27. 
44. 'Continuing the Conversation' , in Barbour, op. cit. , 58. 
45. 'The Religious Background of the Present Environmental Crisis', 
reprinted in Spring and Spring, op.cit. 
46. See· Iassmore, op.cit., and the references therein, as well as the 
anthologies mentioned in n.40 above. On the continent, see 
Amery, Das Ende der Vorsehung. 
47. 'Man's Responsibility for the Environment'. Darling states that, in 
brief, 'the ideal is expressed by saying that the aristocrat is 
the servant of his people. It involves the notion of restraint 
••• Superiority is accepted, not assumed in conceit, nor disclaim-
ed in mock modesty; when superiority is known to its holder it is 
accepted humbly as a burden proudly carried' (p.ll7). William 
Temple had expressed this idea in a Christian context in 1944: 
'As animals we are part of nature, dependent on it and inter-
dependent with it. We must reverence its economy and co-operate 
with its processes. If we have dominion over it, that is as 
predominant partners, not as superior beings who are entitled 
merely to extract from it what gratifies our desires' ('What 
Christians Stand for in the Secular World' 1 section 3) • 
48. Darling, op.cit., 119, Darltng's emphasis. 
49. Ibid., 122. 
50. Loc. Cit. 
51. For examples see, inter alia, Clines, 'The Image of God in Man'; 
Barr, 'The Image of God in the Book of Genesis'; Sawyer, 'The 
meaning of 0 " \\·~ .~ a '~ :;1 in Genesis i - xi' . For surveys 
of the interpretation of 'the image concept, see Clines, op.cit., 
54-61; Barth,CD .III.l .. 191-206. 
52. Sawyer, op.cit., ; also Barr, 'Man and Nature', reprinted in Spring 
and. Spring, op.cit. 
53. Liedke, 'Von der Ausbeutung zur Kooperation'; Krolzik, 'Zur Umwelt-
krise und ihrer Entstehung' ; idem, Umwel tkrise: Folge des Christ-
enturns? 
54. 'Passmore, op.cit., 19; Liedke, ]n Bauch des Fisches, 66f. 
55. Discourse on the· Method,· Rlrt Six; in Martin Hollis (ed.), The Light 
of Reason, ,_ 82££. 
56. For a brief survey, see Hendry, Theology of Nature, Chapter 1. 
57. This is demonstrated by Wiltsher, 'The Biblical Teaching on 
Creation in Modern Christian Theology'. 
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58. Liedke, op.cit., 2lf. 
5.9. Jbid, 63-70. The f.irst creation was the creation of order out of 
chaos, by divine !iat; man, as the image of God, imitates this 
type. of creation by bringing order to the chaos of nature. 
60. Liedke, 'Solidarity in Conflict',73. 
61. 'Der Satz von Gottes Sch~prer - und Herrschertum hat seinen 
legitimen Grund nur im existentiellen Selbstverst&ndnis des 
Menschen': Bultmann, quoted by Liedke, Irn Bauch des Fisches, 74. 
62. Westennann, Creation, 1-4; Wiltsher, op.cit:.,; Liedke, op.cit., 
72, speaks of 'creation without nature' as the modern phase ~in 
der wir noch stehen, fdie] unter dem Eindruck des Trorrrrnelfeuers 
naturwissenschaftler Kritik eine Art Flucht nach vorn angetreten 
[wurde J . "Sch~pfung" soll te mit dem Reali tll.tsbegriff der 
neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft, mit dem Bereich der res extensae 
praktisch nichts mehr zu tun haben. "S.ch~pfung" war ein 
Interpretationsdatum d~r Geschichte'. 
63. Cobb, God and the World, 123f. 
64. Ibid., 124, 123. 
65. Ibid., 137f. Cobb's choice lies with Alfred North Whitehead and 
process theology. 
66. Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, 379. 
67. :fi:>id. , 377,380. 
68. Ibid. , chapter XXIV. 
69. Loc. cit. 
70. Liedke, op.cit.,; Cobb, op. cit. 
71. There has been considerable cooperation between the Roman Catholic 
Church and the World Council of Churches, at a number of levels 
(e.g. between SODEPAX and the Huma.num Foundation) • See, for 
example, Preston (ed) , Technology and Social Justice, and espec-
ecially the papers by Duff, 'The Corrrrnon Christian Conern', and 
de Vries, 'The Background of the Text in Ecumenical Social Ethics'. 
Nevertheless, concepts and approaches characteristic to Roman 
Catholic theology do not appear in the Church and Society resource 
materials I as will be evident in my Chapter Three below. 
72. Macquarrie, op.cit., sections 112, 115. 
73. For surveys, see Macquarrie, op.cit; Nichols, Systematic and Philo-
sophical theology; Zahrnt, The Question of God; Pailin, 'Theology'. 
74. E.g;.. Young, Creator, Creation and Faith, surveys the different 
theological approaches taken by Barth, Tillich, Bultmann, and 
Mol tmann; their treatments of the themes of creation, Fall, and new 
creation; and the practical implications of their approaches for 
social justice and environmental· ethics. 
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7 5 . Chapter Two, section 4 (ii) , and Chapter Four, section 4. 
76. E. g. Reed., 'Towards a Religion of. the Environment'. 
77. Section 4 (iii) • 
78. Tillich, Systematic Theology,IIT,, 17-31 and chapter XXIII. 
79. Ibid. , chapter XX:W. 
80. Ibid., 34. 
81. Ibid., 20. 
82. Ibid., 19. 
83. Young, op.cit., 206, n.36, cites an unpubished essay by Michael 
Moore, 'Christian Faith and Environmental Crisis in the Theology of 
'Paul Tillich' (New Haven, 1974); see also Stock, 'Tillichs E'rage nach 
der Earti§ipation von Mensch und Natur'. 
84. Tillich, op.cit., 224; Young, op.cit., 125. 
85. Tillich, op.cit., 34ff, 77ff. 
86. Ibid., 436, 432. 
87. Young, op.cit., 126. 
88. See the discussion of Birch's process stance, in Chapter Four, section 
4 below; also see Chapter Two, section 4(ii). 
89. Macquarrie, 'Creation and Environment'; for criticism of Macquarrie's 
stance, see Young, op.cit., 124-127. 
90. Macquarrie, 'God and the World, One Reality or Two?'. This was 
followed by 'A Comment' from Brian Hebblethwaite, to which Macquarrie 
replied in a 'Letter to the Editor' (Theology, LXXV, No.628, Cbtober 
1972, 539f). 
91. Heidegger, 'The Question Concerning Tedmology' and •,ether Essays; for 
criticism, see Waterhouse A Heidegger Critique. 
92. Young, op.cit., 128f. 
93. The Historie/Geschichte distinction is discussed at length in Malet, 
The TE.OUgfit of Rudolf Bul tmann, 61-80. 
94. id., 9f. 
95. Words written by Bultrnann in 1926, and quoted. by Young, op.cit., 116; 
they show the persistence of Bul tmann' s distinction between nature 
and history. 
96. Malet, op.cit .. , 93-101. 
97. Bul tmann states that he is not guilty of making an ontological 
separation between the realms of history and nature. See Minear, 
'Rudolf Bultmann' s Interpretation of New Testament Eschatology', and 
Bultmann's 'Reply'. 
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98. Young, op.cit. 1 143£.. 
99. Malet1 op.ci.t., 88-93. 
100. Bultrnann, op.cit., 268. 
101. Ibid., 267. 
102. Malet, op. cit. 1 has Bul tmann' s enthusiastic endorsement and 
contains a very lucid and._sympathetic account of his approach. 
For another evaluation, see Roberts, Rudolf Bultmann's Theology: 
A Critical Interpretation. 
103. Moltmann, Theology of Hope, published 1967. 
104. Idan, 'Creation as an open Systan', in The Future of Creation. 
105. Macquarrie, Religious Thought, 391. 
106. Young, op.cit., 147.~ see also Macquarrie, loc.cit. __ 
107. Young, op.cit., 156-161, describes the tlheology of Rubem Alves (who 
has figured· in ecumenical discussions) in the framework of 
Moltrnann's theological approach. 
108. Moltmann, Religion, Revolution and the Future (1969) ;quoted by 
Young, op.cit., 149. This interpretation is reiterated in the 
essay 'Creation as an Open System' (p.l20 therein) and indeed is 
fundamental to it. 
109. Young, op.cit., 149f. 
110. Ibid., 153~155, 186-198. 
111. Moltmann, 'Creation as an Open System', 116. 
112. Ibid., 120. 
113. Young, op.cit., 151-153. 
114. Moltmann, op.cit., 115f; also p.l89 n.4, for Moltmann's camment on 
Pannenberg. Moltmann agrees with Panne:hberg that God 'is- :the 
power of the future' , but adds the dimension of God's suffering. 
115. Ibid. I ll8f.. 
116. Ibid., 119. 
117. Ibid., 190 n.l4. The concept originates in thermodynamics and has 
proved. useful in theoretical biology.· Moltrnann uses it metaphor-
ically and without reference' to the specific content or nuances of 
the scientific concept., ·being more concerned: with 'openness' to the 
historical process and- to God. 
118. Ibid., 122. 
119. Ibid., 126. 
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120 o Ibid. 1 127 • 
121. "Ibid. I 129. 
122. Loc. cit. 
123. See Julian Huxley's 'Introduction' to Teilhard's posthumous 
The Phenomenon of Man. See also Towers, Teilhard de Chardin, 
for a brief an enthusiastic account of Teilhard's life and 
thought; and Passmore, The Ierfectibility of Man, 251 ~25>9 (and 
references cited there). 
124. Towers, op.cit., 35-38; Huxley, 'Introduction', 18f. The 
Christogenic process uses the • radial . energy' of increasing 
ca:nplexification, and the • Christie' energy manifest in a 
'spiritually converging world' (Teilhard, op.cit., 297). 
125. Teilhard, op.cit., 297. 
126. Reed, op.cit. 
127. Teilhard, op.cit., 289. 
128. Ibid., 278-285. 
129. Ibid., 308 n.l. 
130. Ibid., 288. 
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131. Reed, op.cit., seems to imply the contrary. But his .• religion of 
the environment' is really an attempt to justify the study of 
ecological science on the Teilhardian principle, which makes 
'ecology' the study of the biosphere and neospB.ere together. 
This is very different from the issue of restoring 'nature' to 
theological discourse. 
132. von Rad, Old Testament~Theology, two volumes published in 1962 
and 1965 respectively; Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, two 
volumes published 1964 and 1967 respectively. See also Wiltsher, 
op. cit. , esp. chapters 3 and 4; though Eichrodt was not one of the 
biblical scholars examined in Wiltsher's study, he conforms to the 
general pattern. 
133. von Rad, , • The Fom-Cri tical Problem of the Hexateuch' and Other 
Essays; Wil tsher, op. cit. , 59-68. 
134. von Rad , Old Testament Theology, vol.2, 137,139. 
135. Wiltsher, op.cit., 62f; Liedke, Im Bauch des Fisches, 75-77. 
136. Eichrodt, op.cit., vol.2, chapter 'iN. 
13 7 • Ibid. , 9 8, Eichrodt' s emphasis. 
138. Ibid., lOOf. 
139. Ibid., 110. 
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14Q • Jbid. 1 116 o 
141. See section 2 above. Cf. Passmore, Man's Responsibili£Y for Nature: 
'Christian theology, however, has in the past proved itself to be 
ranarkably flexible. Theologians are now busily attempting to 
work out new attitudes to nature, still consonant in a general way 
with traditional Christianity but reverting ·in important respects 
to a prelapsarian conception of man and man's role and denying 
that men have a 'sacredness' which animals do not possess. For 
my part I more than doubt whether Christian theology can thus 
reshape itself without ceasing to be distinctively Christian' 
(p.l84). His argument is that 'the concept of the sacred' is 
to be rejected, and only then will men see themselves as 'quite 
alone, with no one to help them except their fellow men; products 
of natural j?rocesses which are wholly indifferent to their 
survival; t?nd thus be able to] face their ecological problems 
with their full .irr'plications'. (Loc.cit.). In other words, 
either ecological theology cannot be Christian, or it cannot 
serve as a foundation for environmental ethics. -
CHAPTER TWO 
1. Holmes (ed.), Henderson's Dictionary of Biological Terms, 
2. Gray, The Dictionary of the Biological Sciences. 
3. The idea of an ecological approach to theology is discussed 
briefly in Chapter 4 of Cobb and Griffin, Process Theology; see 
also McCloskey's discussion of possible meanings for the expression 
'ecological ethics', in his paper 'Ecological Ethics and its 
Justification: A: Critical Appraisal'. 
4. So Lord Gifford, in establishing the Gifford Lectures in Natural 
Theology: 'I wish the lecturers to treat their subject as strictly 
natural science • • • without reference to or reliance upon any 
supposed special exceptional or so-called miraculous revelation • 
(quoted by William Temple in the 1934 Gif~ord Lectures, Nature, 
Man and God). See also Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology 
252-270. 
5. So Cobb and Griffin, op.cit., chapter 4; Hendry, Theology of 
Nature, esp. chapter 1. 
6. There is an extensive literature about dialogue between scientists 
and theologians. See, for example, Barbour, Science and Religion; 
for attempts at dialogue from the scientists' perspective, see 
Birch, Nature and God; Peacocke,. Science and the Christian 
Experiment, ,idem, Creation and the World of· Science; idem (ed.), 
The Sciences arid. Theology in ·the Twentieth' Century. 'Th the 
Gennan literature, G:tlnter Altner has earned doeturates in both 
biology and theology; see hisSch~pfungsglaube uncl Entwicklungsgedanke 
in der protestantischen Theologie zwischen Ernst Haeckel und Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin. ·In the ecumenical fon:nn, see the reports 
of the consultations held at Mexico City (1975) and Cambridge, 
England (1978), as well as the MJT conference. 
241 
Chapter Two cont'd. 
7. Kaufinan, 'A. Problem for Theology: The Concept of Nature' • 
8. The term 'Theologie der Natur' is used equally to describe 
1 theology of nature' and. what I prefer to call 'ecological 
theology'; the issue of. Evangelische Theologie devoted to 
ecological theology· (37/1, Jan-F.eb 1977) was titled 1 Zur 
Theology der Natur' , and the only occurrence of the term 
'~kologische Theologie' I have seen is in Liedke, Im Bauch des 
Fisches. · 
9. Sittler, The Ecology· of Faith. 
10. Cobb, Is r It Too Late?· A Theology of Ecology, has a ve:cy strong 
ethical orientation. Its theology is described briefly in 
section 4(ii) below. 
11. Laszlo, The Systems View of the World, and the bibliography there 
which lists works of natural, life, and social sciences, as well 
as philosophy, which adopt a 'systems' approach. 
12. Jbid. Sane theologians have attempted to use the insights of 
sysfemsPhilosophy: vaux, Subduing the Cosmos; Ellul, The Techno-
logical System; Moltmann, 'Creation as an Open System'; and 
Hutchingson, 'The World as God's Body: A Systems View'. 
13. Of course no system is 'self-contained' or 'self-canplete' with 
reference ~~ God -- these adjectives refer only to empirically 
observable phenomena. 
14. See above, Chapter Cbe; and Morrison, 'The Nature of Strategic 
Nuclear Weapons'. 
15. See my account of the debate between Passmore and the Routleys, 
above, pp.9f. 
16. Section 4(iii) below: Liedke, op.cit; Steck, World and Eiwiromment. 
17. For a theologian's response to this evidence and its implications, 
see Hefner, 'Towards a New Doctrine of Man', esp.238-250. 
18. This is one of the motivations for dialogue between scientists 
and theologians; see, for example, my description of Birch's 
approach in Chapter Four, section 4 (i) below. 
19. In the ecumenical discussions, see Chapters VI and VI·.n of the 
Geneva 1970 report. 
20. Chapter One, section 3 makes it clear that Tillich, Bultmann and 
Moltmann would return different answers to this question. 
21. Other doctrines are· involved in the discussion as well 
section 4(iii) below, and n.l48. 
22. CD III.2, section 43. 
see 
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23. Of the main theologians of the sixties, Barth is the only one likely 
to object. to the enterprise of ecological theology - as my 
survey of Chapter One, section 3 shows. 
24. Barth states clearly that science and theology have their own 
separate and legitimate realms (CD I.l section 1.1; III.2., 
section 43.2; IV. 3 (1) 1 section 69.2). In the Preface to CD III.! 
he states that 'There is free scope· for natural science beyond 
what theology describes as the work of the Creator ••• I am of the 
opinion, however, that future workers in the field of the Christian 
doctrine of creation will find many problems worth pondering in 
defining the point and manner of this twofold boundary' (pag~ x) • 
25. CD!. I, 1 section 7. Confonnity with the biblical witness is an 
integral part of the necessary reference to the Word of God. 
2 6. CD.JII. 2. , section 43 • 1, 17f. 
27 o Jbid. 1 18f o 
28. Ibid., 19. 
29. Jbid. ' 26-41. 
30. Ibid., 40. 
31. Ibid., 42. 
32. Ibid., 43. 
33. Loc. Cit. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
Ibid., 24-26. 
Ibid.' 23. 
Ibid., 7. 
Jbid.' 9. 
Ibid., 10. 
·Loc. cit. 
40. 'Dogmatics itself ••• [is] a confronting of the Church's proclamation 
with the Word of God. In this way Barth puts the theologian in the 
position of having to claim 'that the dogmatics he writes is subject to, 
and the result of, a new divine initiative, a decision of the Word 
of. God himself • • • He must claim, and clearly seek to make good his 
claim by constant reference· to the Scriptures,· 'that in his work the 
Word. of. God is itself newly challenging· the Church's proclamation' 
(Sykes, 'Barth on the Centre of Theology' 1 in Sykes (ed.), Karl Barth 
- Studies of his Theological Methods; Sykes' emphasis, Cit.p-.34). 
41. CD III. 2, section 43 .1, p. 17 • 
42. Loc. cit. 
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43. CD JII.l, section 41, p.42. 
44. Ibid., 228-329 and 94-228 respectively. 
45. Barth's exegesis in CD III .1 has been studied as part of another 
thesis at. the University of Durham, and the argument of my next 
two paragraphs depends upon this thesis: Wil tsher, 'The Biblical 
Teaching on creation in Modern Christian Theology'. See also 
D. F. Ford, 'Barth's Inte.rpretation of the Bible' • 
46. Ford, op.cit., 55, quotes a nice anecdote to this effect. 
47. 'Why did the first man have to fall into that deep sleep when the 
W::>rk of God was done in which the woman had her origin? From 
the standpoint. of the New Testament it is because the Church of 
Jesus Christ was to have its origin in His mortal sleep and to stand 
complete before H1m in His resurrection. 
'Why had the woman to be taken out of the man ••• i.e. be "fonned" 
from his rib? Because the death of Jesus was to be His sacrifice 
for His Church, and its reconciliation an exchange between divine 
glory ·and human misery ••• He [Jesus] recognises [the Churcf!l as 
His body, fonned from what was taken fran Him, and alive through His 
death' (CD III.l, p.321). 
48. Wiltsher op.cit., 21; Barth says that 'The man of whom the [second 
creation] saga spoke, objectively if not subjectively, is ••• this 
man Jesus. So near are we in this second creation history to the 
threshold of the history of the covenant and salvation that, even 
though we continue to give due attention to the other strata of its 
content, we cannot interpret it finally, and therefore decisively 
in any other way than this' (CD III.l, p.230). 
49. Wiltsher, op.cit., 155 ff; Steck, op.cit. 
50. CD IV.3(1), section 69, pp.l35-165. 
51. Ibid., 137. 
52. Ibid., 151-153. 
53. Loc.cit. 
54. Ibid., 136; see also his discussion on pp.l53-164. 
55. Ibid., 153. 
56. Cf. CD III. 2., section 44.1. 
57. CD IV 3(1), section 69.2, pp.l44f and 156f. 
58. CD III.2., section 43.2. 
59. :: Loc.cit. 
60. Loc.cit.; also CD IV.3 (1), pp.l36f and 156f~ 
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61. CD III.2, section 43.1, pp.7-ll. 
62. Ibid~, 6f. 
63. Ibid. I 17. 
64. Ibid., 8. 
65. Ibid., 23-25; see also 12f, and 79-91. 
66. Ibid., 11. 
67. CD IV. 3(1), section 69.2; the two foci are discussed on pp.l35-155, 
155-165, respectively. 
68. Ibid., 140. 
69. Ibid., 141. 
70. Ibid., 147f. 
71. Ibid., 137ff, 152f. 
72. Ibid., 159. 
73. Ibid., 163. 
74. Ibid., 162. 
75. Ibid., 147f.; Steck, op.cit.; section 4(iii) below. 
76. CD IV.3(1), section 69.2, 159. 
77. Ev'. Th 34/6, Nov-Dec 1974, 'Anthropologie und Naturverh&ltnis; 
37/1, Jan-.F.eb 1977,. Zur Theologie der Natur. 
78. Ibid., .33-49. See n.8 above, on the Genuan use of the tenn 
'Theologie der Natur' as synonym for •e,kologische Theologie'. 
79. GUnter Al tner, 'Zu diesem Heft', 2. 
80. Dembowski, op.cit., 33. 
81. Loc. cit. 
82. Loc.cit. 
83. J.:bid.' 41. 
84. Loc. cit .• 
85. Loc. cit. 
86. Loc.cit. 
87. Loc.cit. 'Natur wird zum Dfunon' • 
88. Loc. cit. 
89. Ibid., 34f. 
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90. Ibid., 36. 
91. Ibid. I 42f. 
92. Ibid. I 47. 
93. Ibid., 48: 'Wahrnehmung vollzieht sich als Erkennen, das offen, 
umfassen~ differenziert, klar und kritisch vernirnmt, was ist, 
woher und warum es ist, was daraufhin ~lich und was nOtig ist' • 
94. Loc.cit. There is a simi.larity between Dembowski's concept of 
Wahrnehmung, and Gregory of Nyssa's concept of epinoia (which is 
important to the discussion in Chapter Four, section 5 below) ; 
this similarity may bear further investigation. 
95. Loc. cit. 
96. Ibid., 37. 
97. Ibid., 43f. 
98. Ibid., 37: 'Jm Rahmen der Interaktion mit Menschen, ihrer "Kultur" 
im Verhalten und Verh~ltnissen, nirnmt Jesus Christus "Natur." wahr'. 
99. Loc. cit. Dembowski cites Mk 6:14ff, Mt 6:28ff, MJ(. 4:36ff,Mk:2:23ff 
and Mk 8:20 in support .• 
100. Ibid., 38. 
101. Ibid., 38f. 
102. Ibid., 40. 
103. Ibid., 49. 
104. Ibid., 33. 
105. Ibid., 34. 
106. This theme is stiOng in Birch's presentations also: see his 
addresses to the Nairobi Assembly and to the MIT conference. 
107. See Chapter Three; and Chapter Four, section 4 below. 
108. For a su:r:prising example, see Hartshorne's only presentation to:_ the 
Church and Society Programme, at the 1977 Zurich theological 
consultation on Humanity, Nature, and God: Hartshorne, 'God and 
Nature'. 
109. On Whitehead's philosophy, see (for example) Kline (ed.), Alfred 
North Whitehead: Essays on:His Ihilosophy. On its adequacy from 
the perspective of contemporary scien~ (with regard to quantum 
mechanics and relativity theory in particular), see Jones, 'Bell's 
Theorem, H.P. Stapp, and Process Theism'; Wilcox, 'A Question from 
Physics ·for· Certam Theists' ; Lewis s. Ford, ' Is Process Theism 
compatible withRelativity Theory?' On process theology generally, 
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see Whitney, 'Process Theism: Does a Persuasive God Coerce?' ; 
Gunton, 'The Knowledge of God According to Two Process Theologians: 
A Twentieth Century Gnosticism', idem, Becoming and Being; 
Meynell, 'The. Theology of HartshorneT; Clarke, 'God and Time 
in Whitehead'; Nelson, 'The RestingiPlace of Process Theology'; 
Reitz, 'Was ist Proze ~ theologie? ' ; · Beholder, 'Gelei twort' to 
the translation (Der Preis des FQrtschritts) of Cobb, Js it Too 
Late?. These references serve to indicate that the debate 
about process thought is wide-ranging, complex, and the subject 
of vast literature. 
llO. After this chapter was written, I discovered another article by 
Cobb, but the abstract supplied in Religious· Index One: Periodicals 
XV, July-Dec.1981, p.l82, implied that it covered much the same 
ground as Cobb's other works: John B. Cobb, Jr., 'Process Theology 
and Environmental Issues', J Rel 60, October 1980, 440-458. 
111. Birch and Cobb, 'God's IDve, Ecological Survival and the Responsive":":"::.,~ 
ness of Nature' ; · id~, The Liberation of Life. 
112. Cobb, God and the World, 9. 
113. Ibid., 10. 
l14. Ibid., 117-138, esp. 124-127 and 130-136;Is :Jt Too Late? chapter 15. 
115. God and the World, 138. 
116. Too Late?, 124. 
117. Ibid., chapter 10. 
118. Ibid, 124. See also the discussion of the evolutionary process 
in Cobb and Griffin, Process Theology, 63-68, and the chapter 'God as 
Creative-Responsive IDve', 41-67. 
120. 'Novelty', 'complexification', 'beauty', and 'enjoyment' are terms 
with special nuances for process thought. On 'beauty' see Cobb, 
Christian Natural Theology, 98~108; on 'enjoyment', see Cobb and 
Griffin,, Process Theology, 16-18, 54-57, 63-68. 
121. Cobb and Griffin, op.cit., 151. 
122. Cobb, Too Late?, 125, 
123. Cobb and Griffin, op.cit., 76-79. 
124. Cobb, God and the World, 95 : 'OUr final complaint against God may 
be that. he has made us such that· we do in fact destroy one another 
rather than cooperate in the creation of a better world. ' 
125. Cobb and Griffin, op.cit., 76-79, esp. 79: 'working out an 
ecological ethic will be a gi'gantic undertaking. The main 
point. • • • is that process thought provides · the , theoretical basis 
for such an ethic.' Also 143, where it is stated that the 
chapter on the environmental crisis 'serves to summarise process 
theology'. 
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126. Ibid. ,chap:_tersc;5; cobb, Christian Natural Theology, Chapter II 
and III. 
127. Cobb, Too L.ate?, 87. 
128. Ibid., 85. 
129. Ibid., 87-91; c.f. Barth, CD III. 2, section 46. 
130. Cobb, Too Late?' 91. 
131. Cobb, God~ the World, 94. 
132. Cobb and Griffin, op.cit., 149. 
133. Cobb, Too Late?, 136. 
134. See my Chapter One, section 2. 
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135. Wiltsher, op.cit.: Chapter 5 describes some features of the bib-
lical reflection on creation that have been neglected; Chapter 
4 contains a comparison of theologians with biblical scholars 
in their treatments of the creation themes. 
136. English translation, Blessing in the Bible and the Life of the 
Church, 1978. 
137. Ibid., chapter one. 
138. Ibid., 6. 
139. Ibid., 26-29. 
140. Jbid.' 59. 
141. Liedke, Im Bauch des Fisches , 95. Westermann's full development 
of the concept of das Grundgeschehen is his massive cormnentary on 
Genesis in the Biblische'Kommentare series. See also Westermann, 
'Die theologische Bedeutung der Urgeschichte'; idem What Does the 
Old Testament Say about God? ===== 
142. Liedke, 'Solidarity in Conflict', 73. 
143. English translation, World and Environment, 1980. 
144. Ibid., 56. 
145. Ibid., 294. 
146. Ibid., 296. 
147. Galloway, The Cosmic Christ; Sittler, 'Called to Unity'; Baker, 
'Biblical views of Nature'. 
148. This does not exhaust the account of possible interrelationships 
of ecological theology with other traditional concerns of 
theology, of course. For example: Roman, Anglican and Orthodox 
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sacramental theologies accord same spiritual significance to 
matter such as bread, wine, water, and oil, and it may be 
possible to extend this and so speak of a •sacramental' ecol-
ogical theology; thus_ I>~a66cke,~ Science and the Christian 
Experiment, chapter 7, esp. 185-188; idem, Creation and the 
WOfid of Science, chapter VII; Daecke=;==="'firofane and Sacramental 
Views of Nature • • 
CHAPTER THREE. 
1. The bibliographic details for the official reports are found in 
the bibliography under the abbreviations MlT/1 and MIT/2. 
Generally, references in these notes .to reports and official 
documents will be given by place and year, and thadetails may 
then be found in the bibliography by referring to the place and 
. -year. 
2. See Figure 1, p.226; see also the Constitution, Nairobi 1975, 
pp.317ff. 
3. For a time-line summary of the Church and Society 'history•, see 
Figure 2, p.227; Duff, The Social Thought of the World Council 
of Churches, chapter 1, has a full account. 
4. Constitution, N, and IX, in Nairobi 1975, 327-329 and 333 
respectively. 
5. Nairobi 1975, 303f. 
6. MlT/prep., p.5. The full five-year plan proposal is reprinted in 
the Church and Society house journal, Anticipation No.23., 1976, 
29-35. 
7. For brevity, 1 will adopt the abbreviation C&S for • Church and 
Society•. The text of the Central Committee• s approval of the 
proposed C&S five-year plan is reprinted in Anticipation 23, 
1976, 36, as Appendix JI. 
8. The preparatory volume for the conference had been titled Faith, 
Science and the Future,and this title functioned as a brief pseudo-
official theme - as shown by the subtitle to the official reports, 
namely: 'Report of the World Council of Churches• Conference 
on Faith, Science and the Future•. 
9. Amsterdam 1948, 77. 
10. Duff, op.cit., 191-222; Oldham, •a Responsible Society•, esp. 
138, 143. 
11. Oldham, op.cit •. 
12. Amsterdam 1948, 77f. 
13. Loc. cit. 
14. Evanston 1954, 113. 
15. New Delhi 1961, 99f. 
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16. ' ••• since Evanston so many new nations have come into being and 
are in the early stages of establishing political institutions, 
that more account must be taken of the difficulties which such 
nations face. We live in a highly dynamic situation with many 
quite different national experiments' (New Delhi 1961, 100). 
The Evanston criteria reflected the· experience of long-
established constitution states, but the New Delhi Assembly faced 
a very different situation - a mere 7 years later. 
17. 'Only a prof~und dedication to responsible world order ••• will 
be adequate [to the churches' taskJ' (ibid., 105); see also the 
discussion there of ·'International Institutions', 107. 
18. Ibid., 99-101. 
19. Geneva 1966, 52, for example; also de Vries' essay on the Report 
of Section III to the Uppsala Assembly, 'The Background of the 
Text in Ecumenical Ethics' • 
20. Geneva 1966, 52; 'Christian theology must expound and defend the 
understanding of the "human" as a criterion for judging economic 
and social change. (This indeed is the purpose of the concept 
of "the responsible society" ••• J·' ; the footnote to that 
passage stresses the need for the continuing study of the 
humanum criterion. 
21. Uppsala 1968, 202ff; and the address by Berkhof, 'The Finality of 
Jesus Christ' • Section III had reported that 'The central issue 
in development is the criteria of the human' (section 20). 
22. For a brief history of the Humanum Study, see Lindqvist, Economic 
Growth and the Quality of Life, 75-77 (referred to hereafter as 
EGQL) • Abrecht' s view of the connection between the Humanum 
study and the work of C&S was stated at the 1969 Central 
Corrmittee meeting, as follows: 'Dr. Abrecht replied that it was 
his understanding that the results of the [Futurum] study would 
be [church and So_ciety' ~contribution to the humanum study. It 
was fbis] Department's job to· see that the total study of 
huma:rium included this dimension' (Central Cormnittee minutes, 
quoted EGQL, 76n.253. ) 
23. See, e.g., Part I of the Report of Section III: 'World Economic 
and Social Development', Uppsala 1968, 45. On the ideal of 
'participation' in the responsible society concept, see New Delhi 
1961, 102, 108ff; de Vries, op.cit., 48f; Oldham, op.cit. 
24. Oldham, op.cit., 120: 'the crisis of society is at bottom a crisis 
of man himself' • The question of the humanum has, rightly, 
been a perennial issue in ecumenical social ethics since Stockholm 
1925 and Oxford 1937; see EGQL, 58-62. 
25. On the mixed reception of.the Humanum study, see EGQL, 75-77, and 
his chapter IV passim ; also 'Guidelines for Future Programues', 
Nairobi 1975, 297-299. 
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26. Uppsala to Nairobi, l09f; the C&S report to the Uppsala Assembly 
Uppsala 1968, 240-245, esp. 244f; Geneva 1966, 90 and 190, thus 
-
1 The churches should welcome the develop:nent of science and 
technology as an expression of God's creative work ••• ', 'There 
is no dispute about the·general goal of technological development: 
a fuller life for every human person' • 
27. EGQL, 57. 
28. New Delhi 1961, 96f.; Sittler's address to the Assembly, 
'Called to Unity'; cf. Geneva 1966, 137-140. The ethical issue 
was to find appropriate economic systems and structures within 
the assumption of unl.imi ted _ potential growth. See also Shinn, 
'The Impact of Science and Technology on the Theological Under-
standing of Social Justice'. 
29. Third World participants in the ecumenical discussions, such as 
S.L. Parmar and M.M. Tha:nas, had constantly questioned the 
assumption that economic development was a panacea. This was 
particularly strong 'in Geneva 1970, chapters VI and VIII~ The 
first C&S response to the 1 l:i.mi ts to growth' thesis is in the 
Nemi meeting- Nemi 1971, 8f; l2f; see also Shinn,op.cit.,53f. 
30. See the scenario prepared by one of the working groups at a 
Futurum regional consultation (Pont~a-Mousson): 'Scenario- The 
Nations of the North Atlantic Decrease by 90 percent the Use 
of Gasoline by Private Automobiles, 1975-1992', Anticipation 15 
1973, 19-21. 
31. E.g. Bucharest 1974, esp. page 12 which introduces the long tenn 
concept of the j.ust and sustainable society, with an awareness 
of the effects of contemporary human behaviour on future generat-
ions. 
32. Loc. cit. 
33. Ibid., 7. Various C&S conferences in the seventies, according 
to Lindqvist, used utopian models - EGQL 98 n. 66 and the 
references there. 
34. EGQL, 97; Shinn, op.cit., 53; Preston, 'The Question of a Just, 
Participatory and Sustainable Society', l08f. Several reports 
were published by the Club of Ra:ne: The Limits to Growth, (1972) 
Mankind at the Turning Point, (1975), Re-shaping the International 
Order, (1977), and Goals for Mankind, (1977); see Preston's 
paper for brief discussion and criticism of the first report. 
35. Central Committee minutes, quoted EGQL, 98. 
36. The appropriate quotation from the Central Committee Minutes is 
given in MITjPrep.,S 
37. C.T. Kurien (India), quoted in Preston, op.cit., 111; for other 
comments, see Barbour, 'Justice, Participation and Sustainability 
at MIT' ,384. M.:trien's own report of the conference is reprinted 
in Anticipation 27, 1980, 8-ll. See also de Vries, op.cit., 49, 
amd Pannar's foreword to Geneva 1970. 
38. Preston, op.cit., 115, for brief discussion. 
251 
Chapter Three cont'd. 
39. Bucharest 1974, 12; Birch, 'Creation, Technology and Human 
Survival'. An abbreviated version of Birch's address is 
reprinted in Anticipation 22, 1976, 6f. 
40. Five-year plan, 29. 
41. So Abrecht, MIT/2, 1; but since I have been unable to locate the 
specific ·reference, this may represent Abrecht' s interpretation 
of the C&S programne directions outlined in Nairobi 1975,303f., 
and of the reccmnendations 72 and 73 made there in the Report 
of Section VI, 138f. 
42. So Abrecht, MIT/2,2. The passage quoted does not appear in the 
body of the report (Jamaica 1979) • 
43. The MIT conference was expected to shed new light on the issues, 
as the first chapter of MIT/prep makes clear; according to Barbour, 
op.cit., 384, it failed to do so. 
44. Bucharest 1974,12. 
45. Nairobi 1975, 299. 
46. Rapid Social Change Study, 1955-1961 (for an account, see EGQL, 
50-54); the Futurum project, 1969-1974; the two major conferences 
are the tennini of this study, namely Geneva 1966 and Mill' 1979. 
47. Quoted EGQL, 58. 
48. Oxford 1937, 88: 'The subordinatio~ of God's purpose for human life 
to the demands of the econanic process seems in practice to be a 
tendency common to all existing kinds of economic organisation' -
though this produced a rather vague response (89f) • See also 
Potter, 'Science and Technology', 23. 
49. Amsterdam 1948, 75. 
50. Thessalonica Conference of 1959, quoted EGQL, 53, n.ll5. 
51. EGQL, 54, states that this 'inability to cope' was Abrecht's 
assessment. Cf. also New Delhi. 1961, 96-98, on the theological 
problematic of nature. 
52. This is especially evident in subsection II. D of the C& s report 
to the Uppsala Assembly, Uppsala 1968, 244f. 
53. For a time-line surrmary of the Futurum project, see Figure 3, p. 
228. See alsoUe,rsaia to Nairobi, 109-116; EGQL, 77-86; and my next 
section. 
54. Geneva 1970, 55-58, 71-75. 
55. Quoted in Geneva 1970, 75; for a similar claim from another working 
group, see p.67 there. 
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56. Mostly genetic technology and nuclear engineering, at least in 
the C&S forum. Cf. the account of the discussion of the five-
year moratorium on nuclear development at the MIT conference 
- MIT/2, section VI, esp.l03f;·also.Barbour, op.cit., 385-387. 
57. Quoted EGQL, 78 n.267, p.86. Also 193: 'natural scientists have 
dominated the dialogue both quantitatively and qualitatively'. 
58. Geneva 1970. Cf. the complaint that the public has lost its 
faith in science and the human spirit, and that scientists have 
lost their ne:rve, made in a lecture to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1979: Rabi, 'Government, Science 
and Technology - Twilight of the Gods' • 
59. Nemi 1971, 3. 
60. These themes recur in Potter's opening address to the MIT Confer-
ence, 'Science and Technology', MlT/1, esp.2lf., 25f. 
61. Gilkey, 'Teclmology, History and Liberation' ; according to 
Lindqvist, ' the most thorough theological document of the 
Futurum project concerning the issues of teclmology' (EGQL 
127, n.ll3) • Gilkey was chaiman of this working party. 
62. Bucharest 1974, 36. 
concern. 
The report lists five areas of particular 
63. Mexico City 1975. A number of papers presented at this consult-
ation were reprinted in Anticipation 22, 1976. 
64. Nairobi 1975, 129. 
65. Anticipation 23, 1976, 29-36, esp. part IV. 
66. The conference concerns are listed in MIT/1, Sf, and MITY:'2,lf.; 
see also my section 3(i) below. 
67. Abrecht, ' Introduction' • 
68. Bucharest 1974, 37, lists the titles and themes of the working 
groups. 
69. Reprinted from Central_Committee minutes in Anticipation 19,1974, 
43. 
70. Nairobi 1975, 303, 129. 
71. See Five-Year Plan, produced by the C&S Working Group at its 
1976 meeting. 
72. MIT/1, 5£. 
73. Above, n.8. 
74. Uppsala 1968, 244f. 
75. Quoted Uppsala to Nairobi, 109. 
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76. EGQL, 78ff; MIT/2. 
77. EGQL, 193• 
78. Geneva 1970; Uppsala to Nairobi, 110; EGQL, 79. 
79. Nemi 1971; Uppsala· to Nairobi, llOf., and the participants 
named on ll3; Shinn, op.cit., 53f. 
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80. Reports in EcR July 1972, Anticipation Nos.l4 and 15 respect-
ively. on the failure of the Futurum project to involve 
other regions, Abrecht stated .at Bucharest that 'For lack of funds 
and staff and other reasons, similar meetings to those at 
Accra etc. could not be held in the Middle East, Latin America, 
and Eastern Europe' (quoted EGQLi 80 n.284) • The wee relation-
ship to Latin American Christians has been consistently proble-
matic - EGQL, 55, 71-731 80 etc. 
81. This has been regarded as part of the Futurum project; it appears 
as such in the brief history of the project given· in Anticipation 
17, 197 ,, 60f. The report and papers of the C&S presentation 
are reprinted in Anticipation.ll 1972. 
82. The report of the Zurich consultation on genetics appeared in 
Study Encounter X, No.1, January 1974, and the report and papers 
for the consultation have been compiled and published under the 
editorship of Birch and Abrecht as Genetics and the Quality of 
Life. I shall cite it as Genetics 1975, and it .is so: listed 
the bibliography; the abbreviation Zurich 1973 refers to the 
other Zurich meeting and its report, 'A Theological Critique of 
Scientific Rationality'. The Working Group's statement on 
population policy is 'Ibpulation Iblicy, Social Justice and the 
Quality of Life', Study Encounter Cctober 1974, 49ff. 
83. Geneva; WCC and World Student Christian Fellowship, 1973. 
84. See the debate, 'Rights for Both, .Man and Nature?' in Anticipation 
16, 1974, 20-36, to which Birch, Cobb, Griffin, Derr and Gregorios 
contributed. 
85. Published under the title The Human Presence. An Orthodox View 
of Nature. 
86. Bucharest 1974; for personal insights, see EGQL, 109f.f. 
87. See above, section 1 (ii) • 
88. For a schematic summary of the C&S programme, see Figure 4,p.229 
The 'energy' problem has come to dominate the C&S progrCllt[11e, 
occupying a substantial proportion of recent issues of 
Anticipation (nos. 23,24,26), second only to theMIT conference. 
89. Birch's book refers primarily to the Australian situation. 
90. EGQL, Chapter II~.: Man and Nature. 
91.. Ibid. I 25ff. 
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92. Ibid., 193; cf. Preston, op.cit., 116f. 
93. This is mainly due to the personal enterprise of Paul Abrecht, 
to wha:n Gregorios paid tribute at MIT -- quoted by Geyer, 
'The EST Complex at M]T', 373. 
94. EGQL, 133ff, 19lff., 27f. 
95. Ibid., 135 n.l47; see also Zagorsk 1968, Mexico City 1975, 
Cambridge 1978. 
96. EGQL, 193, Lindgvist's emphasis; he has the Nairobi Assembly 
in view. The vexed question of the 'authority' of eo:urrenical 
documents is not far from the surface here; see Preston, 'A 
Breakthrough in Ecumenical Social Ethics?', 25-29, 32-39. 
97. Since the Raman Catholic Church is not a member of the World 
Council, its contribution to wee affairs and debate is unofficial 
and undertaken on a 'good will' basis - as in the cooperation 
between SODEPAX and the Humanum Foundation. Cf. also Eci..':{ 24/3 
July 1972: Patterns of Relationships Between the Raman Catholic 
Church and the World Council of Churches. 
98. EGQ£~,110 n.l2. On the place of biblical theology in C&S 
discussions of social ethics, see Genetics 1975, 203 (quoted 
below, p.l20) ; Ramsey, Who Speaks Eor T.he Church?; Preston, op. 
cit., 27. Sittler's paper at the 1970 Geneva conference was 
later published under the title 'Ecological Co.mmitment as 
Theological Responsibility'. 
99. EGQL, 115-119. 
100. van Leeuwen, Christianity in World History; cox, 'The Responsi-
bility of the Christian in a World of Technology'; on Shaull's 
theology, see Grenholm, Christian Social Ethics in a Revolutionary 
Age, chapter 6. 
101. EGOt; 133. 
102. Loc.cit. 
103. Lionel Charles Birch is Challis Professor of Biology at the 
University of Sydney. He has been Chainnan of the C&S Working 
Group since 1976, and was deputy chainnan from 1972 to 1975. 
104. For expositions, see Birch and Cobb, 'God's Love, Ecological 
Survival and the Responsiveness of Nature'; Cobb and Griffin, 
Process Theology; Zurich 1977, part II.B. 
105. Zurich 1977 has a subsection expounding the process theology 
viewpoint, but no single conference report from 1966 to 1979 
endorses the process theology stance. 
106. EGQL 119-121; 121 n.77 contains an account of Birch's sharp 
attack on the theological section of the Bucharest report, which 
Lindqvist interprets as a sign of disappointment and discourage-
ment in the process camp. 
107. For bibliography, see EGQL, 122 n.80. 
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108. Gregorios, op.cit., 84; quoted below, Chapter Four, section 5. 
109. Bucharest 1974, 35f. The Orthodox contribution to the Futurum 
project is summarised in EGQL, 122-124. 
llO. This coincidence was evident at Bucharest; cf.EGQL,l33 n.l45. 
111. Ibid., 124-129 and 129-132 respectively. 
ll2. Gilkey, op.cit.; Uppsa:la to Nairob.;L, 109ff.; EGQL, 127ff, and the 
references given there in n.l24. 
113. 'The Global Environment, Responsible Choice and Social Justice'; 
Bucharest 1974 1 12; see the discussion in Preston,. 'The Question 
of a Just, Participatory and Sustainable Society', esp.p.ll5. 
ll4. Pont-a-M:msson 1973, 14f.; Nairobi 1975,125. 
115. Bucharest 1974, 35,; cf.EGQL,l30f. 
116. Whyte, 'The Moral OUtlook on Growth'. Outside the C&S ambit, see 
Darling 1 'Man's Responsibility for the Environment' , who makes the 
same point by reference to the 'aristocratic ideal' • 
ll7. EGQL, 132. 
118. Ibid., 28. 
ll9. !bid. 1 27f. 
120. !bid. 1 79ff. 
121. Ibid. I 119 1 Lindqvist's emphasis. 
122. Cobb and Griffin, op.cit. 1 118. 
123. EGQL, lllf, esp. 112 and n.l8. there. 
124. Grenhobn, op.cit., 210ff. 
125. • . Quoted in EGQL, ll7n. 49. 
126. Ibid., 111 n.l5. 
127. Altner, Sch5pfung am'Abgpm.d1 86-119, analyses six types of 
response appearing in the secular debate about the relation 
between nature and history. Lindqvist concentrates· on the 
question of history, and divides the theological approaches 
represented in the C&S programme on the basis of their views of 
history. · 
128. Cox, op.cit.; ;ic;1em, The Secular City, By the 1970 Geneva 
conference, Co~ adopted a different stance, saying 'I do not 
believe the future is going to be very secular' (Geneva 1970,84f). 
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129. EGQL, 111 n.l5 and passim. 
130. Ibid. 1 119. 
131. Ibid. I 11lf, 129£. 
132. Ibid., 119. 
133. Ibid., 116, 118. 
134 • Ibid, 1 116, 
135. Ibid., 118, 116 n.46. Derr was present, but his theological 
influence was not pronounced; Gilkey drafted the first part of 
the report of the theological section. 
136 o Ibid, 1 117f. 
137. Zurich 1973,7. 
138 Gilkey, op.cit. 
139. Ibid., 14. 
140. Ibid., 18. 
141. The emancipatory approach appears at Bucharest, in an African 
context only: Bucharest 1974, 26. 
142. Ibid., 33-35. 
143. Ibid., 33. 
144. EGQL, 117, defines the • theology of hope' approach using the 
four characteristicsof that approach listed in Bont-a-Mousson 
1973, 15. My definition extends his, and separates the emanci-
patory and the 'hope• approaches more clearly. 
145. This failure is evident in the Report of Section VI (Nairobi 1975, 
119-141), especially the section 'Social Responsibility in a 
Technological Age• (125-129). Birch, 'Creation, Technology, 
and Human Survival' • 
146. See the reports listed above, n.88. 
147. The report of the 1978 Cambridge consultation about science 
appeared in the same issue of Anticipatio~. The issue was titled, 
appropriately, BJ.lruinjJ Issues. 
148. Paulos Gregorios is the ~cclesiastical name of Paul Verghese, 
Metropolitan of New Delhi since 1975. 
149. Zurich 1977, 22. 
150. Section V has a theological title, but is primarily concerned with 
the problem of relating theological vision to praxis and ethics. 
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151. Bucharest .was 'home ground' for the Orthodox team, whereas 
Gregorios was the only Orthodox representative at Zurich. 
152. Koch, 'The Old Testament View of Nature', 52. For reaction, 
see Daecke, 'Profane and Sacramental Views of Nature' , which 
attempts to make Koch into a process theologian (a conclusion 
not warranted on the sole basis of his Zurich paper). 
153. Baker, 'Biblical Views of Nature' • 
154. Ibid., 43, on Proverbs 6:6-11, 12:10, 19:15, 28:19, 
Deuteronomy 22 : 6, etc. 
155. Ibid. , 44. 
156. Loc.cit. 
157. Ibid., 46. 
158. Loc. cit. 
159. Above, pp.l08f. 
160. Bucharest 1974, 34. It is worth noting that the C& s Working 
Group, in its commentary on the 1977 Zurich and 1978 cambridge 
consultations, also was influenced _ by the theology of hope approach; 
'Sustainability is the expression of the goodness of creation, 
of the effectiveness of reconciliation and of the hope of redempt-
ion in spite of the power of ch9,os' ( 'Corrmentary' , 72) • 
161. Zurich 1977, 32f. 
162. Ibid., 39, one of the questions listed for further study. 
163. Koch, op.cit., 52. 
164. Zurich 1977, 35. 
165. Ibid., 24, includes two sentences (one from Koch, op.cit., 50, on 
the nez@esh, and one from Baker, op.cit. ,43) side by side in the 
expos! on of the 'process' part of the report(II.B). 
166. This is clear from the editor's introductions to Anticipation 
Nos. 25 and 26. 
167. Since World Council constraints of finance and staffing force C&S 
to give theology second place to social ethics, it would be unfair 
to criticise the theological inadequacies of the C&S programme too 
rigorously or unconstructively. 
168. Zurich 1973, 7; the report's emphasis. 
169. Bucharest~ 197 4·, 36. 
170. Loc. cit. 
171. E.g. Birch, 'Creation, Technology and Human Survival' 1 Nairobi 
1975, 129. 
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172. 'God in Nature and History' ; the New Delhi Assembly had, however, 
called for the development .of a 'theology of nature' (New Delhi 
1961, 96) • 
17 3 • Chapter One, section 2 • 
174. EGQL, 115. 
175. 'Global Environment,·Responsible Choice and Social Justice',442. 
176. Zurich 1977 ,'![I.e; cf. Sittler, 'Called to Unity'. 
177. This claim is assessed in Chapter Four, section 4 below. 
178. Baker, op.cit., 46. 
179. EGQL, 193. 
180. Ibid., 28; and my discussion above, p.l04. 
181. Ibid., 185, 135 n.l47; cf. also Geneva 1970,87. 
182. Bucharest 1974, 12. By contrast, see the response to the biological 
evidence about human evolutionary history in the theological section 
of the same report, 35f. 
183. Above, p.87. 
184. Zagorsk 1968; EGQL, 68f, 192. 
185. EGQL, 192f., Lindqvist's emphasis. 
186. E.g. Zurich~l.9.77.~ IILD: 'Eschatology and Futurology'. 
187. ·•Human Development • • • • •• (Fifth Assembly of the WCC, Notes for 
Section VI)', part 2; Nairobi 1975, 125, 138f. 
188. Gilkey, op. cit., is one such 'isolated instance'. For a survey 
of the C&S discussion of technology, see EGQL, 124-129. 
189. Zurich 1977, 39 (Question 2(b)). 
190. Genetics 1975, 203; quoted also in Uppsala to Nairobi, 111, and in 
Birch, op.cit., 76. For more moderate statement see MIT/2,153. 
191. MJ:T/2,' 2; Geneva 1970, 28f.. The need for specialised infonnation 
was recognised at. the 1966 Geneva conference- Geneva 1966,8f,38ff. 
192. EGQL, llO and n.l2 there; also my n.98 above. 
193. Birch and Cobb, 'God's Love, Ecological Survival and the Responsive-
ness of Nature' , 32: ~It, is our judgment that the da:ninant view of 
nature in Western Christendom ••• is gravely deficient both as an 
interpretation of biblical views of the creation and as a basis for 
an adequate contemporary ethics of ecology' • 
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194. The main sources are, of course, the volumes MIT/prep, MIT/! 
and MIT/2. 
195. Bucharest_~l9~4,12;Nairobi 1975,303. 
196. Five-Year'Plan, 29-36. 
197. Five-Year Plan, Appendix II, reprints . . · . this endorsement, 
198. Central Corrmittee minutes, quoted MIT/1,14. 
199. CL the almost identical mandate for the 1966"'Geneva conference, 
reprinted in Geneva 1966, 8ff.: that conference. started the 
tradition of 'advisory' conferences. 
200. Three lists of conference concerns are given in the sources: 
MIT/prep. 1 Sf.; MIT/l,Sf. (Roger Shinn): and MIT/2, lf (Paul 
Abrecht) • All agree on the need to gather scientific infonn-
ation. 
201. Five-Year Plan, Appendix II. The 1966 Geneva conference had 
too many social scientists' (Geneva 1966, 39: Shinn, op.cit., 52.: 
EGQL, 77f) : the Futurum project had too many natural scientists 
(EGQL, 193). Theoretically, this recommendation from the Central 
Committee restores the balance, but in practice MIT turned out 
d!iJfferently (Barbour, op.cit., 38lf.: Preston op.cit., 116). 
202. Barbour, loc. cit.; Preston, loc.cit. In the preparatory 
materials for the conference, 60 of the 236 pages of the MIT/ 
prep. were devoted specifically to issues of economics and govern-
ment: but in the two numbers of Anticipatio.:o.:Nos.25,.and 26) which 
also served as preparatory material, there was only one i tern of 
interest to social scientists, namely the report of the consult-
ation on political" economy, ethics, and theology· (Zurich 1978). 
203. EGQL, 193. 
204. Mm'/2, 2f. 
205. The conference programme is reprinted in MIT/1, 383-386. 
206. The reports are reprinted in MIT/2. 
207. Mir/2, 147-165; see also Abrecht' s comnent, MIT/2,4. 
208. Reprinted in' Science and Technology for a new International 
Economic Order', 4lf. 
209. Geyer, op.cit.; Barbour, op.cit.: Duma.s . 'When Science Looks to 
Faith': Jensen, 'The MIT Conference'. 
210. Geyer, op.cit., 376. ·The whole sentence was italicised. 
211. Ibid., 374. 
212. Jensen, op.cit., 394. 
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213. Geyer, op.cit., 375. 
214. MIT/1,15. 
215. MJl'/2, 4. 
216. Abrecht, 'Response to the Conference', 3,4. 
217. MIT/1,68. 
218. Cf. Gregorios, The Human ·Presence 86f., for his statement about 
the need for a reverent..:.receptive attitude to nature. Birch is, 
I believe, fOllowing Gregorios' lead. See my Chapter Four, 
section 4, p. 187 •. 
219. Galtung is a Norwegian, presently working in Geneva for the 
Institute l!;or the Study of Developnent, and the author of several 
books about peace, development, and social justice. 
220. MIT/1,79. 
221. ~orovoy was a participant at the 1966 Geneva conference, and 
represented the Russian Orthodox Church at the Uppsala and Nairobi 
Assemblies. 
222. Nicolay Fedorov, 1828-1903. One of Fedorov's essays has been 
translated, and reprinted in Schmemann Is anthology Ul t.imate 
Question£. Schmemann says that Federov 'remains a controversial 
figure, heretical to some, deeply Orthodox to others', and 
includes him in his anthology only so that he may be judged on 
his own terms (173f) • So Borovoy' s enthusiasm for Federov 
must be assessed with charity and wisdcm. 
223. M:rl'/1,81. 
224. IDc.cit. 
225. Ibid., 82. 
226. Jbid., 83. 
227 o Jbid. 1 84. 
228. Loc. cit. 
229. Jbid., 84f., Fedorov believed tha:t' technology, if used by a 
humanity united in brotherhood, can perfonn miracles, can even 
raise the dead' (p.85). 
230 • Jbid. 1 85 • 
231. My discussion of Gregorios' starice is found in Chapter Four, 
section 5. 
232. MIT/1, 86f; this is one of a number of editorial interpolations 
which help to place the conference addresses into the context of 
the conference process; see Roger Shinn's statement, M:rl'/1, xiii. 
In the conference reports themselves, the only passage dealing with 
the pertinence of scripture to contemporary ethical discussion 
is found in Section X(~ITT/2,153). 
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233. MIT/2,28-38. 
234. Section 2 (v) above. 
235. MIT/2 I 36£. 
236. Ibid. I 36 • 
. l 
237. Ibid. I 1. 
238. On the rejection of Orthodoxy, see p.l36 below. There is a Third 
World codicil at the foot of p.33 of the Section II report, very 
muted. 
239. Jensen, op.cit., 395ff. Cf. Kurien, 'The Debate about Growth and 
Sustainability at MIT',8: 'The mood was that of wealthy, stable 
and compassionate societies of the West trying to support the poor, 
struggling nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America'. 
240. MIT/2,32f.;. cf. Zurich 1977 1 III.D. 
241. E.9:. Section VI, and the debate on the nuclear moratorium; see 
MIT/2, 88-104, and Barbour, op.cit., 385-387. 
242. Geyer·, op.cit., 375; quoted above, p.l26. 
243. MIT/2,32. 
244. Ibid. I 7-27. 
245. Ibid., 33, the report's emphasis. 
246. Ibid., 34. 
247. Ibid., 31 (vii),34. 
248. ' Ibid. I 32f. 
249. Ibid. ,34. 
250. Ibid., 29. 
251. Ibid., 31 (x). 
252. Ibid., 33; quoted above, p.l35. 
253. Ibid., 32 (xii); this may be compared with Liedke, Irn Bauch des 
Fisches, 200f: 'die einfache Mahlzeit als ~kologische 
Symbolhandlung'. 
254. Gregorios, op.cit., 85-89; Khalil, 'The Ecological Crisis',205ff; 
Schmemann, The World as Sacrament, esp. chapter 2. 
255. Zurich 1977, ILP. 
256. MIT/2,30. 
257. Jbid., 34,32. 
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258. 
259. 
259a. 
260. 
261. 
262 
263 
264. 
265. 
Ibid.' 28. 
Birch, 'Nature, Humanity and God in Ecological Ierspective', 68. 
Cf. Birch and Cobb, 'God's Love, Ecological Survival of the 
Responsiveness of Nature' , 3 4: 'The task ahead calls for a 
radical reinterpretation of the man-nature-God relationship 
that has dominated Western Christianity over recent centuries 
and which is not adequate to meet the task of the 20th Century'. 
MJT/2, 36. 
Geyer, op.cit., 375; quoted above, p.l26 • 
. MJT/2, 147-165. The theology is concentrated on 153, and 16lff. 
]:)id. ' 149. 
Ibid., 161. 
Ibid., 16lf.; cf. Gregorios, op.cit., 66~71. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
l. Niehbuhr, Christ and CUlture:published 1951, delivered as a series 
of lectures in 1949. 
2. A variety of responses was already evident at the first big 
conference of the Futurum project, at Geneva in 1970. See 
Geneva 1970, 75-79, which quotes extensively from a working 
group report listing five views represented in its own 
membership. 
3. Niebuhr, op.cit., 32. 
4. Ibid. I 32-39. 
5. See Chapter One, section 1; also Carson, Silent Spring; Ward and 
Dubos, Only One Earth. 
6. Geneva 1966, 66-80. This theme recurs constantly throughout the 
C&S discussions; see EGQL, chapter JI; M F I 1, 154-169 • 
7. Geneva 1980, 78. 
8. Niebuhr, op.cit., chapter 2. 
9. In an interview with David Gill in Geneva, Lynn White described 
Jacques Ellul's position as a I curious revived demonism: maybe 
God is dead, but Satan is alive and Satan's name is Technology! 
and one of the things that made me happiest while skimming over 
the reports of your Working Comnittee (Nemi, June 1971) is that I 
could find no reflection of the Jacques Ellul position'. White, 
'Snake Nests and Icons', 35. 
10. Marcuse's book was part of a general post-1960 criticism of science, 
technology, and empiricism - see Macquarrie, Twentieth Century 
Religious Thought, 381-384. For an amusing account of Roszak's 
only contribution to the C&S programme, see Derr, Ecology and 
Human Liberation, 42f. 
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11. Micquarrie, op.cit., 383., 
12. Niebuhr, op.cit., chapter 3. 
13 • Jbid, 117. 
14. 'Ibid, 116-120 describes the general theology of the median. 
15. Ibid., chapter 4. 
16. Ibid, chapter 5. 
17. 'Jbid., 190-196 esp. 
18. EGQL, 111 n.l5, quoting Berkhof, 'God in Nature and History', 157; 
see also my discussion above, Chapter Three, section 2(iii). 
19. EGQL, 114. 
20. The Faith and 0X.4$~ document is printed in Faith and Order Studies 
1964-1967, 7-31. 
21. Derr refers to Berkhof' s study and to the Faith and Order study 
several times, with approval. His own thesis is that 'the 
historicisation of nature [and its J desacralisation turn out to 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
be useful and even necessary in meeting the environmental 
challenge' (p.45), which shows his affinity with Berkhof's stance. 
Berkhof, op.cit., 143. 
Jbid. 1 144. 
Loc. cit. 
Ibid. 1 143f. 
Jbid. 1 143. 
Ibid. I 158. 
Loc. cit. 
Jbid. 1 157-159; see also 15lf. 
Ibid. 1 153. 
Ibid. I 149-151. 
Ibid. 1 150. 
Ibid. 1 151. 
Ibid. I 150. 
Ibid. I 143; also 152. 
Jbid. 1, 148. 
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37. Ibid., 150. 
38. Loc. cit. 
39 o Ibid. 1 154 o 
40. Loc. cit. 
41. Ibid., 154f, 
42. Ibid., 155. 
43. .Lbc. cit. 
44. Loc. cit. 
45. Ibid., 154,155. 
46 o Jbid. 1 159£. 
47. Derr, op.cit., 86. 
48. Ibid., 97, following the discussion on from p.92. 
49. Ibid., 97. 
50. Ibid. , chapter 6, 69-86. 
51. Ibid., 74. 
52. Ibid., 73; see also 75ff. 
53. Ibid. I 8lf. 
54. Ibid., chapter 71 87-109. 
55. Ibid. I 104. 
56. Ibid., 108. In India, 'the children born in the next few decades 
will have almost no chance for a normal healthy life' (p.l07). 
57. Ibid. I 103. 
58. Ibid., 53, Derr's emphasis. 
59. Ibid. I 52. 
60. Ibid., 52,53, 
61. Ibid.,50; see also chapters 2 and 3 generally, and his conclusion 
pp.43-45. 
62. Niebuhr, op. cit. , 145. 
63. Derr, op.cit., 11, 52. 
64, Ibid, 1 lQ • 
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65. Ibid., chapters 5 and 7; 'When the care of nature is understood to 
be for man's survival and. betterment, the order of priorities 
is straight' .. (p.60). 
66. Ibid., 49. 
67. •' :lliid.' 51-57. 
68. Berkhof, op.cit., 151-153. 
69. Ibid., 154; Derr, op.cit., 51-57 
70. Discourse on the Method, Bart Six; in Hollis (ed.)The Light of 
Reason, 83. 
71. Derr, op.cit., 47. 
72. Valerius Terminus or The Interpretation of Nature, published 1603; 
quoted by Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature, 19. 
73. Passmore, op.cit., 19: Bacon's attitude was 'heretical in a manner 
that was essential .if Christianity was to be reconciled with 
technological optimism'. 
7 4. Loc. cit. : 'Only in so far as they rejected the view that man is 
essentially depraved could Bacon and his successors find ground 
for optimism in their conviction that through science man could 
greatly extend his power over the world'. 
75. Derr, op.cit., 60. 
76. Geneva 1970, 75-79. 
77. Colossians 1:15, Hebrews 1:3, 2:5-9; etc. Berkhof op.cit., 154. 
See also Clines, 'The Image of God in Man', l02f. 
78. So Steck, World and Environment, 198-203: Wiltsher, 'The Biblical 
Teaching on Creation' , chapter 5. 
79. Derr, op.cit., 54, Derr's emphasis. 
80. cf. Niebuhr, op.cit., 145. 
81. Berkhof, op. cit., 150. 
82. There are surveys of the interpretations of the image concept in 
Barth, CD III. l, 192ff., and Clines, op.cit., 51££. 
83. Barr, • The Image of God in the Book of Genesis • ; idem, •,Man and 
Nature'; Sawyer, 'The ·Meaning of a•n·,~ a-,~:1.' = 
. ":~ •: .... ; 
84. Sawyer, op.cit., 426. 
85. Zurich 1973; Gilkey, 'Technology, History and Liberation'. 
86. Bucharest 1974, 33-35, is based on Gilkey's draft; see also my 
Chapter Three, section 2. 
87. Baker, 'Biblical Views of Nature'; Liedke, 'Solidarity in 
Conflict'; Gilkey, op.cit. 
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88. . One difference between Mol tmann and the C&S theology of hope may 
be alluded to: for M;)l tmann' s approach, God is necessarily the 
suffering God, whereas the C&S theology of hope makes no refer-
ence to the passibility or impassibility of God. 
89. Liedke, ]m Bauch des Fisches, 71-80. 
90. lbid., 21-25. 
91. r'lbid., 63-70; above, section 2(iii). 
92. !bid. , l09ff. Lietlke' s ecological· exegesis is built on the 
theological foundation laid by Barth and Westennann and dis-
cussed above in Chapter 'l'w'o, sections 3 (ii) and 4 (iii). 
93. lbid., 130-141; Baker, op.cit., 42f. 
94. Liedke, op.cit., 161-164, 153-156; Baker, op.cit., 45f. 
95. Baker, op.cit., 45; Liedkeop cit., 160. 
96. Liedke, op.cit., 108. 
97. lbid., 27, 152; Gilkey, op.cit., 14. 
98. Baker, op.cit., 44; Liedke, op.cit., 29ff. 
99. <t, LieGlke, op.cit., 177; cf. the interpretation of Phillipians 2:7ff. 
100. Ibid~, 31. 
101. Ibid., 108. 
102. lbid., 150-152. 
103. Liedike., 'Solidarity in Conflict' ,76;J"Jin Bauch des Fisches, 132-141. 
104. Ilbid., 25-34; Baker op.cit.. 44. 
105 :Giedke, op.cit•, 138. 'Ein Segen,· C!er in solchem Umfang die 
au~enuenschliche Sch8pfung ':zersWrt, dalJ der Mensch • • • nur als 
satanisch-zersWrendesWesenvon der·au(sermenschlichen SchBpfung 
empfunden werden kann, kann nicht der Segen der SchBpfung sein, 
wie Gott 'ihn gemeint. hat (p.l39) • 
106. Ibid., 172. 
107. Baker, op.cit., 46. 
108. Gilkey, op.cit., 14. 
109. Baker, op.cit., 44 .• 46; the biblical testimony implies that the 
whole universe is in 'essential harmony' with G0d as revealed 
in Jesus 'and that therefore there mtist'be some mDdus vivendi 
between man and nature which,·· even· if not yet attained, is in 
keeping with all that is best in both' (p. 46) • 
110. Gilkey, op.cit., 14: Baker, op.cit., 44, 46; Liedke, op.cit., 
171 85. 
111. Liedke, 'Solidarity in Conflict', 74. 
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112. Baker, op.cit., 40f. 
113. Liedke, Ji:n Bauch des Fisches, 109:.-
114. Ibid., 109-152. 
115. It is not appropriate for me to engage in extensive and detailed 
criticism of Liedke's approach in the body of my text, except as 
representative of the C&S theology of hope. I believe that 
Im Bauch des Fisches fails on two counts. First, the 'conflict' 
motif is imported·. from elsewhere, though Liedke implies that the 
existence of conflict between man and nature is a conclusion of 
ecological exegesis. Second, his use of a sociological theory 
of conflict amelioration between human partners cannot be extend-
ed simplicite~ and used to provide a strategy for conflict 
amelioration when one of the:partners is not human. See also (iii) 
below. 
116. Bucharest 1974, 33f. 
117. For examples, see Derr, op.cit., 50,57 etc.,; Liedke op.cit., 13-19; 
and the referencesthey contain. Cb the philosophical side, see 
Macquarrie, op.cit., 380-385. 
118. Liedke, op.cit., 161-164, 180f; 'Solidarity in Conflict',74. 
119. Baker, op.cit., 44. 
120. Liedke, op.cit., 78f, gives a brief account. 
121. Liedke, Im Bauch des Fisches, 109-152. 
123. Above, Chapter One, section 3 (iii) • 
124. Zurich 1977, 34. 
125. Ibid., 35. 
127. The debate is listed in the bibliography, No.2, under the general 
heading 'Rights for Both, Man and Nature?' Cobb's contribution was 
titled 'The Christian Concern for the Non-Human World'; Griffin's, 
'Human Liberation and the Reverence for Nature'. The passages to 
which the process theologians took exception are in Derr, op.cit., 
25-28, 37-39. The ensuing debate included two responses by Derr. 
In fact, the debate was a theological version of the Passmore-
Routley debate, described above, pages 9 and 10. 
128. Birch and Cobb, 'God's Love, Ecological Survival and the 
Responsiveness of Nature~. 
129. Hartshorne, 'God and Nature'. He did not even state the process 
case convincingly,, but spoke at length of the mistakes traditional 
'religion' had made (e.g. with regard to birth conttol and the 
oppression of women) and the need to rectify them by adopting a new 
world view. Coming from a very astute ldgician, this approach 
is incredible. 
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130. The Nairobi Address is 'Creation, Technology and Human SurVival'; 
a condensed version appeared in Anticipation 22, 1976, 6f. The 
MIT paper was 'Nature,· Humanity and God in Ecological Perspective'. 
A bibliography of Birch's contributions to the C&S programme, 
to 1974, is given in EGQL,203. 
131. E.g. Birch, Confronting the Future. His basic thesis there is 
'that a fundamental .transfonnation needs to take place in Western 
culture and in those·developing·countries which are embracing 
the same values' (p.24) 7 and he interprets the sustainable society 
as the social analogue of the ecological community in biology 
(pp.37-41). 
132. London: SCM Press, 1965. The two articles are 'Iarticipa-
tory Evolution: The Drive of Creation', and 'Purpose in the 
Universe: A Search for Wholeness'. 
133. Nature and God,lO: Birch, 'The Organic Image of Nature, Humanity 
and God', 56. 
134. Birch, 'What Docs God Do in the World?', 44. The 'colleagues' include 
'two of the most distinguished evolutionary . biologists of this 
century', namely Sewall Wright and C.H. Waddington. On the 
effect of metaphysical beliefs on scientific research, see Wadding-
ton's autobiographical account in Towards a Theoretical Biology , 
2: Sketches. 
135. Birch, 'Participatory Evolution', 157f. 'The Organic Image', 55; 
Nature and God, chapter 3: Chance and Purpose. On the concept of 
teleonamy in biology, and its differentiation from teleology and 
vitalism, see Waddington, op.cit., and the extensive discussion 
therein conducted by David Bohm, Marjorie Grene, and J.Maynard 
Smith; and in volume 1: Prolegomena, see Waddington's defence of 
his choice of the term 'chreod', 14f. 
136. Bi:t.chu 'Participatory Evolution' ,157. 
137. Ibid., 156-159; this is a recurring theme in Birch's process 
theology. 
138. Ibid., 160. 
139. Nature and God, chapter 5: The Meaning of Creation. 
140. Cobb and Griffin, Process Theology, c~}apter 7: Eschatology. Cf. 
1-bltmann, 'Creation as an Open System', which gives a similar 
description of the world's future (above, Chapter One, section 3 
(iii)), from a different theological perspective. 
141. Birch, 'Participatory Evolution', 153. 
142. Ibid., 151-154. 
143 • Jbid. 1 154 • 
144. Birch, 'Nature, Humanity and God', 65-67. Cf. Gregorios, The Human 
Presence, chapter· VII: Mastery and Mystery. 
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145. Birch, op.cit., 65-67. 
146. Birch, 'What Does God. Do in the World?' , 43, 4lf. 
147. Ibid., 44. 
148. Birch, 'Nature, Humanity and God', 62, 64, 70; this view is 
expounded· at length throughout Nature and God. 
149. Birch, 'Nature, Humanity and God', 68. 
150. Birch, !O:r:·ganic Image', 53. 
151. ~irch, 'Creation, Technology, and Human Survival', 76. 
152. Birch, 'Nature, Humanity and God', 72f. 
153. Birch, 'ParticipatoryEvolution', 153. 
154. Birch, 'Nature, Humanity and God', 71. 
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155. Birch, 'Participatory Evolution', 159; 'Nature, Humanity and God', 
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156. Griffin, op.cit., 29 n.9. See also Gunton, 'The Knowledge of God 
According to Two Process Theologians' ; idem, Becoming and Being; 
etc. See also the references in Chapter-TWo, n.l09 and the 
references there. 
157. Niebuhr, op.cit., 110,115. 
158. Birch and Cobb, op.cit., 32. 
159. Birch, 'Ol:'ganic Image', 57. 
160. Gerald Durrell, The Bafut Beagles, concludes with Durrell showing 
same recently captured wild specimens to a sceptic who believed 
that the 'wild' state was better and preferable for animals than 
captivity and human influence. Durrell emphasised the existence of 
parasites on and diseases in the wild animals, then set to treat-
ing them, to the sceptic's chagrin. 
161. Birch 'Nature, Hurnani ty and God' , 68. 
162. Birch, 'What Does God Do in the World?', 44. 
163. Birch, 'Nature, Humanity and God', 71. 
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